

RISE AND FALL OF MUḤAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

It will be remembered that as declared in the preamble, Baranī's¹ history is not a chronological account of the reign of MuḤammad bin Tughluq. He gives an event precedence not because it happened first but because it struck his imagination most. Evidently, by putting the enhancement of revenue in the Doāb at the head of the emperor's projects he does not mean to say that it was the first of all those formed, and that it was followed by others, namely, the transfer of the capital to Deogīr, the introduction of the token currency, and the Khurāsān and the Qarāchīl expeditions. It would be absurd to take these events in the order described by Baranī. Yet Mr. Moreland assumes Baranī's order of events as correct. "At the outset of his reign," says he,² "MuḤammad decided to enhance the revenue of the River Country. Not long afterwards the king carried out his plan of transferring the capital to Deogīr, and in the year 1329 Delhi was evacuated by practically the entire population."

What Baranī really means is that considering the disastrous results produced by all of the Sultān's projects, the enhancement of the revenue of the Doāb would rank first. Along with the huge³ enhancement of the assessment new cesses and taxes were imposed. As a result, the backs of the ryots were broken. Those who were already feeble and without resources collapsed, while those who possessed resources revolted. The news of the troubles in the Doāb spread to other provinces, where people revolted for fear of the same fate befalling them. Such a picture of chaos, insurrections and rebellions, which Baranī here draws and which he connects with the emperor's punitive expeditions in the Doāb of the years 1333 and 1334 is inconsistent with his account of the brightness and prosperity, characteristic of the beginning of the reign. It follows therefore

¹ Baranī (B.I.), pp. 467-468.

² Moreland : *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 48.

³ How much the revenue was enhanced is a problem. Baranī's words, "*yaki ba dah wa yaki ba bist*," if translated literally would mean ten-fold and twenty-fold, or an increase of ten and five per cent., neither of which seems correct. Mr. Moreland observes that Baranī's phrase is "rhetorical, not arithmetical," and that it only signifies an enormous increase.

The Doāb was the most fertile part of the empire, and could well bear an increased levy which was much lighter than 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji had imposed. He had raised the land revenue to 50 per cent. of the produce (Baranī, 287). This rate was reduced by Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh Khālji. Gardner Brown (*A.U. Magazine*, 1925) is of opinion that while Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq had fixed the rate roughly at 10 per cent. MuḤammad bin Tughluq raised it to 20 per cent. Fīroz Shāh reverted to 10 per cent.

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MUḤAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

بشد قانع از دفن خاک پدر	خویش را ده ناها یون سیر
بید عشق کی عشرت آگاه کرد	خطای تاریک سار کرد
و کرد و زنا موسی ماتم گشت	مرد روزی بنا موسی ماتم گشت
بعد عیش بر تخت زربهر داد	دو اعی بوشید و تاجی نهاد
شده بوالحبا به دران روزگار	بکم خد اکنیت شهر بار
که دیدند فرقت سزای کلاه	و بدشت خزان خیل و سیاه
بخوانند جوانا بندای زمان	خطاب قدیش بند و پشان
بکارش به بستند هر یک کمر	سراون جمله پیش نهادند سر
که بر تخت نشست آن شهزاد	تا پنج به هفده مست و جا
فرمان داری ملک قدیم	چو ملک بر شد بروک

فریب دادن سلطان محمد شاه این

تعلق خلق هند و پستان

بشارت هر شهر و کشور دهند	نفر خود هر سوختا در دهند
نفر و پیش شاهان او بر ساز	که گرفت شاه رعیت نور
کی تا یازده است شاه روی	منم نایب شاه فرخنده خوی
درین بنگه بای خوشم گذشت	اگر شاه بر خیت عدل داشت
مرا حاجی شاه جهان یرواست	هر جا که بری درین کشور است
مرا هست بر جای هزارمین	درین شهر و کشور هر جا حاجی
همه بپند شده خون و پیوند من	هر جا کی بلبل سر زده من

THE RISE AND FALL OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

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[Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London, 1935.]



LONDON
LUZAC & CO.

46 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, W.C.1

1938

Printed in Great Britain
at the BURLEIGH PRESS, Lewin's Mead, BRISTOL.

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GAZ.	-	-	-	-	GAZETTEER
A.U.	-	-	-	-	ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY
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H.B.	-	-	-	-	HABIBGANJ

PREFACE

I AM convinced that no greater service can be rendered to Indian historical research than the rewriting of the history of medieval India with a view to removing the misunderstandings that are, I fear, in spite of the efforts of modern scholars, still being perpetuated. It is believed, for example, that the lot of the Hindūs under Muslim rule was that of "hewers of wood and drawers of water to their Muslim masters" inasmuch as Muslim rulers were in general under the influence of Muslim jurists, who regarded the humiliation of the Hindūs as a religious obligation.

It is with the endeavour to combat such arguments and do away with beliefs of this kind that I venture to offer to the public the present work—The Rise and Fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

Muḥammad bin Tughluq is perhaps the most important of all the Muslim rulers in India and certainly one of the most grossly misunderstood. His attitude towards Hinduism, and his relations with his Hindū subjects and the Hindū ascetics on the one hand, and with the Muslim jurists—the 'Ulamā and *Fuqahā*, and "the Sayeds, the Sunnīs, the Ṣūfis and *Mashāikh*"¹ (saints) on the other were of enormous importance in one of the most interesting and most instructive phases of Indian history. It is an irony of fate that no official records of his reign exist, and the only source of true information, which I had the good fortune to discover, namely his *Autobiography* is meagre and insufficient.

What is still more unfortunate is the fact that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had the most unsympathetic chroniclers and historians, who for all their good intentions took a prejudiced view of things. It is a misfortune that Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, who presents a striking contrast to Sultān Muḥammad in almost every respect, specially in matters religious, has been regarded as his apologist. It is again a misfortune that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who was decidedly biassed, has been called an impartial journalist.

The bias of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa is evident from a comparative study of the *Rihla* and the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*. The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* tells us that the Qāzīs of the empire had declared war on the emperor and had approved of his execution. Now Ibn Baṭṭūṭa was one of the most important Qāzīs. What then could have been his attitude? Could he have failed to be touched by the spirit of revolt which was

¹ Cf. Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 457-472-476.

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in the air? Was he indifferent to the cause of his fellow-Qāzīs, and the fate of the *Aṣḥab-i-dīn*¹ with whom the emperor was at war? One thing is certain: Ibn Baṭṭūṭa ultimately lost the emperor's favour, and was confined to his own house under guard. How he managed to save his neck from the executioner's sword can be read in the *Rihla*, but one would search in vain for the *real* cause of his estrangement from the Sultān. The cause must have been grave because Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's mind was positively set against him. He refused to accept service under him when it was offered; and was not at heart reconciled even when favoured with an opportunity to go on an embassy to China. After his shipwreck when most in need of the emperor's charity and benevolence—the only trait of his character he really liked—he avoided seeing him. Instead of going to Delhi, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa proceeded to Ma'bar.

Now Ma'bar had long been the headquarters of rebels. Among the twenty-two rebellions of Sultān Muḥammad's reign, the rebellion of Ma'bar was the first of those he failed to subdue, and marked the beginning of the break-up of the empire. To the arch-rebel of Ma'bar, Jalāl-ud-dīn Aḥsan Shāh, who became the first king of Ma'bar, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa had been closely related, having married a sister of his wife.² Jalāl-ud-dīn Aḥsan Shāh was no more; but Ibn Baṭṭūṭa preferred to live under his successors, who were no less the enemies of the emperor of Delhi.

It seems that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa had intended much earlier to leave Delhi for Ma'bar; he would have gone there directly, had he not been sent on the Chinese embassy. His connections with the enemies of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq help to illumine the background of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's mind.

The nature of the antagonism between Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq and Baranī on the one hand, and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa on the other will be clear to the readers of this book. Here it is advisable to note that the discovery of the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* has made easier to understand the cause and source of the charges levelled by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa at the Sultān: for instance the plot Sultān Muḥammad, then known as Jauna Khān, is said to have formed with Aḥmad bin Aiyāz to murder his royal father Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* gives practically the same tale as is found in the *Rihla*. Again, the story of the inhuman treatment meted out by Sultān Muḥammad to Bahā-ud-dīn Gushtāsp (whose flesh was cooked with rice and given to elephants) as related by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa is found with minor differences in the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*. And again, the blood-curdling stories about the forced exile of all the inhabitants of Delhi and about the punishments inflicted upon a blind man and a cripple

¹ *Aṣḥāb-i-dīn*, literally "men of religion," is the term used by 'Iṣāmī probably for the 'Ulamā, Fuqahā and Mashāikh. See p. 135.

² Def. et Sang., III, 337.

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for having failed to leave the city, described in the *Rihla*, find their parallels in the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*. The natural result of our finding these stories similarly set out by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and 'Iṣāmī is to make us suspect the accuracy of the Moorish traveller since we know that 'Iṣāmī was definitely hostile to the Sultān.

The *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* is a poetical history composed during the lifetime of Muḥammad bin Tughluq by 'Iṣāmī; and dedicated to Sultān 'Alā-ud-din Ḥasan, the founder of the Bahmanī dynasty, a rebel against Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Written to please the Sultān's enemies, it censures him for his revolt against Islām, for making common cause with the Hindūs, and for mixing with the Jogīs—this last charge is also put forward by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Briggs¹ was misinformed about the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, and is not justified in declaring it to be an unimportant book of "historical romances."

The value of the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* as an independent and contemporary source of information will be clear to those who study it along with Sultān Muḥammad's *Autobiography*. It will be seen that the *Autobiography* bears out the observations of 'Iṣāmī regarding the Sultān's revolt against Islām. The *Autobiography* illumines and explains many of Baranī's obscure passages regarding the psychology and character of Sultān Muḥammad. It enables the reader to understand the Sultān's attitude towards his predecessors and particularly towards his own father, Ghiyās-ud-din Tughluq. It also explains the causes of the Sultān's complete surrender to the 'Abbasid Caliph. Furthermore, the *Autobiography* brings to light the nature of the difficulties confronting the Sultān as ruler of India, and finally it helps us to form an estimate of the circumstances that led to the break-up of the empire, and the troubles that overwhelmed the emperor.

The two Sanskrit inscriptions of 1327 and 1328 supply the much-needed Hindū evidence in favour of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Mention may also be made of the *Tughluq Nāmah*.

The foregoing are the new sources that have been, along with the others already known, examined and utilized in the preparation of this work. It is an attempt to present a true account of the life and policy of that emperor who was an enigma to Baranī, an enemy of Islām and friend of Hinduism to 'Iṣāmī, and a mixture of opposites and a freak of nature to others.

In this work, the obscurities regarding the chronology of the Sultān's reign have been removed; and difficult passages in Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* regarding the Sultān's temper and mind, his personal and public policy, his cruelty and his devotion to philosophy have been explained. The generally accepted view that Sultān Fīroz Shāh had great regard for Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq has been examined. The stories of Tarmāshirīn's invasion, of the

¹ Briggs, J., *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power*, I, 406.

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levy of oppressive taxes in the Doāb, and of the man-hunting expeditions have also been discussed. Conclusions have been reached in each case after a careful marshalling of facts and a study of the factors underlying the fabric of history.

Hard was the lot of Muḥammad bin Tughluq; and he suffered amply for his free thought and rationalism. But he proved himself a revolutionary and his career helped Baranī to realise how little the preceding Sultāns of Delhi had been influenced by the *Fuqahā* (jurists). Baranī therefore, discarded all of them, and regarded Fīroz Shāh as *the first truly Islamic King of India*.¹ The historian was not without justification. History shows that the theories of Qāzī Muḥṣi-ud-dīn, of Maulānā Shams-ud-dīn and even of the recognised Arab jurist Māwerdī² did not carry much weight in the eyes of the Sultāns of Delhi. Dr. Tritton's³ observation: "the conduct of the rulers was often better than the law demanded," made with regard to the Caliphs, is more true of the Sultāns of Delhi.

Baranī⁴ puts into the mouth of Il-tūtmish a theory which the latter as well as his successors, notably Balban, regarded as impracticable. According to this theory, a Muslim king should always uphold the religion of Islām, endeavour to extirpate idolatry, and humiliate the Hindūs. He should suppress every heresy among the Musalmāns, and confer all high and responsible posts, particularly those in the judicial department, upon pious men of religion. And, lastly, he should do his utmost to administer impartial justice. This theory in so far as it inculcates severity to non-believers was rejected by almost all the Sultāns. Even a mild king like Jalāl-ud-dīn⁵ Khaljī remonstrated powerfully with the exponents of this theory and worsted them in argument, declaring the theory as impracticable, and graphically describing the powers and privileges the Hindūs had hitherto enjoyed under Muslim rule. "All along the course of history," he said, "the Hindūs have been publicly practising idolatry and have been freely celebrating their religious rites." "Every day," he continued, "I hear them playing their music under the walls of my own palace along the banks of the Jumna."⁶

For these reasons Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn refused to change his mild attitude towards the Hindūs. Baranī tells us⁷ that before his accession, Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī had been attacked and wounded by a Hindū (Mandāhar),⁸ but refrained from taking revenge. After his accession to the throne Jalāl-ud-dīn was graciously pleased to

¹ Cf. Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 538 ff.

² Māwerdī: *Al-Aḥkām-us-Sultāniya*, Cairo, 1881.

³ Tritton, A. S., *The Caliphs and their non-Muslim subjects*, p. 231.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 41.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 216-218.

⁷ Ibid., 195.

⁸ Mandāhar (Baranī, 195), or as Sir Denzil Ibbetson puts it (III, 65) Mandahār is a tribe of Rājputs in Kaithal, Karnal and Ambāla. They are also found in the vicinity of Patāla, and in Sahāranpur, east of the Jumna.

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appoint his Hindū assailant Vakīldar to Malik Khurram with a salary of 100,000 Jitals.¹

Much has been said about the "anti-Hindū" legislation of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālījī. But Mr. Moreland has earned the gratitude of many by telling the truth about the nature of 'Alā-ud-dīn's legislation. He has shown how Baranī's use of the term "Hindū" has been taken by the modern historians as evidence of 'Alā-ud-dīn's hostility to his Hindū subjects. "Baranī," observes Mr. Moreland,² "speaks of the 'Hindūs,' but here and in various other passages where the phrase occurs, the context makes it plain that he is thinking of the upper classes, not of the peasants. Taking his book as a whole, I would infer that he thought of the kingdom as consisting not of two elements but of three—Moslems, Hindūs and 'the herds' or peasants.³ In this passage, the details which follow show that the question really at issue was how to break the power of the rural classes, the chiefs and the headmen of parganas and villages; in point of fact, the regulation was favourable to the smaller peasants,⁴ in so far as it insisted on the leaders⁵ bearing their fair share of the burden—the weak were not to pay for the strong."⁶

A careful study of Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* and the *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī* as well as of the *Rihla* and the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* further shows that it is historically inaccurate to say that "the lot of the Hindūs under Muslim rule was that of hewers of wood and drawers of water." The *Rihla* completely refutes such a charge. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa relates how a Hindū noble brought an accusation in the court of Qāzī against Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and how the latter was summoned and tried. The case was decided in favour of the Hindū plaintiff, and the Sultān satisfied⁷ him. This tends to show that the Hindūs under Muslim rule were not without the means of securing redress. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us that law-abiding Hindūs lived on good terms with the Musalmāns. A Hindū named Gul Chand was a companion of Amīr Hulajūn, the Muslim governor of Lahore. Another Hindū, Ratan, was appointed governor of Sind by Muḥammad bin Tughluq. And the Sultān was known to have similarly patronised several Hindūs. Firishṭa⁸ tells us that Bhīran Rāi, commandant of the Gulbarga fortress, was one of the trusted officers in the royal service. Baranī⁹ tells us that Hindū nobles

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 195.

² Moreland, W. H., *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, 32.

³ That is, Hindū masses or workers in contradistinction to Hindū chiefs, i.e., Hindū *Khūṭ*, Hindū *muqaddams*, etc.

⁴ i.e., smaller (Hindū) peasants.

⁵ i.e., Hindū chiefs; *Khūṭs*.

⁶ i.e., 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālījī legislated with a view to protect the smaller Hindū peasants from exploitation by the more powerful Hindū chiefs.

⁷ Def. et Sang., III, 285.

⁸ *Firishṭa* (Bombay), I, 522.

⁹ Baranī: *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī*, MS., F. 119-120.

PREFACE

rubbed shoulders with the Muslim aristocracy. They possessed horses, lived in splendid houses, dressed magnificently and owned slaves. Even Musalmān servants were found in their suite.¹ Before the Hindū aristocracy of wealth, the poor Musalmāns used to come as supplicants, and were seen begging at their doors.² Even in the capital city the Hindūs in all honour and respect, enjoyed the honorifics of "Rāi," "Thākur," "Sāhū," "Mahant," and "Pandit."³ They also had complete freedom to read their religious books⁴ and study Sanskrit. The use of Sanskrit on ceremonial occasions is attested by the Sanskrit inscriptions described in this book.

It remains for me, finally, to acknowledge my thanks to Sir E. Denison Ross, C.I.E., D.Lit., for his inspiring encouragement and for kindly securing financial aid from the London University for the publication of this thesis.

I also thank Nawāb Ṣadr Yār Jung Maulvi Ḥabīb-ur-Raḥmān Khān Sāhib Sherwānī of Ḥabībganj for allowing me to make use of his library where I was able to consult a unique manuscript of Amīr Khusrav's *Tughluq Nāmāh*. My thanks are also due to Mr. V. Minorski, Reader in Persian at the School of Oriental Studies in London, for helping me to translate into English the fragmentary memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, which I discovered at the British Museum.

Lastly, I wish to thank Dr. C. Collin Davies, formerly of the School of Oriental Studies, now Reader in Indian History at Oxford University, for the keen interest he took in my work.

MAHDI ḤUSAIN

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London,

December, 1935.

P.S.—I may be permitted here to add that for the period I carried on my research work at the School of Oriental Studies, London, the MS. of the *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn* was not available. It had been loaned from the India Office Library to the University of Madras, and had not been returned at the time I submitted my thesis (June, 1935).

Before leaving England, however, I was fortunate enough to obtain this MS., which I found so useful that I incorporated many relevant parts in this book.

¹ Baranī: *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī* MS., F. 120.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Even after resuming my duties in India, I was able to continue my work on this important document. In this connection I must tender my sincere thanks to Dr. H. N. Randle, the Librarian of the India Office Library, for his kindly lending it to the Agra College for my use.

I consider the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* an important source of information not only for the history of Muḥammad bin Tughluq but also for that of Medieval India up to A.D. 1349. It must be acknowledged, however, that its statements are not always free from exaggeration, and should be scrutinized.

The *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* throws light on the psychology of the 14th century India; on the principal towns and their respective distances; on the nature of punishments then inflicted; on the Hindū amīrs and princes; on the Hindī words and idioms then in Muslim usage. The reader will, moreover, easily find in the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* material which will enable him (1) to build up the personal history of its author, 'Iṣāmī, (2) to understand the military history of the period, particularly as regards the administration of the army and the armament then in use, and (3) to appreciate the social history of Medieval India. The *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*, moreover, abounds in moral discourses and in reflections on human life and its experiences.

It is much to be regretted that the real name of 'Iṣāmī is nowhere mentioned in the book. An attempt¹ has, however, been made to identify him with Khāwja 'Abd Malik 'Iṣāmī on the authority of the *Khazīna-i-Ganj-i-Ilāhī* (Ilahī's treasury), a biographical account of the poets of the 9th and 10th centuries Hijra including also some of those of the 8th.

'Iṣāmī tells us that on finishing his book—the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn*—he was 40 years of age. This enables us to fix 711/1311 as the date of his birth. He was 16 years of age when under orders of Muḥammad bin Tughluq (727/1327), he left Delhi for Daulatābād in the company of his aged grandfather, 'Aizz-ud-dīn. Perhaps his father had already died.

'Iṣāmī remained for some time in Daulatābād; and in the course of the next 24 years—a period in which he witnessed the "outrages" of Muḥammad bin Tughluq in the Deccan—he was so much weighed with grief that he became grey. He was so disgusted with life that he resolved to leave India, his native country, so that he could spend the remainder of his life in peace at Mecca. But he desired to leave a souvenir in the form of an epic, which might challenge comparison with the *Shāhnāma* of Firdausī. Thus originated the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* which may legitimately be called the *Shāhnāma of Medieval India*.

'Iṣāmī began to write the *Futūh-us-Salāṭīn* on the 10th of

¹ The Catalogue of Persian MSS., in the India Office Library.

P R E F A C E

December, 1349, and finished it on the 14th of May, A.D. 1350. It took him "five months and nine days" to complete the book.

Previously 'Iṣāmī had written several works, but as they were not appreciated they fell into oblivion. They were, however, followed by the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* which survived because it was written under the royal patronage of 'Alā-ud-dīn Ḥasan Bahman Shāh, to whom 'Iṣāmī had been presented by Qāzī Bahā-ud-dīn of Daulatābād.

It should be noted that although 'Iṣāmī was the contemporary of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, neither makes any reference to the other. Perhaps each was unaware of the other's existence; for while Baranī lived most of his life in the north (Hindustān), 'Iṣāmī resided for many years in the south (Deccan). 'Iṣāmī wrote his *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* some eight years before Baranī produced his *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*.

Nothing is known about 'Iṣāmī after the completion of the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (May, 1350). Perhaps it was at this time that he proceeded to Mecca.

'Iṣāmī's style is simple and unostentatious; his expressions are lucid; he is free from that magniloquence or rhetoric which was then considered beautiful. He is much clearer than Badr Chāch and might be called the best epic writer of his age.

I have to thank my sister Būa Jān, who helped me in studying the photographic copy of the MS. of the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* which I had brought with me from London. In the hope of furthering the exploration she wrote to the Professor of Indian History at the Madras University who was good enough to send her a copy of the '*Iṣāmī Nāma* of Mr. A. S. U'sha published by the Madras University, in March, 1937. While I agree with Mr. U'sha's appreciation of 'Iṣāmī's work and style, I cannot concur with the views expressed in the '*Iṣāmī Nāma* about 'Iṣāmī's portraiture of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.


M.H.

Agra College,

Agra.

January, 1938.

PART ONE
HIS EARLY CAREER AND RISE TO POWER



[By the kind permission of Mr. O. C. Gangoly,

SULTĀN MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

A copy of the (most) remarkable likeness of the greatest emperor, Ghāzī Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq at Delhi (Dehli), the capital.
May his soul be blessed ! A.H. 940 (A.D. 1533).

CHAPTER I

THE SULTANATE PERIOD: THE RISE AND FALL OF DYNASTIES

THE three centuries of Muslim rule (1206-1526)¹ generally known as the Sultanate period witnessed the rise and fall of five dynasties namely the Slaves (1206-90)²; the Khaljis (1290-1320)³; the Tughluqs (1320-1413)⁴; the Sayyids (1414-51)⁵; and the Lodis (1451-1526).⁶ The history of this period resembles a long drama in which various dynasties rise and fall in rapid succession, the average life of each being about seventy years. Why one dynasty alone did not maintain its rule throughout this period; what sounded the death-knell of each, and made the rise of another inevitable, are questions which call for an answer. One is struck by the long life of the Mughal empire under its illustrious line of rulers, which, beginning with Bābur's conquest of Delhi and Agra in 1526/933, did not decline until the death of Aurangzeb (1707/1119), and was not finally extinguished until the Mutiny of 1857.

Between the Mughal empire and the Sultanate of Delhi there is, in spite of some resemblance, a brilliant and a striking contrast. The Mughal empire, under the dynasty founded by the Chaghatai Timurid, Bābur, had a longer life than all the five dynasties of the Sultanate period put together. This was due to many causes, a discussion of which would require a comparative study of both in their various aspects—a subject not within the scope of this thesis. It should, however, be noted that the Sultanate was the root and the Mughal empire the fruit of Muslim initiative and statesmanship in India. The Sultanate period was decidedly one of experiment, and as such was one of great difficulty. The Mughal emperors had three hundred years of Muslim rule behind them, with all its experiments, failures and successes; and were able to profit from the lessons of the

¹ A.H. 603-933.

² A.H. 720-816.

³ A.H. 603-690.

⁴ A.H. 816-855.

⁵ A.H. 690-720.

⁶ A.H. 855-933.

past. They had before their eyes a panorama of the difficulties and dangers which had beset their co-religionists in the 13th and 14th centuries. The problems of government were no longer so formidable. The Hindū princes and people, rebellious Muslim generals and malikṣ, the Mongol hordes of Chingiz Khān—these had been the most dreaded enemies of almost every dynasty in the Sultanate period; and the Sultāns, unless they possessed great military skill as well as great organising ability, had to succumb to one or another of these foes. Their power was broken either by external invasions or crushed by the forces of rebellious provincial governors. The hostile masses of the Hindū population were always a force to be reckoned with, and the Hindū chief and his clan were the most important factors in the political situation. That is why the majority of the sovereigns, who ascended the throne of Delhi in the Sultanate period, came to grief. Some were deposed, others were imprisoned or killed. There was a constant struggle between the sovereign, that is, the Sultān, and the malikṣ or the captains of the army; and the principle of the survival of the fittest determined the life of every king and every dynasty. The slightest weakness of the executive led to rebellions, and the rise of adventurers. The latter, anxious to gratify their own ambitions, attempted either to seize the throne for themselves or rallied round a puppet king entirely dependent upon them. This and the absence of any definite rule of succession produced anarchy, and led to the rise of rival parties. Faction fought faction, and dynasty succeeded dynasty.

Briefly, these were the reasons producing such a rapid succession of dynasties. Of the specific causes why each dynasty came to grief, the first was the inherent weakness of the government; the second, the deterioration of the ruling house; the third, the abuse of slavery; the fourth, decentralization and provincialization; the fifth, the strength of the Hindū opposition; and the sixth, the disturbing effect of the Mongol raids.

It will not be amiss at this stage to enter into a more detailed examination of these factors:—

(1) The inherent weakness of the government.

The system of government was at this time based upon personal rule, as opposed to what is now known as the "Rule of Law." The only form of government then known was personal despotism.

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The strength of the government depended upon that of the monarch, for a weak ruler was the signal for anarchy. Sultān Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish was a powerful ruler, who established peace and made many conquests. He was followed by weak rulers, Rukn-ud-dīn Fīroz, Rāziyya, Mu'izz-ud-dīn Bahrām and 'Alā-ud-dīn Mas'ūd. Under them everything was thrown into confusion, and the country witnessed terrible scenes of treachery, assassination, intrigue and discord. With the rise of a powerful man like Balban peace once more reigned supreme. Unfortunately, he left behind him no capable successor.

Rebellions and efforts to found new dynasties had always to be faced under a weak ruler when the power of the central government declined. This is well illustrated by the history of Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād, Balban's grandson and successor. His weakness tempted his minister Nizām-ud-dīn to cast covetous eyes on the throne. In fact, his innermost thoughts have been recorded for us.

"Sultān Balban was a wary old wolf who held possession of Delhi (Dēhli) for sixty years, and kept down the people by means of firm rule. He is gone, and his son who was fitted to be a king died before him. Bughrā Khān remains contented at Lakhnāūtī and the roots of the empire, which the old man planted, are day by day growing weaker. In his devotion to pleasure the Sultān has not a thought for his government. If I get rid of Kaikhusrav, the son of the Martyr Prince, and can remove some of the old nobles from the person of the sovereign, the realm will easily fall into my hands."¹

Accordingly, he procured the assassination of Kaikhusrav and exterminated all undesirables, nobles, ministers and Mongol adventurers in the service of the Sultān. Even when Kaiqubād realized the danger, and removed this scheming minister by poison, he fell into the hands of the principal military leaders. Stricken with the palsy, Kaiqubād found that his amīrs and maliks were all eager to seize the sceptre. A conflict arose between two factions—the Turkish amīrs who espoused the cause of Kaiqubād's child, Kaimurās, and the Khaljīs, the supporters of Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīroz, who seized the throne, and founded the Khaljī dynasty.

Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīroz was a mild ruler. His mildness bred

¹ Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, p. 132 (Bib. Ind.).

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criticism, and finally produced open rebellion. Plots were hatched to murder him and to snatch the sceptre from his feeble hands, with the result that he was killed and 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, the powerful regicide, reigned in his stead.

'Alā-ud-dīn can be fittingly compared with Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban, Sher Shāh Sūrī, and Jalāl-ud-dīn Akbar. Like these rulers he subdued his enemies, established order, overhauled the whole system of administration and extended his kingdom until it became a mighty empire stretching from the Indus in the north to Maḍura and practically to Rāmeśvaram in the south, touching the sea on the west and on the east. He introduced reforms into every department of government. But both his reforms and his empire were short-lived. What he created died with him, for it is impossible to postulate a succession of able despots. Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī bears testimony to the fact that symptoms of decline became manifest during his lifetime. He enumerates 'Alā-ud-dīn's blunders which brought about the fall of his empire and dynasty.

(a) He dismissed the wise and experienced officers of his empire and replaced them by idlers of slave stock, and by worthless eunuchs. (b) He gave his sons no proper training and saddled them with authority before their time. By a special document signed by all the maliks Khizr Khān was formally declared heir-apparent. Thus Khizr Khān obtained the parasol of authority at an early age. But he was put under no tutelage. Untutored and untrained, the prince began his public life by throwing himself headlong into pleasures and debaucheries. His association with persons of mean tastes and low morals heightened the prevalent disorders. (c) The infatuation of 'Alā-ud-dīn for Malik Kāfūr proved fatal.¹ He had promoted him commander-in-chief of the empire and had raised him to the position of chief minister. As a result, Malik Nāib grew conceited. He became a deadly foe of Alp Khān, the maternal uncle and father-in-law of Khizr Khān; poisoned the Sultān's mind; had Alp Khān executed, and Khizr Khān imprisoned and exiled. "On the day of the execution of Alp Khān, and the imprisonment and exile of Khizr Khān," says Baranī, "the dynasty of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn fell." Baranī stresses the point only to set off and bring into relief the destructive character of the policy of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn towards

¹ Malik Kāfūr is also referred to as Nāib Malik and Malik Nāib. Sir Wolsley Haig (*Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, pp. 120, 736, 739).

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the end of his reign. Given supreme powers a despot who has grown old and lost balance is likely to do incalculable harm. His weakness means the weakness of the executive and is attended by the rise of adventurers, and rival factions. The enfeebled mind of 'Alā-ud-dīn was now swayed by minions. He had accepted a master in Malik Nāib; hence the consequences. The execution of Alp Khān, and the maltreatment of Khizr Khān made matters worse. At this critical stage, while troubles were brewing and rebellion raising its head, Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn died.¹

His death was followed by prolonged anarchy which, despite Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh's spasmodic efforts at amelioration, did not end until the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty.

The Tughluq power reached its zenith under Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq and rapidly degenerated shortly after the death of Fīroz Shāh. His death was, therefore, the signal for renewed anarchy. Weak and incapable rulers—Ghiyāsh-ud-dīn Tughluq II, Abū Bakr, Muḥammad Shāh, Sikandar, Maḥmūd II, and Nuṣrat Shāh—came to the throne in rapid succession.

Like 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālījī, Sultān Fīroz Shāh gave his sons no efficient training and committed the same mistake of saddling them with authority and power before their time. He conferred on Prince Faṭḥ Khān the paraphernalia of sovereignty with the permission to strike coins and have the *khutba* read in his name.² Faṭḥ Khān as well as other princes formed factions of their own. Their jealousies and hostilities culminated later in wars of succession, which proved disastrous to the stability of the kingdom. The Hindū chiefs realizing the weakness of the government defied the Sultān and refused any longer to pay taxes.

The Sayyid rulers who next wielded the sceptre at Delhi cannot be called powerful. None of them was able to cope with the situation. As a result rebellions and disturbances continued. The degradation of the monarchy was complete, power having passed into the hands of the nobles. Under Muḥammad Shāh and 'Ālam Shāh, the last two Sayyid rulers, the crown of Delhi became a bone of contention

¹ Baranī does not give the date of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn's death. But, from a statement of his regarding the accession of Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn, it follows that the Sultān's death took place in 1316/716. Sir Wolsley Haig gives January 2nd, 1316, as the date of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn's death. (*Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 119.)

² Firishṭa assigns this event to the year 760 (A.D. 1358). *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa*, p. 243, Vol. I (Bombay, 1831).

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between the ambitious kings of Mālwa and Jaunpur on the one hand and the nobles of Delhi, and Bahlol Lodī, the governor of Sirhind, on the other. Anxious to choose a candidate whom they could overrule, the nobles offered the crown to Bahlol Lodī, who founded the Lodī dynasty.

The first two Lodī kings, Bahlol and Sikandar, were stronger and wiser than the last. By tact and a conciliatory policy they created a party sworn to support them. Thus they were able to wage defensive and aggressive wars and to re-establish in a way the prestige of the monarchy. But the third ruler Ibrāhīm Lodī was tactless. He came to grief by departing from the wise example of his predecessors. He lost the confidence of the nobles, who had hitherto formed the chief support of the Lodī monarchy. Consequently rebellions broke out in different provinces—in Bihār, in the Panjāb, and in the Doāb. During these disturbances Bābur invaded India, and, after severe fighting, laid the foundation of the Mughal Empire.

In short, the Delhi Sultanate sorely lacked a constitution, a permanent executive or legislative body, which like the Parliament of medieval England would have continued to function irrespective of the rise and fall of monarchs. The exceedingly great powers which the Sultān of Delhi enjoyed proved highly detrimental to his rule. He became conceited, and neglected, or was inclined to neglect, the advice of every sagacious and wise minister in the realm. He carried all before him as long as he was powerful. But the betrayal of the slightest weakness on his part was exploited by the disaffected nobles—hence the rebellions and insurrections which form a normal feature of the political history of India in the 13th and 14th centuries.

(2) The absence of a definite and rigid law of succession was no less a cause of trouble. The fact that all the Sultāns were military despots, combined with the disturbed condition of the country meant that the sword was the natural method of settling disputes. The want of a body of disinterested workers in the cause of peace and order combined with the assumption or the certainty that the death of a king would be the signal for civil warfare, made the Delhi court an arena for powerful candidates and parties contesting for sovereignty. The candidates were recruited from within the ruling-dynasty as long as it was practicable; otherwise power

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was seized by ambitious adventurers. Hence the frequent changes of dynasties.

As a rule, a dynasty was capable of producing two or three capable rulers, after which it deteriorated. This deterioration was inevitable because of the increasing Indianization which followed. The adventures of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī to win the hand of Kamla Devī of Gujarāt or of Padminī of Chittor were by no means creditable to him. His wooing of Hindū princesses and his infatuation for Malik Kāfūr did more than anything else to undermine his prestige and to degrade the monarchy. That the Hindū-Muslim matrimonial alliance was not always capable of producing a man of strong character is evidenced by the example of Fīroz Shāh (1351-1388). How Rajab's marriage was contracted with the daughter of Rānā Mall Bhaṭṭī of Abohar, later known as Bībī Nāila, is described by Shams Sirāj 'Afīf.¹ The fruit of this marriage was Fīroz.

(3) The slave system had been originally and primarily a source of great strength to Muslim rule in India, which had in fact been founded and consolidated by slaves—by Quṭb-ud-dīn Aibak, by Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish, and by Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban. Their careers amply prove that they had received a sound training. Slavery both provided a test of capability and character and gave opportunities for advancement. So long as the institution of slavery at its best flourished, an able ruler was always forthcoming, but with the deterioration of slavery the supply was cut off at the source. Balban was the last product of the true system of slavery. After him the system was so corrupted that it ceased to produce men of character. The slaves of the Khaljī and Tughluq periods were far from being faithful and brave. Malik Kāfūr was a slave of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. He behaved most disgracefully during the lifetime of his master and even after his death. Malik Tāghī was a slave of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, but he revolted like several others and defied his master. Fīroz Shāh increased the number of his slaves far more than any of his predecessors had done. When he sent one of his slaves, Malik Qabūl, to Sultān Sikandar of Lakhnāutī, the latter asked if his master had other servants like him. Malik Qabūl replied that he was a slave in the second palace, and that 10,000 men as good as he kept watch over the palace of his sovereign.

¹ 'Afīf, *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 36-7.

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Sultān Sikandar was amazed to hear this.¹ According to the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* the number of Sultān Fīroz Shāh's slaves amounted to one lakh.² According to 'Afif, the contemporary historian, it came to one lakh and eighty thousand.³ A separate department with a large staff of officers had to be kept for their management.⁴ The Sultān had swelled their ranks indiscriminately. Many of the Hindūs, but nominally converted to Islām, had been accepted as slaves. They were neither loyal nor faithful. They were men of low morals, governed by sordid ambitions. Even during the lifetime of Sultān Fīroz they had proved themselves a curse to the empire and their intrigues heightened the disorders and troubles which clouded his closing years. Far from serving the state by crushing its rebellions or advancing its frontiers like the slaves of the 13th century they drained the state exchequer. ✓

(4) The governmental organization in the Sultanate period was far from efficient. The provincial and central governments were not well knit together. The *Vālī* or the provincial governor was endowed with almost absolute powers, since he had an *army*, and a *treasury* of his own, and exercised the powers of life and death over *his* subjects. He was constantly on the look-out for rebellion. But at the same time he was only too prone to make use of every opportunity of establishing his own independence, and even of usurping the throne of Delhi. The history of the Slave, *Khaljī* and Tughluq dynasties is replete with the rebellions of provincial governors. Baranī tells us how Tughral, the governor of Bengal, revolted against Balban, and assumed the title of Sultān Mughīṣ-ud-dīn. The disaffected nobles encouraged him saying, "Sultān Balban has grown old, and has sent both of his sons to checkmate the Mongols. . . . Take up, hence (O Tughral !) the Chatr (parasol) ; be a king and set your face against Balban."⁵

(5) The Hindū opposition was another force with which these rulers had to contend. The bulk of the people in India were Hindūs. Every Muslim conqueror had of necessity to measure swords with them. Even after they were defeated in the field they had to be treated with consideration, as no administrative machinery could

¹ 'Afif, *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 160-1.

² Quoted by Firishta (Bombay), Vol. I, p. 270.

³ 'Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 270.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁵ Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 82.

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function and no government could be established without their co-operation. This is one of the reasons why the Arabs, the pioneers of Muslim rule in Sind as well as the Turks, the pioneers of Muslim rule in Hindustān, employed Hindūs in the agricultural and revenue departments.

Some historians¹ are of opinion that Hindūs were excluded from all offices by the Sultāns of Delhi. This, however, cannot be readily accepted in view of the contemporary evidence to the contrary. While describing Balban's triumphant return after crushing Tughral's rebellion in Bengal Baranī twice refers favourably to the Hindūs. In the first instance we are told that through whichever town or region the Sultān passed, the Qāzīs, the 'Ulamā, the Mashāikh as well as the Kārkūns, the Mutaṣariffs, the Rājās, the Chaudhrīs and the Muqaddams advanced with their presents to offer him congratulations. They were honoured in return with royal favours and robes.² Again, we are told that as the Sultān entered Delhi all persons whether Musalmāns, Hindūs, Turks or Tājiks, who held offices of honour or owned land or had been granted an In'ām (free gift), came to pay their respects to the Sultān and were granted many favours and robes of honour.³ Far from being excluded from office or neglected the Hindūs constituted an important factor in the politics of Delhi, and Hindū chiefs and officials were paid in return for their services to the state by grants of land or by assignments. Baranī shows clearly how the Hindūs, like Muslims, held In'ām or land free from assessment. They were required to collect revenue from the peasants and remit it to the exchequer. Presumably the Hindūs acted both as assessors and collectors of revenue. They performed a work on which depended the welfare of the country as well as the prosperity of the government. In other words, the Hindūs controlled the local administration of the Muslim state in India.

Firishta⁴ testifies early in the reign of Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī to the existence of several Hindū rājās of consequence. The *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī* of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī equally testifies to the existence of Hindū chiefs. In a special chapter on the Jizya and the Kharāj

¹ Smith remarks that "He (Balban) refused to employ Hindū officials." (*Oxford History of India*, 1919, p. 228.)

² Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 106.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁴ *Firishta* (Bombay), p. 154.

even the *Fiqh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* treats of the Hindūs. . Thus it becomes difficult to deny the existence of Hindū chiefs and rājās throughout the period holding and owning large districts and estates. They were expected to pay *Kharāj*¹ to the royal officers at specific seasons, and as long as they made their payment regularly no interference whatever was made in their internal administration. It seems that the Muslim conquest produced but little change in the rural areas, for the country districts at a distance from the metropolis and the provincial capital remained practically independent under Hindū chiefs, and assignments were given to Hindūs on lands and they were expected to raise the local revenue and pay it to the exchequer.

In rural India the peasantry was entirely Hindū; even in urban areas the agrarian, revenue and fiscal departments were manned by Hindūs. Occasionally the Hindūs formed the rank and file of a rebel prince. Such was the case with Malik Chhajjū. When he revolted against Sulṭān Jalāl-ud-dīn *Khaljī* he recruited Hindūs freely in his army. At the head of an enormous following of Rāwats—the term *Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī* employs for the Hindūs—he marched against the *Khaljī* ruler.

It is true the Hindūs in the Sultanate period did not hold as many and as high positions as they did later under the Mughal emperors. But this was to a large extent due to the general distrust and jealousy of the rival Muslim candidates. Still, Sulṭān Muḥammad bin Tughluq did not hesitate to raise a capable Hindū, Ratan² by name, even to the office of a provincial governor. Another Hindū named Dhārā Dhar was appointed Nāib Vazīr of Deogīr,³ and head of the *Dīwān-i-Uslūb*.⁴

It seems that the Hindūs were not only an essential part of the Delhi empire, but, what is more, they formed an imperium in imperio. The Muslim governing class consisting of the Sulṭān and the Vālīs (provincial governors) had their sphere of control limited to the towns; it was the Hindū chief who was the link between the provincial governor, usually a Muslim, and the Hindū peasants. There was no love lost between the Muslim Vālī, and the Hindū intermediary. Each was suspicious of the other. And while the

¹ The word *Kharāj* here means tribute in a general sense (*Encyclopedia of Islām*, II, p. 902.)

² Ibn Battūṭa: *Def. et Sang.*, III, pp. 105, 106.

³ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), 501.

⁴ *Hājji-ud-Dabīr*, III, 874.

Muslim master was content to leave the Hindū chief alone and let him enjoy a large measure of independence as long as he paid his dues, the latter would avail himself of every opportunity of collecting money and accumulating the sinews of war. He bided his time. At times he would tyrannize over the peasantry, at others he would become arrogant and politically disaffected. Given the slightest opportunity he would assert his complete independence and would refuse to pay his dues to the Muslim Vālī (governor). That is why the kings of Delhi had one after another to adopt repressive measures. Balban, 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq have left behind records of their policy in this respect. Experience had taught each of them that the Hindū peasantry could under no circumstances be neglected, and could not be left to be exploited by the Hindū chiefs or intermediaries; and that the latter could not with impunity be allowed to accumulate treasures. When analysing the causes of rebellions, Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī found the increasingly great powers of the Hindū chiefs to be the principal cause; and he set about curtailing them.

It was too much to hope that these Hindū chiefs, masters of the peasantry and possessed of a considerable military force, and masters of their domains, enjoying rich legacies, and having a long and unbroken local independence, would always be loyal to the Muslim governors. Few Muslim rulers therefore had a peaceful time. Whilst the strongest of them wrestled with the hot-headed Hindū chiefs, the weakest fell victims to the chaos produced by Hindū rebellions.

(6) The Mongol raids.

The Mongol hordes of Chingīz Khān constituted in the 13th and 14th centuries a great menace to the peace of India. For the most part they remained massed on the Indus, and raided frequently into the interior, plundering at times even to the gates of Delhi and Amroha. Balban mentions their unfailing irruptions from year to year. "These accursed wretches (Mongols) have . . ." says he, "set their mind on plundering India. They have raided and plundered Lahore, which is an outpost of our empire. No year passes that they do not come here and plunder the villages."¹ Accordingly Balban threw himself into the work of defence—fortifying the frontiers, disciplining the army, and keeping it ready for war at

¹ Barani: *Tārīkh-i-Firoz Shāhi* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 50-1.

the capital with a view to marching at a moment's notice against the enemy. As a result he could not travel frequently as he would otherwise have done to the distant provinces of his kingdom, where rebellion was engendered. The disaffected nobles incited Tughral, the governor of Bengal (1279), to rebel on the ground that Balban was too busy with the Mongols to think of crushing him. For the Sultāns of Delhi, they contended, there could be no engagement more absorbing and more imperative than confronting the Mongols, and repulsing them. Neither the Sultān nor his sons could possibly give it up; nor could they turn to Lakhnautī without neglecting the Mongol invasions.¹

The above illustrates full well how the Mongol raids gave a lever to the forces of discontent. In their raids the turbulent elements in the country—the disaffection of the Hindū chiefs, the jealousies and revolts of the maliks and amīrs and the prevalence of robbery and brigandage—found great stimulus. A strong government alone could cope with the situation.

With the increasingly pressing demand for an invincible army on the frontiers, and at the capital, as well as for new fortifications commanding the route of the Mongols, power passed into the hands of military commanders. Placed in charge of great forts of strategic importance or holding commissions in the army they formed the backbone of the state. They did not refrain from fishing in troubled waters when the executive became weak and from assuming sovereignty as soon as an opportunity presented itself. The history of the great military generals—İltūtmish, commandant of the fortress of Budāūn under Quṭb-ud-dīn Aibak; Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīroz Khaljī, muster-master under Kaiqubād; and Ghāzī Malik Tughluq, the warden of the marches and governor of Dīpālpur under Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh—affords an illustration of the above.

The vanquished Mongols and those who like Ulghū Khān,² a descendant of Chingīz Khān, accepted employment under the Sultāns of Delhi were potential enemies. On his defeat by the forces of Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī, Ulghū Khān embraced Islām, and settled in company with his 3,000 countrymen in the suburbs of Delhi. They were granted estates, and were afterwards known as amīrān-i-jadīdah (new amīrs). But they roused the suspicions of Sultān

¹ Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 82.

² Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 219.

'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī who put thousands of them to the sword—a tragedy known in history as the massacre of the new Musalmāns. This alienated the survivors, who lost no opportunity of creating and exploiting disturbances in the country.

In spite of their destructive character the Mongol raids had exercised a kind of salutary effect on the military history of the Sultanate. Since the time of İltūtmish Mongolphobia had acted as the great incentive to the Sultāns of Delhi. When, however, the Mongol attacks ceased under Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, the military superiority and morale of the Sultanate was undermined. Decay set in. All the successors of Muḥammad bin Tughluq including the much-applauded Fīroz were sadly lacking in the essential attributes of a warrior-king, and the standard of ability was generally low among the rulers of Delhi. The demoralization of the army ; the disloyalty and corruption of the military leaders, who were divided into rival factions ; the insecurity of the frontier and the defencelessness of the fortresses commanding the traditional Mongol route in the time of Maḥmūd II, the last of the Tughluq monarchs, facilitated the remarkably rapid progress of Tīmūr, whose success was symptomatic of a decline that had already taken place.

CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TUGHLUQ DYNASTY

OF the five dynasties of the Sultanate period, the Tughluq dynasty occupies the middle position, and its opening scenes, staged in the reign of Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq, the founder of the dynasty, and in that of his son, that grossly misunderstood monarch, Sultān Muḥammad, mark the zenith of Muslim rule in India before the Mughals.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa¹ and Shams Sirāj² 'Afif both assign the arrival of Tughluq in India to the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa informs us that Tughluq came to Sind in a miserable condition. He was then in the service of a certain merchant under whom he worked as a shepherd. This occurred during the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, when the governor of Sind was his brother, Ulugh Khān.³ Tughluq entered his service and was attached to his person. Ulugh Khān enrolled him among the infantry. Later his bravery became known, and he was promoted to the cavalry. Afterwards, he was installed as one of the minor amīrs (Umāra-i-Sighār), and Ulugh Khān made him his superintendent of the stable (Amīr-i-Khail). Finally he became one of the great amīrs (Umāra-i-Kibār) and was named Malik Ghāzī. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa saw an inscription on the principal place of prayer in the great mosque at Multān—the mosque⁴ which had been constructed by orders of Tughluq—"I have fought twenty-nine battles with the Tartars, and have defeated them. Hence I have been named Malik-il-Ghāzī."

Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh made Tughluq the governor

¹ (a) B.N. MS., 909 f.

(b) Def. et Sang., III, pp. 201-2.

² 'Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 36.

³ His name was Almās Beg, and his title Ulugh Khān. Firishṭa: Bombay, Vol. I, pp. 174, 179, 180, 189. Defrémery's text gives the word as "Ulū Khān," Def. et Sang., III, p. 202.

⁴ The existence of this mosque is attested to by Amīr Khusrav in his *Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 63. See p. 35 of this chapter.

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of Dīpālpur, and his son Jauna superintendent of the royal stable (Amīr-i-Khail).¹

'Afif is not so informative as Ibn Battūta, but he strikes a different note. He² holds that the three brothers, Tughluq, Rajab and Abū Bakr, came to Delhi from Khurāsān during the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, who showed them great kindness, employing them at his court. Tughluq fared extraordinarily well, and profoundly impressed the Sultān, who made him governor of Dīpālpur.³

Both these authorities agree that Tughluq came to India in the time of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, that he rose to the rank of great amīr, that he enjoyed the reputation of being the greatest warrior of the age and that he was invested with the command of the imperial armies which marched against the Mongols every time they invaded India. That Tughluq rose so shortly after his arrival in India to the highest offices of responsibility and was awarded the greatest possible distinctions, so much so that he secured the hand of a daughter⁴ of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn is not convincing. The information given by Firishta, who traces the rise of Tughluq from the time of Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban seems to be nearer the truth. He says⁵ :—

“ The historians of India, the earliest as well as the latest, having been careless, none of them ascertained the origin and descent of the Tughluq kings. When early in the reign of the emperor Nūr-ud-dīn Muḥammad Jahāngīr, the writer of these pages, Muḥammad Qāsim Firishta, arrived in the city of Lahore (Lāhaur) on behalf of the Sultān-i-'aṣr (lord of the times), Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh, he enquired there of some of the people given to reading and learned in the history of Indian kings about the origin, descent and family of Tughluq Shāh. They said : ‘ We too have found no express mention about it in any book ; but in these parts it is generally held that Malik Tughluq, the father of King Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq Shāh, was one of the Turkish slaves of King Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban ; that

¹ Literally, superintendent of horses.

² 'Afif : *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 36.

³ Dīpālpur is the modern spelling. Formerly it was spelt Dībālpur or Deobālpur. Our authorities give the former, *i.e.*, Dībālpur. It is now reduced to a village in the Montgomery district of the Panjāb.

⁴ This follows from Ibn Battūta's account of Mas'ūd Khān, a brother of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Mas'ūd Khān's mother was a daughter of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. Def. et Sang., p. 292.) But Ibn Battūta's statement remains unconfirmed.

⁵ *Firishta* (Bombay), I, 230-231.

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he married into a local Jāt family,¹ and that King Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq was the fruit of that marriage."²

Firishta has been in the main followed by the Hindū historian of the 17th century, Sujān Rāi, the author of the *Khulāṣat-ut-Tavārikh*.³ Firishta's version may therefore be regarded as approximately true.

It follows that in the age of Balban, Muslim adventurers took unto themselves Hindū wives, though the practice had begun as early as the Arab conquest of Sind. According to the *Chāch Nāmāh*⁴ Muḥammad bin Qāsim had married Lādī, a wife of Rājā Dāhir. Later Muḥammad of Ghūr is said⁵ to have married a Hindū princess of Uch (1175). The examples set by their chiefs must have encouraged the rank and file of Muslims to take Hindū wives. One is led to such a conclusion in view of the probability that the earliest Muslim conquerors and settlers had come to India unaccompanied by women. The scarcity of women of their own religion, and their resolution to make permanent homes in Hindustān, combined with a natural desire to increase their progeny, forced these Muslims to intermarry with the Hindūs with whom they were thrown into contact. Such has been the practice of almost all conquering peoples. They have either intermarried or made concubines of the native women.

The first notice of the practice in the annals of Muslim India is the seizure of the harem of Rāi Karan of Gujarāt by Almās Beg Ulugh Khān, and Malik Nuṣrat Khān, and the marriage of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji to Kamala Devī. Her daughter, Deval Devī, who had sought shelter with Rām Deo of Deogīr, was later recovered and married to prince Khizr Khān. Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn is also said

¹ An appendix in Elliot, I, 507, contains a note on the Jāts, but a much clearer one will be found in Tod's *Rajasthan*, edited by Crooke, Vol. I, p. 127. The sum and substance is that the Jāts were connected with the Rājputs. Both originated from the early Central Asian invaders. While their leaders became Rājputs, the lower orders became Jāt peasants.

² *Firishta* (Bombay), I, pp. 230-31.

³ Sujān Rāi says: "Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq Shāh, formerly known as Ghāzi Malik, a king of Turkish descent, bore the name of Malik Tughluq Shāh. He was one of the slaves of Ghiyās-ud-dīn, his mother being from a Jāt tribe of the Panjāb." (*Khulāṣat-ut-Tavārikh* MS., F. 95. School of Oriental Studies, London.)

⁴ (a) B.M., Or. 1787, p. 183.

(b) Haig, Sir Wolseley: *The Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 5.

⁵ Haig, Sir Wolseley: *The Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 38.

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to have made some vain efforts at securing the hand of Padminī,¹ the wife of Rājā Ratan Sen of Chittor.²

The second instance is mentioned by 'Afif, who informs us that "Sultān Tughluq" desired to marry Rajab into the family of one of the *Rāis* of Dīpālpur. This took place during the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, when Tughluq was the governor of Dīpālpur. Rajab was his younger brother. Tughluq, however, resolved to marry Rajab to the daughter of Rānā Mall Bhaṭṭi of Abohar. The marriage proposal was at first refused, but Tughluq coerced³ the Rānā into accepting it. The marriage took place about 1313 during the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī whose marriages with Hindū princesses seem to have created a congenial atmosphere. The example set by the emperor and his son, Prince Khizr Khān, was probably followed by many of the nobles. And in view of the information given by 'Afif regarding the marriage at Abohar the conclusion cannot be withheld that this was the age of the rapid mixing of Hindū-Muslim blood.

It should be noted that the last-mentioned marriage differs characteristically from its prototypes. It was not personal but political. Of the need for such an alliance there was no better judge than Ghāzī Malik Tughluq. He had a personal experience of

¹ In his account of the siege of Chittor, Firishṭa makes no mention of Padminī, *vide* Ain, II, p. 269, and Tod, I, p. 30.

² *Firishṭa* (Bombay), p. 180.

³ "As he (Tughluq) was," says 'Afif, "making enquiries . . . he was informed that the daughter of Rānā Mall Bhaṭṭi was extremely handsome. . . . In those days the great-grandfather of this historian, namely Malik S'ād-ul-mulk Shihāb 'Afif, was the governor of Abohar on behalf of Sultān Tughluq. In consultation with him Sultān Tughluq sent some exceptionally wise and clever men to Rānā Mall with a marriage proposal. When the proposal was made on behalf of Sultān Tughluq, Rānā Mall, through his extreme arrogance and haughtiness, began to utter improper and unbecoming words. When the intelligence of the refusal of the marriage proposal was conveyed to Sultān Tughluq he again consulted my great-grandfather. After much discussion it was resolved that Sultān Tughluq should go to Rānā Mall's villages, and demand payment in a lump sum instead of by instalments of the annual revenue. On the following day Sultān Tughluq went to Rānā Mall's villages and demanded cash payment of the annual revenue. He subjected the *Mugaddams* and *Chaudhris* . . . to hardship. The whole of Rānā Mall's government was confounded, and the people as a whole were reduced to the verge of destruction. When after a few days Rānā Mall's subjects were extremely hard pressed, his mother . . . came crying . . . into his house and spoke in despair. At that time Rānā Mall's daughter, the would-be mother of Sultān Firoz, stood in the courtyard. On seeing her grandmother cry, she enquired the reason. 'I cry,' replied the grandmother, 'for fear of your life. If it were not for you, Sultān Tughluq would not have subjected the people here to so great coercion.' Thereupon the daughter said, 'Oh, grandmother! if by giving me away so many of your subjects can be relieved, you should accept the marriage proposal. . . .'" ('Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Firoz Shāhi*, pp. 36-39.)

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the difficulties with which a Muslim governor was confronted in securing the co-operation of the Hindūs. He knew, also, what Ibn Battūṭa later noted, the Hindū contempt for the Muslim. Perhaps he wanted to remove the causes of friction alienating one people from the other. The idea underlying this marriage was to remove from Muslim rule the stigma of foreign rule. The favour he showed to his new sister-in-law Bibī Nāila or Kadbānū—an honorific conferred upon her by Ghāzī Malik Tughluq—is highly significant.

Rajab had already two wives,¹ probably Muslim wives, and by each he had a son. One was called Quṭb-ud-dīn and the other Ibrāhīm. But, Bibī Nāila or Kadbānū was held in higher esteem than the senior wives of Rajab. The same was the case with her son, Fīroz.² Ghāzī Malik Tughluq doted on both. In accordance with a promise he had made to Bibī Nāila he continued to bestow special attention on Fīroz as long as he lived. After his death, Fīroz was specially favoured by Sulṭān Muḥammad. On the death of the latter, he became king in spite of other claimants to the throne. His brothers Quṭb-ud-dīn and Ibrāhīm were overlooked in spite of their seniority. They are mentioned by Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī in the list of Sulṭān Fīroz's courtiers.

It is true that the method Tughluq adopted to win the hand of Bibī Nāila for his brother, Rajab, was not laudable. But it must be acknowledged that Tughluq did or was prepared to do in the 14th century what few would think of doing now in the 20th. To accomplish his object he waged no war against the ruler of Abohar. Tughluq regarded the Hindū aristocrats, or, at any rate, the ruling family of Rānā Mall Bhaṭṭī of Abohar, as his equals socially; and in accordance with the time-honoured Muslim custom sent a marriage-proposal through some select officers. They were expected to broach the matter tactfully to the Rājā, to propitiate him, to win his goodwill and to take full care not to injure his feelings. When Rānā Mall spurned the proposal, and despised Tughluq, the latter had no choice left. He had to be stern in order to convince the Rānā

¹ "Sipah-Sālār Rajab had no other child, either son or daughter, from Bibī Kadbānū. Those who say that Malik Quṭb-ud-dīn was a brother of Fīroz Shāh speak the truth, but he was born of another mother. The same was the case with Malik Nāib Bārbak (grand usher). He was also his brother, but by a different mother." ('Afif, p. 40.) This finds confirmation in Baranī (p. 527) and it follows that both Quṭb-ud-dīn and Ibrāhīm, the grand usher (Bārbak), were older than Fīroz. It is also evident from 'Afif (p. 40) that Bibī Nāila, the mother of Fīroz, was the last wife of Rajab.

² 'Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhi* (Bib. Ind.), 40

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that the man whose proposal he spurned was no ordinary man, that he was a man of his word and was far superior to the Rānā in every respect.

While we possess a wealth of detail about the marriage of Rajab, the younger brother, there is very little information about that of Ghāzī Malik Tughluq, the elder brother. All that can be inferred is that he had several wives, and that his first wife was the mother of Jauna, his eldest son. She outlived him by many years, and was seen in her old age by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,¹ when as the mother of the ruling Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, she was the Queen-dowager, enjoying the title of Makhḍūma-i-Jahān² (mistress of the world). She had lost her eye-sight. Her advanced age combined with the fact that she had borne Tughluq his eldest son, already a grown-up man under Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, able to command armies, and cut a prominent figure in war, encourages the conclusion that she was the first wife of Tughluq. In all probability Tughluq married her on his arrival in India soon after the death of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban, as is evident from the memoirs of their son, Sultān Muḥammad. In those days Tughluq could not have obtained a wife from a ruling family. Whom, then, could he have married? His inclinations towards a matrimonial alliance with the Hindūs, which later became conspicuous in connection with Rajab's marriage, postulates such a contingency.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and 'Afif have erroneously ascribed Tughluq's arrival in India to the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa obtains his information from Shaiikh Rukn-ud-dīn Multānī. But it is doubtful whether the Shaiikh himself knew much about the antecedents of so obscure a man as Tughluq. Neither the Shaiikh nor 'Afif has mentioned any authority. They were not eye-witnesses; hence their statements cannot be regarded as authentic. Even Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, a contemporary writer, takes no notice of the matter, nor does Amīr Khusrav. Far less could later writers like Yahya bin Aḥmad, 'Abdul Qādir Budāūnī,³ and Niẓām-ud-dīn Aḥmad, the respective authors of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, the *Muntakhab-*

¹ Def. et Sang., III, pp. 376 ff.

² See the photograph of her grave (p. 212). For the date of her death see p. 180.

³ This is how Sir Wolsley Haig transliterates it (*Cambridge of History of India*, III, p. 646). Rieu (*Catalogue of the Persian MSS. in the British Museum*) has Badā'ūnī, and Lee (*Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, p. 39), Badāyūnī. The correct old form is Badāūn, while the modern spelling is Badāyūn.

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ut-Tavārīkh and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, be expected to throw light on the matter. Embarrassed by this, Firishṭa set out with the object of making inquiries.

Firishṭa would have us place Tughluq's birth in India in the Panjāb, the home of his Jāṭ mother, early in the reign of Sulṭān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban. But a reference to the memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq shows that Firishṭa's information is inexact. Sulṭān Muḥammad affirms that his father had come as a stranger to India after the period of Balban. Presumably Tughluq was then (1286) a young man, approximately twenty years of age. It was in the reign of Mu'izz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād that he married; and probably in the last year of Kaiqubād's reign (1290) was born his eldest son Jauna or Jauna¹ Khān, who later became Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, and then Ulugh² Khān, and finally Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh.

This is borne out by Amīr Khusrav³ who knew Tughluq personally before the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty. He holds that Tughluq had made a career and earned a reputation as a warrior under Sulṭān Jalāl-ud-dīn Khālji—a fact which goes a long way to confirm the conclusion we have reached regarding his antecedents.

Jauna was born at a time when his father was yet in straitened

¹ Rihla: Def. et Sang., III, 302. According to Steingass (p. 379) Jaunah (جاونا) is an Arabic word for sun. 'Iṣāmī, who writes it as "Jauna," says it is a Hindī word. *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, I, 231a. Now, Jawan or Jaun is a Hindī word for a Musalmān, a foreigner and a barbarian (Platts, 398). Jaunpur, which as 'Afif (p. 148) tells us, derives its name from Sulṭān Muḥammad's original title Jauna, perhaps meant "the town of the foreigner or Mohanmadan" (Platts, 398). 'Afif's orthography جونا (Jaunān) remains unconfirmed.

² Ulugh means powerful, great (Steingass, p. 94).

³ Amīr Khusrav's *Tughluq Nāmāh* contains some of Tughluq's antecedents—those which were described by himself on a historic occasion before an assembly of notables. "I was," says he, "a man unknown to fame experiencing the coldness and bitterness of life. It was the late king Jalāl-ud-dīn who showed me favour and drew me near. I became a personal attendant of his. . . . After his death I was much depressed and caten up with anxiety as to my future. At last Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn ascended the throne, and because of his kindness I began to make gradual progress. I sought service under Ulugh Khān, the king's brother. After his death I was again cast adrift. Before long, however, I entered the service of Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn. It is by his favour that I have attained the position you see me in."

The above is the address, which, according to Amīr Khusrav, Tughluq delivered to the grand assembly at the Hazār Sutūn palace in Sīrī, where he was eventually elected emperor.

The assembly is reported to have made the following reply: "O amīr! We know you very well. We are aware of your distinctive parts. When Sulṭān Jalāl-ud-dīn had laid siege to Ranthambor, and when the besieging army was violently attacked and harassed by the beseiged it was to you that the Sulṭān looked for relief. You were commissioned to march against the enemy, whom you defeated. The Sulṭān honoured you in return. After his death Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn was equally kind to you, and fully recognized your merits as a warrior. He deputed you against the Mongol assailants. . . ." *Tughluq Nāmāh* (Aurangābād, 1933), pp. 135-139.

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circumstances. No one knew what a glorious fate was reserved for a child born in obscurity; none cared to record the date of his birth. Before long, however, better days came. Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī showed kindness to him and made him his courtier, and later enlisted him as a warrior. After his death Tughluq was again left to his own resources, but made his way to the front before long. He was introduced to Ulugh Khān, Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn's brother, then governor of Sind,¹ whom he served in different capacities.² Subsequently he attracted the notice of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, who appointed him governor (Muqṭī'³) of Dīpālpur.⁴

It was about this time that Tughluq committed Jauna to the care of a private tutor, 'Aẓd-ud-dīn.⁵ Before long 'Aẓd-ud-dīn was replaced by Qutluḡ Khān.⁶

Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī skips over Jauna's childhood and boyhood, but one can infer that he must have been a precocious child. And from what the historian says regarding his attainments as emperor it follows that the youthful Jauna possessed a sharp intellect, a strong and retentive memory and an inquisitive turn of mind. He had a great liking for men of learning and loved to associate with the 'Ulamā, the Mashāikh (saints), the Ṣūfīs and the philosophers. He had great respect for saints like Shaikh Rukn-ud-dīn Multānī and Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. It was from them that he drew his inspiration, and to them he was indebted for his initiation into Ṣūfism.

Side by side with the pursuit of letters Jauna acquired a training in the art of war. While still a young man he became efficient in theology, philosophy, medicine, mathematics, history and astronomy.

¹ Ulugh Khān was sent on an expedition to Multān in the very first year of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī's reign (Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 249). The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind., p. 21) mentions the year 1296/696 as the date of this expedition. This was probably the time when Ulugh Khān became known as governor (amīr) of Sind. It is to this time, namely, Ulugh Khān's governorship of Sind, that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa erroneously assigns Tughluq's arrival in Sind.

² The *Riḥla* and the *Tughluq Nāmah* practically confirm each other on this point.

³ (a) 'Affī, p. 27.

(b) In those days Sultān Tughluq was the Muqṭī' of Dīpālpur.

⁴ No date has been assigned to this appointment by Baranī, but he, as well as the authors of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* and *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh*, refer to him as fighting the first battle of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī's reign against the Mongol invaders. Budāūnī assigns this battle to the year 1298/698. It seems that Tughluq was appointed governor of Dīpālpur early in Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī's reign. *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 82; *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh*, p. 184.

⁵ Firishṭa mentions Maulana 'Aẓd-ud-dīn as the tutor of Sultān Muḥammad. *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* (Bombay), I, 236.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 454.

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He also became expert at archery,¹ tilting, riding and in the use of the javelin and the sword. He acquired a marvellous command of language and was, according to Baranī,² an excellent conversationalist, his delivery being extremely lucid, simple and delightful.

Baranī is fully confirmed by his contemporary, Bahrām Aiba Kishlū Khān, the governor of Sind, and comrade of Ghāzī Malik Tughluq. He had seen Jauna as a youth, and possibly also as a boy. He was impressed by his talents and considered him fit to be a king, while his father Ghāzī Malik Tughluq was yet alive.³

The death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī (1316) marks a stage in Jauna's life. He was still under thirty but was accomplished and ambitious, ready to embark on an adventurous and brilliant career. About twenty years were still to elapse before he ascended the throne of Delhi as Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq. To understand the circumstances leading to his accession a survey must needs be made of the revolutions which followed the death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn.

After his death power passed into the hands of Malik Nāib, and a dictatorship began. Malik Nāib assembled the leading amīrs, and in their presence cancelled the document by which Khizr Khān had been made heir-apparent. He installed Malik Shihāb-ud-dīn, a five-year-old son of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, as a puppet king, and set himself up as regent. He then issued orders in compliance with which Khizr Khān, still a prisoner at Gwālior, was blinded, and the eyes of his brother Shādī Khān were torn out by means of a razor. Mubārak Khān, the other brother, was imprisoned. Malik Nāib was out to extinguish completely the 'Alāi house, and to seize the throne for himself, but he feared opposition from the great 'Alāi maliks still in power in different parts of the empire. He desired to collect them together in the capital where they might be conveniently put to the sword. But his plans leaked out, and the 'Alāi slaves, guardians of the Hazār Sutūn palace in Sīrī, united to kill him. One night they broke into his sleeping chamber, cut off his head, and sabred his adherents.

Thus ended the dictatorship of Malik Nāib, thirty-five days after the death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. Why it was not perpetuated, and why the Khaljī house was not extinguished are questions which call for an answer.

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 464.

² Def. et Sang., III, p. 206.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 463.

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It should be noted that among other essentials the establishment of a new government or dynasty requires the formation of a new and powerful party determined to support their candidate at all costs. This party must increasingly preponderate and establish itself by undermining and uprooting any rival factions, or any supporters of the old dynasty. An illustration of this is afforded by the conditions which obtained under Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād and Sultān Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī. The weakness of the executive under Kaiqubād led to the rise of a new and rival party headed by Jalāl-ud-dīn. Kaiqubād was put to death and Jalāl-ud-dīn proclaimed Sultān; but the supporters of the house of Balban being still strong, the new king had not the heart to enter Delhi. He took up his abode at some distance from the capital city at a place called Kalu-Karī. There he laid the foundation of a new city which he called Shahr-i-Nau (new city), and began gradually to win adherents to his cause. When he considered himself sufficiently powerful he entered Delhi, but he still encountered opposition from the supporters of the house of Balban. In fact, the latter were not entirely extinguished until the rise of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. It was then that a strong Khaljī party was definitely formed, the party which Baranī calls the A'wān-o-Anṣār-i-'Alāī (the helpers and comrades of 'Alā-ud-dīn). That Malik Nāib was able, despite the 'Alāī party to play the tyrant testifies to the great influence he wielded over Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn and his empire. It is a proof of the weakness of the 'Alāī party. That is why a revolution was engineered by Malik Nāib immediately after the death of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. His will was abrogated; the "waliahdī" (heir-apparentship) of Prince Khiṣr Khān was discarded and the document which had been so diligently executed to confirm it was publicly cancelled. Khiṣr Khān was blinded, exiled and thrown into prison; Prince Shādī Khān's eyes were cut into slices and torn out; and Prince Mubārak Khān was thrown into prison—all this was complacently observed by the 'Alāī party, and not a finger was raised in support of the sons of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. That Malik Kāfūr was not able to carry this tyranny to greater lengths, that he failed to murder Mubārak Khān and Malik Shihāb-ud-dīn and that he came to grief and lost his own head was entirely due to his mistakes and follies, which have been commented upon even by Baranī. He tells us that Malik Nāib failed to create a party for himself. He

should have secured the alliance of the "helpers and comrades of the empire,"¹ that is, the 'Alāī party. He paid no heed to the "thousands" of 'Alā-ud-dīn's helpers and comrades (A'wān-o-Anṣār-i-'Alāī) and made no secret of his malicious designs and laid violent hands on the 'Alāī princes and harem. Furthermore, he erred by maintaining all the rules and regulations of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. He failed to realize how essential it was for the establishment of the new régime to subvert the old order and system of government. "As a rule," says Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, "after the death of a king no rules and regulations of his are observed; a new system of government arises, and new conditions of life obtain." Malik Nāib was hopelessly wanting in statesmanship. On the very first day of his dictatorship he sent for the heads of administrative departments (Davāvin) and ordered them to continue to observe the laws and regulations of the time of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn.

Had a more able dictator than Malik Nāib arisen at this time, the course of history might have been different. But the government had passed into the hands of mediocre slaves, and no wise man of established fame was at the helm of affairs. Still Baranī talks magniloquently and repeatedly of the overwhelming number and strength of the 'Alāī party and regards them as a great obstacle in the way of Malik Nāib. His statements lose obviously much of their force, when one realizes the weakness of the 'Alāī party. Curiously enough, it was the Pāiks, the lowest slaves of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, who rose at last to overthrow the tyrant. Thoroughly demoralised none of the 'Alāī party had the courage to rise and save the house and realm of their master from destruction.

The Pāiks, who killed Malik Nāib, were too low and insignificant to make a bid for sovereignty. They stood by their royal master, whose dynasty they sincerely desired to perpetuate. The reactionary forces set in operation since the aggressions of Malik Nāib had long been working in favour of a restoration. Malik Shihāb-ud-dīn was therefore maintained on the throne. Prince Mubārak Khān, who was still a prisoner, was released and set up as his Nāib (deputy). He was in the prime of youth with no training and no culture, but he took a leaf out of the book of Malik Nāib, and aspired to sovereignty. After a few months' Niyābat (deputyship) which he utilized to win over the maliks and amīrs, he ascended the throne, and

¹ "A'wān-o-anṣār-i-mulkī"—Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 473.

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assumed the title of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh (1316/717). His younger brother, Malik Shihāb-ud-dīn was blinded and sent to Gwalior—a fate which Khizr Khān and Shādī Khān had met at the hands of Malik Nāib.

Jauna, now about twenty-seven years of age, first came into prominence under Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn. The latter appointed him first as superintendent of the royal stable (Ākhur Bak), and later as postal superintendent¹ (Barīd-ul-Mulk). After this his progress was more rapid. By the close of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn's reign he was classed with influential courtiers, and responsible officers—a fact borne out by later history. When after the murder of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn the leading nobles of the empire were instantly sent for and taken into custody, Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna was among them. This is the only express mention of Jauna that Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī has made in the whole of his chapter on Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn. In his chapter on Khusrav Khān Baranī makes a similar but clearer reference to Jauna. "Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq Shāh," says he, "held a high position in the court of, and enjoyed close access to, Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn."² It follows that Jauna was towards the close, if not in the beginning, of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn's reign a man of considerable importance, and rubbed shoulders with the old and experienced nobles of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji's court,³ namely with Malik 'Ain-ud-dīn Multānī and Malik Waḥīd-ud-dīn Quraishī. This is borne out by the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, which in the course of its chapter on Khusrav Khān refers to Jauna saying, "Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, the real son of Ghāzī Malik, endowed with liberality, munificence and bravery, was classed with the 'Alāi nobles."⁴

Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn was enamoured of a Hindū youth of obscure origin, whose real name is unknown. Historians⁵ mention him as

¹ Curiously enough, Baranī is silent as to the manner in which Jauna acquitted himself under Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn. How he attracted the Sultān's notice and had the responsible posts of Ākhur Bak and Barīd-ul-Mulk conferred on him is not mentioned. It is only in the list of Qutb-ud-dīn's courtiers that he mentions Jauna as "Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Ākhur Bak Jauna, Barīd-ul-Mulk." From this it can be inferred that Jauna was first appointed Ākhur Bak (superintendent of the stable), and then Barīd-ul-Mulk (postal superintendent).—(Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 379.) His appointment as Ākhur Bak is confirmed by the *Rihla* (Def. et Sang., III, p. 202), which, however, gives Amir-i-Khāl (superintendent of the horse) as his designation instead of Ākhur Bak. The terms are practically synonymous.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 411.

³ Ibid., p. 309.

⁴ Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad (Bib. Ind.), p. 188.

⁵ (a) *Muntakhab-ul-Tawārikh* (Bib. Ind.), p. 203; (b) Firishṭa (Bombay, p. 222).

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Malik Afghān and Malik Talīgha Yaghda, Muqṭī' of Kara had accompanied him. He aimed at killing them all. But as each had a large army of his own, Khusrav Khān was afraid to take the initiative. At last his plans leaked out and some of the most faithful of the maliks headed by Malik Tamar and Malik Talīgha remonstrated with him, and forced him to retire to Delhi.

The maliks hoped strongly that their conduct would meet with the Sultān's approval. But he was still blindly in love with Khusrav. As soon as he learnt of the latter's departure for Delhi he made special arrangements for his conveyance. On reaching the capital Khusrav poisoned the Sultān's mind by all kinds of slanders against the maliks. Although Malik Tamar and Malik Talīgha spared no efforts to inform the Sultān about Khusrav's conspiracy, he would not listen; and punished them ruthlessly. Malik Tamar was humiliated, and forbidden admission to the palace and deprived of his Iqṭa' of Chanderī, which was given to Khusrav Khān. Malik Talīgha, who had been more outspoken was beaten, and deprived of his office. Punishments were also inflicted upon those who had borne witness against Khusrav; some were imprisoned, others were exiled.

Khusrav Khān's position was supreme and unrivalled; and he vigorously pursued his plans for the murder of the Sultān. He strengthened his party, which consisted primarily of the Parwārīs of Gujarāt, and was joined subsequently by disaffected Muslim chiefs—by Bahā-ud-dīn, the "ungrateful secretary," by the son of Qara Qimār and by Yusuf Ṣūfī. As the Sultān went out on a hunting expedition, the Parwārīs wished to kill him, but the son of Qara Qimār and Yusuf Ṣūfī warned them against attacking the Sultān in the open country and suggested that he should be killed in the palace on his return.

When the Sultān returned from his hunting expedition he handed over to Khusrav Khān the keys of one of the palace gates. By this means large numbers of Parwārīs secretly met in Malik Nāib's apartments, where they planned the Sultān's murder.

Qāzī Ziyā-ud-dīn, otherwise known as Qāzī Khān, who held charge

Muḥammad bin Tughluq's autobiography, wherein he uses the word Iqṭa' or Iqṭa'-i-Buzurg with regard to Dipālpur governed by his father, Ghāzī Malik Tughluq, and (2) the language of the *Tughluq Nāmah*, which declares Tughluq to have been a minor chief, I am inclined to think that in theory at least, the Muqṭī' was politically lower than or subordinate to the Vālī.

of the keys of the citadel, warned the Sultān against Khusrav Khān, and his Parwārīs. But the Sultān refused to listen to him, and that same night he, as well as Qāzī Khān, fell under the daggers of the Parwārīs.

The murderers rejoiced in their victory in commemoration of which they illuminated the palace, and at midnight a *darbar* was held to which Khusrav Khān invited the maliks—Malik 'Ain-ud-dīn Multānī, Malik Wahīd-ud-dīn Quraishī, Malik Faḥr-ud-dīn Janna, who later became Sultān Muḥammad Shāh, and Malik Bahā-ud-dīn Dabū- together with other leading persons. All were taken on to the roof of the Hazār Sutūn (one-thousand-pillared) palace to witness the scene, and perhaps to share the responsibilities for the Parwārī atrocities, when Khusrav Khān ascended the throne, and assumed the title of Sultān Nāṣir-ud-dīn.

Amīr Khusrav, the next contemporary authority for this episode, differs in minor details from Baranī. He makes no mention of the lighting up of the palace subsequent to the murder of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn; nor does he mention the summoning of the amīrs in the night and their being kept in custody. He strikes a different note by saying that after the assassination some of the Muslim chiefs joined the Hindūs, and discussed all through the night which of the princes of the blood royal should be raised to the throne. The poet maintains that the objective of Khusrav Khān's conspiracy was the removal of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn, not the usurpation of the throne. But the various attempts made by Khusrav Khān after his rise to the Vizārat (Ministry) to assassinate the Sultān, and to foment rebellion are well described by Baranī and give us a clear insight into the working of Khusrav Khān's mind. Furthermore, the latter had no reason to be personally hostile to the Sultān who was sincerely devoted to him, and could never bring himself to accept any report against him, even though it was communicated personally by extremely reliable officers. However, the *Tughluq Nāmah*¹ implies that Khusrav, after murdering Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn, was not anxious to reign in his stead. But he was prevailed on by his supporters to do so.

The *Tughluq Nāmah* throws new light on the atrocities committed by Khusrav Khān, particularly the cold-blooded murder of Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn's brothers, Farīd Khān, Abū Bakr, 'Alī Khān, Bahār

¹ Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 21.

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Khān and 'Uṣmān. The eldest, Farīd Khān, was fifteen years of age. He had finished his course of Quranic reading and was undergoing military training. Abū Bakr Khān, who was fourteen years old, was studying the Qurān and had a special taste for poetry, prose and calligraphy. The other two brothers, 'Alī Khān and Bahār Khān, were both eight years old. The fifth and the youngest, 'Uṣmān, was only five years of age. The first two of these brothers were killed and the other three blinded by the orders of Khusrav Khān. The poet affirms¹ that the information he has thus given is authentic and exact, but he does not disclose the source of his information.²

Baranī³ tells us that Khusrav Khān threw open the royal treasury and disbursed money liberally to his party, which he wanted to strengthen. He had, however, some apprehensions regarding Ghāzī Malik Tughluq who was still in his Iqṭa' of Dīpālpur, and was indignant at the excesses of Khusrav, and his henchmen. In the hope of enticing him to Delhi and with the object of thus capturing him, Khusrav Khān showed every kindness to his son, Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna. He maintained⁴ him in his old post of Ākhur Bak (superintendent of the royal stable) and awarded him riches and robes of honour. But Jauna was no less indignant. "His blood," says Baranī, "was boiling at the murder of the Sultān, and he was gnawing his hand at the predominance of the Hindūs and Parwārīs, whom he encountered."⁵ For the moment he was helpless, because Khusrav Khān and his followers were capturing and enrolling men by means of gold. Equally helpless was Ghāzī Malik, who spent his days at Dīpālpur, forming plans for wreaking vengeance on these Hindū and Parwārī murderers. Still he could not take any decisive

¹ Ibid., p. 23.

² The information here given by the *Tughluq Nāmah* is partly confirmed by the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh*. The *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* (p. 217) mentions three princes—Abū Bakr, 'Alī Khān and Pahar Khān. It should be noted that instead of the Bahār Khān of the *Tughluq Nāmah*, the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* gives Pahar Khān. But this is due to the copyist's mistake.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 418.

⁴ Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī's language (p. 411) shows that Jauna had held some time in Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn's reign the post of Ākhur Bak (master of the horse) in which Khusrav Khān confirmed him. The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* makes the point clearer still. It says: "Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, son of Ghāzī Malik, the Ākhur Bak (master of the horse) under Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn was maintained in his old post." (*Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, Bib. Ind., p. 88.) Almost the same is the meaning of the language used in the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* (p. 218) and the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* (Bib. Ind., p. 188). The same is reported by Ibn Battūṭa. "Sultān Qutb-ud-dīn," says he, "made Ghāzī Malik's son, now emperor of India, his master of the horse (amīr-i-Khail). When Khusrav Khān ascended the throne, he maintained him in the same post."

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 411-412.

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step in this direction lest the Hindūs should hurt his son Jauna, then at Delhi.

After ten weeks of tension Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna at last determined to avenge the murder of his royal patron. One afternoon he mounted his horse and fled with a few of his slaves from Delhi to Dīpālpur.

The *Tughluq Nāmah* agrees in the main with Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* but differs in so far as it calls Jauna Malik Fakhr-ud-Dawal (the pride of the state) and Malik Fakhr-ul-Haqq (the pride of truth). It informs us that the latter held a meeting¹ which was attended by his counsellors. With them he discussed the practical aspects of the situation and invited their opinion as to the best course to be adopted. His counsellors suggested that a message containing full news of all the late tragic occurrences and scenes should be sent to Ghāzī Malik and that his advice should be followed. Malik Fakhr-ud-Dawal accepted the suggestion, and sent one 'Alī Yaghdī to his father at Dīpālpur. In reply to the message delivered by 'Alī Yaghdī, Tughluq sent word to his son desiring him to withdraw as soon as possible from Delhi, and come over to him. Malik Fakhr-ud-Dawal conspired with Malik Aibā's son, then at Delhi, and both made their escape² to Dīpālpur.

In view of the importance of Jauna's flight, which formed the prelude to the war of succession, and the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty, it is desirable to know whether Jauna fled from Delhi of his own accord or was urged to do so by his father. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa maintains that it was Ghāzī Malik Tughluq who wrote a letter to Jauna desiring him to come over to Dīpālpur and bring Bahrām Aibā's son along with him. But in view of the evidence to the contrary given by the *Tughluq Nāmah*, the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* and Jauna's own autobiography the conclusion cannot be withheld that it was the son (Jauna) and not the father (Ghāzī Malik)

¹ Amir Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 41.

² It may be interesting to note that there is a minor difference regarding the time and method of Jauna's escape between the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari* on the one hand, and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and Baranī on the other. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's evidence is on the whole in conformity with Baranī (p. 414), though he was not an eye-witness. Unlike the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbari*, he observes that Jauna fled in the day. He had suggested to Khusrav Khān that the horses had grown restive, and needed exercise. Accordingly, he took them out every day. Sometimes he was out for one hour, sometimes for two and sometimes for three hours; and at times he remained out even for four hours. One day he disappeared and did not return till the decline of the sun. (Def. et Sang., III, p. 204.)

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as Ibn Battūta would have us believe, who primarily revolted. It was Jauna who decided upon flight and intimated his intention to Ghāzī Malik Tughluq, requisitioning a relay of post horses to be fixed in all directions on the roads.¹

Three points of some importance emerge from the above. First, that it was then possible for the officials of the Delhi empire to carry on clandestinely hostile correspondence without being detected by the central government. The Sultān at Delhi had therefore to be vigilant to protect himself against any hostile propaganda. Second, Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna possessed as a young man much political acumen. Third, he was familiar with the physical geography of the territory lying between Delhi and Dīpālpur. He knew the distance which lay between the two, knew the time-limit necessary to traverse it and knew also the roads and paths. That his flight was successfully effected and that he defied all attempts² at his capture reflects creditably on his efficiency as a rider. The flight brings into relief the personality of Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, who afterwards played the leading part in the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty.

Baranī³ tells us that Ghāzī Malik Tughluq now began to make preparations for war. But how a Muqṭī'—for Ghāzī Malik was no more than a Muqṭī' of Dīpālpur—was able to raise an army powerful enough to fight the imperial army of Delhi is a problem, which cannot be answered with the help of Baranī. Nor are the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* of much help. But the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* and the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* are of great use, and of still greater use is the *Tughluq Nāmah*. It not only gives a detailed account of Ghāzī Malik's preparations for war, but also draws a picture of what came to pass at the court of Khusrav Khān after Jauna's flight.

We are told that Jauna's flight dealt Khusrav Khān a staggering blow. He consulted his comrades, who advised him to kill immediately all the surviving princes of the royal house, and then win over to his side the military leaders and captains of the army

¹ Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), p. 218.

² That attempts were made under Khusrav Khān's orders to pursue and capture Jauna follows from the *Tārīkh-i-Firoz Shāhī*, the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* and the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*. The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind., p. 88) maintains that a force of mounted soldiers was sent by Khusrav Khān in pursuit, and that they chased Jauna in vain for three days and nights.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind., p. 415).

by means of bribes. Khusrav acted accordingly. His murder of the princes inflamed the anger of Ghāzī Malik, who vowed to wreak vengeance on all concerned in this foul crime.¹

The *Tughluq Nāmah* further informs us of Khusrav Khān's second advisory council in which Yusuf Şūfī, a Muslim adherent of Khusrav Khān, made a powerful speech despising Ghāzī Malik and rousing his comrades to a decisive war with him. Furthermore, Yusuf Şūfī sent a messenger to Ghāzī Malik Tughluq at Dīpālpur urging him to surrender to Khusrav Khān and refrain from war. This made Ghāzī Malik indignant. He denounced Khusrav, and killed his messenger.²

The poet next tells us how Malik Fakhr-ud-Dawal related to his father the atrocities which had been perpetrated in Delhi by Khusrav Khān.³ This made Ghāzī Malik still more indignant. He ordered his private secretary (Dabīr-i-Khāṣ) to draft letters⁴ to (1) Amīr Muḡhlattī, the governor⁵ of Multān; (2) Muḡammad Shāh, the governor⁶ of Sivistān; (3) Bahrām Aibā, the governor of Uch⁷; (4) Yakhlakhī, the governor⁸ of Sāmāna; (5) Hoshang, the governor⁹ of Jālor; and (6) 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī¹⁰ desiring all to assist him in the retaliatory war that he intended to wage.

Of all the amīrs to whom letters were sent the most important in the eyes of Ghāzī Malik were Malik Bahrām Aibā and 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī. To Bahrām Aibā he took care to send the letter through a special favourite of his named 'Alī Ḥaidar.¹¹ 'Alī Ḥaidar exerted his personal influence and Malik Bahrām Aibā responded readily and came over to Ghāzī Malik. To 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī Ghāzī Malik Tughluq wrote a very persuasive letter. 'Ain-ul-Mulk showed the letter to Khusrav Khān and made no reply. Ghāzī Malik sent him a messenger¹² to make a personal appeal. 'Ain-ul-Mulk explained

¹ Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah* (i) H.B. MS., pp. 45-48; (ii) the Hyderabad edition, verses 843-896.

² Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, pp. 48-52.

³ The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (I.O. 3,089, f. 207b) confirms the *Tughluq Nāmah*.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 54-62.

⁵ Ibid., p. 62. In the original, the expression for the governor is Mīr.

⁶ Ibid., p. 57.

⁷ Ibid., p. 57.

⁸ Ibid., p. 57.

⁹ Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 57. The poet uses the term Muqṭī' instead of Mīr in this case.

¹⁰ Cf. p. 166.

¹¹ 'Alī Ḥaidar or Malik 'Alī Ḥaidar is mentioned by Hājjī-ul-Dabīr (III, p. 86) subsequently as a courtier of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq.

¹² Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, pp. 55-69.

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to him how he had as a matter of expediency joined the standards of Khusrav Khān, and promised to go over to Ghāzī Malik as soon as the war came to an end.¹

Mughlaṭṭī, the governor of Multān, who was jealous of Ghāzī Malik, refused to help him because he regarded himself as the natural leader of the revolt.² Thereupon, Ghāzī Malik incited the amīrs of Multān against Mughlaṭṭī urging them to rebel. A rebellion consequently broke out headed by one Bahrām Sirāj. Mughlaṭṭī was attacked and he took to flight, but was pursued and put to death.

Muḥammad Shāh, the governor of Sivistān, was in trouble. He had been thrown into prison, before Tughluq's letter arrived, by the recalcitrant nobles, who were probably roused by the surging reaction against Khusrav Khān's atrocities in Delhi. The nobles offered to release him, if he would agree to join hands with Ghāzī Malik. He agreed to do so, but the war had ended before his arrival.

Malik Yakhlakhī, the governor of Sāmāna, refused to co-operate and resolved to fight Tughluq, whose letter he forwarded to Khusrav

¹ The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (Bib. Ind., pp. 90 ff.) maintains that 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī had been made vazir by Khusrav Khān, and that he was in Delhi when Ghāzī Malik's letter arrived. He wrote a reply expressing his inability to join the ranks of Ghāzī Malik, but promised at the same time not to join Khusrav Khān. He resolved to betake himself elsewhere and await the issue of the war.

² Amīr Mughlaṭṭī's contention that the Muqṭī' of Dīpālpur—a dependency of Multān—was not in a position to lead the revolt throws light on the position of the Muqṭī' and the Iqṭā' (*vide supra*, p. 28n). Amīr Mughlaṭṭī takes pride in being the Vālī (the holder of the Vilāyat or province), as is attested by the following verse:

"I hold the vilāyat, and possess resources, a treasury as well as an army . . ."

He despises Tughluq as a Muqṭī' or petty governor of Dīpālpur, a mere village compared to the big town of Multān.

"Between him (a Muqṭī') and us (the amīr) there is as much difference as between Multān (a big town) and Dīpālpur, a village."

It seems that the position of the Muqṭī' was much inferior to that of the Vālī, at least in certain respects. Some of the following verses (Nos. 1183-1186) tend to confirm this view. A further confirmation is afforded by the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* which relates that on being despised and refused support by Amīr Mughlaṭṭī, Tughluq opened secret correspondence with the inhabitants and Muqṭī's of Multān (p. 89). It follows that Amīr Mughlaṭṭī, the Vālī of Multān, had a number of Muqṭī's under him.

That Tughluq was a Muqṭī' of Dīpālpur is mentioned by 'Afīf (p. 27), although the *Tughluq Nāmah* (p. 62) and the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (p. 89) call him "amīr." "Amīr" was the general title for a chief applicable both to the Vālī and the Muqṭī'. This is attested by the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (p. 89).

The *Tughluq Nāmah* informs us that Ghāzī Malik was for some time the Muqṭī' of Multān and that during his term of office he had built a great mosque—in all probability the same which Ibn Baṭṭūṭa saw subsequently (cf. p. 16 *supra*). He agrees (*Def. et Sang.*, III, p. 202) with Amīr Khusrav (*Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 63) that it was built by Tughluq and contained his famous inscription (see p. 16, *supra*).

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The *Tughluq Nāmah* and the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*¹ are fundamentally in accord as regards the contents and results of the letters,² though the former is decidedly more informative. It mentions six letters, unlike the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, which has only five. The sixth letter, according to the *Tughluq Nāmah*, was addressed and sent to Amīr Hoshang, the Muqṭī'³ of Jālor. He was the son of Amīr Kamāl-ud-dīn Garg and has been mentioned by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa as well as by Baranī in the annals of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. It is to be regretted that the poet gives no details regarding this letter, and it is not known how Amīr Hoshang acquitted himself. The *Tughluq Nāmah* is further outdone by the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, which tells us that on receiving answers to his letters Ghāzī Malik was disappointed and filled with anger. He then sent for Aibā and other maliks and amīrs, and made a fiery speech, which ran as follows :—

“ The Hindūs have captured the realm of Islām, and have subverted the ‘Alāī house. I hereby wish to avenge the wrongs done to that house. Just as you have readily and actively co-operated with me for years in the past I wish you even at this juncture to help me. I earnestly hope that with your help and co-operation I shall with others be able to wield the sword. . . .”

All the persons present having consented to this, the speech was recorded and drawn up in the form of a document, attested with the signatures of all.

Both the *Tughluq Nāmah* and the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* next proceed to describe Tughluq's preparations for war. The two accounts are in general agreement except for minor details. The *Tughluq Nāmah* relates the story of three of Ghāzī Malik's successive dreams, which foretold victory, and both give a thrilling account of Ghāzī Malik's adventure. A convoy with the revenues

¹ Yahya bin Aḥmad : *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 89.

² Neither Baranī nor Ibn Baṭṭūṭa takes notice of these letters. But a reference to them is found in the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (I.O. MS., F. 208 a and b) as well as in the *Muntaḥab-ut-Tavārikh* (p. 218).

³ Amīr Khusrav : *Tughluq Nāmah*, p. 57.

“ The next letter was sent to Hoshang, the Muqṭī' of Jālor, who, like his father, is a wolf in battle.”

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of Multān and Sivistān together with numerous horses was making its way to Delhi, and as soon as Ghāzī Malik came to know of this he sent a handful of his forces, captured the convoy and appropriated its wealth. With the money thus acquired Ghāzī Malik awarded two years' salary in advance to his armies.

It is interesting here to note that neither Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī nor 'Iṣāmī has mentioned any of the above facts, though both supply useful information concerning the war—more useful and richer in detail than the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*. But Amīr Khusrav, the great epic poet, gives by far the best account of the wars. His *Tughluq Nāmah* contains a lively description more detailed than any other history, contemporary or non-contemporary.

According to him Khusrav Khān sent his brother Khān Khānān against Ghāzī Malik. Setting out from Delhi for Dīpālpur the Khān Khānān reached Sartaba, a frontier outpost of Ghāzī Malik's *Iqṭā*. The fortress of Sartaba was next besieged. Maḥmūd, the commandant of the fortress, put up a stubborn resistance, but could not prevent the suburbs from being plundered.

After the Khusrav Khānīds had crossed the frontier, Ghāzī Malik's army was mobilized. It marched towards Delhi headed by Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, with Ghāzī Malik bringing up the rear. Passing through 'Alāpur¹ the army arrived at the Hauz Bahat² in the vicinity of which they encountered the enemy.

Tughluq's army presented a weird sight. It was divided into several divisions, one of which was cut off from the rest of the army. The Khusrav Khānīds viewed this complacently, thinking that Ghāzī Malik's army had been struck with panic and was on the point of retreat. Consequently they made a rush towards a certain division, and fell upon it. Instantly, however, they caught sight of another division of the Tughluq army. This was easily defeated. So, the assailants, still more encouraged, made a furious charge. But hardly had the assault materialized than the various divisions of Ghāzī Malik's army, headed by their leaders—Bahā-ud-dīn,

¹, ² Amīr Khusrav locates the site of the battle beyond 'Alāpur in the vicinity of Hauz-i-Bahat, which the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (p. 90) describes as Hauz-i-Hahātī (Hauz-i-Bahātī). Baranī (p. 416) mentions Dalili, which Raverty (*J.A.S.B.*, 1893, Pt. I, p. 262) writes Dabhalī. He is of opinion that Dabhalī lay between Dīpālpur and Sarastī or Sirsa, 36 miles west of Abohar (Uboh-har). Budāunī (Ranking, p. 293) writes "the reservoir of Thānesar," which is presumably a mistake. Firishṭa (Bombay: Vol. I, p. 229) fixes the battle in the vicinity of the Sarsutī. The *Riḥla* makes no mention of the site of the battle.

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Asad-ud-dīn, 'Alī Haidar, and Shihāb-ud-dīn—advanced, and came in sight of the enemy. The latter, having advanced much too far, found retreat impossible. The Tughluq army now moved rapidly. One wing encircled the Khusrav Khānīds; and surrounding them on all sides, shot hundreds of them down with arrows. Then the rest of the Tughluq army charged the enemy, Tughluq personally taking the lead. As a result, the Khusrav Khānīds were panic-stricken, Khusrav Khān, Yusuf Khān, Shāistah Khān, and Khizr Khān, the various commanders of Khusrav's army, taking to flight. One division, however, put up a fight against Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, but not for long, for their leader Khān Khānān had fled. Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna refrained from pursuing the fugitives, and preferred to collect the booty. Among other valuables left behind by the Khusrav Khānīds, Jauna obtained Khusrav Khān's red parasol, and twelve elephants.

As Ghāzī Malik marched in triumph towards Delhi, Khusrav Khān, stricken with grief, gave up all hope. He spoke his mind to his comrades, who tendered their advice to him. Some were of the opinion that peace should be made with Tughluq. Others held that a final sally should be made, but that the booty from the imperial treasury should be first distributed to the army. Khusrav Khān approved of this plan, and ordered a general levy of the army in the Hauz-i-Khāṣ, where the soldiers' tents were pitched. In front of the camp a ditch was dug, the rear being protected by a wall, which encircled the Raushan Hauz, the water supply of the Khusrav Khānīds.

On his way to Delhi, Ghāzī Malik crossed the Sarsuti¹—the extreme boundary of his territory. He then came to Hānsī, whence he proceeded to Madīna.² Later he arrived at Rohtak, and thence went past the towns of Maṇḍautī and Pālam. Crossing the *Kasambūr*

¹ Cf. (i) Elliot, Vol. II, p. 350, and Vol. I, p. 49. (ii) *Tabaqāt-i-Nāṣiri* (Bib. Ind., p. 120). The author mentions Sarsuti in connection with the battle of Tarain (1192/588). Rāj Pithaura is said to have been taken prisoner in the neighbourhood of the Sarsuti. Sarsuti is considered as part of the Sivālik territory and was together with Hānsī next captured. Raverty (p. 468) notes that the ancient word was Saraswati. The printed text of the *Tabaqāt-i-Nāṣiri* has Sursi, but the correct word is Sarsuti. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, p. 142) mentions Sursuti as a great city, which may be identified with the modern Sirsa. It was situated on the bank of the river Sarsuti. (*Āin-i-Akbari*, Jarret, Vol. II, pp. 105, 281, 294, 326, and Raverty, p. 468.)

² Madīna is now a village a few miles north of Rohtak. *Tughluq Nāmah* (Hyderabad edition, pp. 54-57).

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hills of the Arāvallis he came into the plain of Lahrāwat¹—a plain bounded by the Jumna on the east, and Sirī on the south.

It should be noted that the *Tughluq Nāmah* alone gives us in detail the course of Ghāzī Malik's march towards Delhi. The information it has given seems correct on the whole, and is borne out by Baranī,² who likewise mentions Lahrāwat as the site of Tughluq's camp.

Amīr Khusrav tells us that Khusrav's army included many Muslim chiefs; namely Yusuf Khān Šūfī, Kamāl-ud-dīn Šūfī, Shāistah Khān Qar Qimār; Amīr Ḥajib Kāfur Muhrdār and Shihāb, the governor of Oudh (Awadh). Of the Hindū chiefs the poet mentions Ahar Deo, Amar Deo, Narsia, Parsia, Harmār, and Parmār, the most important of all being Khusrav Khān's brother Khān Khānān and his uncle Rāi Rāyān Randhol. Thus Khusrav Khān's army consisted of an almost equal number of Hindūs and Muslims.

As soon as Ghāzī Malik reached the plain of Lahrāwat he was challenged to battle by Khusrav Khān. Having reached there first he had made his preparations for war, while Ghāzī Malik Tughluq was anxious to gain time by delaying the fight. The Ghāzī was forced, however, to draw up his army immediately in battle array. The disposition of his forces was as follows :—

- I. (a) the right commanded by Bahā-ud-Daula.
(b) the right wing commanded by Malik Bahrām Aibā.
(c) the reserve commanded by 'Alī Ḥaidar.
- II. (a) the left commanded by Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna.³

¹ Lahrāwat (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 418) lay somewhere between Hauz-i-'Alāi and Delhi. It is difficult to fix the site exactly, because Lahrāwat was only a village and was perhaps destroyed soon afterwards.

² According to Baranī (p. 415) Khusrav Khān sent his brother Khān Khānān, accompanied by Amīr Šūfī Khān at the head of a large army against Ghāzī Malik, who came out of Dipālpur, and using the Sarsuti river to protect his rear gave battle to the enemy near the town of Dalili. In the very first sally Khān Khānān and Šūfī Khān were routed. They fled to Delhi, their armies having melted away. Their camp was plundered and their canopy, elephants, horses and treasure fell into the hands of the victor.

A week later Ghāzī Malik proceeded to Delhi and halted at Indrapat. Dismayed and distressed at the defeat of his forces, Khusrav Khān now marched in person out of Sirī at the head of a large army. To induce men to fight in his cause he brought with him the "whole treasure," which he distributed recklessly on the way to his soldiers. But so deep was the soldiers' distrust and so profound their hatred of him that they seized huge sums of money and retired home. The battle was fought near the town of Lahrāwat. But Khusrav Khān's troops were routed at the first sally, and Khusrav Khān fled for his life.

³ The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* similarly describes the plan and division of Tughluq's army. The difference between the version of the *Tughluq Nāmah* and that of the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* lies in the assignment of positions. Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, for instance, is mentioned in the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (F. 212A) as being posted together with an amīr named Shihāb on the right wing.

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(b) the left wing commanded by Asad.

(c) the reserve under several amīrs.¹

III. the centre under the personal charge of Ghāzī Malik.

Further, he ordered his chieftains to tie peacock feathers² round their banners to serve as a distinctive mark, and fixed the word "Qala"³ as the password for his army.

Khusrav Khān's army was the first to advance to the attack and, penetrating to the centre of the Tughluq army, put it to flight. But Tughluq himself stood his ground with only a handful of three hundred horsemen.⁴ Before long some of his comrades rallied to him, and fell upon the Khusrav Khānids. This attack proved an unqualified success. Khusrav Khān's army was disorganised and fled in utter confusion.

Amīr Khusrav informs us that the above charge was carefully planned by Tughluq himself. He had contrived that the brunt of the attack should fall on the weakest points of Khusrav's army, and the lead was taken by him personally. He made a charge on Khusrav Khān's parasol, which collapsed on his head. This was Tughluq's *coup de grâce*. Khusrav's army was consequently reduced to a rabble and a mass of fugitives.

Tughluq's troops then set their hands to plunder. While plundering they were suddenly attacked by a detachment of Khusrav Khān's army—a detachment, which had been kept in reserve, and was commanded by his Muslim officers headed by Yusuf Šūfī. Yusuf Šūfī had bided his time, and succeeded in taking the Tughluq troops unawares. He might have carried the day but for Ghāzī Malik, who forthwith realized the gravity of the situation. He pulled himself together, and contrived—by fixing his standard firmly in the ground, and making the kettle-drum beat incessantly and loudly—to rally his army. He then fell upon his assailants and utterly defeated them.

Amīr Khusrav is on the whole confirmed by Ibn Battūta.⁵ He

¹ Amīr Khusrav gives no name.

² The poet (p. 122) informs us that peacock feathers had been the distinctive mark of Ghāzī Malik's banners in his wars against the Mongols. He held them auspicious, and looked upon them as emblems of victory.

³ "In that battle which looked like a world calamity, the password of Malik Ghāzī's army was 'Qala.'" (Amīr Khusrav, p. 123.)

⁴ On this point Amīr Khusrav is corroborated by Ibn Battūta (Def. et Sang., III, p. 205).

⁵ Def. et Sang., III, p. 205.

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holds that the Hindūs who formed the rank and file of Khusrav Khān's army put up a very severe fight. Ghāzī Malik's army was panic-stricken, and his camp was plundered. He remained stranded with his original three hundred veterans, whom he roused by a stirring speech. His scattered army having once more rallied he fell upon the enemy and carried the day.

Amīr Khusrav¹ tells us that the victor spent the rest of the day in the camp. On the following day, Saturday, the 6th of September, 1320 (1st of Sha'bān, 720) he set out marching triumphantly to the capital. The procession was headed by a row of elephants captured from Khusrav Khān's army. Next came the drummers beating their drums, and trumpeters blowing their horns, and the naqībs² calling out "Dūrbāsh."³ Then followed the infantry and cavalry brandishing their swords. The poet does not tell us the position of Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna and of Ghāzī Malik in the procession. Probably they held the central position. On reaching the royal palace, the Hazār Sutūn of Sirī, Tughluq dismounted from his horse and prostrated himself by way of thanksgiving to God. On rising he announced a general amnesty. An assembly was next held in which all were treated and seated as equals, no honour or prominence whatever being assumed by Tughluq in token of his victory. Shortly after he rose and made a speech calling on the amīrs to make whomsoever they liked king, and dissociating himself from every kind of desire or aspiration for rule. The amīrs made an appropriate reply fully acknowledging Tughluq's distinctive parts. They cited instances of Tughluq's victories which, they contended, constituted his title to the throne. Tughluq declined, and insisted that even if the royal stock had died out, any of the amīrs could be selected, and made king. But he was silenced, and set thinking, when he was told that he would be surely put to death, should any other person ascend the throne, because of all the people in Hindustān he would be the most formidable rival. Tughluq then consented to become king.⁴

¹ Amīr Khusrav: *Tughluq Nāmah*, pp. 132-34.

² "Naqīb" was a servant whose duty was to proclaim the titles of his master. (Steingass, p. 1421.)

³ According to Steingass (p. 543), "Dūrbāsh" is a mace or baton with which the mob is kept from pressing too close in public solemnities.

⁴ Tughluq consented to become king on the 6th September, 1320 (1st Sha'bān, 720). He ascended the throne on Saturday, the 7th of September, 1320 (2nd Sha'bān, 720). *Tughluq Nāmah*, pp. 132-134. This date of Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq's accession to the throne (721/1321) has better claims to accuracy than that given

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Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī differs from Amīr Khusrav regarding certain details. He holds that Tughluq did not achieve the victory over Khusrav until the close of the day. The following night he spent in the camp. On the morrow he set out with a large following for the town of Sīrī and the Hazār Sutūn palace where great amīrs and chiefs had assembled. He took his seat in their midst, and mourned in common with them the loss of Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn and his brothers. Then he offered thanks to God for his victories, and addressed the assembly, saying :—

“ I am one of those who were exalted by Sultān ‘Alā-ud-dīn and Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn. Because of my inborn faithfulness I risked my life, and battled with the enemies, and destroyers, of my (royal) patrons. I took revenge as best I could. You are the notables of the ‘Alāī and Quṭbī realm. If any descendant of our patrons has survived, I ask you to bring him here instantly so that we should instal him on the throne ; and I should gird up my loins (like a slave) before that offspring of my patron and pay him my homage. In case the enemies have completely wiped out the descendants of Sultān ‘Alā-ud-dīn and Quṭb-ud-dīn I shall ask you as notables of either age to nominate and instal on the throne whomsoever you deem fit for rule. I for one am prepared to bow to him, and to abide by your choice. Verily I drew the sword merely to avenge the murder of my patrons, not to seize power. I hazarded my all—my life, my property, and my family—not for the sake of gaining a throne but with the object of wreaking vengeance on the murderers of my patrons. Whomsoever you are pleased to select as sovereign I also shall acknowledge him.” In answer to this the assembly replied, “ Not a single son of Sultān ‘Alā-ud-dīn and Quṭb-ud-dīn fit to rule has survived the tyranny of these ingrates. These are difficult times when, on account of the murder of Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn, the predominance of Khusrav and the Parwārīs, and the outbreak of rebellions and disorders, chaos reigns supreme. You, Ghāzī Malik ! decidedly command our allegiance : for so many years you have been our protection against the Mongols. It is on account of you that the Mongols ceased to invade India. Even

by Firishta and others. The same date, i.e., 720/1320, is also given by ‘Iṣāmī. *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, I.O. MS., F. 214A.

According to the *Memoirs of MuḤammad bin Tughluq*, Ghiyās-ud-dīn's reign lasted four years and ten months, and not four years and four months, as is generally supposed. A computation made on the basis of the *Tughluq Nāmah*, and the *Memoirs of MuḤammad bin Tughluq*, yields July, 1325, as the date of Ghiyās-ud-dīn's death. This finds confirmation in the remarks of the *Basātin-ul-Uns* (B. M. Add., 7717) regarding the burning heat of that time. The author, then a member of the royal suite, had journeyed along with Ghiyās-ud-dīn from Tīrḥut back to Delhi. (See p. 252.)

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in the recent crisis it is you who rendered such invaluable service that your faithfulness will be writ large in the pages of history. It is you again who delivered Islām from the hands of the Hindūs and Parwārīs. It is you who wreaked vengeance on the murderers of our lords and masters. You have proved your right to the allegiance of the rank and file of the people of this country. Out of so many servants and slaves of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn it is you whom God granted the grace and aptitude to render the distinguished service. It is you to whom He granted success. Each and every one of us—indeed all the Muslims of this country—are beholden to you; and we hereby see none except you fit to rule. As far as we see no one saving you possesses intellect, talents, learning and probity befitting a king."

This was the cry which rang out from the whole audience. All the great leaders, having then agreed, caught hold of Ghāzī Malik's hand and installed him on the throne. As Ghāzī Malik had rescued the Muslims he became known to history as Ghiyās-ud-dīn (refuge of religion).

Like Baranī, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa gives no detailed account of these events. He says not a word about Tughluq's procession from Lahrāwat to Sirī, which is graphically described by Amīr Khusrav. According to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa people crowded round Tughluq after the victory, and he took the road to the city. The Kotwāl brought him the keys. Tughluq entered the palace, and said to Kishlū Khān,¹ "You should become the king." Kishlū Khān said in reply, "But you should become the king." Kishlū Khān concluded by saying, "If you refuse, your son will become king." Tughluq did not like this, and instantly accepted the kingship, and ascended the throne. The upper classes as well as the common people swore allegiance to him.

It should be noted that no historian except Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² has mentioned this dispute between Tughluq and Kishlū Khān; and none has mentioned that Jauna Khān was proposed as a candidate for the throne. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa has not mentioned his authority for this statement. As he was not an eye-witness and came to India many years later, his statement cannot be readily accepted.

As regards the fate of Khusrav Khān, Amīr Khusrav, Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and 'Iṣāmī³ are in general agreement. He was, under Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq's orders, captured by Jauna

¹ For Kishlū Khān or Bahrām Aibā Kishlū Khān see pp. 145, 146 ff.

² (i) B. N. MS 909, F. 124. (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 206.

³ But 'Iṣāmī (*Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, F. 214A) makes no mention of the part played by Jauna Khān in the capture of Khusrav Khān.

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Khān from a garden where he had hidden himself. He was paraded ignominiously through the streets and in spite of his entreaties put to death.

There is no such agreement regarding the period of Khusrav Khān's rule.¹ Ibn Battūṭa specifies no period; Baranī gives no year. He vaguely says that Khusrav Khān's reign ranged from three to four months. The *Tughluq Nāmāh* implies² that he ruled only two months in the year 1320/720. While the year 1320/720 is right because it is confirmed by a coin of Khusrav Khān bearing the date 720, the number of months cannot be fixed at two, because Sulṭān Muḥammad distinctly mentions four in his autobiography. This is borne out by the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*.³

Thus was established the Tughluq dynasty contemporary with the Plantagenets of England. Nominally the dynasty continued over 100 years (1320-1414), but its effective rule did not extend beyond 68 years—a period in which the throne was filled by the first three rulers, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq (1320-25), Muḥammad bin Tughluq (1325-51), and Fīroz Shāh (1351-88) successively. Before long decline set in. The convulsions of Sulṭān Muḥammad's reign dealt a staggering blow to the empire, recovery from which was rendered impossible by the weakness of Fīroz Shāh. The dying eyes of Fīroz witnessed the ghastly scene of domestic strife and rebellion, and in spite of his numerous offspring⁴—Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq II, Abū Bakr, Muḥammad Shāh, Sikandar I, Maḥmūd II and Nuṣrāt Shāh—the Tughluq dynasty came to an end within a decade of his death (1388). Tīmūr came in 1398 to administer the *coup de grâce*.

¹ The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* and the *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* place Khusrav Khān's rule erroneously in A.H. 721 (A.D. 1321).

² According to the *Tughluq Nāmāh*, Sulṭān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh was murdered on the first night of Jāmādī-us-Sānī, 720 (9th July, 1320), and the battle between Khusrav Khān and Ghāzi Malik was fought exactly two months after this, Tughluq ascending the throne on the following day—Saturday, 1st Sha'bān, 720 (6th September, 1320). Hence, the dates of Khusrav Khān's rule, 9th July, 1320-6th September, 1320.

³ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (I. O. MS. 3089, F. 214A).

⁴ Fīroz Shāh Tughluq was succeeded by his grandson, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq II, who was deposed and killed within a few months (1388). A second grandson, Abū Bakr, who next ascended the throne, met with a similar fate (1389). Then came Muḥammad Shāh, the third son of Sulṭān Fīroz. He ruled for over two years (1389-92). He was followed by three feeble princes. Sikandar I died within a few months (1392). His son Muḥammad II ruled nominally about twenty years (1392-1413), but he was like a tool in the hands of the powerful amirs and had to wage wars with a rival king, Nuṣrāt Shāh, another grandson of Fīroz Shāh, set up by a rival party of nobles.

CHAPTER III

NAME AND DESCENT

THERE has been much speculation concerning the word "Tughluq."¹ Despite the efforts of Firishta and Sujān Rāi, its origin, as Sir Wolseley Haig points out,² remains obscure. Dictionaries³ do not as a rule mention the word. Firishta⁴ suggests that "Tughluq" is an Indian corruption of "Qutlugh," a regular Turkī substantive. But, although he mentions the *Mulḥiqāt*⁵ as his authority, his reasoning is not sound.

The confusion, which thus arose regarding "Tughluq," became worse by the different opinions held with regard to its conventional use. Some held it to be the name of a tribe or of a family, others that of a person. Sir Wolseley Haig⁶ once regarded it as a tribal name.

It is still regarded as the cognomen, and is commonly attributed to all the monarchs of the Tughluq dynasty, although none except the first two rulers—Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq and Sultān Muḥammad—really used it along with their names. Of all the names borne by the successors of Sultān Muḥammad there is none with the suffix "Tughluq." The following titles occur on the coins of Sultān Fīroz : (1) Abul Muẓaffar Fīroz Shāh As-sultānī, (2) Fīroz Sultānī, (3) Fīroz Shāh.⁷

¹ The transliteration of the word varies from Tughlaq, the form used by Mr. Moreland (p. 45) and Tughlak as Lanc-Poole prefers it to Taghlik, as Sir Aurel Stein would have it (*Ruins of Desert Cathay*, I, pp. 180, 185). But Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (*Def. et Sang.*, III, p. 201) gives "Tughluq" as the correct form, and there is no reason to question his knowledge of the word. Such is also the opinion of Sir Wolseley Haig (*J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922).

² *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922.

³ The *Lughāt-i-Kishvārī* (1872), p. 105, mentions Tughluq as a Turkī word for a chief. Maulvi Muḥammad Ḥusain (pp. 83-84) takes it to mean a hillock, but gives no authority.

⁴ Firishta (Bombay), Vol. I, p. 230.

⁵ As far as I know, the *Mulḥiqāt* of 'Ain-ud-dīn Bijāpurī is not available now.

⁶ "I have no doubt that Tughluq is a tribal name. . . . As Tughluq is a tribal name it is not necessary to describe the second of the line as Muḥammad ibn Tughluq, as is often done. Each ruler of the dynasty is entitled to bear the tribal name as a cognomen." (Haig: *J.R.A.S.*, 1922, pp. 319-72.)

⁷ Thomas, *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 274.

RISE AND FALL OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

The coins of the successors¹ of Sultān Fīroz bear the following titles :—

- (1) Tughluq Shāh.
- (2) Abū Bakr Shāh bin Zafar bin Fīroz Shāh Sultānī.
- (3) Muḥammad Shāh Fīroz Shāh (Muḥammad Shāh-i-Fīroz Shāh).
- (4) Sikandar Shāh or Sikandar Shāh Muḥammad Shāh (Sikandar Shāh-i-Muḥammad Shāh).
- (5) Maḥmūd Shāh Muḥammad Shāh Fīroz Shāh or Maḥmūd Shāh Muḥammad Shāh (*i.e.*, Maḥmūd Shāh, son of Muḥammad Shāh).
- (6) Nuṣrat Shāh.

None of these kings used the word “ Tughluq ” as part of his name. Almost every one of them added to his own name that of his father to show his parentage. They might have used “ Tughluq ” instead, if “ Tughluq ” had been a family name or if it had signified a class, clan or tribe.

Of all these monarchs Sultān Muḥammad alone used the word Tughluq invariably with his name. His coins² bear “ Muḥammad bin Tughluq,” “ Muḥammad Tughluq,”³ “ Muḥammad Shāh Tughluq,” “ Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq,” or “ Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq Shāh.” This shows that Tughluq was not an essential part of the Sultān’s name but merely indicative of his parentage, for it was customary in those days for a Muslim to bracket his name with that of his father in order to show his parentage. Almost all the Muslim rulers of medieval India did so except those whose fathers were obscure, and whom they did not desire as a matter of policy to mention publicly.⁴ The coins and inscriptions of Sultān Mu’izz-ud-dīn Muḥammad of Ghūr bear his name as well as that of his father, Sām.

Similar is the case with the coins struck at Ajmer by the son of Rāi Pithaura acknowledging the paramountcy of Muḥammad

¹ Thomas, *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 301-18.

² Thomas, pp. 207-249.

³ The genitive case (*izāfat-i-ibnī*) showing the parentage is not expressed on the coins, but it is understood. This is borne out by Badr Chāch (I.O. MSS. 1232, 1233), who occasionally uses in his verses the name Muḥammad Tughluq making the genitive (*izāfat-i-ibnī*) understood.

⁴ Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq, Jalāl-ud-dīn Khalji, ‘Alā-ud-dīn Khalji, Nāṣir-ud-dīn Khusrav, and Fīroz Shāh did not mention the name of their respective fathers because they were obscure.

of Ghūr. One¹ of the coins mentioned by Edward Thomas in his *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi* bears on the obverse Prithvī and on the reverse Srī Muḥammad Sām.

Curiously enough, no mistake has been made regarding the name of Muḥammed of Ghūr. "Sām" has never been regarded as part of his name, while "Tughluq" has erroneously been considered as part of the name of Sultān Muḥammad Shāh.

The numismatic evidence mentioned above is fully borne out by the contemporary writings,² by the epigraphic records³ and by the odes of Badr Chāch. In the twenty-three verses, which are found to contain the emperor's name, the poet uses Muḥammad-i-Tughluq in six and Muḥammad Shāh or Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq in the remaining seventeen. A few verses are translated below for illustration.

"Muḥammad-i-Tughluq (Muḥammad son of Tughluq) is the prince of the Sultāns; he is the select among the kings invested by the caliphs. He is the greatest of the warrior-lords."

"Muḥammad, son of Tughluq, is the prince of kings; his helper is God."

"Sultān Muḥammad, whom the caliph has invested with the government of the universe, is at once the head of the church and state."

¹ Thomas, p. 18.

² (a) Muḥammad Dāūd bin Sulaimān Khāqānī dedicating his commentary on *Bānāt Su'ād* (I.O. MS. 2646, F. 104-5), the famous ode in praise of the Prophet, to Sultān Muḥammad mentions his name as Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

(b) Ṣadr-i-'Āla Ahmad Ḥasan Dabīr, a native of Delhi, a hereditary servant of the court, and author of the *Basātin-ul-Uns* (B.M. Add. 7717), a contemporary work, mentions the Sultān's name as Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq Shāh.

(c) The *Futūḥāt-i-Firoz Shāhī*, which embodies the ordinances of Sultān Firoz Shāh gives Sultān Muḥammad's name in the same way.

(d) The *Sirat-i-Firoz Shāhī* gives the Sultān's name as Muḥammad Shāh and his father's name as Tughluq Shāh.

P. 7, MS. Bankipore Library.

(e) The *Inshā-i-Māhrū* quotes a letter of Malik-us-Sharq Shihāb-ud-Daulah, governor (Muqṭī') of Budāūn, addressed to Sultān Muḥammad congratulating him on his accession. The heading of the letter, which has been framed by 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī, the compiler of the *Inshā-i-Māhrū*, the famous courtier of the Sultāns of Delhi, and a rebel against Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, gives the name as Muḥammad Shāh.

P. 36. Letter No. XIII. The *Inshā-i-Māhrū*. MS. Bengal Asiatic Society.

(f) Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī mentions the name as Muḥammad Shāh, son of Tughluq Shāh.

(g) Ibn Battūta (Def. et Sang., III, p. 215) gives the original name as Jauna, by which he was known early in his life. On his accession to the throne he assumed the name Abul Mujāhid (father of fighters in the way of God), Muḥammad Shāh.

³ Vide Appendix B.

RISE AND FALL OF MUḤAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

“Muḥammad Shāh, the son of Tughluq, is the powerful master of the east and the west ; from fear of his sword the sun is trembling within the nine skies.”

“Muḥammad Shāh is the ambitious and magnanimous king of the whole world ; in comparison to the waves of his heart the river found itself reduced to a drop.”

“Sultān Muḥammad enjoys the title of Abul Mujāhid (chief of the fighters in the way of God), Zille-i-Haq (shadow of God) ; he is so great that the smoke of the candle of his evening parties gives lustre to the effulgent sun.”

“Sultān Muḥammad is the king whose sword has conquered the land as well as the sea ; his enemy struck with envy has been shedding tears.”

“Muḥammad Shāh is the viceregent of the caliph of the age : he is like ‘Alī, the fourth caliph, master of all the sciences.”

“Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq is such a king that as soon as he ascended the throne he was inspired and began to discover hidden things.”

“Muḥammad, the son of Tughluq, is the chief of the fighters in the way of God, and is a Ghāzī : his position is so high that the king of China and Cathay is a slave at his palace.”

“The present king of India is one whose patronymic is *Abul Mujāhid* ; and whose name like that of the Prophet of Arabia is Muḥammad.”

“Sultān Muḥammad, the son of Tughluq, is the king of the world ; it befits Alexander to become a servant at his court.”

Another verse, analyzed according to the ‘Ilm-i-Jafr (art of divining), yields Muḥammad, the name of the king.¹

Almost all later writers—‘Afif, Niẓām-ud-dīn, Budāūnī and Firishṭa—have followed suit.² ‘Afif gives Sultān Tughluq as the name of the first ruler of the dynasty, and Sultān Muḥammad as that of the second. Niẓām-ud-dīn³ mentions the latter as Muḥammad-i-Tughluq Shāh, while Budāūnī¹ calls him Muḥammad ‘Ādil. There is reason to believe that Sultān Muḥammad claimed to be ‘Ādil (just), and liked to associate this dignified word with his name,

¹ ‘Uṣmān Khān : *Commentary on the Odes of Badr Chāch* (1867), Vol. II, p. 480.

² ‘Afif : *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, p. 27.

³ Niẓām-ud-dīn : *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 198. It should be noted that the genitive (izāfat) is understood in the text.

¹ Budāūnī : *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), p. 225.

as is attested by his coins¹ and architecture.² But his claim to be 'Ādil was strongly questioned by the 'Ulamā.³ And it is doubtful how far it was really acknowledged by Fīroz Shāh, although the latter mentions him as Muḥammad 'Ādil in his *Khutba*⁴ (sermon).

It follows that Muḥammad was the name of the Sultān, and that he was variously known as Muḥammad Shāh, Muḥammad bin Tughluq, Muḥammad-i-Tughluq, Muḥammad Shāh-i-Tughluq, Muḥammad bin Tughluq Shāh, and Muḥammad Shāh. He has also been called Muḥammad III,⁵ and Muḥammad II.⁶ If Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn Muḥammad bin Sām be regarded as the first king of Delhi, as is borne out by his coins, he should be called Muḥammad I; Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Muḥammad *Khajī* should be Muḥammad II; and Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, Muḥammad III. Enough has been written to prove that Muḥammad Tughluq or Muḥammad Tughlaq, as some historians⁷ call him, is a misnomer.

Equally confusing are the theories concerning his descent. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁸ makes out that he belonged to the race of the Qarauna Turks.

"Qarauna" is a term of which the origin or meaning is as obscure as that of "Tughluq." In his enquiries regarding the descent and origin of Tughluq, Firishta did not come across "Qarauna." Hence no help can be had from him. Even Ibn Baṭṭūṭa gives no details.

Marco Polo⁹ describes the Qaraunas ("Caraonas or Karaunah") as a people of mixed breed, and attributes the name "Karaunah" to their mixed parentage. Yule¹⁰ thinks that Marco Polo was mis-

¹ Lane-Poole, S.: *The Coins of the Sultāns of Delhi in the British Museum*. Nos. 280, 281, 282, 283.

² Sultān Muḥammad's fortress at Delhi was named 'Ādilābād.

³ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, p. 293 ff.) relates the story of Sultān Muḥammad's torture, and murder of Shaikh Shihāb-ud-dīn. The latter had refused to attend and obey the Sultān because he regarded him as a tyrant.

⁴ 'Alf: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhi* (Bib. Ind.), p. 107.

⁵ Dow, A.: *The History of Hindostān*, I, 299.

⁶ Lane-Poole (*The Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 300) calls Muḥammad bin Tughluq Muḥammad II, and so does Levy (Levy, R.: *The Sociology of Islām*, Vol. II, p. 263).

⁷ Moreland: *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 15.

⁸ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa was informed by Shaikh Rukn-ud-dīn Multānī that Sultān Tughluq belonged to the race of the Qarauna Turks, who lived in the hilly regions between Turkistān and Sind (Def. et Sang., III, p. 201).

⁹ According to Marco Polo, Qaraunas (Caraonas) were people whose fathers were Tartars and mothers Indians. They were robbers by profession. Their chief, Nogodar, fled with a body of 10,000 Qaraunas from his uncle, Chaghatāi, to India, where he seized the province of Dalivar (Lahore) from Asedīn Soldan (Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn). There he established himself and spent his life fighting the Tartars. (Yule's *Marco Polo*, pp. 98-99.)

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

led by the term Qarāun ("Kārāun"), which, he assumes, was in use among the Mongols. "Qaraun" derived from Qara—black—denoted dark children born of Mongol fathers and black mothers. Mzik¹ is of opinion that "Qarauna" is connected with the Sanskrit "Karaṇa" which means mixed caste, the father being *Kṣatriya* and the mother *Śūdra*. He does not agree with Yule that "Qarauna" is derived from a word Qara meaning black. That would only be a popular etymology prompted by the fact that the word denoted the offspring of a white Aryan with a black Sudra woman.

The translators of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*² tell us that "Qaraunah" or "Qarāwana" was a term of reproach. It was contemptuously used by the "Moghuls" for the Chaghatāis. Perhaps it was used equally contemptuously in regard to Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa or by his authority Shaikh Rukn-ud-dīn Multānī, a saint by no means favourably inclined to the Sultān. No other historian identifies him with the Qaraunas. Badr Chāch,³ the court poet, traces the Sultān's descent from Bahrām Gōr, the fifth king (246-93) of the Sasānian dynasty of Persia.

While Ibn Baṭṭūṭa is at variance with Badr Chāch he also differs from Marco Polo—a difference which raises two important points: (1) Were the Qaraunas Turks or Mongols? (2) How and when, if at all, did they come to settle in India?

Marco Polo⁴ uses in regard to the Qaraunas the term Tartar in a sense apparently synonymous with Mongol. Mirkhvānd⁵ describes the Qaraunas as a tribe forming a special division in the Mongol army. Waṣṣāf⁶ is reported to have mentioned a tribe among the Mongols named "Kurānas." He describes the Qarawinah or Qarawinas who were enlisted in the Chaghatāi armies. Moreover, there is an evidence⁷ of the existence in modern Persia of the Qaraunas, who speak Turkī and are considered part of the

¹ Mzik: *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Batuta durch Indien und China*, p. 97.

² Elias, N., and Ross, Sir E. D.: *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, pp. 75-79.

³ "You (Sultān Muḥammad I) are the light of the eye of Bahrām . . ."

"You (Sultān Muḥammad I) are the master of the world, and the pride of the house of Bahrām . . ."

"Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq is such a king that by virtue of his good fortune the standard of the house of Bahrām surpassed the sky." (*Odes of Badr Chāch*.) I.O. MSS., Nos. 1232, 1233.

⁴ Yule: *Travels of Marco Polo*, Vol. I, p. 98.

⁵ Mirkhvānd: *Rauzat-uṣ-Ṣafā*, Vol. V, p. 96.

⁶ (i) Elias, N., and Ross, Sir E. D.: *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, p. 77. (ii) *Tārīkh-i-waṣṣāf* (Bombay), p. 265.

⁷ Ibid., Appendix B, p. 491.

Goklān Turkman, though they identify themselves with the Chingīz Khānī "Moghuls." Probably the Qaraunas were Turks of mixed breed, and came like other tribes—Uighurs, Naimans, and Karluks—of Turkī descent, who joined the Mongol hordes, to be associated with the Mongols. If Tughluq or his father came to settle in India under Balban, and afterwards rose to prominence as Firishta informs us, he should be a Turk rather than a Mongol, since Balban hated the Mongols, and welcomed Turks.

Making a compromise between the different accounts of Ibn Battūta and Badr Chāch regarding Sultān Muḥammad's descent one feels constrained to conclude that he was certainly a Turk as his father's name "Tughluq"—a Turkī word—indicates, but he was not identical with the Qaraunas, being a lineal descendant of the Sasānian kings of Persia.

Marco Polo's theory regarding the Qarauna settlement in India is misleading. He confounds Nogodar, whom he mentions as the progenitor of the Qaraunas in India, with Nigudar Aghul,¹ who had nothing to do with the Qaraunas. On the contrary they were his enemies, since they formed the peculium of his rival and nephew, Arghūn bin Abāqā, and eventually brought about his destruction (1284/683).

The *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*² informs us that the Mongols raided Northern India and captured Lahore (1239) under the weak rule of Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn (1239-41)—the Asedin of Marco Polo, whom Yule tries to identify with Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban.³ Malik Ikhtiyār-ud-dīn Qarā-Kush, the governor (Muqṭī) of Lahore, fleeing from them came to Delhi. The Sultān sent an army headed by the Vazīr to repel them, but a rebellion having broken out in the army the Vazīr returned to Delhi, and fomented an insurrection, which resulted in the deposition and murder of the Sultān. Prince 'Alā-ud-dīn was then raised to the throne. He was a weakling like his predecessor. The Mongols who had seized Lahore under Mu'izz-ud-dīn remained in possession of it until⁴ the accession of 'Alā-ud-dīn Mas'ūd and

¹ According to Mirkhvānd (*Rauzat-us-Safā*, Vol. V, p. 100) Nigudar Aghul was the son of Hūlāgū, and brother of Abāqā. He revolted against Abāqā and fled from him, not from Chaghatāi, as has been reported by Marco Polo.

² P. 194.

³ Yule: *Travels of Marco Polo*, Vol. I, pp. 104-105.

⁴ Sir Wolsley Haig implies that the Mongols retired immediately after taking Lahore. (*Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 63). But the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* (pp. 194-96) makes no mention of the Mongol retreat from Lahore under Mu'izz-ud-dīn.

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perhaps for some time afterwards. Flushed with their victory in the Panjāb, the Mongols made a fresh incursion on Uch (1245).

The prolonged occupation of Lahore by the Mongols might have led to their association with Indian women. This might be considered more reasonable than Marco Polo's version of Nogodar's flight as marking the arrival of the Qaraunas in India, for there is no proof that the Qaraunas came to India *in large numbers* as settlers.

CHAPTER IV

ULUGH KHĀN

(A) REORGANISATION UNDER GHIYĀS-UD-DĪN TUGHLUQ

OF the three great rulers of the Tughluq dynasty the most important is Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, for under him the Tughluq empire reached its greatest extent. But no study of his reign would be complete without taking into account the history of his illustrious father and predecessor, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq, and his much-extolled successor, Sultān Fīroz.¹

Old as he was, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq mounted the throne with a resolute determination to govern to the best of his abilities. Orderly in business, sparing in diet, his personal character profoundly affected his administration.

He awarded titles and honours to his comrades in war and to his kinsmen. To Bahrām Aibā² he gave the title of Kishlū Khān, with the government of Multān and Sind. He also honoured him by addressing him as brother. To his adopted son, Tatār Khān, he gave the title of Tatār Malik, together with the *Iqṭā'* of Zafarābād. To his nephew, Malik Asad-ud-dīn, he gave the office of Nāib Bārbak (deputy grand usher). Another nephew, Malik Bahā-ud-dīn, was raised to the position of 'Arṣ-i-Mumālik (minister of the army). He made his son-in-law, Malik Shādī, supervisor of the revenue ministry (Dīwān-i-vizārat). Malik Burhān-ud-dīn received the title of 'Ālim-ul-Mulk, and was made *kotwāl* of Delhi. Burhān-ud-dīn's son, Qutluḡ Khān, was raised to the position of *Nāib Vazīr* of Deogīr. On Qāzī Kamāl-ud-dīn, the Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt, he conferred the title of Ṣadr Jahān, and appointed Qāzī Sama'-ud-dīn as Qāzī of Delhi. He raised Malik Tāj-ud-dīn Ja'far to the office of *Nāib 'Arṣ*, and entrusted him with the government of Gujarāt. He also honoured his own sons with titles, though he gave them no administrative

¹ Frequent references will be made to relevant parts of the history of Sultān Fīroz.

² Barani (Bib. Ind.), p. 428.

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charge or government. The eldest, Malik Fakhr-ud-dīn Jauna, was declared heir-apparent, and was awarded the royal canopy together with the title of Ulugh Khān. The remaining four sons obtained the titles of Bahrām Khān, Zafar Khān, Maḥmūd Khān and Nuṣrat Khān, respectively.¹

He was tolerant to the Hindūs² and Parwārīs unless they had been implicated in the murder of Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh or had misappropriated the public money while serving under Khusrav Khān. In this respect even the Muslims were not spared. All those to whom Khusrav Khān had recklessly advanced money were made to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. Even Shaiḳh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, the famous saint of Delhi, was ordered to refund what he had received as a gift from the usurper. The saint's inability to comply with this order led to strained relations between him and the emperor.

He refrained³ from restoring the agrarian and fiscal policy of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, but formulated, on the principles of Balban, a new policy in a spirit of concession and moderation. Instead of the Measurement of 'Alā-ud-dīn's time, Sharing was introduced; and Hindū chiefs and headmen (*Khūṭs* and *Muqaddams*) who had been reduced to the economic position of peasants by 'Alā-ud-dīn were restored to the status they had enjoyed under Balban. While they were strictly prohibited⁴ from imposing a separate assessment on the peasants, apart from the king's revenue, special instructions being issued to this effect to the *Vālīs* and *Muqṭī's*, they were granted remunerations.⁵ Again, while they were strictly prohibited from making excessive demands on the peasants, they were given discretionary powers to force refractory cultivators to till the soil.

Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq denounced the farming system,⁶ and appointed no revenue-farmers as provincial governors, who were usually recruited from the nobility.⁷ They were regarded as responsible officers enjoying a position and status higher than those of the

¹ Baranī, p. 428 (Bib. Ind.).

² Ibid., pp. 432-33.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 429-32.

⁴ "... He urged on the *Muqṭī's* and governors' investigation and consistency in the collection of revenue, so that chiefs and headmen (*Khūṭs* and *Muqaddams*) should not impose a separate assessment. . . ." Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 430.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 430.

⁶ Ibid., p. 429.

⁷ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 430-431.

ordinary executive officers.¹ They were still, however, subject to the control of the revenue ministry (Diwān-i-Vizārat), which checked their accounts periodically. If found guilty of misappropriating public money they were to be punished and forced to refund it.

There is no evidence of any regular salaries being fixed for the provincial governors, but they were entitled to a certain proportion of the revenue. Their subordinates, the *Kārkins* and *Mutaṣarrifs*, had fixed salaries, though they were entitled in addition to a small percentage of the revenue.²

By prohibiting the governors from levying excessive demands on the peasants and the revenue ministry from making arbitrary demands on the governors, Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq sought to avoid the creation of strained relations between the revenue ministry and the provincial governors, which had been a prominent feature of the administrative system of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji. The provincial governors were required to remit a specified amount to the central government and were in this way relieved from extravagantly irregular demands.³

Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq was a soldier by profession noted for his skill in war, who, after his accession to the throne, distinguished himself as an administrator. He was on good terms with the 'Ulamā, but had fallen foul of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. His reign would have been peaceful but for the troubles which broke out in the Deccan and Bengal.

(B) THE WĀRANGAL AND JĀJNAGAR EXPEDITIONS

That in 1310/710 Malik Kāfūr had overrun Telingāna, and the rājā (Rāi Ludder Deo) had engaged to send his tribute⁴ annually to Delhi is evident from the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*⁵ as well as from the *Khazāin-ul-Futūh*.⁶ But it is difficult to say whether this tribute was regularly paid. The only reference found to this effect is that in 1311 Rāi Ludder Deo sent twenty elephants to Delhi with a letter stating that he was ready to pay tribute at Deogīr to anyone whom

¹ Ibid., p. 431.

² (i) Ibid. (ii) Moreland: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 42.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 429.

⁴ In his *Khazāin-ul-Futūh* or *Tārīkh-i-'Alāi*, Amīr Khusrav uses the word Jizya for tribute. (i) B.M. Add. 16,838. (ii) Elliot, III, p. 84.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 330.

⁶ B.M. Add. 16,838.

the Sultān ('Alā-ud-dīn) would commission to receive it. Perhaps it was the practice afterwards to receive it at Deogīr. But with the subsequent extermination of the Khālji dynasty, disorders followed in Deogīr, and Ludder Deo revolted and asserted his independence. To suppress him Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq deputed his son, Ulugh Khān, who marched at the head of a large army for the first time in 1321/721. Baranī says vaguely that the emperor sent along with the prince leading chieftains and experienced warriors. Firishta is more definite. He says that the emperor collected armies from Chanderī, Budāūn and Mālwa, placing them all under the command of Ulugh Khān.

On his way to Wārangal, the capital of Telingāna, the prince stopped at Deogīr, where he recruited more troops, and then resumed his march. Telingāna lay at a great distance from Delhi, and could not be reached in less than three months.¹ But Ulugh Khān, by forced marches, appears to have reached it in a much shorter time. The rājā shut himself up in the fortress of Wārangal, which was besieged. This fortress² was really two forts; an inner made of clay and an outer of stone. The clay structure was apparently much stronger than the stone. It was in the former that the rājā had taken refuge. The siege was unusually prolonged. The prince, running short of provisions, detailed his soldiers to plunder the towns of Telingāna. Almost all kinds of weapons then used in war, including catapults and fire-engines, were brought into play. At last, the besiegers secured possession of the outer wall of the fortress. The rājā then sent his messengers (*basīlths*)³ to Ulugh Khān, and through them sued for peace, offering to make rich presents and to send tribute regularly. Perhaps he hoped that, like 'Alā-ud-dīn, who, twenty-five years before, had accepted the rich offers made, and then raised the siege, Ulugh Khān would adopt a similar policy. But Ulugh Khān refused to accept the tempting bait and resolutely continued the siege.

Baranī is reticent regarding the details of the siege as he is of all Ulugh Khān's wars. His narrative⁴ amounts to this, that the expedition of Telingāna had been hurriedly conceived, and Ghiyās-

¹ Def. et Sang., III, p. 208.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 330, 446.

³ Ibid., p. 447. In his *Tārīkh-i-'Alāi*, Amīr Khusrav uses the same word *basīlth* to indicate a messenger. It is a Hindī word (Elliot, III, p. 83).

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 446-50.

ud-dīn Tughluq had no time to establish new posts or to improve the lines of communication between Delhi and Telingāna. The old posts of the time of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī were utilized, which at first supplied Ulugh Khān with messages from Delhi twice a week. Before long this system fell into disorder, and all communications ceased; and for about a month no news was heard from Delhi. This gave rise to many suspicions. A few men, like 'Ubaid, the poet, and Shaiḫzādah of Damascus, joined with others in spreading a rumour of the death of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. They then instigated the leading captains of the army, Malik Tamar, Malik Tigīn, Malik Mall¹ Afghān and Malik Kāfūr, Keeper of the Seal (*Muḥrdār*), to desert Ulugh Khān on the plea that he was planning to have them assassinated. This created a panic. All the officers of the army withdrew with their respective troops, and the prince with his forces seriously depleted was compelled to raise the siege, and to retreat in haste and disorder, towards Deogīr, where he received letters from his father. He then collected his scattered army. Most of the officers who had deserted him were killed by the enemy. 'Ubaid, Malik Kāfūr and Malik Mall or Malik Makh Afghān, and a few others were taken prisoners and sent bound to the prince, who dispatched them in the same condition to his father at Delhi. When Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq heard of this, he became furious and ordered the prisoners to be impaled on sharpened stakes.

'Iṣāmī² tells us that when the siege of the Wārāngal fortress had dragged on for six months, Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn suspected foul play on the part of his son. He thought that Ulugh Khān had secretly joined the enemy, and wrote to him weekly letters to this effect. Ulugh Khān was hurt, and wished to withdraw the siege immediately and return to his father.³ But he consulted 'Ubaid, the philosopher-astronomer. The latter predicted victory, specifying its day and time, and expressed his readiness to die if the prediction fell through.⁴ Consequently, Ulugh Khān pressed on the siege. When the specified time drew near 'Ubaid, who had duped Ulugh Khān,

¹ The B.M. MS. (Or. 2039) of Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* has Malik Mulla Afghān on p. 467, and Malik Mall or Mull on p. 468. The printed text of Baranī (Bib. Ind.) gives in the first instance on p. 448 Malik Mall Afghān, and in the second instance on p. 449 Malik Makh Afghān. Firishta (*Bombay*, I, p. 233) has Malik Gul Afghān.

² I.O. MS. 3089, F. 216A.

³ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 216A.

⁴ Idem.

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 in self-defence spread a false report of Tughluq Shāh's death. He conspired with Malik Tamar and Malik Tigīn, the leading officers of the army, telling them that Ulugh Khān intended to put the army chiefs to death by treachery, and that he had suppressed the news of his father's death with that object.¹ This led to the outbreak of a general revolt against Ulugh Khān.

Baranī accuses Shaikhzādah of Damascus as well as 'Ubaid. But a closer examination of the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*² reveals that they were after all not so disaffected and wicked as Baranī would have us believe. Had they been so, they would not have been allowed by Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq to proceed with Ulugh Khān to Telingāna. This is clear from a different account about them given elsewhere by Baranī. In his chapter on Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī, Baranī tells us that Malik S'ad-ud-dīn Mantīqī (the metaphysician) was the leading disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya and had the honour of being a companion of Amīr Khusrav and a courtier of Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī. In his chapter on 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī³ Baranī commends 'Ubaid as Ḥakīm 'Ubaid, the court poet.

It may be interesting to note that on this occasion Baranī⁴ also mentions with equal respect one Maulāna Najm-ud-dīn Intishār, whom he later⁵ refers to as one of the evil-minded associates of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

It seems that S'ad and 'Ubaid quarrelled with Ulugh Khān during the siege of Wārangal for personal reasons. They had previously come to Telingāna under Malik Kāfūr, and had taken part in the siege of Wārangal. They knew that 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī had specially advised Malik Kāfūr to withdraw the siege, and retire to Delhi as soon as the rājā surrendered and promised to pay the tribute. They favoured this mild policy of 'Alā-ud-dīn, and recollected how they had profited by it. Perhaps they also recalled how Khusrav Khān, far from pressing the siege of Wārangal, had accepted the rich offers made to him, and had agreed to retire. They disliked the grim resolve of Ulugh Khān to press the siege, and were chagrined at his refusal to accept the tempting offers made by the rājā. It is evident from the *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*⁶ that they conspired with the

¹ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS., F. 219A.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 198.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 360.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 465.

⁶ The *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn* (I.O. MS. 3089, F. 217) describes a conspiracy into which the army chiefs, Malik Tamar (Timūr) and Malik Tigīn, had entered with Rāi Ludder Deo.

rājā's messengers (*basīṭhs*), who were negotiating with Ulugh Khān. It was after the *basīṭhs* had retired that disorders broke out in the imperial camp. Malik Tīmūr, Malik Tigīn, Malik Kāfūr and Malik Mall Afghān left it, and withdrew, taking with them their respective detachments. Their departure profoundly influenced the remaining officers with the result that the whole army became demoralized. The beleaguered garrison threw open the gates of the fort, and rushed out *en masse* to plunder the imperialists. In this way arose the conflict between Ulugh Khān and his chieftains—'Ubaid, the poet, and Shaikhzādah of Damascus.

Why Ulugh Khān refused to accept the rājā's tempting offers; why he persisted in pressing the siege until Telingāna was conquered; why he failed to realize the discontent amongst his army chiefs; and why he adopted no measures to prevent rebellion—these are problems which Baranī has evaded. Evidently, however, prince Ulugh Khān had a far deeper and more profound knowledge of Deccan politics than any of his subordinates. He knew how the mild policy of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji had failed. He apparently¹ argued that the tribute which the rājā then offered to pay would never be paid regularly in future. He recalled how 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji had been betrayed at Deogīr, and how Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh had failed to get the tribute regularly. He was convinced that the chronic restlessness from which Telingāna suffered could be removed only by its conquest and that drastic steps had to be taken, otherwise the fortress of Wārangal would be considered invincible, and would prove a perennial source of trouble.

According to Ibn Battūṭa,² Ulugh Khān intended to rebel in Telingāna. He conspired with his friend, 'Ubaid, and spread through him in the army the rumour of Sulṭān Tughluq's death. He calculated that the people would immediately hasten to swear allegiance to him. But when the report of the Sulṭān's death was circulated the amīrs refused to believe it, and would have killed Ulugh Khān had it not been for Malik Tīmūr. Deserted by his maliks, Ulugh Khān fled to his father with ten horsemen, whom he called his sincere friends (*Yārān-i-Mūāfiq*). His father gave him money and troops, and ordered him to return to Telingāna (Teling). Ulugh

¹ (i) Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 447. (ii) *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* (Bombay, Vol. I, p. 233).

² Ibn Battūṭa describes 'Ubaid as being at once a poet and a jurist, unlike Baranī, who describes him only as a poet. Def. et Sang., III, p. 209.

Khān did so. Later, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq killed 'Ubaid and ordered Malik Kāfūr Muhrdār (keeper of the seal) to be impaled.

The accounts of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī and Ibn Battūṭa are at variance. Ibn Battūṭa was obviously far less competent than Baranī to give the right information. He came to India ten years after the Telingāna expeditions, and wrote from hearsay. Furthermore, his account is far from complete. He does not even refer to the second expedition into Telingāna, and his account of the first is entirely inadequate. He makes no mention of the causes of the rājā's rebellion, and gives no account of the war. To crown all, he cites no authority for his statements. But he is in accord with 'Iṣāmī in holding Ulugh Khān guilty of conspiracy.

From Baranī¹ it appears that Ulugh Khān stayed in Deogīr four months, where he received reinforcements from Delhi. And Baranī is, on the whole, confirmed by 'Iṣāmī.² But Firishta³ and Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad⁴ maintain that Ulugh Khān left Deogīr for Delhi, where he remained four months. On being reinforced he proceeded to Telingāna. After conquering all the fortresses on the outskirts of Wārangal, the capital of Telingāna, including Bīdar, he then laid siege to the outer fort of Wārangal. With great difficulty he reduced it, and afterwards also the inner fortress. Rājā Ludder Deo, with his relations and dependants, was sent to Delhi under the charge of Qadr Khān and Khawāja Ḥājī Nāib.

Ulugh Khān then attempted to consolidate his new conquests. He divided Telingāna into several administrative units, over each of which he set up new officials and re-christened Wārangal Sultānpur.⁵

He then stormed Jājnagar⁶ (Orissa). No contemporary history, however, gives the reason for this. Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr⁷ informs us that Ludder Deo had in his fight with Ulugh Khān secured the co-operation of a body of rājās. This tends to confirm Baranī, and it

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 449.

² Futūḥ-us-Salātīn (MS., F. 220A).

³ Firishta (Bombay), Vol. I, pp. 233-4.

⁴ Nizām-ud-dīn: Tabaqāt-i-Akbari (Bib. Ind.), pp. 195-196.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 450.

⁶ In his account of the first Muslim invasion of Orissa Banerji identifies Jājnagar with Jajallangar in Chhattisgaḍh (Banerji, R. D.: *History of Orissa*, Vol. I, 258). In a subsequent account of Fīroz Shāh's invasion (p. 282) the author fixes Jājnagar at the extremity of Gadhakataṅga (Jubbulpur). But there is no doubt that the Jājnagar of the Muslim historians of the 14th century was an area roughly corresponding to the Orissa of later times.

⁷ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, Vol. III, p. 860.

follows that Bhānudeva II (1306-1328), the rājā of Orissa, had joined Rājā Ludder Deo in his wars against Ulugh Khān. The traditional wars of the rājās¹ of Orissa, the predecessors of Bhānudeva II, with the Muslims of Bengal and Delhi, also confirm this view. Bhānudeva II himself is known to have intervened in Bengal, and fought with Ghīyās-ud-dīn during his famous Lakhnautī expedition. Perhaps the chiefs of Gondwāna,² the region lying between Berar on the west and Orissa in the east, were the allies of Bhānudeva II, referred to above. An indirect evidence to this effect is afforded by the reported flight³ of the rebellious amīrs of Ulugh Khān's army to Bengal. At any rate, it follows that the prince marched from Wārangal to Jājnagar and overran it by way of chastisement. According to Baranī, he captured forty elephants, which were subsequently⁴ sent to his father at Delhi. But an inscription⁵ of his at Rajamahendri near the mouth of the Godāvari, bears testimony to his military triumphs. There he raised a mosque, which still exists. There is no proof of Banerji's⁶ contention that Ulugh Khān turned the principal temple of Rajamahendri into a mosque. Orissa abounded in temples, its rājās having been famous temple builders. But no instances⁷ of demolition or of desecration of any of them have been ascribed to Ulugh Khān. Neither was the ruling dynasty extinguished, nor was the vanquished rājā maltreated.

¹ The following table of the rājās of Orissa down to Bhānudeva II, the contemporary of Ghīyās-ud-dīn and Muḥammad bin Tughluq, has been built up with the help of Banerji's *History of Orissa*, Vol. I, pp. 246-282.

Rājarāja III.	(1198-1211.)
Anangabhimā III.	(1211-38.)
Narasimha I.	(1238-1264.)
Bhānudeva I.	(1264-79.)
Narasimha II.	(1279-1306.)
Bhānudeva II.	(1306-1328.)

² The history of Gondwāna is obscure. Sir Wolseley Haig (*Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 535) makes use of a local tradition at Kherla in Gondwāna, to show how it came into the hands of the Muslims during the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.

³ Def. et Sang., III, p. 210.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 450.

⁵ *Annual Report of Archaeological Survey of India*, 1925-6, p. 150. (For details of the inscription see Appendix B.)

⁶ Banerji, R. D. : *History of Orissa*, I, p. 276.

⁷ Muḥammad bin Tughluq is supposed to have erected the Deval mosque in the Bodhan town (*Report of the Archaeological Department* of H.E.H. the Nizām's dominions, p. 4). It has been contended that Deval was a temple, which was turned into a mosque. But the Persian inscriptions of Muḥammad bin Tughluq which have been discovered there contain no reference to this effect.

It should be noted that the remark of Shihāb-ud-dīn Aḥmad 'Abbās (Quatremère : *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits*, Tome XIII, p. 198) regarding Muḥammad bin Tughluq's demolishing fine temples, and breaking the images, is evidently part of an eulogy and cannot be cited as a proof of the case under consideration.

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Whether or not he proceeded from Jājnagar to Gondwāna to punish the remaining allies of Ludder Deo is not definitely known. It is, however, almost unanimously agreed¹ that he re-entered Wārangal in triumph, whence he returned to Delhi. Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad holds that Ulugh Khān stayed on at Wārangal until Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq decided to march on Lakhnāutī, and sent for him. But the probability is that he had already set out for Delhi before the royal summons for his recall was issued. On reaching Delhi, Ulugh Khān was warmly received by his father, who conferred on him a robe of honour, and ordered a week's rejoicings to commemorate his victory.²

The conquest of Telingāna reflects creditably on Ulugh Khān's perseverance and courage. It gives us information about some of the weapons of war³ then in use, and brings into relief the importance of a fortress in a town of medieval India. The fortress then served as a protective bulwark for the entire town. On its capture depended to a great extent the results of the war. The strength of the mud fortresses of the fourteenth century is also demonstrated; the mud fortress of Wārangal long defied the Delhi forces, and was captured at last with great difficulty.

The conquest testifies to the efficient postal system of the Delhi empire, by means of which Delhi was connected with Telingāna, and probably with all other parts of the empire. An inefficient postal system would have led to serious disturbances in the army.

The conquest of Telingāna provides us with a detailed account of the organization of the Tughluq armies. They were composed of divisions, each under the command of an amīr. The allegiance of the army to the chief commander was very uncertain; it depended upon the goodwill and co-operation of the amīrs, and other subordinate commanders. If the amīrs were estranged the whole army soon became uncontrollable. Furthermore, the amīrs were not above corruption. Often they placed their private interests before their public duties. Presumably the armies were heterogeneous bodies or confederacies of amīrs.

The accounts of the Telingāna campaigns afford us illustrations of the kind of punishments then inflicted upon Muslim rebels by a Sultān famous for his mildness.

¹ (a) Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 450. (b) Firishta (Bombay), Vol. I, p. 234.
² *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS. F. 222B. ³ See p. 56.

The conquest of Telingāna further shows how sparing Ulugh Khān was in the chastisement of Hindū rebels. There is no mention of the victor having indulged in a wholesale slaughter. Probably the *basīḥs*, who had been responsible for the mutiny in Ulugh Khān's army were killed.¹ Nor is there any evidence of the enslavement of the conquered Hindūs and the demolition of their temples.

'Iṣāmī² tells us that the rejoicings consequent upon Ulugh Khān's victories in the Deccan and his triumphant return were still in progress when a wave of Mongol invasion burst upon northern India. Gurshāsp, the governor of Sāmāna, sent a message to Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq intimating that the Mongols had crossed the Indus and invaded Sāmāna. The Sultān sent an army, commanded by some Hindū³ and Muslim officers. On reaching Sāmāna the supreme command of the army was assumed by Gurshāsp, the other officers being relegated to subordinate posts. Two battles were successively fought, and won; one in the Siwālik hills east of Sāmāna and the other to the north on the banks of the Biās. The Mongols were defeated and repulsed, and many were captured alive. The triumphant army then returned with its Mongol prisoners to Delhi, and the emperor was pleased to reward the officers handsomely.

Baranī⁴ gives a short account of this Mongol invasion, which has been adopted by Sir Wolseley Haig.⁵ But Baranī differs from 'Iṣāmī in details, and a comparative study of the two shows that 'Iṣāmī was an independent observer.

Two months after, according to 'Iṣāmī,⁶ a Parwārī insurrection broke out in Gujarāt. Shādī Dāwar, the Nāib Vazīr, who had already distinguished himself by repelling the Mongol invaders, was dispatched to Gujarāt. The rebels were driven into a fortress, but they secured their release by means of a stratagem. A group of them pretending to be musicians gained access to Malik Shādī Dāwar, and killed him treacherously. His troops then retreated to Delhi.

Nothing is known about the fate of the Parwārī murderers. The

¹ This appears from *Firishta* (*Bombay*, I, 234), and 'Iṣāmī (F. 220B), though their language is not free from exaggeration.

² *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (MS. F. 222-224).

³ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (MS. F. 222-223).

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 450.

⁵ *Cambridge History of India*, III, 132.

⁶ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (MS. 3089, F. 224-225).

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 account given by 'Iṣāmī—the only source of information—is incomplete. But it cannot be altogether dismissed considering (1) that Malik Shādī Dāwar, the Nāib Vazīr, is mentioned by Baranī¹ as an amīr at the court of Ghiyāsh-ud-dīn Tughluq, and (2) that Muḥammad bin Tughluq on his accession sent his Vazīr, Malikzādah Aḥmad bin Aiyāz, on an expedition to Gujarāt.² This expedition was probably intended to restore order in Gujarāt. Firishṭa³ bears out 'Iṣāmī.

(C) THE LAST PHASE OF GHIYĀSH-UD-DĪN TUGHLUQ
 THE LAKHNĀUTĪ AND TIRHUT EXPEDITIONS AND HIS DEATH

To understand the circumstances leading up to the Lakhnautī expedition some knowledge of the previous history of Bengal⁴ is necessary.

From the time of Sultān Mu'izz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād (1287-1290) an independent kingdom had existed in Lakhnautī, and the descendants of Balban ruled over it in undisputed succession till 1322. In that year died Shams-ud-dīn Fīroz Shāh, leaving four sons, Shihāb-ud-dīn Bughra Shāh, Nāṣir-ud-dīn, Ghiyāsh-ud-dīn Bahādur, and Qutlū Khān. Of all these Ghiyāsh-ud-dīn Bahādur was the most powerful and ambitious. He had governed Sonārgāon during the lifetime of his father, asserted his independence (1310) and endeavoured to establish his claim over the whole of Bengal by striking coins in his


¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 423.

² *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (MS. F. 231B).

³ Firishṭa (*Bombay*), I, 238.

⁴ Lakhnautī is identified with Gaur, the ancient capital of Bengal on the left bank of the Ganges. (Stewart's *History of Bengal*, p. 49.)

⁵ The following genealogical table of the descendants of Balban, the kings or independent rulers of Bengal, has been constructed from Ibn Battūṭa and Edward Thomas.



name. On the death of his father he lost no time in attacking his brothers with a view to depriving them of their inheritance. He murdered the youngest, Qutlū Khān, and turned out the eldest Shihāb-ud-dīn, and harassed the survivor, Nāṣir-ud-dīn. The last two having, one after the other, attempted to seize the throne of Lakhnautī, were forced to abandon it. Both, according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, made their way to Delhi and implored Sulṭān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq's aid to regain the throne.¹ This provided the Sulṭān with a splendid opportunity of reducing Bengal to subjection, and he readily acceded to their request.

He seems to have attached far greater importance to Bengal than to the Deccan. When the subjection of Telingāna in the Deccan was desired, he deputed his son to effect it; but the conquest of Bengal he undertook personally. Bengal was the traditional home of rebels. It had yielded but a wavering allegiance to the Delhi empire, since its conquest by Bakhtiyār Khaljī (1105/499). The Sulṭān, therefore, resolved to march to Bengal himself, leaving Ulugh Khān, the heir-apparent, as viceregent in Delhi.

It appears from the narrative of Baranī that before the Sulṭān left Delhi, Nāṣir-ud-dīn had recovered his position and set himself up as ruler in Lakhnautī. The same appears from the text of Budāūnī.² According to Baranī,³ when Tughluq's armies reached Tirhut, Sulṭān Nāṣir-ud-dīn, ruler of Lakhnautī, attended the emperor and surrendered to him. The local Hindū chiefs submitted and acknowledged Tughluq's paramountcy, and the only resistance offered was that of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur, governor (Zābitah)⁴

¹ It should be noted that Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī differs from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. He does not mention the flight of these princes to Sulṭān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn's court. He says that some of the amīrs of Bengal came to Delhi seeking redress of their grievances from the emperor (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 450). Other historians hold that petitions arrived from the people of Bengal inviting Tughluq Shāh to rescue them from the hands of the tyrant of Bengal.

It is preferable here to follow Ibn Baṭṭūṭa supplementing him with the numismatic records as found in Thomas's *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings*, since the above-mentioned historians are generally at fault confusing Nāṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd Bughra Khān (son of Balban) with the latter's grandson, Nāṣir-ud-dīn (*Kulāṣat-ut-Tawārikh*, p. 237); and, again, mistaking Bahādur Shāh, otherwise known as Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bhonra, for an amīr of the court of 'Alā-ud-dīn or Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh Khaljī.

² Budāūnī. *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh*, (i) Nawal Kishore Press, p. 58, (ii) Bib. Ind., I, p. 224.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 451.

⁴ This probably followed on the death of Shihāb-ud-dīn, the brother of Nāṣir-ud-dīn. Had he been alive he might have been made governor instead. Great difficulty arises from the fact that no help in this respect is forthcoming from any of the historians of this period.

RISE AND FALL OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ of Sonārgāon. He was defeated by Tatār Khān, the emperor's adopted son, taken prisoner and sent to Delhi.

The emperor, then, set about consolidating his position in Bengal. He confirmed Nāṣir-ud-dīn as ruler of Lakhnāutī, conferring on him the parasol and the staff. Satgāon and Sonārgāon seem to have been placed under the charge of Tatār Khān. This accomplished, the emperor set out for Delhi.

TIRHUT EXPEDITION

According to the *Basātīn-ul-Uns*,¹ the Sultān, after conquering Lakhnāutī and Sonārgāon, advanced to Tirhut. The rājā (rāi) of Tirhut had maintained his independence against all former kings of Delhi. But as soon as he heard of the arrival of the royal troops in his territory he was seized with fear and took refuge in the hills. Shortly after, Tughluq encamped in Tirhut, where he stayed for some time. He showed kindness to the inhabitants of Tirhut and increased the powers and resources of the officials. This accomplished, the emperor proceeded to his capital at Delhi.

Firishta² bears out the *Basātīn-ul-Uns*, but adds on the authority of the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*³ that the rājā hid himself in the jungles, whither he was pursued and captured by the emperor. Placing Tirhut under the charge of Aḥmad Khān, son of Malik Taligha, the emperor proceeded to Delhi.

THE DEATH OF GHĪYĀS-UD-DĪN TUGHLUQ

From Tirhut, the emperor proceeded by forced marches to Tughluqābād. As he neared it he sent orders, according to Ibn Battūṭa,⁴ to his son, Ulugh Khān, that he should build him a palace on the bank of the river in the territory of Afghānpur. This palace, in the main a wooden structure, was built within three days. It was carefully constructed under the supervision of Malikzādah Aḥmad bin Aiyāz, the inspector of buildings, and later Khwāja Jahān, the principal vazīr of Sultān Muḥammad. Its foundations were laid on pillars of wood. It was so constructed that on the approach of elephants it was bound to collapse. After the arrival of the emperor meals were provided for the people, who later dispersed. The prince

¹ B.M. Add. 7717.

² Firishta (*Bombay*, Vol. I, p. 234).

³ 'Iṣāmī. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (I.O., MS. 3089, F. 228-229).

⁴ Def. et Sang., III, p. 212.

then asked the emperor to allow him to have caparisoned elephants ride past him in procession. Permission was granted. Shaikh Rukn-ud-dīn, who was with the emperor at the time, told Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, that Ulugh Khān approached him saying : " Master ! this is the time for the 'Aṣr¹ prayer ; come and pray." The Shaikh complied with this request. Elephants were then driven towards the palace, which immediately collapsed on the emperor and his son, Maḥmūd. On hearing the uproar the Shaikh returned, leaving his prayers unsaid. The prince, although he ordered pickaxes and shovels to be brought, made no attempt to rescue his father, the work of excavation not taking place before sunset. Some writers affirm that he was taken out alive, and afterwards murdered. His corpse was carried in the course of the night to the tomb, which he had constructed outside the city of Tughluqābād.

Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī² differs from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. He ascribes the construction of the palace to the personal initiative of Ulugh Khān. He maintains that on hearing of the emperor's forced march to Tughluqābād, Ulugh Khān (Muḥammad) ordered that a small palace should be constructed near Afghānpur³ at a distance of three or four kos from Tughluqābād to serve as a shelter for the night in order that the emperor should proceed in state on the morrow to the capital.

Baranī is probably right, for such was the custom.⁴ When Sultān Muḥammad himself returned from his wars and expeditions, he halted, as a rule, somewhere outside the capital city for the night. One such occasion, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁵ personally witnessed.

Baranī also differs from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa when he says that after the meal most of the amīrs came out of the palace to wash their hands while the emperor continued sitting with a few of them until suddenly

¹ One of the five daily prayers performed in the afternoon.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 452.

³ There being no village of this name now near Tughluqābād, Sir W. Haig is inclined to believe that the palace was built at Aghwanpur, a village about five miles from Tughluqābād. The name of this village, he suggests, may be a corruption of Afghānpur. But Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī has clearly described Afghānpur as lying in the vicinity of Sirī, the capital of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. Akat Khān, his rebellious nephew, on being surprised in the palace at Sirī, fled to Afghānpur, where he was captured and beheaded (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 276.)

It is no wonder that Afghānpur, merely a village in the 14th century, ceased to exist in the 20th. It was probably destroyed much earlier, for the *Maṭlūb-ut-tālibīn* (I.O., MS. 653, F. 54), a work of the 17th century, ignores it altogether and distinctly mentions Tughluqābād.

⁴ Cf. *Rihla* : Def. et Sang., III, 391-5.

⁵ Idem.

a storm broke over the palace, which collapsed, burying the emperor and a few of his amīrs.¹

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa charges Ulugh Khān with murder, and tries to prove him a parricide. Baranī completely exonerates him, and ascribes the emperor's death to a stroke of lightning.

The author of the *Basāṭin-ul-Uns*,² Ṣadr-i-'Āla, Aḥmad Ḥasan, a courtier of Sulṭān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, was in his suite in the Lakhnāutī expedition, and accompanied him to Delhi. He describes most vividly the overwhelming heat, hot winds, and hardships that he, with his companions, had suffered during the return journey to Delhi, where he at last fell dangerously ill. This is borne out by the *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, which fix Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq's death about the month of July.³ There is therefore nothing improbable in Baranī's ascribing the collapse of the palace to a stroke of lightning. Circumstantial as well as contemporary evidence goes far to confirm this. In tropical countries on a summer's afternoon storms often occur.⁴

Sir Wolseley Haig⁵ puts a special construction on Baranī's words and concludes that he did not speak the truth for fear of incurring the displeasure of Sulṭān Fīroz Shāh. Referring to Baranī's phrase, "a thunderbolt of a calamity from heaven," he contends that it should have been "the calamity of a thunderbolt from the sky," if Baranī really meant to express thereby the stroke of lightning. But the changed order of words is, in fact, immaterial. The meaning remains the same in either case. The phrase *Balā-i-Āsmānī* and

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 452.

² B.M., Add. 7717.

³ Muḥammad bin Tughluq gives four years and ten months as the period of his father's rule (see Chapter VIII, p. 173). This is in conflict with the generally accepted period of four years and four months, according to which Sir Wolseley Haig (*Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, p. 135) fixes the Aghānūr tragedy in February, 1325. A computation on the basis of the evidence afforded by the *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq* fixes the death of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq in July, 1325, his accession having taken place on the 6th September, 1320. (See Chapter II, p. 41 *supra*.)

⁴ Rashīd-ud-dīn-Faḥl-Ullāh, the famous author of the *Jāmi'-ut-Tawārīkh* (Vol. II, p. 414), gives in his narrative of Qublāi Khān's history an account of the war between two Mongol chieftains, Ariqbuḳā and Ulghū. One day as Ariqbuḳā sat in great peace of mind a strong wind suddenly arose, which completely uprooted his tents.

Again, the force of the storm is mentioned in the *Tabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* (Bib. Ind., pp. 22-3), in the account of Arsalān bin Mas'ūd, the Saljūq. The author tells us that during the reign of Arsalān extraordinary accidents came to pass. One of them was that there dropped from the sky lightning and fire, which burnt to ashes the bazaars of Ghazna.

⁵ J.R.A.S., July, 1922.

not *Ṣāiqa-i-Āsmānī* is idiomatic, as is borne out by *Minhāj-i-Sirāj*.¹ The words *Ṣāiqa*² and *Balā*³ are quite clear and significant.

Whether Sultān Fīroz was interested in concealing Sultān Muḥammad's crime is a difficult problem. The contemporary evidence is against it. The *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī*,⁴ a unique but anonymous work of great importance, written probably at the dictation of Sultān Fīroz Shāh,⁵ contains a chapter which reflects adversely on Sultān Muḥammad: his reign—the year 1332/732—being specially denounced for its tyranny. Nevertheless, not a word regarding Sultān Muḥammad's responsibility for his father's murder is found therein. Probably Fīroz did not consider Muḥammad a parricide. In his *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, he says that out of regard for Sultān Muḥammad he secured a general forgiveness from those he had injured, and from the heirs of the injured persons he obtained a writ of pardon, which he deposited in the grave of the deceased Sultān. How far this was done by Fīroz out of true regard for Muḥammad, and how far his motive was political is a matter of opinion. The object of Sultān Fīroz was to dissociate himself from Sultān Muḥammad's policy; hence the demonstration. Still, if he had held Sultān Muḥammad to be guilty of his father's murder he would have first secured a writ of pardon from the heirs of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, whose daughter, *Khudāwandzādah*,⁶ was alive. Fīroz often used to converse with her for hours. Even in his long and intimate conversations with her, there was not the slightest reference to the alleged plot of Sultān Muḥammad. Nor does the *Inshā-i-Māhrū*,⁷ an important work of the same period, written by the famous 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī⁸ contain anything regarding this plot. 'Ain-ul-Mulk was a leading amīr who served the state in different capacities from the time of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī down to that of Sultān Fīroz. He was by no means favourably inclined towards Sultān Muḥammad for he had revolted against him. His *Insha* contains a letter⁹ of condolence written by Shihāb-ud-Daulah

¹ "As the Mongols were besieging the fortress . . . there fell a thunderbolt from the sky." (*Tārīkh-i-Āl-i-Changēz*, Bombay, p. 21.) *Balā-i-Āsmānī* . . . *nāzil shud*.

² The use of the word *Ṣāiqa* is illustrated in the *Jāmi'-ut-Tavārikh* of Rashīd-ud-dīn Faḡl-Ullāh, Vol. II, p. 61, as well as in the *Tārīkh-i-Jāhān Kūshai* of 'Alā Malik-ul-Juwainī, p. 162.

³ The word *Balā* signifies disaster.

⁴ Bankipore MS.

⁵ 'Affī, pp. 45-48, 100-104.

⁶ See p. 166.

⁷ Cf. p. 255.

⁸ MS., A.S.B.

⁹ MS., p. 36. Letter No. XIII.

RISE AND FALL OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ
governor (Muqṭī') of Budāūn. It clearly mentions the Afghānpur palace to have been strong and durable, and refers to the accidental death of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq brought about by an unforeseen calamity. A similar view was taken by Yahya bin Ahmad, the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*,¹ though his account resembles that of 'Iṣāmī.²

From the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*³ as well as from the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh*,⁴ it appears that suspicions were cast on Sultān Muḥammad, and exaggerated accounts of the occurrence were given. The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* informs us that the meal being over the amīrs fearing that the Sultān would hasten to Delhi, rushed out in order to wash their hands, but the Sultān continued sitting with his hands unwashed, when all of a sudden the roof of the palace tumbled down, and the Sultān was buried under it. The author also draws attention to the fact that in some accounts the cause of the fall has been ascribed to the weakness of the roof, and to its being newly and hastily erected, and to the tramping of the elephants around so frail a structure. He himself comes to the conclusion that Ulugh Khān must have built this frail structure with the deliberate intention of causing his father's death. Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad also contends that inasmuch as the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* was written in the time of Fīroz Shāh, who was devoted to Sultān Muḥammad, Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī feared to write the truth, and that it was a well-known fact that Sultān Tughluq was not on the best of terms with Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. This was the reason why on his return from Lakhnauti, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq ordered the saint to leave Delhi before he arrived. To this the saint is reported to have replied, "*Dehli hanuz dūr ast* (Delhi is yet distant)."⁵

According to the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh*,⁶ Ulugh Khān received the emperor warmly and entertained him sumptuously in the palace at Afghānpur. Then Tughluq Shāh ordered that the elephants, which had been brought by him personally from Bengal, should be stampeded. But as the palace had been newly built, and its foundation was very weak it began to shake on account of the elephants. The people knowing that the emperor was in a hurry, came out of

¹ Yahya bin Ahmad : *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 96.

² *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 229-230.

³ Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad : *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 198 ff.

⁴ Budāūnī : *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 224-5.

⁵ Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad : *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 198 ff.

⁶ Budāūnī : *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 224-5.

the palace, their hands being still unwashed. But the emperor waited in order to wash his hands until he washed his hands of life. All of a sudden the whole palace tumbled down, and the emperor was buried under it. The author maintains that there was no need for raising such a palace. He insinuates that Ulugh Khān contrived to make its foundation hollow and unstable, and declares this to have been the general opinion. He thinks that Baranī did not mention this for fear of Fīroz Shāh.

It should be noted that the purport as well as the language of both the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* and the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* are almost the same. Perhaps their source is the same. None cared to sift the matter. Each wrote what he heard or read. Both were unaware of the *Inshā-i-Māhrū*, which testifies to the strength and durability of the palace.

According to Firishta,¹ Ulugh Khān had made no preparations to murder his father, and the fact that he left the palace before it collapsed was a mere coincidence. Firishta examines and dismisses the theories advanced by Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad, by Budāūnī and particularly by Ṣadr Jahān Gujarātī, and agrees with Ḥājji Muḥammad Qandhārī, who believes the collapse of the palace to have been an accident.

Rāi Bindrāban,² the Hindū historian of the reign of Aurangzeb, comes to the same conclusion. And so does also Muḥammad Bulāq, the author of the *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn*.³ He distinctly mentions lightning as the cause of the fall of the palace and exonerates Muḥammad bin Tughluq from all blame.

Sujān Rāi,⁴ another Hindū historian of the seventeenth century, is of opinion that Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq came to grief because of his quarrel with Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. This is also the opinion of Ḥusām Khān.⁵

But while they believe in the spiritual influence of the saint (Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya), some western writers⁶ have cast suspicions on him. It has been contended that the saint had an understanding

¹ Firishta (Bombay), p. 235.

² Rāi Bindrāban: *Lubb-ut-Tavārīkh-i-Hind*, I.O., MS. F. 38.

³ I.O., MS. 653, F. 54.

⁴ Sujān Rāi: *Khulāṣat-ut-Tavārīkh*, B.M., Add. 55, 59, F. 186.

⁵ Ḥājji-ud-Dabir, III, p. 862.

⁶ (i) Sleeman (Sir W. H.): *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, II, p. 145.

(ii) Cooper: *The Handbook for Delhi*, p. 97.

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with Ulugh Khān to murder the emperor, and brought it about
through the agency of his numerous wandering disciples.

Such a view is, according to Mzik,¹ untenable and unhistorical.
The character of the saint is decidedly above all suspicion.

In view of the emperor's war with the 'Ulamā and Mashāikh, it is
by no means improbable that a number of stories were concocted
to denounce him and were given wide currency. That the story of
his plot to murder his father was one of them is borne out by the
Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn,² a contemporary work in verse, which in a way
became more popular than Baranī's prose, and was drawn upon by
later writers. It contains in full the charges against the emperor,
which with minor differences are found in the *Rihla*,³ in the *Ṭabaqāt-i-*
*Akbarī*⁴ and in the *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh*.⁵

By telling us that a special construction was put on the Afghānpur
tragedy by a class of people who regarded Ulugh Khān (Muḥammad
bin Tughluq) as an unscrupulous tyrant, the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*⁶
enables us to realize why Baranī's account of the flash of lightning
was not generally incorporated in later works. We are told that⁷
during the Lakhnāutī expedition the father (Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn
Tughluq) had been estranged from his son (Ulugh Khān) on account
of the various reports that had reached him about his extravagance.
The son contrived the father's murder, entering into a plot⁸ with
Malikzādah Aḥmad bin Aiyāz, who was promised the office of vazīr
if Ulugh Khān ascended the throne after the death of Sultān Ghiyās-
ud-dīn Tughluq. The indictment of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁹ follows the same
lines. Beginning with the estrangement between the father and the
son, it recounts the rebellion of Ulugh Khān in Telingāna and his
conspiracy in Delhi and at Afghānpur.

Most of these charges lose their weight when the popularity of
Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq is taken into consideration. Only a few
years before, the amīrs and maliks had joined together to place him
on the throne. He could not have incurred the displeasure of all
the nobles. Indeed, he was so popular that the slightest injury
to him would have brought forth instantly hundreds of defenders.

¹ Mzik, *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Batuta durch Indien und China*, 103.

² *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*: I.O., MS. 3089, F. 229-30.

³ Def. et Sang., III, 210-214.

⁴ *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), 197-198.

⁵ *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), 224.

⁶ I.O., MS. 3089, F. 229-30.

⁷ Ibid., F. 230B, 231A.

⁸ Ibid., F. 229B.

⁹ Def. et Sang., III, 212-214.

Even Fīroz Shāh (1351-88), who was not so popular as Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq was saved¹ by his attendants the moment they knew he was being attacked by Khudāwandzādah, the daughter of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. Dāwar Malik, the son of Khudāwandzādah, rose to defend him ; and Fīroz Shāh's orderly, Rāi Bheron, a Hindū, rushed at the enemy with drawn sword to save his royal master.

Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī, who was murdered with impunity by his nephew, 'Alā-ud-dīn, had been unpopular² from the beginning. Unlike him, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq was the idol of the people,³ and enjoyed the full support of the *maliks*, who would have taken steps to save him.

Muḥammad bin Tughluq brands 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī⁴ as a usurper, and the contempt he has for the latter on that ground is evident from his memoirs. It does not therefore follow that he courted the same indignity for which he despised 'Alā-ud-dīn by murdering his own father of whom he speaks with great respect, and in glowing terms.

It is interesting to recall that two years before the Afghānpur tragedy when Muḥammad, then known as Ulugh Khān, had according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,⁵ revolted in Telingāna and spread the news of his father's death, the captains of the army had refused to co-operate with him and deserted him. Why they co-operated with him now in bringing about the murder of the same monarch is a difficult problem.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa charges Muḥammad bin Tughluq with a conspiracy which he is alleged to have entered into with Malikzādah Aḥmad bin Aiyāz to bring about the death of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. This is exactly the charge mentioned by 'Iṣāmī,⁶ and is not corroborated by Shaikh Rukn-ud-dīn Multānī. A comparison of the *Rihla* with the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* enables us to realize how Ibn Baṭṭūṭa relied on circumstantial evidence and built up the following chain of events : Bahrām Aibā Kishlū Khān's proposal to raise Ulugh Khān to the throne, which Ghāzi Malik Tughluq had declined ; Ulugh Khān's rebellion in Telingāna ; his conspiracy in Delhi and the eventual murder of his father at Afghānpur—which tend to show

¹ 'Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 100-104.

² Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, 206-217.

³ Ibid., 425-436.

⁴ *The Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, see Chapter IX.

⁵ Def. et Sang., III, pp. 208-210.

⁶ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 231.

that there was no love lost between the father and the son.¹ But Ibn Battūta cannot be regarded as a reliable source for what he had not personally seen, and for events for which he acknowledges no authority.

All that is known about the character of Ulugh Khān, both as prince and Sultān, militates against the charges brought against him. He was much too strong a man to succumb to the temptation of murdering his father in order to win the throne. He would not have acted against his conscience even if his life had been at stake.² But here neither his life was in danger nor his crown. He was decidedly the best of all the sons of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn, and had long been the heir-apparent. There was no rival claimant to the throne. If 'Alā-ud-dīn Khalijī murdered his royal patron it was because his chances of ascending the throne were slight. If the Mughal princes, Khusrav, Khurram and Aurangzeb, revolted against their respective fathers, it was because each had to struggle for the throne, and because there was no definite will regulating the succession. None of these princes was sure of the crown. The case of Ulugh Khān was entirely different, for he was the acknowledged heir.

It is easy to understand why suspicions were cast on his conduct, when we recall his conflict with the 'Ulamā. Ibn Battūta was one of these. He had eventually lost the emperor's favour and had been placed under guard in his own house.³ Moreover, he was related⁴ to one of the Sultān's enemies, and subsequently lived⁵ with them in Ma'bar. It is by no means astonishing if he accepted the highly coloured reports, which tended to display Muḥammad bin Tughluq as a rebel and a parricide. Had there been any plot to murder Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, then Baranī, who was by no means favourably inclined towards Muḥammad bin Tughluq, would have certainly made a great point of it in his narrative. Baranī's account is further confirmed by (1) 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī,⁶ (2) Firishta,⁷ (3) Muḥammad Bulāq⁸ and (4) Ḥājji-ud-Dabir.⁹

¹ In his "Five Questions in the History of the Tughluq Dynasty of Dehli," Sir Wolsely Haig regards this as the third question. *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922, pp. 319-72. Compare *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 229-230.

² This is demonstrated in the course of the history of his reign, particularly by his conflict with Shaikh Shihāb-ud-dīn. (*Riḥla*: Def. et Sang., III, 293-298.)

³ *Riḥla*: Def. et Sang., III, 445.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 188-190.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 190-206.

⁶ 'Ain-ul-Mulk Māhri: *A.S.B.* MS., 36.

⁷ Firishta (Bombay), I, 235.

⁸ Muḥammad Bulāq: *Maṭṭūb-ut-Tālibīn*, MS., F. 54.

⁹ Ḥājji-ud-Dabir, III, 862.

PART TWO
HIS EMPIRE

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

INTERNAL

A STUDY of the Minhāj-i-Sirāj,¹ of Ḥasan Nizāmī,² and of Baranī³ shows that from 1175, when Muḥammad of Ghūr launched his first campaign in India, capturing Multān, to 1236, when Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish died, Muslim rule was gradually extended over that part of northern India which roughly corresponds to the Panjāb and the modern United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, to Sind in the west, to Bengal in the east, and to Mālwa in the south. Large tracts, however, still remained under Hindū rājās, some of whom were entirely independent, but the majority paid tribute to the central government. Ajmer was restored⁴ to Hindū rule by Mu'izz-ud-dīn Muḥammad of Ghūr, though later it was consolidated under a Muslim governor.⁵ Gwalior was restored to Hindū rule⁶ by Quṭb-ud-dīn Aibak, to whom it had surrendered in 1196. Jālor was left to its Hindū ruler by Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish.⁷ Hindū chiefs were able⁸ to retain their position in Kālinjar, in Ranthambor and in Mālwa, which included Bhīlsa and Ujjain. The *Ṭabaqāt-i-*

¹ Minhāj-i-Sirāj : *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣiri*.

² Ḥasan Nizāmī : *Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir*, B.M., 7623.

³ Baranī : *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhi*.

⁴ Ḥasan Nizāmī : *Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir*, B.M., MS. 7623.

⁵ Raverty (*Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣiri*, p. 519) mentions this point clearly.

⁶ Ḥasan Nizāmī : *Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir*, B.M., MS. 7623.

⁷ Ḥasan Nizāmī informs us that the victorious Sultān Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish granted Udē Sāh (or Udī Sāh : the word is transliterated differently in Elliot and Raverty, and written with slight variations in the various manuscripts of the *Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir*), the vanquished rājā (Rāe) of Jālor (Jālōr as given in I.O., MS. 209), his life and restored his fortress. The rājā presented by way of tribute one hundred camels and twenty horses (*Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir*, I.O., MS. 209, F. 220A). This finds confirmation in the imperial gazetteer (XIV, p. 30), where probably on the basis of the local Rājput legends, the Udī Sāh of the *Tāj-ul-Ma'āṣir* is mentioned as Udai Singh, grandson of Rāo Kirthi Pal, who made Jālor his capital towards the end of the 12th century. It is related that Udai Singh surrendered the fortress to Shams-ud-dīn, who immediately restored it to him.

⁸ Minhāj-i-Sirāj : *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣiri* (Bib. Ind.), p. 291.

Nāṣirī is full¹ of instances attesting to the existence of Hindū rulers in Gwalior, in Oudh (Awadh), in the Arāvalli hills, in the Siwālik, in Kanauj and, in a word, in what was then known as Hindustān.

From 1236 to 1294 there was no expansion of the Muslim kingdom in any true sense of the term. Periods of disorder following the death of Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish alternated with those of peace and consolidation under Balban and Jalāl-ud-dīn *Khaljī*. The Hindūs of Mewāt proved extremely troublesome and aggressive under Balban. The same was the case with the Hindūs of the Doāb. Balban did his utmost to curb the Mewātīs,² and consolidate the Doāb. But Jalāl-ud-dīn *Khaljī* found it a hotbed of sedition, and had to subdue it by means of punitive expeditions. 'Alā-ud-dīn *Khaljī* had also to adopt a similar policy. Eventually the Doāb was consolidated, the Hindūs acknowledging Muslim rule. But their power was not crushed and intermittent revolts took place. A similar state of affairs existed under Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

Mālwa³ affords another instance of a Hindū power. It had been overrun by Iltūtmish,⁴ who had captured Bhilsa and Ujjain in 1234/632. It was subdued by Balban, who took Narwar in 1251. But it had to be invaded once more under Jalāl-ud-dīn *Khaljī*, and the Hindūs of Mālwa were strong enough to defy Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn. Amīr *Khusrav*⁵ tells us that Malik Deo of Mālwa and Kūka Pardhān in command of a powerful army of some forty thousand horsemen,

¹ Minhāj-i-Sirāj tells us that he wrote a separate work in verse called *Nāṣirī Nāmāh*, giving details of Ulugh *Khān*'s (Balban's) conflicts and wars with the great Rānās. The *Nāṣirī Nāmāh* is, as far as I know, not available now, but the object of its composition described by the author throws light upon its contents, a verification of which is afforded by the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* itself. In the course of the years 1247-1248, Balban, then known as Ulugh *Khān*, is reported to have urged Sulṭān Nāṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd to lead an expedition into Hindustān on the plea that there was at that time no danger of any Mongol invasion from the north. Ulugh *Khān* contended that the "Mawas" and Rānās who had paid no tribute for several years might be coerced into making payments, and the wealth thus gained would strengthen the hands of the state in resisting the Mongols. The royal troops accordingly marched to Hindustān, passing down the Doāb between the Ganges and Jumna (Minhāj, *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*, p. 291). Minhāj proceeds to tell us that as a result of this expedition the fort of Bilsar, previously referred to as a fortified village in the neighbourhood of Kanauj, was captured, and Ulugh *Khān* was sent to subdue Dalaki wa Malaki, a powerful Hindū ruler in the vicinity of the Jumna between Kālinjar and Karā, over whom the Rāis of Kālinjar and Mālwa had no authority. No Muhammadan army had yet penetrated into his territories.

² The MSS. as well as the printed text of Baranī (p. 57) have "Mewāns" (=Meos), but Firishta (Bombay, Vol. I, pp. 133-8) has "Mewātīs."

³ It appears from the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* that the Mālwa of those days did not include Gwalior and Chanderi, though it comprised Bhilsa and probably Ujjain. *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* (Bib. Ind.), 215.

⁴ Minhāj, T. N. (Bib. Ind., p. 176).

⁵ Amīr *Khusrav*: *Khazāin-ul-Futūḥ*, B.M., MS. 16,838, F. 26-29.

defied 'Alā-ud-dīn until his conquest of Mālwa in 1305/705. This, combined with his other conquests of Gujarāt—Somnāth, Nahrwāla, and Cambay; of Rājputāna—Jālor and Jaisalmer; of Mewār or Chittor; and of the Deccan—Deogīr, Telingāna, Dvārasamudra and Ma'bar, transformed the kingdom of Delhi into an empire. 'Alā-ud-dīn also established a line of communication between Hindustān and the Deccan through Mālwa, Māndū, Chanderī, Gwālior, Siwāna and Ellichpur. That the Hindūs still remained powerful rulers in the Deccan, in Tirhut, in Jājnagar, and in Gondwāna is evident from subsequent history.

The Panjāb,¹ which constituted the northern and north-western parts of the Sultanate of Delhi, held a position of unparalleled importance in the thirteenth century. It had been the cockpit for the Mongol invaders. Muslim power had been consolidated here from Balban's time onwards under capable governors like Sher Khān, Muḥammad Shahīd, Arkalī Khān, Ghāzī Malik,² and Bahrām Aibā.³ By the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty, Mongol raids had almost ceased.⁴ As a result, Multān, which had hitherto been regarded as a city of first-rate importance, second only to Delhi, fell into the background. Baranī does not emphasize the importance of Multān under Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, nor does he mention any special administrative measure adopted by him with particular reference to it. Mīr M'aṣūm, however, informs us that one Tāj-ud-dīn was appointed governor of Multān, Khawāja Khāṭir, governor of Bukkur, and Malik 'Alī Sher, governor of Sivistān. He also records the conquest of lower Sind by the Sumera⁵ tribe.

¹ The term Panjāb was not used in the 13th and 14th centuries to indicate a province or a political and administrative division. Ibn Battūta's use of the term as a name for the Indus valley is suggestive enough. (Def. et Sang., III, p. 93.)

² The *Tārīkh-i-M'aṣūmī* (B.M., Add. 24,091) describes Ghāzī Malik Tughluq as the governor of Multān and Sind.

³ The *Tughluq Nāmah*, as well as the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, describes several Alāi amīrs—Ghāzī Malik, Muḥammad Shāh Lur, Bahrām Aibā, and Amīr Mughlāṭṭī as governors of different parts of the Panjāb or Sind.

⁴ The last Mongol invasion recorded by Baranī, as well as by 'Affī, was about the year 1324 (Baranī. Bib. Ind., p. 450; 'Affī, p. 389). Both agree that it was unimportant and was soon repulsed.

⁵ A controversy rages about the origin of the Sumeras. (See Elliot, I, 483 ff., and Ray's *Dynastic History of Northern India*, I, p. 30 ff.). Basing his information on local traditions, Mīr M'aṣūm is inclined to hold the view that the Sumeras were of Hindū origin. They rose to power under the leadership of one Sūmra, who fought against the Ghaznavid Sultān 'Abdur Rashīd about A.D. 1052. This view is confirmed by the *Tārīkh-i-Tāhīrī*, which distinctly mentions the Sumeras (Sūmra) as a Hindū tribe. The author tells us that they belonged to the Hindū faith but ate the flesh of buffaloes. The *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* of Muḥammad Yusuf agrees on the whole with the *Tārīkh-i-M'aṣūmī*, but gives in addition a list of the Sumera

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Gujarāt,¹ administered as a province of the Delhi empire since the time of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, had been traditionally rebellious. His death (1316) was followed by a rebellion, which was subdued with difficulty under his son and successor, Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn. In the beginning the rebels were strong enough to kill one Malik Kamāl-ud-dīn, the first governor sent by Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn from Delhi. It was the capable 'Ain-ul-Mulk Muṭṭanī, subsequently deputed to Gujarāt, who succeeded in suppressing disorder and establishing peace. But his recall was the signal for the outbreak of old troubles, which continued, despite the efforts of several governors—Malik Dīnār, Ḍafar Khān, Ḥisām-ud-dīn and Wajih-ud-dīn Quraishī—to suppress them. Peace was not restored in Gujarāt until the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty. Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn is reported by the *Mirāt-i-Aḥmadī*, to have personally visited Gujarāt, and appointed Malik Tāj-ud-dīn Ja'far as the governor. The latter apparently continued as governor until the accession of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq.² No change was, however, made by him in the beginning, although Gujarāt was destined to prove during his lifetime a constant source of trouble.

Bengal³

Bengal⁴ (Bangāl) as well as Bihār, had been from the beginning a hotbed of sedition, and its governors seized every opportunity of asserting their independence. The first governor to rebel was Muḥammad Sherān 'Izz-ud-dīn, the successor of Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī, the conqueror of Bengal and Bihār. He asserted his independence during the lifetime of Quṭb-ud-dīn Aibak. 'Alī Mardān Khaljī, the next governor, rejected the authority of Delhi on the death of Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn (1210). Ḥisām-ud-dīn 'Ivaz, the next governor, refused to send presents to Delhi and was attacked by

rulers. The *Tuḥfat-ul-Kirām* states that the Sūmra tribe sprang from the Arabs of Sāmira, who came to Sind in the 8th century A.D. (second century Hijra). The same is the view taken by Ibn Battūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, p. 101). He uses the term Sāmīrah for the Sumeras of Janāni on the Indus. He regards them as Muslims who had remained there from the days of the Arab conquest of Sind in the beginning of the 8th century. But some of their customs which he later describes tend to identify them with the Hindūs—a conclusion which is supported by Firishṭa (*Bombay*, II, pp. 609, 610, 613) and the *Dabistān-ul-Mazāhib* (p. 188).

¹ 'Alī Muḥammad Khān: *Mirāt-i-Aḥmadī*, I.O., MS. 444, p. 26.

² 'Alī Muḥammad Khān: *Mirāt-i-Aḥmadī*, MS., No. 444, p. 26.

³ In the 13th and 14th centuries Bengal included Bihār, which did not form a separate political division.

⁴ Stewart's *History of Bengal* (pp. 38, 39 ff.). *Riyāz-us-Salātīn*, pp. 59-62, ff.

Iltūtmish (1225). But hardly had Iltūtmish returned to Delhi, when Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn revolted again. Iltūtmish then sent his son, Nāṣir-ud-dīn (1227), and the rebellious governor was killed. Bengal, as well as Bihār, remained under Nāṣir-ud-dīn, until his death in 1227 was the signal for fresh disturbances. This forced Iltūtmish to march to Bengal a second time (1228). He restored order and appointed Malik 'Alā-ud-dīn as its governor.

Under the weak successors of Iltūtmish there was renewed trouble in Bengal. Toghān Khān, the governor, became ambitious and made abortive efforts to conquer Karā-Mānikpur. Before long a fight broke out between Toghān Khān and Tīmūr Khān, another adventurer, a former governor of Oudh, for supremacy in Bengal. The latter eventually seized the government. Ikhtyār-ud-dīn Tughral Khān was the next governor to rebel, and he assumed the title of Sultān Muḡhīṣ-ud-dīn. But he died at last in an aggressive war with the Hindū rājā of Kāmṛup (1257). This was an opportunity for the Sultān of Delhi to re-establish his authority in Bengal and one Jalāl-ud-dīn Khānī was deputed as governor. But Jalāl-ud-dīn was attacked and killed by Irsilān Khān, the rebellious governor of Kara.

Under Balban, Bengal, which was ruled by one Muḡammad Tatār Khān, paid tribute to Delhi. But his successor, Tughral, raised the standard of revolt and was not finally subdued until Balban marched personally to Bengal.

The government of Bengal was then bestowed by Balban on his younger son, Nāṣir-ud-dīn, who continued until the time of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. He divided Bengal into two parts, western and eastern, in the hope of rendering it more subservient to the court of Delhi. The capital of western Bengal, Lakhnāutī, was held by Nāṣir-ud-dīn, while that of eastern Bengal, Sonārgāon, was administered by a tyrannical chief named Bahādur Shāh. Complaints against him reached Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, and led to his Lakhnāutī expedition. He restored Nāṣir-ud-dīn to the government of Lakhnāutī, and appointed Tatār Khān, under the title of Bahrām Khān, to the government of Sonārgāon.

On his accession Muḡammad bin Tughluq heard of the death of Nāṣir-ud-dīn, and appointed Qadr Khān¹ to the government of Lakhnāutī. He made Bahrām Khān and Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur

¹ Qadr Khān was the title which Muḡammad bin Tughluq gave to an amir of his court named Malik Baidār. See p. 88.

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whom he now released from his confinement at Delhi, where he had been brought a prisoner by Tughluq Shāh, joint governors of Sonārgāon.¹

The Deccan

It follows from the *Khazāin-ul-Futūḥ*² of Amīr Khusrav, and the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* of Baranī,³ that 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī had subdued all the four Hindū kingdoms of the south—the Yādava kingdom of Devagīrī, with its capital at Devagīrī (Deogīr); the Kakatiya kingdom of Telingāna, with its capital at Wārangal; the Hoysala kingdom of Dvārasamudra; and the Pandya kingdom of the extreme south. The crowning feature of all the Deccan campaigns ranging over sixteen years was the capture of the Pandya capital, Mathra or Maḍūra (1311).

Professor Aiyangar,⁴ who has dealt exhaustively with the wars of Malik Kāfūr and of Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh in Ma'bar, tells us that a Muslim garrison was placed in Maḍūra "from which the descendants of the ancient Pandyas retired once for all. . . ."⁵ Thus the presence of a Muslim garrison at Maḍūra, and Kannanūr has been regarded as sufficient evidence for the existence of a Muslim province of Ma'bar.

It should be noted that Baranī⁶ mentions Ma'bar as a province of Sulṭān Muḥammad's empire, and clearly describes the conquest of Ma'bar effected by Malik Nāib.⁷ It is true that with the death of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī (1316) reaction began in some parts of the Deccan. Harpāl Deo, the ruler of Deogīr, asserted his independence, and Sulṭān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak personally led an expedition against him, in which Harpāl Deo was defeated and killed. Deogīr was afterwards consolidated under a Muslim governor, Yakḷakhī by name. Another expedition headed by Khusrav Khān was directed

¹ Here there is a conflict between the *Riyāz-us-Salāṭīn* and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa makes no mention of Qadr Khān, nor of the two distinct parts of the province of Bengal, western (Lakṣnāuti) and eastern (Sonārgāon) as is clearly mentioned in Stewart's *History of Bengal* (pp. 79-80), and the *Riyāz-us-Salāṭīn* (p. 90). Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, p. 317) maintains that Sulṭān Muḥammad released Ghiyās-ud-dīn Bahādūr from imprisonment, and, restoring him to his government of Bengal, made him joint governor with his own nephew Ibrāhīm Khān.

² B.M., MS. 16,838.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 328-29, 330-33.

⁴ Aiyangar, K.: *South India and her Muslim Invaders*, 123-4, 129-40.

⁵ Aiyar: Aiyangar, K.: *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 2.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 468.

⁷ Idem., p. 333.

against Telingāna, whose rājā had failed to send the stipulated tribute. In fact, it had been sent only once¹ since Malik Kāfūr's expedition into Telingāna. The rājā submitted and agreed to pay an annual tribute. Khusrav Khān was then sent on an expedition to Ma'bar.² Yakhlakhī, the governor of Deogīr, having revolted, was punished and replaced by 'Ain-ul-Mulk.

'Alā-ud-dīn's Deccan policy was that of letting the Deccan remain under its native Hindū rulers, if they agreed to pay tribute. This policy was abandoned by Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn, who after his conquest of Deogīr appointed Muslim officials.

Khusrav Khān's invasion of Ma'bar was uneventful. He meditated treason and was recalled to Delhi, where he killed his royal master and became king. During the Tughluq revolution that followed, Rudrā Deo, the rājā of Telingāna (1294-1325), threw off the yoke of Delhi, but was eventually subdued by Prince Ulugh Khān, now Sultān Muḥammad. With his accession in 1325 Muhammadan power in the Deccan, in the words of Professor Aiyangar,³ reached its greatest extent.

EXTERNAL

The thirteenth century, which witnessed the great Mongol irruptions, is of outstanding importance in the history of Central Asia. According to Ibn-ul-Aṣīr⁴ (1160-1230), the Mongol hordes of Chingīz Khān emerging from the confines of China quickly overran Turkistān, Transoxiana, Khurāsān, Mesopotamia, Kipchak, Ghazna and the adjacent parts of India, Sīstān and Kirmān. Thus was eventually established an empire spreading from China to the Carpathians. Ibn-ul-Aṣīr's work comes to an end at this stage. But Juwainī,⁵ Rashīd-ud-dīn,⁶ Waṣṣāf⁷ and Ḥamd-Ullāh Mustawfī continue the story, and tell us that after his death (1227) the empire of Chingīz Khān was divided among his four heirs. Jūjī,⁸ the eldest son, having

¹ According to Baranī (Bib. Ind., p. 334), Ludder Deo (Rudra Deo) was the name of the rājā of Telingāna, who only sent the tribute once.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 398.

³ Aiyangar, K.: *South India and her Muhammadan Invaders*, p. 136.

⁴ Ibn-ul-Aṣīr: *Kāmil-ut-Tawārikh*.

⁵ 'Alā-ud-dīn Juwainī: *Tārīkh-i-Jahān Kushāi*.

⁶ Rashīd-ud-dīn: *Jāmi'-ut-Tawārikh*.

⁷ Waṣṣāf: *Tārīkh-i-Waṣṣāf*.

⁸ Lane-Poole (*Muhammadan Dynasties*) writes Jūjī, but Howorth (Pt. IV, p. 350) has Jūchi.

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died before his father, was replaced in the succession by his son, Bātū, who occupied Kipchak, the region of the lower Jaxartes, to the north of the Aral Sea, the valleys of the Volga and the Don, as well as territories in the north stretching beyond the river Ural as far as Western Siberia. The second son, Chaghatāi, obtained Transoxiana, the land between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, Badakhshān, Khurāsān, Herāt, Ghazna and Mekrān. Ogotāi, the third son, ruled to the east of Chaghatāi over Kara Korum and Zungaria, that is, the essentially Mongol land called Tartary or Mongolia. Tulūy,¹ the fourth son, received the territories of the extreme east, some of which were still to be conquered. But he died soon after Chingīz Khān, leaving behind several sons, the most famous being (1) Mangū Khān, who succeeded Kuyuk Khān, the son of Ogotāy, in the dominions of Tartary, and (2) Hülāgū Khān, who conquered the whole of Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria, and destroyed Baghdād (1258). He and his successors were called the Il-Khāns or provincial Khāns of Persia, owing allegiance to the Qaan² (Khāqān) or emperor of Tartary, namely Ogotāi³ and his successors. Subsequently, Ghazān Khān, a descendant of Hülāgū, on his conversion to Islām, renounced his allegiance to the Khāqān of Tartary. The *Masālik-ul-Abšār* probably refers to him, when it says⁴ that the Mongol ruler of Persia asserted his superiority over the respective rulers of Kipchak and Transoxiana contending that his great-grandfather, Hülāgū, was the real brother of Mangū, who had succeeded to the supreme Khānate of Chingīz Khān. In fact, a contest for ascendancy among the Mongol princes had been in progress since the days of Ghazān Khān. The Il-Khānī claims to ascendancy were rejected by the rulers of Kipchak and Transoxiana, who asserted the superiority of their respective grandfathers, Jūji and Chaghatāi over Tulūy. They refused also to acknowledge the title of Hülāgū, the son of Tulūy, contending that Hülāgū owed his rise and authority to Mangū.

This was the origin of the hostility between the rival houses of Chaghatāi in Transoxiana and of Hülāgū in Persia. It had begun according to the *Ḥabīb-us-Siyar*,⁵ even before the death of Hülāgū,

¹ Lane-Poole (p. 205) writes Tulūy, but Howorth (Part IV, p. 374) has Tulūi.

² Qaan or Kaan as Howorth (Vol. I, p. 116) writes is a short form of Khāqān, a title which Ogotāi and his successors enjoyed to distinguish them from other lines of the house of Chingiz.

³ Howorth writes Ogotāi, but Lane-Poole has Ogotāy.

⁴ Shihāb-ud-dīn Aḥmad 'Abbās: *Masālik-ul-Abšār*, B.N., MS. 5867, F. 33.

⁵ Ghiyās-ud-dīn: *Ḥabīb-us-Siyar*, pp. 205 ff.

when Khurāsān was invaded by the Chaghatai Mongols for the first time. Hostilities continued right up to the time of Abū S'aid and Tarmāshirīn. This is also borne out by the *Shajarat-ul-Atrāk*.¹ With Tarmāshirīn's² conversion to the Sunnī form of Islām, a new or religious cause of hostility was added to the dynastic, political and territorial causes of hostility already in existence. The Sunnī-Shi'ah conflict in the fourteenth century was intense.³ It was the age of Uljaitū Khān,⁴ the aggressive Shi'ah zealot of Persia, Malik An-Nāṣir,⁵ the intolerant Sunnī monarch of Egypt, and the great Ibn Taimiya,⁶ a Sunnī reformer or free-thinker and a bitter enemy of heretics. He exercised a powerful influence over the Muslims in different countries, in Syria, in Egypt, in Transoxiana, and probably in India.

The Mongol power in Persia, under the Īl-Khānids, namely, Abāgha Khān (1265-82), Aḥmad Takūdar (1282-84), Arghūn Khān (1284-91), Kaikhātū (1291-95), Baydū (1295), Ghāzān (1295-1304), and Uljaitū (1304-16), experienced many ups and downs until finally under the young Abū S'aid (1316-35), the contemporary of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, the signs of decay appeared on account of (1) the conflict between rival nobles, the chief of them being Amīr Chobān, and (2) the unruliness of the Chobānids.⁷ Besides being entrusted with the management of public affairs during Abū S'aid's minority, Amīr Chobān obtained the hand of Abū S'aid's sister in marriage. Reaction began with the rebellions that broke out to deprive him of his supreme power, and the relations between him and his royal master, Abū S'aid, became strained. Amīr Chobān thought it advisable to divert the Sultān's mind by wars, and military triumphs. Hence in 1325⁸ he invaded the dominions of Uzbeḡ Khān.⁹ Meanwhile he heard¹⁰ that Tarmāshirīn, the Chaghatai king of Transoxiana, was raising armies near Ghazna and Qandhār with a view to invading Khurāsān. Hence in the following year

¹ *Shajarat-ul-Atrāk*, B.M., Add. 26,190, F. 128 ff.

² The *Masālik-ul-Aḥsār* (B.N., MS. 5867, F. 54) informs us that although Islām was already introduced into Transoxiana, no Chaghatai king embraced it until after 1325/725. The first to do so was Tarmāshirīn.

³ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: Def. et Sang., I, p. 145 ff.; II, p. 57 ff.

⁴ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: Def. et Sang., II, p. 57 ff.; pp. 114-115.

⁵ Ibid., I, p. 83 ff.

⁶ Ibid., I, p. 215 ff.

⁷ Ibid., I, p. 65 ff.; pp. 115-121.

⁸ Hamdu'llah Mustawfi: *Tārīkh-i-Guzidah*, p. 588.

⁹ See p. 103.

¹⁰ *Rauzat-us-Shafa*, Vol. V, p. 152.

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(1326) he sent his eldest son, Ḥasan, towards Zābul¹ and Kābul to attack Tarmāshīrīn. Tarmāshīrīn was defeated and Ḥasan ravaged Ghazna and desecrated the tomb of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna. It is this defeat of Tarmāshīrīn, which in all probability forced him to go to India to solicit the support of Sulṭān Muḥammad bin Tughluq in a joint invasion of Khurāsān. This will be discussed later.

Amīr Chobān was no better for his wars, and eventually revolted² openly against Sulṭān Abū S'aīd. Still he met with no success, and was forced to take refuge in flight. At last he was betrayed and slain (1327). Tīmūr-Tāsh, one of his sons, fled to Egypt, where he was killed by the Sulṭān of Egypt (1328). Amīr Ḥasan had fled to Khwārazm, but he too came to grief. Shaikh Maḥmūd, another son of Amīr Chobān, hitherto governor of Gurjistān, was taken prisoner by Abū S'aīd's troops and put to death at Tabriz.

Although the Chobānīds were crushed by 1328, the troubles in Persia were not over. The ambitious amīrs, the heads of the various Mongol clans, controlled the various government departments and lost no opportunity of defying the Sulṭān. It may be concluded that the empire of the Il-Khānī Mongols of Persia founded by Hūlāgū Khān, comprising Persia, Mesopotamia and Armenia, collapsed by the middle of the fourteenth century, Abū S'aīd, Hūlāgū's descendant in the fourth degree, being the last of the series of the powerful Mongol rulers.

Though the Mongols still held sway over a vast territory from Peking to Damascus, and from the Volga to the north-west frontier of India, their power had weakened. Far from playing the usual rôle of the invaders of India, they were now anxious to cultivate friendly relations with the Indian emperor. The 'Irāq³ embassy sent by Mūsa, a cousin of Sulṭān Abū S'aīd, king of 'Irāq; the Chinese⁴ embassy sent by Togon Tīmūr, the Chinese emperor; and the Khwārazmī embassy sent by princess Turābak, wife of Qatlū Damūr, ruler of Khwārazm, were all attempts on the part of foreign

¹ Hamdu'llah Mustawfī: *Tārīkh-i-Guzidah*, p. 588.

² Hamdu'llah Mustawfī: *Tārīkh-i-Guzidah*, p. 588 ff.

³ Ibn Battūta, *Def. et Sang.*, III.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Def. et Sang.*, IV, p. 1. It should be noted that Ibn Battūta mentions erroneously Pashāi as the name of the Chinese emperor. The real name of the Chinese emperor to whose court he was sent in 1347 on a return embassy from Muḥammad bin Tughluq was Togon Tīmūr. He was called by the Chinese Shun Ti (1333-68).

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governments to maintain friendly relations with Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Other instances with a similar objective are found in the arrival at Delhi of Amīr Saif-ud-dīn, son of Muhanna, chief of the Arabs of Syria, as well as of distinguished visitors from Damascus and Khurāsān.

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Nuṣrat Khān¹ and Maḥmūd Khān, had died, although Baranī² mentions the death of only the last-named, that is, of Maḥmūd Khān.

The emperor inherited from his father a large empire and a well-filled treasury, for Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq had been sparing in the use of money. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa³ tells us that he had erected at Tughluqābād a palace of which the bricks were covered with a coating of gold. Therein he had stored valuables and had sunk a reservoir which he filled with molten gold.⁴

The empire which Muḥammad inherited from his father was one of the largest to which any Muslim king of India has ever succeeded. Excepting Kashmīr and what is now called Afghānistān and Balūchistān, it embraced practically the whole of India. It extended to the Himālayas on the north-east and to the Indus on the north-west; on the east and west it reached the sea, and in the south it covered almost the whole of Mālābār and Ma'bar. On the western Ghāṭs, however, a few of the states were independent. These were mostly seaports mentioned by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa as Sindābur (Goa),⁵ Hinaur,⁶ Manjarūr (Mangalore), Jurafatan (Cannanore), Dahfattan, Budfattan, Fandarayna (Panderani) and Qāliqūt (Calicut). But they acknowledged the paramountcy of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.⁷

This wide extent of the empire is borne out by the accounts of contemporary travellers—Mubārak bin Maḥmūd and Abū Ṣafa Sirāj-ud-dīn 'Umar—preserved in the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*.⁸

This vast empire was divided into twenty-three provinces, namely

¹ Nuṣrat Khān's death is evidenced by the fact that Muḥammad bin Tughluq conferred the title Nuṣrat Khān on Shihāb Sulṭānī, an amīr of his (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 488). It is not possible to fix the date of the death of Nuṣrat Khān.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.).

³ Def. et Sang., III, p. 214.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Mr. Moreas' view (*Kudamba Kula*, p. 213) that Goa (Sindābur) was conquered and destroyed by Muḥammad bin Tughluq is not borne out by the *Rihla*. Mr. Moreas bases his theory upon the chance discovery of a coin of Muḥammad bin Tughluq at the local Saivā temple. The sight of a "mutilated granite Nandi" in front of the temple led him to conclude that the mutilation was the work of the armies of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and that the copper coin had been dropped by them. All this is very plausible, but finds no confirmation in contemporary history.

⁶ Yule's *Cathay*, IV, p. 63. Cf. the various spellings, Honavar, Onore and Hunāwūr.

⁷ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Def. et Sang., IV, p. 71 ff.

⁸ (i) Quatremère: *Mesalek alabsār* . . . Tome XIII, p. 167 ff. (ii) B.M., MS. 5687.

(1) Delhi (Dihli), (2) Deogīr (Dawakīr), (3) Multān, (4) Kahrām (Kuhram), (5) Sāmāna, (6) Sivistān, (7) Uch, (8) Hānsī (Hasi), (9) Sārsutī (Sirsah), (10) Ma'bar, (11) Telingāna (Tilank), (12) Gujarāt, (13) Budāūn, (14) Oudh (Auz), (15) Kanauj, (16) Lakhnāutī, (17) Bihār, (18) Karā, (19) Mālwa, (20) Lahore (Lāhor), (21) Kalānor,¹ (22) Jājnagar, (23) Tilanj Darusamand² (Telingāna (?) and Dvāra-Samundra).

Baranī³ makes no attempt to describe the provinces of the empire. He makes a passing reference to some, namely, (1) Delhi, (2) Gujarāt, (3) Mālwa, (4) Deogīr, (5) Telingāna (Tilang), (6) Kampīla, (7) Dvārasamudra (Dhūr-Samundar), (8) Ma'bar, (9) Lakhnāutī, (10) Satgāon, (11) Sonārgāon, and (12) Tirhut.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa gives no specific number at all. He simply notes those places through which he passed or about which he heard something remarkable, namely, (1) Delhi (Dihli), (2) Bengal, (3) Multān, (4) Uch, (5) Oudh (Awadh), (6) Hānsī, (7) Sārsutī (Sarsuti), (8) Ma'bar, (9) Lahore (Lāhaur), (10) Telingāna (Tiling), (11) Gujarāt, (12) Kanauj, (13) Daulatābād, (14) Mālābār, (15) Mālwa. In addition to these, more or less identical with the provinces given in Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* and the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*, he mentions a few more towns, namely, Kamālpur,⁴ Koshak-i-Zar,⁵ Badrkot, Konkan, Thāna, Lucknow (Lakhnau), Zafarābād, Bahrāich, Amroha, Bijnaur, Biāna, Koil, Brijpur, Vazīrpur, Baroda, Nahrwāla, Agroha, Jalālī, Tājpur, Abharī, Bajālsa, Maurī, 'Alāpur, Gwālior, Barwan, Amwarī, Kachrāo, Chanderī, Dhār, Ujjain, Nandurbār, Cāmbay, Sāgar (Sagour), Jidya, and Wārangal—all of which were included in the empire.

Of Mālābār, through which he travelled, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa has much to say,⁶ and it can be inferred from his observations that Mālābār, which has been omitted both by Baranī and Shihāb-ud-dīn, was a province of the empire, except for certain ports and the adjacent

¹ Elliot (III, p. 575) regards Kalānaur as Gwālior, but Kalānor or Kalānaur has been mentioned by Hājji-ud-Dabīr (III, p. 865) and others in connection with Tarmāshīrīn's invasion. It is in the present Gujarāt district (Panjāb).

² MS. 5687 gives Tilanj (Telingāna) twice. The second mention is presumably a mistake.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 468.

⁴ Kamālpur is in Kathiawar on the Bhaonagar and Gondal Railway, 17 miles east of the Limri station.

⁵ Koshak-i-Zar was probably a small town near Delhi. It seems to have been destroyed after the death of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

⁶ (i) B.N., MS. 909, F. 161. (ii) Def. et Sang, IV, p. 71 ff.

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 coastal strip. "The length of *Mulaybār*," says Ibn Battūta,¹ "is a distance of two months' journey; it stretches along the coast from Sindābur (Goa) to Kawlam (Quilon). In *Mulaybār* there are twelve Hindū rājās, each having an army of his own. The army of the most powerful of them reaches the strength of 50,000 and that of the weakest 3,000. None goes to war against the other and none casts a covetous eye on the territories of the other." But it is regarding Faknūr, Manjarur (Mangalore), Jurafattan (Cannanore), Dahfattan, Budfattan, Kunjā-Karī, Qāliqūt (Calicut) and Kawlam (Quilon) that Ibn Battūta gives more detailed information. "Faknūr," says he, "was under a Hindū rājā named Bās Deo. Manjarur was ruled by Rām Deo, the greatest of all the rulers of *Mulaybār*. Jurafattan was under a ruler named Koil, and to him also belonged Dahfattan and Budfattan. Qāliqūt (Calicut) was ruled by one Sāmari. . . . The king of Hannaur was subordinate to a Hindū ruler, Harib." But he says nothing more about the latter. He mentions Abū Sarūr (Barcelore) as a state of Mālābār, but gives us no information about its ruler. It is not clear whether it was included in the empire.

Ibn Battūta has not given in full the boundaries of Mālābār, and in spite of all he has said the exact extent of Mālābār is unknown. He does not regard Mālābār as identical with the territories of the Hindū rājās, since, apart from their states, he mentions a few, namely Abū Sarūr, Heli and Fanderina (Panderani) which were possibly included in the Delhi empire. That the Hindū rājās held the emperor of Delhi in awe and esteem has been reported in the *Rihla*; and the fact that the Muslims in Mālābār were generally respected and even feared by the Hindūs, combined with the warm welcome extended to the African traveller by the Hindū rājās tends to prove the overlordship or paramountcy of Sulṭān Muḥammad over Mālābār. Curiously enough, Edward Thomas confuses Mālābār with Ma'bar.² But in view of the information given by

¹ (i) B.N., MS. 909, F. 161. (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 71 ff.

² In *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi* (p. 203), Thomas gives "Malabār" in English as corresponding to Ma'bar in Arabic script; both standing at the same number, i.e., 10. Yule in his *Cathay and the Way Thither* (Vol. I, p. 74) describes Mālābār and Ma'bar as two distinct parts on the authority of Friar Odoric. "And now that ye may know how pepper is got let me tell you that it groweth in a certain empire whereunto I came to land, the name whereof is Minibar." (Friar Odoric.) "Minibar," Yule explains in a footnote, "is Mālābār and seems to have been an old Arabic form of that name. It is the same that we shall find in Marignolli."

the *Rihla* one feels justified in stating that Ma'bar and Mālābār were distinct provinces of the empire of Sulṭān Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

This, then, was the vast empire which Muḥammad bin Tughluq inherited. His reign (1325-51) constitutes the most momentous period in the history of medieval India, followed as it was by insurrections leading to the break-up of the Delhi empire, and to the formation of provincial kingdoms. It falls broadly into two parts: (a) 1325-1335; (b) 1335-1351. The first part was comparatively prosperous and peaceful; the second witnessed increasing troubles culminating in rebellions and disintegration.

Edrisi has Manibar, so has Abul Fida. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa has Mulibar; Bakni has Malibar, and Fra Mauro Milibar."

Subsequently Friar Odoric describes Ma'bar. "From this realm (Minibar)," says he, "it is a journey of ten days to another realm which is called Mobar, and this is very great, and hath under it many cities and towns." Yule explains this in a footnote and identifies Ma'bar with the Coromandel region. "It is possible," says he, "that the Arabic name Ma'bar was originally a corruption of Marawar, the name of the Hindu state which adjoined Adam's bridge."

It appears from Yule that Thomas was not the first to confound Mālābār with Ma'bar. Such a mistake was committed earlier by Ritter and Lassen. "Ritter," continues Yule, "puts Ma'bar on the west coast, and Lassen says that the name with Ibn Baṭṭūṭa signifies the southernmost part of the Mālābār coast, but both learned authors are certainly wrong. Kuntomann, again, says, 'It has been recently pointed out that the name (Ma'bar) applies neither specially to the south-west coast nor to the south-east, but to the whole southern apex of the peninsula. . . . All use of it (Ma'bar)," concludes Yule, "that I have seen is clear for its being the south-east coast, as Abul Fida precisely says, commencing from Cape Comorin. 'Ma'bar,' says Rashīd-ud-dīn, 'extends from Kulam (Kōlam) to Silawar (Nilawar or Nellore) 300 farsangs along the shore. . . . The king is called Dewar, which means in the Ma'bar tongue 'the lord of wealth.' Large ships called junks bring merchandise thither from Chin and Machin. . . . Ma'bar is, as it were, the key of India.'" (Yule's *Cathay*, p. 219.)

Again, Lee gives an instance of how Ma'bar has been confounded with Mālābār. "The reader," he says in a footnote (p. 123), "should be informed that in many cases in which Firishṭa has Ma'bar, Col. Dow, not knowing, I suppose, what to make of the word, has translated it by Malabar."

CHAPTER VII

HIS AMBITIOUS PROJECTS

BARANĪ¹ makes a special attempt to describe five of the emperor's projects—(1) the increased taxes in the Doāb, (2) the making of Deogīr into a capital, (3) the token currency, (4) the Khurāsān² expedition, and (5) the Qarāchīl expedition—the pursuit of which ranges over the first part of the reign. But Rājput legends and some of the subsequent Muslim histories refer to two other important occurrences in the opening years of the reign: (1) the defeat and imprisonment³ of the emperor at the hands of Rānā Hammīr of Chittor, and (2) the emperor's⁴ inability to withstand Tarmāshīrīn's invasion.

Rāi Bahādur Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha contends that, encouraged by the miserable state of the Delhi empire following the death of Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn, Rānā Hammīr wished to recover his paternal dominions. Accordingly, he first set his hands upon Māldev's⁵ principalities and began during the latter's lifetime to annex them to his own estates. On the death of Māldev and in the time of his son Jaisa he acquired complete possession of Chittor, the capital city of the Gohilvaṃsh, about the year 1326. Later he established

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 472-78.

² Baranī enumerates six projects, but in reality they come to five, the 4th and 5th being the same.

³ Ojha, G. S.: *Hindī History of Rajputana*, II, pp. 546.

⁴ Firishṭa (*Bombay*), I, 238.

⁵ The Sonigra chief of Jalor whom Rāi Bahādur Mr. G. S. Ojha on the authority of Nainsi declares as having been appointed Governor of Chittor by 'Alā-ud-dīn on the recall of Prince Khizr Khān. He has been mentioned in Erskine's *Gazetteer of Mewār* as well as in Tod as having been appointed Governor of Chittor by Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Mr. G. S. Ojha thinks that Tod was misled by the Mewār bards into believing that it was Māldev who on suffering the loss of Chittor went to Muḥammad bin Tughluq and persuaded him to co-operate in the storming of Chittor.

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his rule over the whole of Mewār placing it under the paramountcy of the Sisodia branch of the Gohilvaṃsh. He then made Chittor his capital, and assumed the title of Mahārānā, Mewār remaining under Sisodia rule from this time onwards. When, thus, the Chauhāns lost their hold over the stronghold of Chittor, and upon Mewār, Jaisa, the son of Māldev, fled to Sulṭān Muḥammad Tughluq¹ at Delhi and persuaded him to march against Mahārānā Hammīr. A battle was fought near the village of Singolī in which Hammīr defeated the Sulṭān, and took him prisoner. For three months the Sulṭān remained a prisoner in Chittor. In the end he purchased his release from Rānā Hammīr by giving him the territories of Ajmer, Rantlambor, Nāgor and Sooespur², together with fifty lakhs of rupees and one hundred elephants.³

Rāi Bahādur Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha contends on the authority of Naiṃsī that Māldev lived six years after obtaining possession of Chittor from 'Alā-ud-dīn; and there he at last died. Nine years after 'Alā-ud-dīn's death (1316) Muḥammad Tughluq ascended the throne of Delhi. At that time Māldev could not have been alive. Possibly his eldest son Jaisa went to the Sulṭān and obtained his help to storm Chittor. Rāi Bahādur Mr. G. S. Ojha thinks that Hammīr must have taken Chittor somewhere about 1328. He tells us that in an inscription of the reign of Mahārānā Kumbha (1438) Hammīr has been extolled as having defeated a Muhammadan army, and is inclined to conclude the view that those were the Delhi troops led by Jaisa.⁴

Rāi Bahādur Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha regards the Rājput report of Rānā Hammīr's recovery of Chittor from Muḥammad bin Tughluq

¹ In a footnote (p. 234, *History of Udaipur*) Mr. G. S. Ojha points out Tod's mistake. He says that Tod has erroneously mentioned Muḥammad Khālji, instead of Muḥammad Tughluq.

² Tod (Vol. 1, p. 319) has "Sui Sopur."

³ Rāi Bahādur Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha puts this in the form of a quotation and refers to Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. 1, pp. 318-19. But of this, only a part is found in Tod, e.g., "of the three steppes . . . from the first ascent from the plain of Mewār to the descent at Chambal the king of Mewār had encamped on the central at Singolī, where he was attacked, defeated and made prisoner by Hammīr, who slew Hari Singh, brother of Banbir in single combat. The king suffered a confinement of three months in Chittor, nor was he liberated until he had surrendered Ajmer, Ranthambor, Nagor and Sui Sopur, besides paying fifty Lakhs of rupees and one hundred elephants. . . ." (Tod, Vol. 1, p. 319.)

⁴ Ojha, G. S. : *History of Udaipur* (Hindī), p. 234.

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as correct, but he has some doubts regarding the emperor's imprisonment, and his surrendering Ajmer, and other territories, since these were captured subsequently by Mahārānā Kumbha.¹

As far as available historical evidence goes, it can be said that Muḥammad bin Tughluq led no punitive expedition against any Hindū state ; nor can the despatch of his army to Chittor be proved. The inscription of Rānā Kumbha's time is of much later date, and does not mention the name of Sultān Muḥammad. The only reference it makes is to the reign of Rānā Hammīr, whose dates² are still uncertain. Mr. G. S. Ojha's statement is not confirmed by Muslim sources.

It has also been contended that the whole of Rājputāna was independent at this time. It is said that the Rājās of Jaipur, Būndī, Gwālīor, Chanderī, and Kālpī threw off the allegiance of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and acclaimed Rānā Hammīr as their overlord.³ But it is not borne out by any contemporary evidence. All contemporary and non-contemporary sources agree that Sultān Muḥammad waged no wars with the Rājputās, and that his policy towards them was far from aggressive. Gardner Brown⁴ credits him with a liberal policy towards the Hindūs like that of Akbar.

Accordingly, Sultān Muḥammad is said to have created Hindū rule in Jawhar⁵ and Karaulī⁶ and to have tolerated Hindū power

¹ Ojha : *History of Udaipur*, Hindī (1928), p. 236.

² Tod gives 1301-1364 as the dates of Rānā Hammīr. But Rāi Bahādur Mr. G. S. Ojha disputes them.

³ Cf. Tod : *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, I, 320.

⁴ " . . . So far from oppressing his Hindū subjects he (Muḥammad bin Tughluq) showed himself the forerunner of Akbar both in his restriction of . . . Sati, and his employment of Hindū princes in high military posts and of competent Hindūs in high civil posts. He appears also to have been willing to allow other classes of Hindūs to prosper without interference. . . ." (*A. U. Magazine*, 1925.)

⁵ On Nim Shah, son of Jayaba, the Koli chief of Jawhar, a modern state on the B.B.C.I. Railway, situated near Thana in the district of Bombay, Muḥammad bin Tughluq is reported to have conferred the title of Raja. " So important was this event in the history of Jawhar that June 5th, 1343, the day on which the title was received, has been made the beginning of a new era which is still used in public documents." (*Imperial Gazetteer*, XIV, p. 88.)

⁶ " Karauli is a state in the east of Rajputana. It was in the time of Muḥammad bin Tughluq that Arjunpal, one of the descendants of Kunwarpal, the rājā of Karauli, recovered the territory of his ancestors. The revival of Hindū rule in Karauli began in 1327, and culminated in 1348 with the foundation of the town of Karauli, now the capital of the Karauli State." (*Gazetteer of Karauli*, p. 26.) From Drake Brockmann's *Gazetteer of Eastern Rajputana* (p. 298) it appears that a temple called Kalianji was built during the reign of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq in 1348 by Arjundeo on the site of the present city of Karauli. The name of Karauli is said to have been derived from Kalianji.

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in other parts¹ of the empire, for instance in Sind, and in Bihār.²

In his *Purusa Parīksā* Vidyāpatī³ Thākkura, the fourteenth century poet⁴ of Bihār, mentions a mighty Muslim ruler of India, named Muḥammad, presumably Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq. After acknowledging his greatness he describes his fight with a rebellious Hindū rājā named Kāfūr. On his army being defeated, the Sultān made an appeal to some Hindū princes or chieftains. Two of them, Nar Singh Deva of Karnatakula and Charchik Deva of the Chauhan-kula, volunteered their services. They fought for the Sultān against the rebellious Hindū rājā, killed him and sent his head to the Sultān.

It follows that Hindū princes flourished under Sultān Muḥammad, and if the Hindū testimony be credited, helped him even against their co-religionists.

To understand how the legend of Sultān Muḥammad's defeat and imprisonment at the hands of Rānā Hammīr arose, it is necessary to make a survey of the history of Mewār.⁵ Erskine has made an attempt to remove the mystery which shrouds it. It seems that one Karan Singh I was the great ruler of Chittor towards the end of the twelfth century. After his death, the ruling family became divided into two branches; the first branch ruled at Chittor under the title of Rāwal and the second at Sisoda, a village in the

¹ The Sumera tribe of Hindūs was allowed to enjoy power in Sind. This is evident from the *Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī* (B.M.). The *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhi* affords an indirect evidence of the Hindū power in Sāmāna, Kaithal, and Sunām (p. 483), as well as in the Doāb (p. 480).

² Grierson's article on "Vidyapati and his contemporaries" in the *Indian Antiquary* (XIV, July, 1885) contains a reference to the Hindū Power in Bihār. He maintains that although the Muhammadans had conquered Bihar and Bengal, yet they were compelled to allow the burden of Government to remain in the hands of the Hindūs. In this way Mithila or Darbhanga, while nominally under the sway of the Muhammadans, was really governed by Hindū kings. They acknowledged their subordination to the emperor of Delhi and paid him a yearly tribute, but in every other respect they were independent. From the year 1358 to 1459 Mithila was under a dynasty of Brāhman kings and the third or the sixth of this line was king Siva Sīmha, who came to the throne in 1446.


³ *Purusa Parīksā of Vidyāpatī*, by Babu Maheshwar Prasad, pp. 20 ff.

⁴ It is not easy to give the exact dates of Vidyapati. In his "Vidyapati and his Contemporaries" (p. 182, *Indian Antiquary*, XIV, July, 1885), Grierson mentions the year 1400 as the date when Vidyapati was granted the village of Bisapi by Siva Sīmha, later the raja of Mithila. He tells us that Vidyapati died an old man, and was the author of many works; among them being the *Purusa Parīksa*. This work was written in the reign of Deva Sīmha (1385). It seems that Vidyapati flourished under Deva Sīmha (1385) and Siva Sīmha (1446), the successive rajās of Mithila. (*Indian Antiquary*, p. 188.)

⁵ "Mewār" is a corrupt form of the Sanskrit, *Medpat*, that is, the country of the Meos, a tribe usually found in Alwar and Bharatpur. (Vide Erskine: *Rajputana Gaz.*, II, p. 5.) Mewār, which since 1559 became known after its new capital Udaipur, in the 14th century went by the name of Chittor.

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Arāvallis. An attempt is made below to show the line of rulers until the sack of Chittor (1303), which marked an epoch in the history of the Mewār family.



Firishta informs us that Ratan Singh (Rāi Ratan) was the ruler when Chittor was attacked by Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī (1303). It seems that Rānā Lakshman Singh came to rescue Rāwal Ratan Singh, but both were killed. The survivors of the Rāwal family fled into the Bāgar forests in the south, where they ultimately carved out for themselves the states of Dūngarpur and Banswāra. The only son of Rānā Lakshman Singh who survived the siege of Chittor named Ajāi Singh fled into the Arāvalli hills. There he set up an independent rule of his own at Kelwāra.

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Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji re-christened Chittor as Khizrābād, and appointed his son Khizr Khān as its governor. Erskine tells us on the authority of a local inscription that Chittor remained in the possession of the Muhammadans up to the time of "Muhammad Tughlak," who appointed Māldev, the Sonigara Chauhān chief of Jālor, as its governor. It is difficult to accept the legend attributed to Nainsi that Māldev had been appointed governor of Chittor by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji. In either case no external evidence is available.

Ajāi Singh was succeeded by Hammīr Singh I, who later became known as Mahārānā Hammīr. He recaptured Chittor, which in the words of Erskine,¹ brought down "Muhammad Tughlak with a large army but he was defeated and taken prisoner at Singolī, close to the eastern border of Mewār, and was not liberated till he had paid a large ransom said to have been fifty lakhs of rupees, and one hundred elephants, and ceded several districts. Hammīr Singh gradually recovered all the lost possessions of his ancestors, and died in 1364 leaving a name still honoured as one of the wisest and most gallant of chiefs."

From the accounts of Erskine, Tod, and Rāi Bahādūr Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha it follows that Rānā Hammīr survived Sultān Muhammad bin Tughluq, and subsequently his son and successor Khet Singh carried his father's victories further by defeating the Delhi forces at Bakrol. Mokal, one of the successors of Khet Singh, is said to have completely defeated and expelled a Muslim invader, Fīroz Khān of Nāgor. Rānā Kumbha, the son and successor of Mokal, defeated the joint forces of the Muslim kings of Mālwa and Gujarāt. "He (Kumbha)," Erskine² tells us, "defeated Mahmūd Khālji of Mālwa and kept him prisoner at Chittor for six months." Rāi Mal, a son and successor of Rānā Kumbha, defeated Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn of Mālwa. And Prithwī Rāj, a son of Rānā Rāi Mal; according to one account took the latter prisoner. According to another account he captured Muẓaffar Shāh, the King of Gujarāt. Rāi Mal was succeeded by the famous Rānā Sānga, who became the leader of a Rājput confederacy and fought against Bābur at Khānuā. "The Princes of Mārwar and Amber did him homage and the Rāos of Gwālīor, Ajmer, Sikrī, Raisen, Kālpī, Chanderī, Būndī, Gāgraun, Rāmpura and Ābū served him as tributaries."³

Now, the ascendancy of Mewār, which became an outstanding

¹ Erskine : *Rajputana Gazetteer*, II, A., p. 5 ff.

² Erskine : *Mewār Gazetteer*, II, A., p. 18.

³ Ibid.

feature of sixteenth century history, must have had a long story. The beginning of the rise of Mewār has perhaps rightly been traced to the time of Rānā Hammīr, a contemporary of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq, but the improbability of the Sultān's defeat and imprisonment at the Rānā's hands is obvious. It seems that the long succession of victories which the Rānās of Mewār gained over the later Muhammadans encouraged the Rājput bards, anxious to extol their idol Hammīr, to fabricate the story of Sultān Muḥammad's defeat and imprisonment.

Even the story of Rānā Hammīr's recovery of Chittor and the revolt of Mewār and Rājputāna is one-sided, and cannot be accepted on *ex parte* evidence unless supported by more explicit epigraphic, numismatic, and cumulative evidence.

All that can be safely inferred is that Sultān Muḥammad having refrained, unlike 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and Balban, from waging war with the Rājputs and Hindūs allowed great latitude to Rānā Hammīr. As a result the imperial authority suffered a set-back in Mewār. But the historian cannot draw any conclusion regarding the cowardice or humiliation of the Sultān in view of the Hindū applause for the Sultān in a Sanskrit inscription of the opening years of the reign.¹

An equally amazing report concerning the cowardice and humiliation of Sultān Muḥammad comes from Muslim sources. It is contended that the Sultān was unable to withstand an invasion of Tarmāshīrīn² from Transoxiana, that he was cowed into submission and that he made a most disgraceful peace with the invader by offering large amounts of money. The information that Firishta³ gives on this head amounts to this, that in the year 1327/727, Tarmāshīrīn, son of Dāūd Khan Chaghataī, marched with a huge army upon India with a view to conquering it, and overran the whole country from Multān and Lamaghān to Delhi. Sultān Muḥammad humiliated himself before him and purchased peace by giving the invader as much wealth as he wanted. Tarmāshīrīn then withdrew plundering as he went, and taking many prisoners.

Unfortunately Firishta does not mention his source. He thinks that Baranī did not mention Tarmāshīrīn's invasion because he feared to displease Sultān Fīroz. But this cannot be accepted, since Baranī has mentioned far more unfavourable incidents than Tarmāshīrīn's

¹ See Appendix B.

² This name is spelt Tirmāshīrīn in Lane-Poole's *Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 359, but Sir Wolseley Haig spells it as "Tarmāshīrīn" (*Cambridge History*, III, p. 143).

³ Firishta (*Bombay*, Vol. I), p. 238.

invasion. Perhaps he never knew Tarmāshīrīn as an invader. He has repeatedly mentioned the large numbers of Mongols, who came to Muḥammad bin Tughluq's court in the hope of profiting from his munificence. Perhaps Tarmāshīrīn was one with them, according to Baranī.

In consistency with his hypothesis mentioned in the preamble, Baranī has recorded in his account of Muḥammad bin Tughluq events of decisive importance only. Tarmāshīrīn's story therefore found no place in his scheme. He emphasizes¹ with all the force he can command Muḥammad bin Tughluq's power and vigour as well as the admirable working of the administrative machinery of his empire in the opening years of his reign. He maintains that revenue was collected from the distant as well as from the adjacent provinces with great ease. Every provincial governor used to send his contribution and quota to the imperial exchequer at the specified time.

The emperor's control even over distant provinces like Telingāna, Kampīla, Dvārasamudra, Ma'bar, Tīrta, ~~Tandjānūr~~ Satgāon, and Sonārgāon, was as vigorous and effective as it was in Delhi. The Sultān conquered a number of territories successively and every new conquest made was carefully consolidated, new and capable officers—Vālis, Nāibs and 'Āmils—being immediately appointed. In short, the new administrative organisation established in the opening years of the reign was so effective that nothing resembling it had existed under the preceding kings. So much wealth now began to pour into the royal coffers that nothing like it had ever before been realised. To crown all, neither in the distant provinces; nor in the outposts was any rebel to be seen; not a single *muqaddam* or *khūṭ* was defiant.

There was not a single village, which dared disobey the emperor's orders, or could delay, far less refuse, the payment of dues. Over and above the dues, even the arrears accumulated for many years were realized with great ease. Furthermore, all the rājās (rāyās) amīrs, muqaddams, and tribal chiefs were extremely faithful, loyal and submissive to the emperor.

Firishta² follows Baranī. Immediately after his account of Tarmāshīrīn's invasion, he devotes considerable space testifying to the efficiency of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's administration. He tells

¹ Baranī. (i) Bib. Ind., pp. 468-9. (ii) B.M. or 2039

² Firishta (*Bombay*), Vol. I, p. 238.

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us that even in the distant provinces like Dvārasamudra, Ma'bar, Kampīla, Wārangal, Lakhnautī, and Sonārgāon, an excellent administrative system was set up, and the same was the case in the whole of the Carnatic.

Firishhta therefore contradicts himself. A king who was so weak as to surrender to an invader and purchase from him a most disgraceful peace was not likely to establish so effective and admirable an administrative system. Moreover, the slightest exhibition of the emperor's weakness would have encouraged the Turkish amīrs and Hindū chiefs to revolt. In that case the disintegration of the empire would have come earlier, and Muḥammad bin Tughluq could hardly have continued as king for about a quarter of a century.

Accounts regarding Tarmāshīrīn differ in different books. Yaḥya bin Aḥmad¹ maintains that he invaded Delhi in 1328/729 and overran many parts, including Lāhore, Sāmāna and Indrī,² taking the inhabitants prisoners. He reached the Jumna, where he encamped, retiring at last by the same route. All the while, the emperor remained with his army in the vicinity of Delhi, which he left only after Tarmāshīrīn had recrossed the Indus. Then he went with his troops in pursuit of him as far as Kalānaur. Leaving the fortress of Kalānaur, which was in a dilapidated condition to one Mujīr-ud-dīn Abū Rija, and charging some of the chieftains to carry on the pursuit, he retired to Delhi.

Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr³ states that the transference of the capital from Delhi to Deogīr by Muḥammad bin Tughluq left Hindustān more or less undefended, and was an invitation to Tarmāshīrīn to plunder and lay waste India. On hearing of the invasion the emperor, who was still in the Deccan, set out for Delhi, which he reached before Tarmāshīrīn. The latter came subsequently, and encamped in the suburbs of Delhi; his huge army having set themselves to plunder in the directions of Budāūn and Sāmāna. As a result the empire of Delhi received a staggering blow; great havoc was wrought. As long as Tarmāshīrīn did not retire of his own accord, the emperor remained in Delhi.

Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr's account is very inaccurate. In the first place, he regards Tarmāshīrīn as the King of Khurāsān instead of Trans-

¹ Yaḥya bin Aḥmad: *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 101.

² A *pargana* town in 29° 53' N. and 77° 5' E., near the western bank of the Jumna (*Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 143).

³ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, III, p. 865.

oxiana. In the second place, he declares that Tarmāshīrīn invaded India because of the evacuation of Delhi—a captious phrase seriously misleading. The so-called transference of the capital to Deogīr, or the “evacuation of Delhi,” came after Tarmāshīrīn’s invasion, according to Firishta. Therefore, it could not have been one of the causes leading to the invasion. Finally, Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr accuses the emperor of cowardice, which is hardly consistent with the contemporary accounts of his character and military achievements.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa¹ tells us that Muḥammad bin Tughluq was extremely kind to Tarmāshīrīn, and that brotherly relations subsisted between the two. On his way from Khurāsān to India the traveller had stopped at Bulḥārā, where he met Tarmāshīrīn, and lived with him about two months. He gives a detailed description of this event, but does not mention any invasion. He informs us that the dominions of Tarmāshīrīn lay between those of four of the most powerful sovereigns of the world ; the King of China, the King of India, the King of ‘Irāq, and King Uzbek. These four rulers made presents to him and treated him with great consideration and respect. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us further a queer story about the fate of Tarmāshīrīn, which he heard on his arrival in India. His principal subjects and amīrs conspired against him, swearing allegiance to one of his cousins, Buzūn Ughle by name. They proclaimed him king and deposed Tarmāshīrīn because the latter had violated the precepts of Chingīz Khān. Tarmāshīrīn sought shelter at Ghazna, but was subsequently captured at Balkh and imprisoned. From Balkh he was taken as a prisoner to Bulḥārā and Samarqand. Near Samarqand, at a place called Nasaf, he was killed and buried.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa proceeds to give an entirely different version of Tarmāshīrīn’s tragic end. According to this account, which is perhaps more reliable, he fled in disguise to India ; his son, Bāshi Ughle, and his daughter, with her husband, Fīroz, having forestalled him, to the court of the Indian King, Sultān Muḥammad. He treated Tarmāshīrīn’s children with consideration, and assigned them splendid lodgings on account of the amity and brotherly relations which had subsisted between him and Tarmāshīrīn.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² reports that subsequently a man pretending to be Tarmāshīrīn came from Sind. ‘Imād-ul-Mulk Sarteẓ, then governor

¹ Def. et Sang., III, pp. 31-47.

² (a) B.N., MS. 909, F. 103-106. (b) Def. et Sang., III, pp. 31-47.

of Sind, had him identified through some of the amīrs, who had known Tarmāshīrīn personally. The news was then sent to the emperor. He commissioned his court doctor, who had previously served Tarmāshīrīn, and had healed an abscess, which the latter had developed below his knee, to identify the man. The doctor found on him the scar, which the abscess had left behind, and identified him as Tarmāshīrīn.

Thus Tarmāshīrīn stayed in Multān, and possibly moved with a following of his Mongol tribesmen through Lamaghān and Indrī into the neighbourhood of Delhi. Some idea as to the strength of his following might be formed from a statement in the *Rihla* that they amounted to 40,000 men. But this statement is based upon hearsay and the figures are obviously exaggerated. They help, however, to illustrate the circumstances in which the story of Tarmāshīrīn's invasion of India arose and found its way into an authentic Mongol history like the *Shajarat-ul-Atrāk*, and thence into Indian histories. Hence the popular belief that Tarmāshīrīn was a definite menace to Muḥammad bin Tughluq and had to be bought off. According to the story the arrival of Tarmāshīrīn's subjects in the vicinity of Delhi being reported to the emperor, he had Tarmāshīrīn exiled from India. But he awarded him 5,000 dīnārs.¹ Tarmāshīrīn arrived in Shīrāz and was treated with consideration by Ishāq, the King of Shīrāz. On arriving in Shīrāz after his return from India, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa learnt that Tarmāshīrīn was still in Shīrāz. But he did not see him.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's account of Tarmāshīrīn tends to confirm the legendary character of the story of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's abject surrender to him. It throws light on Tarmāshīrīn's defeat at the hands of Amīr Ḥasan, near Ghazna, and his march with a large following towards India, which looked like a military expedition or campaign. This was in consistency with the Mongol traditions; hence the popular version in the Mongol and Indian histories. On entering India at the head of an armed following Tarmāshīrīn looked like an invader. His Mongol soldiers might have overrun certain places as they passed through Lamaghān and Indrī, to the neighbourhood of Delhi. That the emperor was advised by his Vazīr, Khwāja Jahān, and tutor, Qutlugh Khān, to take an immediate step to assure the maintenance of peace, shows that the Indians

¹ For the value of a dīnār see Chapter XII.

possessed no knowledge of the situation in central Asia or of the trend of events beyond the Indus. Hence Tarmāshīrīn was in their eyes one of the many Mongol invaders of India. So he continued to be regarded right up to the time of Tīmūr ; and, in fact, up to the present day. Muḥammad bin Tughluq's gift of 5,000 *dīnārs*¹ to Tarmāshīrīn is the origin of the belief that the invader had to be bought off.

It is evident from the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*² that orthodox Sunnī Islām, which had long found its way in the Chaghataī dominions was established as the state religion with the conversion of Tarmāshīrīn in the beginning of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign. All the chiefs,³ as well as the inhabitants, of the country had also been converts. This must have been a turning-point in the history of the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Delhi. Hitherto the relations between India and Transoxiana had been far from friendly, for the Mongol hordes from Transoxiana used to overrun India, as is evidenced by Baranī.⁴ The *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*⁵ tells us that the enmity between the governments of India and Transoxiana was of old standing. The inhabitants of India were unable to withstand the invasions from Transoxiana. The only defence they could make was to bring forth their elephants. The author, a contemporary witness, rejoices⁶ to think how greatly the power of the Muslim government of India had increased under Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

It goes without saying that with the rise of Ghāzi Malik Tughluq, Mōngolophobia had considerably diminished. By the time Muḥammad bin Tughluq ascended the throne, the king of Transoxiana had become a zealous convert to the Sunnī form of Islām, and felt drawn towards the Muslim king of India, the more so because of the traditional hostility between the Chaghataīs and Īl-Khānīds. The friendly correspondence and brotherly relations, which in these circumstances began between Tarmāshīrīn and Muḥammad bin Tughluq, are powerfully attested by the eye-witness, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa.⁷

It will be remembered that the fourteenth century was the age of great sectarian rivalries in Islām. The antagonism between the

¹ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa uses the term *dīnār* for a silver ṭanka. See Chapter XII.

² Shihāb-ud-din Aḥmad 'Abbās : *Masālik-ul-abṣār*, B.N., MS. 5867, F. 54.

³ According to the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* they were the most zealous converts to Islām. They had overcome all doubts and misgivings, and were able to distinguish the lawful (*Halāl*) from the unlawful (*Harām*). B.N., MS. 5867, F. 54.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 259 ff.

⁵ B.N., MS. 5867, F. 55, 56.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa : *Def. et Sang.*, III, p. 32-49.

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Shi'ahs and Sunnīs was exceedingly acute¹; hence the rivalry between the Īl-Khānīds of Persia and the Chaghataīs of Transoxiana became bitter.² The Īl-Khānīds in Persia had accepted the Shi'ah faith. Uljaitū-Khān (1303-16), a contemporary of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī of India, was a staunch Shi'ah. He is said to have severely persecuted the Sunnīs in his dominions (1309). In 1311/712, he invaded Syria, then held by the Sunnī ruler, An-Nāṣir. Ibn Taimiya, the great Sunnī jurist or anthropomorphist free lance, as Macdonald³ calls him, then in the latter's service, was authorized⁴ to accompany the army departing for Syria; and it was he who probably incited Kabek Khān, the King of Transoxiana, and a brother and predecessor of Tarmāshīrīn, to wage war against the Shi'ah aggressor. Kabek Khān threatened to march on Khurāsān, and Uljaitū was forced to retire. He lost hold eventually on some of his territories—Kābul, Ghazna and Qandhār, which passed into the hands of the Chaghataīs. In 1316 Uljaitū Khān was succeeded by his young son, Abū S'aīd. After some nine years, approximately the time when Muḥammad bin Tughluq ascended the throne of India (1325), the relations between Sultān Abū S'aīd and his powerful minister, Amīr Chobān, became strained. Meanwhile, Tarmāshīrīn, having ascended the throne of Transoxiana, had become a staunch Sunnī. He pursued an anti-Īlkhānī policy like his brother and predecessor, Kabek, and began to make preparations for an invasion of Khurāsān. With this object in view he had collected troops in Ghazna, an outpost of strategic importance. No sooner did Amīr Chobān hear of this, than he sent a huge army, under the command of his son, Ḥasan, towards Ghazna. Ḥasan fell unawares upon Tarmāshīrīn, then in the vicinity of Ghazna. There a battle was fought early in 1326.⁵ Tarmāshīrīn was defeated, and he fled to

¹ Ibid., I, pp. 144-147.

² 'Abdur-Razzāq: *Maḥla'-us-Sa'dain*, I.O., MS. 192, F. 19-23.

³ Macdonald: *Development of Muslim Theology Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, pp. 270-78.

⁴ *Encyclopædia of Islām*, Vol. II, p. 421.

⁵ (a) 'Abdur-Razzāq: *Maḥla'-us-Sa'dain*, I.O., MS. 192, F. 22-23.

(b) Hamd-Ullah Mustanfi: *Tārīkh-i-Guzidah*, p. 607.

(c) Khvānd Mir: *Habib-us-Siyar*, III, Pt. I, p. 703.

(d) Mir Khvānd: *Rauzat-uṣ-Ṣafa*, Vol. I, p. 152.

N.B.—Lee (*The Travels of Ibn Batuta*, p. 89) remarks that the exploits of Tarmāshīrīn in the neighbourhood of Ghazna are referred to in the *Maḥla'-us-Sa'dain* under the year A.H. 732 (A.D. 1332). This is wrong. The *Maḥla'-us-Sa'dain* describes the above-mentioned fight of Tarmāshīrīn with Amīr Ḥasan near Ghazna under the year 726 (1326) and not 732 (1332).

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India, taking a large part of his army with him. Its strength is not definitely known. But it formed the nucleus of the exaggerated numbers, 40,000, which Tarmāshīrīn is said to have brought into India on his flight from Transoxiana. As the story runs, he took them through Multān right up to Delhi, to the great indignation of the nobles of Delhi.

This appears to be the truth regarding Tarmāshīrīn's visit to India. The account of his invasion of India with a view to conquer it, and of the abject surrender of Muḥammad bin Tughluq is apocryphal. Sir Wolseley Haig¹ rejects the account of the emperor's surrender, and his attempt to bribe the invader, though he regards Tarmāshīrīn's incursion as a raid.

It appears from Firishta² that after Tarmāshīrīn's return, Muḥammad bin Tughluq began to make preparations for the conquest of the Il-Khānī territories of Persia, Khurāsān and 'Irāq. He began to raise a new army, subsequently known as the Khurāsān army, and to award rich gifts to Mongols visiting his court from those countries. Baranī repeatedly complains against the emperor's lavishing wealth upon the Mongols. But the emperor did so with a fixed purpose in the hope of eliciting information about the enemy's countries. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to suppose that Tarmāshīrīn's visit had something to do with the Khurāsān expedition of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

On reaching Transoxiana, Tarmāshīrīn sent his son-in-law, Amīr Nauroz, with a large number of Mongol chieftains, to the court of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. All of them joined the Sultān's army³; and Amīr Nauroz remained⁴ in Muḥammad bin Tughluq's service until the latter's death near Tattāl (1351). It was after this visit of his, that Tarmāshīrīn opened Ghazna to direct communications and negotiations with Sultān Muḥammad. Ghazna was afterwards made a diplomatic centre, and came within the Sultān's sphere of influence, as he frequently sent money to the Government of Ghazna, and almost took the Qāzī of Ghazna into his pay, a fact which Baranī repeatedly deplores. It is to the friendly relations thus established between Muḥammad and Tarmāshīrīn that Ibn Battūṭa

¹ (i) *Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 143. (ii) *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922.

² *Firishta (Bombay)*, Vol. I, p. 238-239.

³ *Firishta (Bombay)*, I, pp. 239-40.

⁴ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 533. Baranī (p. 533) mentions Amīr Nauroz as Nauroz Kargan.

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bears so powerful a testimony. It is, again, to these that the *Masālik-ul-Abşār* testifies. It records on the authority of Shaikh Abū Bakr Bazzī, that Sultān Muḥammad sent a present of three lakhs of gold ṭankas to Transoxiana, Shaikh Abū Bakr Bazzī himself bears one of the bearers of the money.

The cumulative evidence in favour of the establishment of a friendly alliance between Muḥammad and Tarmāshīrīn throws a side-light on the nature of the latter's popularly believed invasion or raid. In either case Muḥammad was not the man to forget or forgive Tarmāshīrīn. He would have waited long for his revenge, and instead of meditating an invasion of Khurāsān would have concerted plans for the destruction of Tarmāshīrīn.

* No foreign conquest was possible without a large army and money for its upkeep, and the certainty of the continuance of peace and prosperity in the country. This turned the emperor's mind towards the Deccan, which of all parts of the empire was the weakest and most dangerous. Of this he had had a personal experience. The mere delay in the communication of news from Delhi, while he was in charge of an expedition in Wārangal, had led to a revolt in the army.

One of the factors controlling the situation in the Deccan was the scarcity of the Muhammadans—a fact which made it so tempting to the Hindū rulers to revolt, and so difficult for the emperor of Delhi immediately to control the situation from so great a distance. At the slightest outbreak of trouble in any part of the Deccan, either a capable general had to be sent from Delhi or the emperor himself had to march in person as Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh Khiljī had done. Sultān Muḥammad's desire to make Deogīr a centre of Muslim culture and plant there a colony of the Muhammadans mentioned by the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*¹ had probably this political motive behind it. He hoped in this way to solve the Deccan problem. He would employ the saints (mashāikh)—the disciples of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya and others—peacefully to disseminate the teachings of Islām in the south, as had been done with remarkable results in northern India, by their predecessors—Shaikh Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Kākī, Shaikh Farīd-ud-dīn Ganj-i-Shakar, Shaikh 'Alā-ud-dīn, and Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. Each had become a popular idol with a large following of both Hindūs and Muhammadans. All had been

¹ Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, pp. 273-275.

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of great service in spreading the culture of Islām and in fostering the growth of a better feeling between the Muslims and Hindūs.¹ This seems to have been one of the objects with which the Sultān endeavoured to choose a more centrally situated capital. Firishṭa tells us that the Sultān's vazīr and his councillors suggested Ujjain² as a suitable place, but he himself was in favour of Deogīr, which was re-christened Daulatābād.

The *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* makes no mention at all of the transference of the capital. On the other hand, it³ tells us that the empire of Delhi (Dehli) had two capitals ; (1) Delhi and (2) Deogīr or Qubbat-ul-Islām (the metropolis of Islām) between which the Sultān had taken care to place drums at every posting station. Whenever anything happened in a city and whenever the gates of a town were opened or closed the drums were beaten in rapid succession from posting station to posting station. In this manner the Sultān knew every day definitely the time of the opening and closing of the gates of the towns lying at varying distances.

Gardner Brown⁴ thinks that the emperor intended to take the new provinces of the Deccan under his personal rule, because Deogīr was more centrally situated than Delhi and closer to the scene of action in the Deccan to make it into a second capital. He is definitely of opinion that with the accession of Muḥammad bin Tughluq the empire's centre of gravity had shifted from the north to the south, and to this Brown attributes the projected change. He suggests that one of the reasons responsible for the shifting of the centre of gravity was the decline in the importance of the Panjāb, which apart from being devastated by a hundred years of Mongol raids was, so it is reported, devastated by a great flood. That the Panjāb had been for a hundred years exposed to invasions from the north cannot be denied ; that a great flood had occurred may also be conceded, but the diminished importance of the Panjāb was not the real or primary cause of the so-called transference of the capital.

Baranī⁵ tells us that the other project of Sultān Muḥammad, the carrying out of which brought destruction to the capital city and

¹ See my article on " The Saints in Pre-Mughal India " in the *Agra College Magazine* (October, 1931, pp. 11-14).

² Firishṭa (*Bombay*), I, p. 242.

³ (a) B.N., MS. 5867, F. 27. (b) *Notices et extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, pp. 210, 172.

⁴ *A. U. Magazine*, 1925.

⁵ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 473.

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misfortune to the upper classes, as well as decline of the select and distinguished people, was that the Sultān took it into his head to re-name Deogīr, Daulatābād. He desired to make it his capital, because it was comparatively central and equidistant from Delhi, Gujarāt, Lakhnāutī, Satgāon, Sonārgāon, Telingāna (Teling), Ma'bar, Dvārasamudra and Kampīla. Without discussing the project, he devastated Delhi so much that in its inhabited areas, inns and suburbs not even a cat or dog remained.¹ All the dwellers, with their families and dependants, wives and children, male and female servants, were forced to leave. Many people, who had been living in their homes for years, and had been attached to their forefathers' houses for generations, perished on the long journey. All around Deogīr, the infidel land of old, there sprang up on all sides the graveyards of the Musalmāns. Although the Sultān made liberal gifts, both at the time of their setting out for Deogīr and on their arrival, the people were unable to endure the hardships of the journey, and perished in "this land of infidels." Out of so many emigrants only a few ever returned. From that day the city of Delhi, which had hitherto been "the envy of the cities of the world," was destroyed. Although the emperor brought nobles as well as men of learning and distinction into the city from other parts and made them dwell there, yet even by this importation of strangers the city was not populated. By these enormous changes and alterations great injury was done to the empire.

Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī² distinctly says that the transference of the capital brought about the *destruction of the upper classes*. It follows that the common people, that is, the mass of the Hindūs, were not affected by the forced emigration to Deogīr. Two Sanskrit³ inscriptions of the years 1327 and 1328 tend to confirm this. The first inscription of the Vikrama year 1384 (A.D. 1327) "records the foundation of a well by a Brahmin of the name of Śrīdhara at the village of Nadayana, the modern Naraina, near Delhi." (The inscription originally consisted of twenty-one verses inscribed on a piece of stone measuring eighteen inches in width by thirteen inches in height. A part of the stone being broken, some of the verses are missing, but sixteen of them are yet preserved. The fifth verse definitely makes a reference to Muḥammad bin Tughluq and applauds

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 473-474.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 473.

³ *Catalogue of the Delhi Museum of Archaeology*, p. 29.

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him as the "mighty Saka Lord, the institutor of a new era, through fear of whom the whole world trembles."

The ten¹ verses which follow throw light on the favourable circumstances in which the Hindūs of Delhi lived under the Sultān at that time.

The other inscription² of the year 1328 (Vikrama year 1384) is said to have been found in the village Sarban,³ five miles south of modern Delhi. It contains a sketch of the history of Delhi from earliest times till the time of the inscription, with special reference to Muḥammad bin Tughluq, the ruling Sultān. It testifies to the prosperity of a family of Hindū merchants, dwelling in Agrotaka, its principal member being Shri Sachadevan. Two of his most distinguished descendants, Khetala and Paituka, sank a well in memory of their deceased ancestors and for "the continuation of their race."

These inscriptions throw a flood of light on the point at issue. If the Hindūs had been persecuted by the emperor; if they had been forced, one and all, to evacuate Delhi; and if Delhi had been ruined, surely none of the Hindūs would have thought of raising any monument, far less of sinking a well to the memory of their departed ancestors. The memorialist seems to be happy, and rejoices in the opportunity he had of serving his co-religionists quenching their thirst, and administering to their needs by means of this well. The well was actually thrown open to the use of the Hindūs, who enjoyed and admired it. "Thus," continues the inscription, "exclaim the crowd of wayfarers when they proceed home, after drinking the sweet clear water of this well." The language of the inscription connotes that the memorialist had a long pedigree, and enjoyed social freedom. It seems that the social history of the Hindūs of Delhi had a continuity irrespective of the changes in the government of Delhi. It also appears from the inscription that the rank and file of the Hindūs of Delhi, far from being crushed, as is generally supposed, enjoyed peace and protection and they seem to have been favourably inclined to the emperor; at least they did not detest him like Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, 'Iṣāmī and Mirkhurd.⁴ The second inscription is no less useful. It tells us that Hindū merchants lived peacefully and prosperously in the Delhi of Sultān Muḥammad.

¹ See Appendix B., Verses 6-16.

² See Appendix B.

³ The inscription has Sarvala or Sarbala.

⁴ That is, Muḥammad bin Mubārak, author of the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*.

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"Agrotaka" is mentioned as the dwelling-place of these merchants. "Agrotaka" probably connected with Agarwāla as the Hindū *Baniyas* of Agra are now called, was perhaps the name of that part of Delhi where the Hindū merchants then lived.

The report of the destruction of Delhi coming from Baranī needs careful examination. His language, though distinct and clear enough in the beginning, becomes ambiguous towards the end. He deplores the fate of the Muslim emigrants in a language which has been taken to mean the wholesale and indiscriminate exile of the natives, the Hindūs. But an examination of Baranī's account, word by word, will show that nowhere does he imply the exile of the Hindūs. He is naturally aggrieved at the sight of the destruction of special Muslim dwellings. As regards the people who were made to go to Deogīr he uses the word *Mutawattinān*,¹ which is particularly applicable to the Muslims, who had adopted India as their home. That he distinctly means the Muslim Delhi or Delhi of the Musalmāns, when he deplores its fate appears from his reference to the growth of its population for "the last 160 or 170 years," that is, since the Muslim conquest. Certainly, there was a populous city of Delhi even before the Muslim conquest. By ignoring the population of Delhi before the Muslim conquest, Baranī seems to ignore in his above statement the Hindū element. The same is true of 'Iṣāmī.² He regards Muḥammad bin Tughluq as "a scourge sent by God" to punish the Musalmāns of Delhi because of their corruption and unrighteousness.³

That the Hindūs could not have been sent at all to Deogīr is clear from the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*.⁴ The author, who was a contemporary of the emperor and probably an eye-witness, informs us that while Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq was sending the people towards Deogīr and meditating the conquest of *Khurāsān*, he had a special palace constructed in Delhi. There a pulpit was placed. All the nobles and leading men of Delhi and the suburbs were summoned to hear the emperor deliver a speech encouraging the people to a "Jihād" against the infidels.

It should be noted that the same people (*Khalq*), who were being

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 474. Elliot (III, 239) has mistranslated *Mutawattinān* as natives.

² 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin*, MS., F. 247-249.

³ Idem.

⁴ Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, 271.

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sent to Deogīr, were to be addressed by the emperor and induced to proceed on a "Jihād" against the infidels. Obviously, the Hindūs of Delhi could not have been persuaded to join a "Jihād" against their co-religionists in Deogīr. The term Jihād is used in a special sense to connote the peaceful dissemination of Islām, as is borne out by the following incident which, according to the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*,¹ occurred during the so-called transference of the capital to Deogīr. The emperor called Shaikh² Shams-ud-dīn, a disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, and asked what a man of his intelligence was doing there. "You," said the Sultān, addressing him, "should go to Kashmīr³ and preach Islām to the idol-houses there." He then issued an order empowering certain officers to send Shams-ud-dīn to Kashmīr. Shams-ud-dīn returned home on the plea that he had to make preparations for his departure to Kashmīr. There, in reply to his relations' inquiry, he said to them, "I saw my master, Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, in a dream: he calls me—I go hence to him. Where can they (the Sultān and his officers) send me?" On the morrow Shaikh Shams-ud-dīn fell ill, and developed an ulcer on his chest, which was operated upon. As the emperor heard of this he ordered Shams-ud-dīn to be brought to the court with a view to ascertaining how far he was really disabled. On the matter being ascertained the Shaikh was allowed to return, but he died⁴ in a few days.

The story of Shaikh Shams-ud-dīn throws light on the purport of the emperor's reported speech in Delhi. It enables us to understand the special meaning of the "Jihād" preached by the emperor. He did not mean to induce the Muslims of Delhi to go to war with the Hindūs of the Deccan, since there was no cause for war, but he meant some of the leading Muslims of Delhi, the amīrs, the 'Ulamā and saints to establish themselves in Deogīr. That only the leading Muslims were pressed to go to Deogīr and not the rank and file is evident from the *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn*. It tells us that in the days when Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq was forcing the leading men of

¹ Sayyid Muḥammad bin Mabārak, p. 228.

² The *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn* describes him as Maulanā Shams-ud-dīn Yahya, a disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya and teacher of the whole city (of Delhi). (*Maṭlūb-ut-tālibīn*, I.O. MS., F. 92.)

³ Islām had not been introduced into Kashmīr as yet. Only a few years before Shāh Mirza, the famous adventurer from Swāt, who became in 1346 the first Muslim king of Kashmīr, had entered the service of Sinha Deva, the Hindū ruler of Kashmīr at that time. (Firishta, *Bombay*, II, pp. 647-648.)

⁴ Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, pp. 225-228.

Delhi to Deogīr, Shaikh Sirāj-ud-dīn 'Uṣmān, a disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, and the author's spiritual guide and teacher, escaped to Lakhnautī. The words "leading men of Delhi" (*Buzurgān-i-Delhi*)¹ used with regard to those who were forced to leave Delhi for Deogīr, should be noted. Almost the same expression is used in the Arabic² history of Gujarāt. The author borrowing his information from Ḥusām Khān, tells us that on resolving to make Deogīr his capital the emperor constructed inns and founded villages at every stage all along the way from Delhi to Deogīr. He then ordered the outstanding inhabitants and nobles of Delhi to set out. He gave them the price of their landed property as well as provisions and allowance for the journey. With them he himself proceeded to Deogīr, where he founded at the foot of the fortress a city called Daulatābād. He made it the metropolis and constructed new buildings in it, making the people dwell there. Delhi was evacuated even by the door-keepers (*Bawwāb*).

There is no mention of the common people—the masses or the Hindūs—being forced to leave Delhi. The nobles and people of note are expressly mentioned as being the emigrants. With regard to the evacuation of Delhi the word "*Bawwāb*" has been used showing the extent to which emigration was carried. "*Bawwāb*" means the *durbān* or door-keeper. It seems that the houses of the aristocracy being emptied, the door-keepers were no longer needed.

The story of Shaikh Fakhr-ud-dīn Zarrādī, a disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, related in the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*,³ elucidates the point still further. It shows us the kind of people who were forced to leave Delhi for Deogīr, Shaikh Fakhr-ud-dīn Zarrādī being one of them. Shortly after his arrival there, the Shaikh began to make preparations to retire or to proceed to Mecca. Kamāl-ud-dīn, the Qāzī of Deogīr, warned him against departing without the Sultān's orders. He told him that the Sultān aimed at making Deogīr a prosperous and renowned city of the world, and desired the 'Ulamā, the Mashāikh, and the nobles to make their homes there. But the Shaikh turned a deaf ear to the warning, and left for Mecca.

¹ Muḥammad Bulāq: *Maṭlūb-ul-Ṭalībīn*, I.O. MS.

² Ḥajjī-ud-Dabīr, VI, III, p. 863.

³ Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, pp. 263, 271-275.

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An examination of the available data leads to the conclusion that Delhi was never deserted; and, in fact, never ceased to be the capital, although the emperor left it in 1327 for Deogīr (Daulatābād). He took along with him the Queen Mother, and the royal household, and was followed by the chief officers and nobles. But Delhi was not destroyed, for when two years later (1329) on the outbreak of Bahrām Aiba¹ Kishlū Khān's rebellion in Multān the emperor proceeded from Daulatābād, he stopped in Delhi to recruit troops for his army. After subduing the rebellion, the emperor again came to Delhi, where he lived for two years. These facts militate against the theory of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī and his followers that Delhi was completely deserted. . . . On the contrary Delhi still remained an administrative centre, for the emperor could not have stopped in a ruined city to raise armies to fight the veteran rebel, the famous Bahrām Aiba Kishlū Khān.

Baranī tells us that on his return from Multān, when the emperor remained in Delhi for two years the situation was peculiar. All his suite, consisting of the amīrs and maliks, remained in Delhi, while their families were in Deogīr. That Delhi was still the capital is maintained by the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*. "The Sultān," says the author, "returned from there (Multān) to the capital (Dār-ul-Mulk), Delhi." After describing two other events Yahya bin Aḥmad proceeds to say that the emperor ordered all the inhabitants of Delhi and its suburbs to travel in caravans to Daulatābād, and Delhi was completely evacuated. Budāūnī repeats the same tale.

It follows that the exodus to the south—the so-called transfer of the capital—was effected by two stages. The first step taken by the Sultān on choosing Deogīr as the site for his new capital was to make arrangements for facilitating the journey. He then marched personally with his family and a special escort as mentioned above (1327). The Queen Mother (Makhdūma-i-Jahān), who was the most prominent of all the emigrants, had probably financed at Delhi many of the nobles, as well as the 'Ulamā and Mashāikh.² After she went away to Daulatābād her dependants in Delhi being in financial difficulties, a fresh summons was issued in 1329 for more

¹ See Chapter VIII.

² Mashāikh is the plural of Shaikh, and stands for holy persons, doctors, and dervishes. (Steingass, p. 1243.)

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of the Sayyids, the saints, the 'Ulamā and the nobles of Delhi to proceed to Danlatābād. But the change was repugnant, and the toils of the journey were irksome.

Baranī¹ has given an exaggerated account of the destruction of Delhi. None of the eleven² contemporary travellers, whose observations regarding Muḥammad bin Tughluq and his empire are preserved in the *Masālik-ul-Abṣar*, a work compiled some ten years after the so-called destruction of Delhi, supports his contention. One of them, Shaikh Mubārak, informed the author of the *Masālik-ul-Abṣar* that Delhi was the capital, and a city of first-rate importance, and that next to it was Deogīr. It should be noted that Shaikh Mubārak like other travellers had visited Delhi subsequent to the "transference" of the capital.

Shihāb-ud-dīn Aḥmad 'Abbās made special enquiries of Shaikh Mubārak regarding Delhi. He was told that Delhi (Dehli) combined several cities, each city having a name of its own, and all together being known as Delhi. Delhi extended for several miles in length and in breadth; its population had a circumference of forty miles. The houses in Delhi were built of stone, and bricks; being roofed with wood and floored with marble-like white stone.

The author obtained similar information from Shaikh Abū Bakr bin Khallāl, who improved upon Shaikh Mubārak's statement distinguishing between the houses of old Delhi and those of new Delhi. He said that Delhi was a name applied collectively to twenty-one cities. It was surrounded on three sides by gardens stretching each way to the extent of twelve miles. On its fourth side, namely to its west, because of the mountains, there were no gardens. It

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 483-485.

² (1) Muḥammad bin 'Abd-ur-Rahīm Qulainashī.

(2) Shaikh Mubārak bin Mahmūd.

(3) Shaikh Burhān-ud-dīn Abū Bakr bin Khallāl Bazzī.

(4) 'Allāmah Sirāj-ud-dīn Abū Ṣafa 'Umar bin Ishāq.

(5) Qāzī Nizām-ud-dīn Yahya bin Al-Hakīm.

(6) 'Alī Bin Manṣūr 'Aqīlī.

(7) Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan bin Muḥammad Ghurī.

(8) Tāj-ud-dīn Abul Mujāhid of Samarqand, otherwise known as Sharīf Samarqandī.

(9) Ibn-ul-Tāj Hāfiẓ of Multān.

(10) Shaikh Muḥammad Khajandī.


(11) Sharīf Nāṣir-ud-dīn Muḥammad Ḥasani, Karamī called Zammurrudī.

Masālik-ul-Abṣar. MS. 5867, B.N., Paris.

N.B.—Shaikh Muḥammad Khajandī, the 10th traveller, had lived in Delhi, and served in the army of Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq. (*Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*. Tome Treizième, p. 189.)

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had 1,000 schools, one of which was for the Shāf'is and the rest for the Ḥanafis. It had about seventy hospitals as well as hospices, big streets and abundant baths. Its wells were not very deep, no deeper than seven cubits.



MAP OF DELHI (DEHLI)

It should be noted that the new Delhi mentioned above was the Jahānpānah of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. It was personally seen by Ibn Battūta in 1334, three years before the emperor is said to

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ف	=	80
ا	=	1
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و	=	6
8	=	5
1	=	1

ما دخلوا = 727


BADR CHĀCH'S CHRONOGRAM.

¹ The restoration of the capital to Delhi is inferred by Mr. Moreland from Baranī (p. 481). "... somewhere about the year 1337 came the restoration of Delhi as the capital" (Moreland, p. 49). Baranī's language, however, does not justify the use of the phrase "restoration of Delhi as the capital." All that he says is that the Sultān gave a general permission to those people of Delhi who still remained in Deogir to return if they so desired. Evidently many of them had already returned. If the return of the people alone warrants the use of the above phrase then it follows that the restoration of Delhi as the capital had already taken place at least in part. Baranī does not say a word about the restoration of the mint, of the treasury, of the governmental machinery and of the army headquarters. As a matter of fact, none of these had been taken away from Delhi; no restoration was needed. It would be nearer the truth to say that about 1337 the emperor acknowledged the failure of his experiment in making Daulatābād a second capital; hence the general permission to those inhabitants of Delhi who still remained in Deogir to return to Delhi. It will be remembered that while Baranī does not mention the transfer of the treasury from Delhi to Deogir, Budāūnī (Bib. Ind., p. 274) makes a statement to this effect. But in so far as Budāūnī's statement is in conflict with that of Baranī's, it cannot be accepted. Baranī says that Delhi being laid waste the emperor endeavoured to re-people it with new inhabitants imported from other parts (p. 474). It follows that the treasury was still in Delhi; otherwise the new importation would have been impossible, nor could the administrative machinery or the army have been taken away from Delhi, for in that case the Hindūs who remained there throughout in full strength would have seized the opportunity to assert themselves. That Delhi did not cease to be the headquarters of the army is evident from the language of Budāūnī himself. In the closing months of the year 1327, the year which is supposed to have witnessed the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Deogir, there broke out in Delhi, according to Budāūnī, the rebellion of Malik Bahādūr Gurshāsp, the Muster-master-general. The Vazīr Malik Aḥmad Aiyāz instantly gave him battle. (Budāūnī, B.I., p. 227.)

It follows from the above that neither the Vazīr had left Delhi nor the Muster-master-general ('Arāiz-i-Lashkar), a military officer, the scene of whose rebellion Budāūnī stages at Delhi.

² The poet praises the fort of Delhi, and then corrects himself, saying that the fort deserves a much higher praise than he has given it, because it belongs to the capital city. *Sharh-i-Qasaid* Badr Chāch: (Lucknow), pp. 181-82.

³ 'Abdul Qādir Budāūnī (*Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh*, B.I., p. 222) quoting Badr Chāch gives the chronogram *Fad Khatūlu*, which as worked out above yields 727 (A.D. 1327). Budāūnī places this chronogram by mistake in his account of the reign of Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq. It undoubtedly belongs to the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq, and is the date of the new city of Jahānpanah or of one of its fortresses explained by Sir Sayyid. *Description des Monuments de Delhi de Sayyed Ahmad Khān* Par M. Garcin de Tassy, pp. 23-25.



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THE BEGUNPURĪ MOSQUE

'Ādilābād erected near Tughluqābād by Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Sir Sayyid¹ mentions two other buildings (1) the Hazār Sutūn² (a palace of one thousand pillars) and (2) the Badī Manzil or Bajī Maṇḍal, as it is popularly known, a tower of the fort of Jahānpanāh, which Muḥammad bin Tughluq probably built or began to build about the same time. Badr Chāch³ describes another fort which, together with a cathedral-mosque and school, was raised or completed in 1343/744. The fort named Khurramābād (house of joy) erected in honour of the Caliph's investiture, is no more ; but the mosque subsequently known as the Begumpurī mosque is still in existence, and remains⁴ a solitary monument of the massive structures of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's new Delhi.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited Delhi about 1334 and was struck by its size and population. He⁵ tells us that the city of Delhi had a wide area and a numerous population. It was a combination of four adjacent and contiguous cities : (1) Delhi, the ancient city of the Hindūs, (2) Sīrī, which was also known as the metropolis, and where the Sultāns 'Alā-ud-dīn and Quṭb-ud-dīn had lived, (3) Tughluqābād, named after its founder Sultān Tughluq, and (4) Jahānpanāh, a city particularly distinguished as the residence of Sultān Muḥammad Shāh, the emperor of India, whose court Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited. Sultān Muḥammad Shāh had built it and wished to include the four cities in one rampart, which he had partly constructed, but had left incomplete on account of the great outlay which its construction entailed.⁶

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa informs us that the rampart round the Delhi city was without parallel. The breadth of its wall was eleven cubits and inside it were houses in which lived sentinels and gate-keepers. In it there were granaries containing ammunition and ballistas, as well as other siege-machines. Corn could be stored there for a long time without undergoing any change or suffering damage. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa saw rice brought out from one of those granaries, which had developed a black colour but possessed quite a good taste.

¹ Garcin de Tassy : *Description des Monuments de Delhi de Saiyed Aḥmad Khān*, pp. 23-5.

² That the Hazār Sutūn palace was built by Muḥammad bin Tughluq in his new Delhi is confirmed by Badr Chāch. (Badr Chāch : *Sharh-i-Qaṣā'id* (Lucknow), pp. 51, 52.)

³ Ibid., p. 295.

⁴ See Photograph facing this page.

⁵ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa : *Def. et Sang.*, III, pp. 146-161.

⁶ Ibid., 147.

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He also saw a kind of millet, which was being taken out from one of the warehouses. All had been stored there in the time of Sultān Balban, ninety years before. In the interior of the rampart horsemen as well as infantrymen walked from one end of the city to the other.

Ibn Battūṭa¹ ascribes twenty-eight gates to the city of Delhi, and mentions seven of them as follows : (1) the Budāūn Darvāzah (gate), the principal gate, (2) the Mandvī Darvāzah near the corn market, (3) the Gul Darvāzah by the orchards, (4) the Shāh Darvāzah, (5) the Kamāl Darvāzah, (6) the Ghazna Darvāzah, and (7) the Bajālsa Darvāzah, outside which was the splendid Delhi cemetery, where flower trees like the tuberose, wild briar, and others grew.

Ibn Battūṭa² confirms to a great extent the information collected by the author of the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*,³ and his account enables us to check the statement of Shaikh Abū Bakr bin Khallāl.⁴ Like him, Ibn Battūṭa was impressed by the cathedral-mosque, namely the Begumpurī mosque⁵ of Jahānpanāh. He⁶ informs us that Sultān Muḥammad wanted to complete the other cathedral-mosque Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh Khaljī had founded but left incomplete in Sīrī. He supplements the information given by Shaikh Abū Bakr bin Khallāl regarding the tanks which supplied drinking water to the inhabitants of Delhi. He specially describes two big tanks outside Delhi—one called after Sultān Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish and the other, which was much bigger, called the Hauz-i Khāṣ. He is impressed by the fakirs living in the dome of the former, and by the musicians living in the pavilions around the Hauz-i-Khāṣ (the special tank). He observes that they had a market there which was one of the largest in the world, as well as a cathedral-mosque, besides many other mosques. He was told that the female singers living there recited the congregational prayers (Tarāwīḥ) in the mosque during the month of the Ramazān.⁷ Female imāms conducted those prayers, female singers being present in large numbers ; and the same was true of the male singers.

¹ Def. et Sang., III, 149.

² Ibid., 146-156.

³ (i) Shihāb-ud-dīn-Aḥmad : *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*, B.N. MS. (ii) Quatremère, M. : *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome Treizième.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See p. 119.

⁶ Def. et Sang., III, 150-153.

⁷ Ibn Battūṭa : Def. et Sang., III, 155.

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Ibn Baṭṭūṭa¹ met in Delhi many of the 'Ulamā and men of probity. He makes particular mention of four of them : (1) Maḥmūd-ul-Kabba, (2) Shaikh 'Alā-ud-dīn Nīlī, (3) Shaikh Ṣadr-ud-dīn Kuhrāmī, and (4) Kamāl-ud-dīn 'Abdullah.

Each had a large following. But almost all of them had renounced the world. Shaikh Ṣadr-ud-dīn Kuhrāmī, who was often visited by the emperor Muḥammad bin Tughluq and other notables, was anxious to avoid an interview with them.²

It is amazing to compare this information of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's regarding Delhi and its population with his subsequent³ account of devastation. The first is based on an eye-witness's account ; the second, on hearsay, and is a reflection of the tales of woe heard by the traveller.

He⁴ tells us that one of the gravest charges brought against the Sultān was his having forced its inhabitants into exile. They used to write abusive and scandalous letters, which they would seal, writing on the cover, " By the head of Aḳḥwānd 'Ālam (Lord of the world) : none except him should read the letter." These letters they used to throw into the council-house in the course of the night. When he tore them open he found they contained abusive messages. So, he resolved to lay Delhi waste. He bought their houses and inns from all the inhabitants of Delhi, and ordered them to leave Delhi for Daulatābād. They refused to do so. Thereupon a crier went forth proclaiming that no one should remain in Delhi after three days. As a result, most of the people went away but a few concealed themselves in their houses. The Sultān ordered a search for those who still lingered. In a lane his slaves lighted upon two men, one, a cripple and the other a blind man. Both were brought to the court. The Sultān ordered the cripple to be thrown by means of the ballista (minjanīq) and the blind man to be dragged from Delhi to Daulatābād. He was torn to pieces on the way ; only a leg of his reached Daulatābād. When the Sultān had done that, all the inhabitants of Delhi came out leaving their property and baggage, and the city was reduced to a desert. In the night the Sultān mounted the roof of his palace and looked round Delhi and when neither the light of a lamp nor the smoke of a fire came into sight he remarked, " Now, my heart

¹ Def. et Sang., III, 157-160.

² Def. et Sang., III, 314.

³ Idem.

⁴ Idem.

is pleased and my soul is at peace." Then, he wrote to the people of other provinces to repair to Delhi, to re-people it. As a result, those provinces were destroyed, but Delhi was not re-peopled on account of its vastness. "Indeed," observes Ibn Battūta, "it (Delhi) is one of the greatest cities of the world and when we entered it we found it in the above-mentioned state. It was empty and was sparsely populated."¹

This account of Ibn Battūta's should be compared with that of 'Iṣāmī. The latter² tells us that Sultān Muḥammad became distrustful of the inhabitants of Delhi, and assumed the rôle of a tyrant. He killed many men, and ordered the rest to evacuate Delhi within a month, and go over to Mahārāshṭra. 'Iṣāmī feelingly describes how his grandfather Sipahī-Sālār A'izzud-dīn 'Iṣāmī, an old man of ninety, was turned out. One morning while still in bed, he was seized, thrown out of his home, and set on the road to Daulatābād. But he died shortly after. On seeing this, the people were struck with terror, and within three days they left in caravans. But many died on the way, and only ten reached Daulatābād. The Sultān ordered the city to be set on fire, and in vain attempted to re-people it by bringing in the inhabitants of the suburbs.

Much is in common between 'Iṣāmī and Ibn Battūta; and the latter's story of the cripple and the blind man, which remains unconfirmed, appears to have been a concoction based on the hardships to which 'Iṣāmī's grandfather, A'izz-ud-dīn 'Iṣāmī, was supposed to have been subjected. Again Ibn Battūta's³ version that Muḥammad bin Tughluq was pleased when, on mounting the roof of his palace, he saw no trace of fire and light in any house, seems to have arisen from 'Iṣāmī's report that the Sultān ordered the city to be set on fire. All this is unhistorical.

With regard to the destruction of Delhi—and 'Iṣāmī considers it as an affliction for the Muslims, not for the Hindūs⁴—it should be recalled that on his first entry into Delhi after his arrival in India, Ibn Battūta had noticed no signs⁵ of its devastation. He seems to have changed his opinion on mixing with the hostile elements in the country, and on hearing unfavourable reports against the

¹ Def. et Sang., III, 314.

² Def. et Sang., III, 314.

³ *Riḥla*: Def. et Sang., III, 314.

⁴ 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS. F. 244-246.

⁵ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS. F. 245-247.

emperor. At any rate Ibn Battūta's information regarding the evacuation of Delhi¹ reflects the universal displeasure the emperor had incurred by forcing the '*Ulamā* and *Mashāikh* (*the Buzurgān-i-Delhi* or the leading men, according to the *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn*²) to go to Deogīr. It is their forced emigration, which has been magnified into a wholesale and indiscriminate transportation to Daulatābād.

In view of the evidence establishing the prosperity of Delhi and the great constructive works designed and carried out there by the emperor during the very years which are said to have witnessed its destruction it is difficult to agree with Baranī.³ His peculiar language regarding the emperor's attitude to Deogīr and Delhi has created one of the greatest misunderstandings of history. Facts prove that *Sultān Muḥammad* did not mean to replace Delhi by Deogīr, but to raise Deogīr into a *new* or *second* capital by taking it under his personal charge as long as circumstances permitted. This was by no means a chimerical scheme because of (1) the establishment of friendly relations with Transoxiana, (2) the pressing need for a more centrally situated capital on account of the difficulties of communication, (3) the secondary place into which the Doāb or the Gangetic valley had receded in comparison with the Deccan on account of the great consolidatory work done by the preceding Sultāns—notably by Balban and 'Alā-ud-dīn *Khālījī*, and (4) the diminishing fears of fresh Mongol invasions.

In spite of Ibn Battūta's statement to the contrary it appears that the methods adopted by the Sultān to execute his plan were constructive⁴ and philanthropic rather than destructive. It must be confessed, however, that the plan eventually failed. Baranī⁵ informs us that the Sultān subsequently permitted the emigrants to return to Delhi. This must have undermined his prestige and engendered opposition.

The mere springing up of a graveyard of the Musalmāns around Daulatābād which Baranī⁶ deplores and which was a necessary concomitant of the Muslim exodus contributed to the rise of Muslim monuments in the Deccan. The graves of the famous poet Amīr

¹ Def. et Sang., III, 314.

² Muḥammad Bulāq: *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn* (I.O.), 653.

³ Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (B.I.), 474.

⁴ Compare Baranī, 473. "The Sultān made liberal gifts to the people both at the time of their setting out for Deogīr and on their arrival."

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 481.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 474.

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Hasan,¹ a comrade of Amīr Khusrav, of Shaikh Burhān-ud-dīn² Gharīb, a disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, and of Qāzī Sharaf-ud-dīn,³ which sprang up in Daulatābād were too important to be neglected. They afterwards became a place of favourite resort and pilgrimage for Muslims. Consequently, Muslim strength in the Deccan increased; and, when disintegration began, a Muslim kingdom known as the Bahmanī Kingdom arose with Gulbarga as its capital.

It should be recalled that after Tarmāshīrīn's departure the emperor's policy had been directed towards (1) the solution of the Deccan problem, and (2) the collection of a large army. Baranī⁴ has given no details of the new recruitment. He only mentions⁵ among other misdeeds of the emperor the collection of a large army of 370,000 men for the conquest of Khurāsān. This new army was obviously over and above the central army of Delhi and the provincial armies in the different provinces. What constituted the personnel of this army, and on what terms the soldiers were recruited is unknown. One thing is certain. The army being temporary, that is, levied to meet an emergency, the terms of appointment must have been tempting enough; otherwise, it would have been extremely difficult to collect about 400,000 soldiers within a year.⁶ A new recruiting scheme was probably drawn up in accordance with which not only Indians,⁷ particularly the warlike Rājput clans of the Doāb,⁸ but foreigners were also enlisted. Amīr Nauroz,

¹ Sayyid Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, p. 308.

² Ibid., p. 282.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 476.

⁴ Ibid., p. 477.

⁵ Idem.

⁶ Ibid., p. 309.

⁷ That Hindūs were recruited in the army by the Muslim rulers as early as the 11th century A.D. is evident from the history of Maḥmūd of Ghazna and his successors. Al-Ōtbi remarks that Maḥmūd's army while marching on Balkh to encounter Ilek Khān contained Indians (*Encyclopædia of Islām*, I, 165). Baihaqī tells us that Mas'ūd, son and successor of Maḥmūd, employed Hindūs in his army, and used them successfully in war against the Muslim rebel Aḥmad Niyaltigin (*Encyclopædia of Islām*, I, 165). Other evidence on this point may be found in the *Encyclopædia of Islām*, and even in Baranī (182-477). He uses (182) the term "Hindustanian" (Indians) to describe the Hindū and Rājput warriors.

The Batiagarh stone inscription of 1328/v.s. 1385 (*Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XII, p. 44) affords another piece of evidence that Hindū troops were employed by Muslim rulers in their armies. This inscription was found at Batiagarh in the Central Provinces and mentions a Muslim commander of the Hindū (Kharpara) armies. Rāi Bahādur Hira Lāl is of opinion that the Kharparas of this inscription "are identical with the Kharparikas mentioned in Samudragupta's stone pillar inscription of Allahabad" (*Epigraphia Indica*, XII, 45).

⁸ Cf. Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 477. The Doāb contained a proportionately large population of the warlike Rājput clans.

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the son-in-law of Tarmāshīrīn, had come with a handful of troops from Transoxiana to join the army.¹ Other Mongols and Afghāns, notably Ismā'il Afghān, Gul Afghān, Shāhū Afghān and Hulājūn Khān mentioned on different occasions by Baranī² had probably come to India in this period to join the army.

But the Khurāsān expedition did not materialise and the army remained unused. Its maintenance, combined with all the expenses incurred for its equipment, caused a heavy outlay of money. Baranī³ tells us that three hundred and seventy thousand horses were enrolled in the muster-master's office. For a whole year these were supported and paid; but as they were not employed in war and conquest, when the next year came round there was not sufficient money in the treasury to support them.

But he gives no reason why the Khurāsān expedition was not undertaken. The reason probably lay in the changes that had come about in the diplomatic and political history of Persia, Egypt, and Transoxiana; namely (1) the restoration of friendly relations between Abū S'aīd of Persia and An-Nāsir of Egypt, and (2) the deposition of Tarmāshīrīn. As a result, the coalition, which had been formed against Sulṭān Abū S'aīd, was broken. Unaided Muḥammad bin Tughluq could not undertake the expedition.

That the emperor gave up all intention of invading Khurāsān early in his reign is clear from the fact that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa makes no mention of it at all. It is also evident from the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*,⁴ which recounts, in the first instance on the authority of the Qāẓī-ul-Quṣāt Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan bin Muḥammad Ghurī Ḥanafī, how Muḥammad bin Tughluq sent one of his private secretaries named Baighṣān as an ambassador to Sulṭān Abū S'aīd, with a sum of ten lakhs of ṭankas to be given away in charity at the sacred shrines in 'Irāq. Hardly had the envoy reached 'Irāq when Sulṭān Abū S'aīd died. Now, Abū S'aīd's death is known to have occurred in the year 1335-6. It follows therefore that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had long given up his idea of invading Khurāsān and that friendly relations had been established between them. In the second instance, the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*⁵ recounts on the authority of Yahya bin Ḥakīm Ṭaiyyārī that a certain 'Aẓd bin Qāẓī Bard employed in

¹ Baranī, 533.

² Idem., 482-498.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 477.

⁴ Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome XIII, p. 187.

⁵ Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, p. 193.

Abū Sa'id's army aspired to become a vazīr, and set about intriguing to obtain the desired post. He incurred the displeasure of the other vazīrs and military chiefs who contrived to have him sent to the court of Muḥammad bin Tughluq as an ambassador from Abū Sa'id. 'Azd's rivals expected that the emperor of India would put 'Azd to death. But unfortunately for the success of their scheme Muḥammad bin Tughluq showed special favour to him. As the latter was still cherishing his ambition to become a vazīr in Persia, he desired, after some time, to withdraw. On leaving the Delhi court he was by the orders of the emperor taken into the royal treasury where he was permitted to take as much wealth as he desired. But he accepted nothing except a copy of the Qurān, whereupon the emperor was immensely pleased and gave him enormous wealth.

It follows that Muḥammad bin Tughluq gave up the projected Khurāsān expedition much before the death of Abū Sa'id. The disposal of the huge army collected for this purpose must have presented great difficulties. Its maintenance was impossible but a sudden and complete disbandment was fatal. It seems that out of the 400,000, 100,000 were employed in the Qarāchīl expedition, and the rest were disbanded.

The Qarāchīl Expedition

Sir Wolseley Haig¹ regards the Qarāchīl² expedition as a part of the Nagarkot expedition which a chronogram of Badr Chāch³ fixes in 1338/738. This may be so in view of the fact that the *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh*⁴ as well as the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak*⁵ *Shāhī*

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922.

² The name Qarāchīl or Qarājīl is found in several forms. The *Bibliotheca Indica* edition of Baranī (p. 477) has Farajal; its manuscript (B.M. or 2039, F. 236) has Qarājīl. Al-Beruni (*Sachau E.G.*, Vol. I, p. 207) has Kularjak. Firishta (*Bombay*, I, p. 240) has Himājal or Himāchal. Ibn Battūta (Defrémery et Sanguinetti, III, p. 325) gives Qarachil (Qarajil). The printed text of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (p. 103) has Qarājāl, while the MS. (B.M. or 1673, F. 3886) has Qarāchal. The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (B.I., p. 204) gives Himāchal. Elliot (III, p. 241) writes Karājāl. Yule holds that Karachil (Qarachil) is a corruption of the Sanskrit Kuverachal (*Cathay and the Way Thither*, II, pp. 410-11). Mizik (p. 168) analyses the word and suggests that its second part "Achal" is connected with the Sanskrit word, Achal, which means a mountain. He tells us that in Sanskrit literature besides Himachal, Karachal is used as a proper name for a district.

³ Badr-i-Chāch, *Qasā'id*, with Urdu commentary by Abdul Majīd Khān (*Lucknow*.) p. 103.

⁴ Budāūnī (B.I., pp. 229).

⁵ Yahya bin Ahmad (B.I., pp. 103-4).

put the Qarāchīl expedition in the same year, that is 1338/738. But neither for fixing the Qarāchīl expedition in the year 1338/738, nor for regarding it as a part of the Nagarkot¹ expedition is there any contemporary evidence.

On the other hand, Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī² has mentioned it as a part of the projected Khurāsān expedition; and it appears from his language that part of the same army which had been collected for the Khurāsān expedition was utilized for the Qarāchīl expedition. He tells us that the Sultān having resolved to conquer Khurāsān and Transoxiana thought he should first bring under the dominion of Islām, "this mountain which lies between the territories of India and those of China, so that the passage of soldiers and the march of the army might be rendered easy."³ Baranī's view that the Qarāchīl expedition was undertaken to facilitate the acquisition of Khurāsān

¹ Nagarkot, an ancient town in the Kāngra district, was attacked by Maḥmūd of Ghazna in 1009. He captured the fort of Kāngra, although subsequently it was recovered by the Rājputs. The next Muslim king to attack Kāngra was Muḥammad bin Tughluq. His expedition of Kāngra has attracted little notice, because it has been mentioned neither by Baranī nor by Ibn Battūta. Badr Chāch alone mentions it under the title of *Fatch Qila'-i-Nagarkot* (capture of the fort of Nagarkot, p. 103). From 'Afif (pp. 185-189), who describes Firoz Shāh's attempt to recapture the same fort, it appears that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had left it in the hands of the Rājputs.

From a passing reference of 'Afif (p. 187) to Muḥammad bin Tughluq's conquest of Nagarkot it is evident that the Nagarkot expedition was led by him personally. An indirect evidence of it is afforded by Baranī, who mentions the emperor's march via Sunām, Sāmāna, Kaithal, and Kuhrām against the Hindū chiefs at the foot of the Himālyas (Rāyḡān-i-Kohpayā), who were subjugated (p. 483). This is in all probability a reference to Muḥammad bin Tughluq's conquest of Nagarkot. That the Nagarkot fortress was taken by the emperor personally in 1337/738 is proved by the following verses of Badr Chāch.

- (1) "The lord of times (Muḥammad bin Tughluq) conquered the strong fort of Nagarkot in the year 738."
- (2) "The Great emperor (Muḥammad bin Tughluq) arrived at the mighty fortress at night with hundreds of thousands of honours and glories."

Unlike the Nagarkot expedition the Qarāchīl expedition was not accompanied by the emperor in person. Ibn Battūta mentions the Qarāchīl expedition twice. In the first place (p. 134, MS. 909, B.N.) he mentions Malik Yusuf Bughra as its commander, and in the second Malik Nakhbia ((i) B.N. MS. 909, F. 138; (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 293). This shows that Ibn Battūta's account of the Qarāchīl expedition is not an eye-witness account, and the Qarāchīl expedition was over before Ibn Battūta's arrival in Delhi. The conclusion thus reached here is supported by Mzik (pp. 170-171). He is of opinion that the revolt in Bengal as well as that in Ma'bar was the consequence of the Qarāchīl expedition. The most powerful army of the emperor being destroyed there, his power was dangerously weakened. At this moment, says Mzik, Fakhr-ud-dīn revolted in Bengal; and then also occurred the rebellion of Aḥsan Shāh in Ma'bar. Mzik (p. 172) strongly questions the traditional date of the Qarāchīl expedition, i.e., A.H. 738 (A.D. 1337), since by that time, the rebellions in Bengal and Ma'bar having broken out, he had no army for such an undertaking. For the Bengal rebellion, the outbreak of which Mzik (p. 172) fixes in A.H. 737 (A.D. 1336) see pp. 163, 164.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 477.

³ Ibid.

cannot be accepted, for the Qarāchīl (Himālaya) mountains were no barrier in the way to Khurāsān. Baranī would have been justified in his remark if the expedition had been sent to the Hindū Kush instead, for the way to Khurāsān or Transoxiana lay through the Hindū Kush. The Qarāchīl mountains commanded the route to China or Tibet, the conquest of neither of which was desired by Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Firishta perhaps realised Baranī's error but in his attempt to find the truth, committed an egregious blunder. He¹ erroneously put the conquest of China as the objective of the Qarāchīl expedition. There is, however, no evidence whatsoever to attribute to Muḥammad bin Tughluq designs to conquer China.

The *Rihla* throws some light on the point. It appears that early in the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq the Chinese had encroached on the hitherto independent Rājput states in the Himālayas; and establishing their suzerainty there had built an idol fane at some place of strategic importance. Muḥammad bin Tughluq viewed this encroachment of the hostile and pagan Mongols on the Rājput states on the Indian frontier with grave anxiety; hence the Qarāchīl expedition.

Another cause for the expedition lay in the need for securing the northern frontier. The emperor had rounded off all other frontiers of his empire. In the north-west Bahrām Aiba Kishlū Khān, hitherto the warden of the marches and the governor of Multān, having revolted, had been crushed. The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*² informs us that Multān was a part of the frontier province of Sind, and after the suppression of Kishlū Khān's rebellion it was re-constituted under Qivām-ul-Mulk Maqbūl. Again under Fīroz Shāh the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*³ emphasizes the importance of Multān as a frontier outpost. In the north-east Bengal had been secured. The south had been made secure by the making of Deogīr or Daulatābād into a second capital. The new fortifications in progress there in the years 1327 and 1329 were witnessed by Shaikh Mubārak.⁴ The Qarāchīl expedition seems to have been sent to complete the chain of fortifications in the north. The conquest of

¹ Firishta (*Bombay*), I, p. 240.

² Yahya bin Ahmad (B.I.), p. 101.

³ Ibid., p. 133.

⁴ Shihāb-ud-dīn 'Abbās Ahmad. MS. 5867, B.N. (*Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de Roi*, Tome XIII, p. 186.)

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Nagarkot effected either¹ now or later in 1338 was part of the same plan.

This was hardly perceived by the later writers, and in the absence of a clear contemporary record they blundered. Yalḥya² bin Aḥmad as well as Budāūnī³ attributed the Qarāchīl expedition to the Sultān's attempt to bring under control the Qarāchīl mountain. Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr⁴ ascribed it to the Sultān's desire to obtain for his harem the beautiful Qarāchīl women. But all accounts of Sultān Muḥammad's character exonerate him from every kind of licentiousness or indulgence.

The *Rihla* helps us further to establish the objective of the Qarāchīl expedition. It⁵ says that the Qarāchīl was held by one of the most powerful infidel rulers. By "Qarāchīl" Ibn Baṭṭūṭa probably meant Kurmachal, the old name of Kumāon, and by infidel, a Rājput. It follows that it was a Rājput state in the Kumāon-Garhwāl region or as Gardner Brown⁶ suggests the mid-Himālayan tract of Kulu in the Kangra district against which the expedition was sent.

The Kumāon-Garhwāl⁷ region, wherein the Sultāns of Delhi had never obtained a fixed footing, was in the fourteenth century under the Rājās of the Chānd dynasty. It is evident from the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*⁸ that the hills of Kumāon served as the place of refuge for the rebels against the government of Delhi. When Khargū, the chief of Katehr, revolted against Sultān Fīroz Shāh in 1380/782 he fled into the Kumāon-Garhwāl region⁹ ruled by the Hindūs.

One feels justified in stating that the accepted view of the Qarāchīl expedition based upon Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* and the *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa* is incorrect. Baranī mentions it among the mis-

¹ In 'Afif's account of Fīroz Shāh's expedition to Nagarkot (B.I., p. 187) there is a reference to Muḥammad bin Tughluq. It is evident from it that the latter had personally led the expedition in 1338. The same appears from the ode of Badr Chāch. As such it is difficult to identify the Qarāchīl expedition, which was certainly not led by the emperor personally, with the Nagarkot expedition.

² Yalḥya bin Aḥmad (B.I.), p. 103.

³ Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* (B.I.), p. 229.

⁴ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, Vol. III, p. 877.

⁵ Deifrémery et Sanguinetti, III, p. 325.

⁶ A. U. Magazine, 1925.

⁷ *Imperial Gazetteer*, Second Edition, Vol. VIII, p. 350; Vol. V, p. 18.

⁸ The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (B.I., p. 134) has Kharku.

⁹ The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (B.I., p. 134) mentions "Kohpāya Kumāon" held by the (Hindū) "Mihṭaragān."

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deeds of the emperor, and Firishta brings it forward as one more example of his folly.

Almost all historians agree that a large army was sent. While Baranī¹ gives no exact number, Budāūnī² and Hājji-ud-Dabīr³ put it at 80,000. 'Iṣāmī⁴ raises it to 100,000, and Ibn Baṭṭūṭā⁵ follows him. While Baranī mentions no commander of the Qarāchīl expedition, Firishta,⁶ like 'Iṣāmī,⁷ names Khusrav Malik, a nephew of the emperor.

As regards the route of the Indian army, a reference which Ibn Baṭṭūṭa makes in his account of the Chinese embassy to the court of Muḥammad bin Tughluq is significant. He tells us that the King of China had asked the emperor's permission to build an idol fane on the skirts of the Qarāchīl mountain at a place called Samhal-(Sambhal), which the Indian army had seized and sacked. This suggests that the Qarāchīl expedition entered the Himālayas after capturing Sambhal through the Ṭarai in the Morādābād district.⁸

It cannot be denied that the emperor had made a careful study of the situation. He instructed Khusrav Malik to establish military posts at intervals along the route through the mountains, between the position to be stormed and the base on the plains. These posts were to serve the two-fold purpose of facilitating the transport of provisions and of serving as places of refuge in case of retreat or disorder. As far as the emperor's instructions were acted upon Khusrav Malik met with success. The royal troops captured Jidya and the surrounding country at the foot of the Himālayas, seized the enemy's lands and valuables and then climbed up the heights and captured Wārangal. On this, they sent a written intimation of their victory to the emperor. He sent a Qāzī and a Khaṭīb to them ordering them to remain there. But Khusrav Malik transgressed the emperor's orders. Flushed with victory, he took the whole

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 477.

² Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), 229.

³ Hājji-ud-Dabīr, III, 877.

⁴ 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS. F. 254B.

⁵ Def. et Sang., III, 326-327.

⁶ Firishta (*Bombay*, I, 240).

⁷ 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS. F. 254.

N.B.—It has been discussed in a footnote above (see page 127 *supra*) that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa failed to remember the exact name of the commander. In one place he has Malik Yūsuf Bughra (Def. et Sang., III, 293), and in another Malik Nakbia (Def. et Sang., III, 32).

⁸ See Muḥammad Husain, Maulvi: *'Ajāib-ul-Aṣfār*, 160.

army or a detached force across the mountains into Tibet.¹ There it was overtaken by rains² followed by the outbreak of plague. A panic seized the army. The tables were turned. The mountaineers got the upper hand. They hurled blocks of stones from the mountain tops on to the retreating troops in the valley below. The military posts established to safeguard the retreat fell into disorder. As a result, almost the whole army was destroyed. Only a few survived; three according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,³ ten according to Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī.⁴

The disastrous results of this expedition, combined with the disbandment of a considerable part of the Khurāsān army tended to create trouble. The disbandment had let loose a number of discontented and unemployed soldiers. This discontent was fomented by the 'Ulamā, the Sayyids, the Mashāikh, and the Ṣūfīs, who had personal differences with the emperor on account of (1) his peculiar views with regard to religion and administration, (2) his disregard of the time-honoured sanctity and privileges that the Sayyids and saints enjoyed and (3) his cold-blooded murder of the Sunnīs, Sayyids and Ṣūfīs, all supposed to be sacrosanct, in the Multān rebellion.

It should be noted that after the Multān rebellion the emperor had, on his return to Delhi, made enquiries into the causes of disaffection. He found many of the 'Ulamā, the Sayyids, and Mashāikh at the bottom of the trouble. He had them ruthlessly killed. This prejudiced Muslim public opinion against him, and is the cause of Baranī's⁵ indictment. Possibly some of Baranī's own friends or relations had suffered. But he slurs over the matter. What made the situation worse was the fact that many of the foreign 'Ulamā—'Izz-ud-dīn, Qāzī Majd-ud-dīn of Shīrāz, Burhān-ud-dīn Wā'iz (preacher), Naẓīr-ud-dīn of Tirmidh, Shams-ud-dīn, Malik Sanjar of Badakhshān—were granted allowances and maintained in the

¹ There is a story relating to Sikandarpāl, the 15th pāl or ruler of the Kulu state, to the effect that he went to the king of Delhi to seek shelter against the Chinese, who had invaded his kingdom. The Rājā of Delhi came, marched through Kulu and took Gya Munou and Baltistan together with the country as far as Mansarowar. (Thornton, III, p. 180. Hunter, *Imp. Gaz.*, XVI.)

Probably on the strength of this story Gardner Brown has been led to think that the army pushed beyond the frontier to this Tibetan territory near the Manasarowar lake. But it is difficult to confirm the story.

² (i) Def. et Sang., III, 325. (ii) B.N. MS. 909, F. 138.

³ Def. et Sang., III, 327.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 478.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 460.

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country by the emperor. This was gall and wormwood to the Indian section of the 'Ulamā.

The situation was, thus, serious enough. It became uncontrollable before long on account of the financial stringency, famine and the rebellions in the Doāb.

The financial stringency appears from a superficial reading of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī's work to have led the Sultān to introduce a token currency. But whether the introduction of the token currency was the cause or the result of the financial stringency is a problem. In order to understand it aright, it is necessary to study the problem of silver in medieval India.

Up till the reign of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī the weight of the silver ṭankas was 175 grains, though he is said to have contemplated reducing it to 140. Among the coins struck after his death the number of silver coins is increasingly low, and even in those which are apparently classed as silver coins there is an appreciable mixture of copper. Under Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, abundant wealth came from the Deccan. There was accordingly some rise in the weight of the silver ṭankas, which ranged from 168 to 170 grains. After Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn's murder there was again a fall in the weight of the silver coins. Under Nāṣir-ud-dīn Khusrav they amounted to 145 grains. After the accession of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq immense wealth came into the imperial exchequer. New silver coins were struck, some of them even weighing 170 grains. During the reign of Sultān Muḥammad the demand for silver became much greater. On the one hand, the large extent of the empire, and, on the other, a large number of new mints spreading all over the country added enormously to the number of coins in circulation. This is attested by the fact that more of his coins than those of any preceding Sultān of Delhi are still to be found.

In the opening years of his reign he increased the weight of gold coins by 28 grains, but lessened that of the silver ones by 35. Enormous wealth came into the royal coffers when Daulatābād was made into a second capital. New coins were then struck. But¹ still there was great disproportion between the amounts of gold and

¹ Nelson Wright and Mr. Neville (*J.A.S.B.*, 1924) have corrected Edward Thomas's views on the fall in the value of gold early in the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. But I think that the great disproportion between the amounts of gold and silver cannot be denied.

silver in the treasury. This is clear from the attempt the Sultān then made at adjustment. The weight of the new gold coins was greater by 43 and 48 grains than that of the silver coins.

The expenses incurred as a result of the maintenance of a huge army of 370,000 men made the problem of silver acute. The treasury contained, however, plenty of gold still. But the situation was not unlike that which Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī had met by devising a new tariff and introducing economic reforms.

Sultān Muḥammad¹ knew the weakness and instability of the Khaljī economic system. He had studied the history of credit currency in China and Persia. In China its introduction is said to have been as old as the beginning of the ninth century A.D. Under Qublāi Khān, the Mongol emperor (1260-94), its use increased. A disastrous attempt at imitating him was made by Kaikhātū Khān of Persia (1293). His notes were direct copies of Qublāi Khān's, and were given the Chinese name *Chāo*. They were issued, however, with entirely different ends and results. Unlike the Khān of China who made due allowance for the people, if they desired the use of gold and silver, and was favoured in his attempt by (1) precedent or tradition, (2) the instincts of the people, and (3) the absence of coined money in gold and silver, the Khān of Persia introduced a new measure under unfavourable circumstances, when on account of the extravagance of the court, the treasury was emptied and the people were distressed.

Sultān Muḥammad was possibly tempted by the Chinese success to try the experiment. The Persian fiasco was too disastrous to attract his attention. Like Kaikhātū Khān he was not compelled to introduce the token currency to refill his treasury, since he had not yet emptied it. It is a mistake to regard his attempt as the result of bankruptcy, as has been maintained by almost all later historians. Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī who must have been an eye-witness carelessly remarks that the Sultān's bounty and munificence had caused a great deficiency in the treasury; so, he introduced his copper money. This statement of Baranī's has led many to conclude that the emperor had recourse to the token currency in order to refill his empty coffers.

That the treasury was still rich is confirmed by the fact that the

¹ This is evident from Baranī (463-465), who tells us that Sultān Muḥammad was fond of history.

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emperor, after the failure of the token currency, had enough gold to pay in exchange for all the copper tokens, genuine or spurious, which had been issued by the government or forged by the shopkeepers and goldsmiths during the two years (1330-32). "So many of these copper tokens were," in the words of Baranī, "brought to the treasury that heaps of them rose up in Tughluqābād like mountains. Great sums went out of the treasury in exchange for the copper, and a great deficiency was caused."¹ There is a discrepancy between the two statements of Baranī's. If the emperor's munificence had really impoverished the treasury, and had even forced him in order to refill it to have recourse to the token currency, he could not have ventured to buy back thousands of copper tokens; or even if he had given orders to that effect, their execution would have been impossible. Perhaps, Baranī made the former statement to emphasize the enormous amount disbursed from the treasury for the Mongols. Perhaps, not the emptiness of the treasury, but the necessity of providing an adequate substitute for the much-needed silver was the immediate cause of this experiment in credit currency made by the emperor. Its principle was borrowed from China, but because of its notorious failure in Persia the emperor did not adopt paper as the medium of exchange. He preferred copper to paper.

The scheme was on the whole quite good and statesmanlike, but it failed in the hands of the emperor despite his good intentions. The causes of its failure are interesting to note, the more so, because the fundamental principle involved in it was in its essentials the same as that of the modern paper currency in British India. The intrinsic value of MuḤammad Shāh-i-Tughluq's copper coins, like that of the modern banknotes, amounted to very little, and government credit was, as at present, the background. But his coins were issued in place of small silver coins, while the modern notes are, or were, until the introduction of one-rupee² notes, for higher amounts. "In no instance," says Edward Thomas,³ "were these representatives of real money issued to pass for the more valuable current gold pieces, the highest coin he desired credit for in virtue of the regal stamp was

¹ Baranī, 475-476.

² The one-rupee notes were introduced during the Great War (1914-18) on account of the difficulty of getting gold and silver for coinage. The general discontent consequent upon the change is well-known. The British Government wisely took back all the one-rupee notes as soon as the need for them was removed.

³ Edward Thomas: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 245.

a tanka of 140 grains of silver and the minor subdivisions were elaborately provided for in detail."

Yet Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq's copper coins, though at first successful, met in the end with complete failure, because of (1) the traditional instability of Muslim rule in India where one Muslim dynasty fast supplanted the other. In order to succeed, a token currency scheme must have behind it the credit of the government. (2) The copper tokens could be easily minted in private houses. Baranī tells us that with the promulgation of this edict the house of every Hindū was turned into a mint, and every goldsmith struck copper coins in his workshop. (3) The abundant coinage of copper, which was already in common use, aggravated the situation. The uncultured and unlettered masses, who received them in great number, raised disturbances and thought, not unnaturally, that the emperor was going to rob them of every penny. (4) The price of metals depended on the law of supply and demand and could not be fixed by imperial enactments. The emperor roused discontent by disregarding this law and raising the price of silver on his own initiative.

Of the emperor's honesty of intention there can hardly be any doubt. When he found it impracticable and had reason to believe that the Hindūs had set up mints in their houses, he recalled all the copper tokens, exchanging each at its face value for silver coin. Thus, the discredited coinage being immediately recalled, all forgery was stopped and the credit of the government was restored. The panic ended; and the people were so gratified that not even a murmur about the matter was heard by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who arrived in India shortly after. Even the author of the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* knew nothing about it. 'Iṣāmī¹ finishes it up in a few verses. But he charges the emperor with dishonesty and with the intention of impoverishing the *aṣḥāb-i-dīn*.² Along with the copper tokens, the poet also speaks of iron and leather ones,³ but as we can find no other mention of these we may assume that he was merely indulging in satire.

The fiasco of the *Khurāsān* and *Qarāchīl* expeditions and the failure of the token currency adversely affected the finances of the empire and led to the enhancement of taxation in the *Doāb*.

¹ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, F. 250B.

² *Aṣḥāb-i-dīn*, literally *men of religion*; 'Iṣāmī probably means the *Mashāikh* and 'Ulamā.

³ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, F. 251A.

HIS AMBITIOUS PROJECTS

that the enhancement of revenue in the Doāb was not the first but the last of the emperor's projects. It decidedly marked the beginning of the great disorders of the realm, and will therefore be fittingly discussed in the next chapter.

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PART THREE

DISINTEGRATION OF HIS EMPIRE

CHAPTER VIII

REBELLIONS AND DISORDERS

THE decisive year, 1335, which divides the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq into two¹ unequal parts, also marks a landmark in the history of its rebellions and disorders. Those which preceded it differed in number, in character and in their results from those which followed. While six² rebellions preceded the year 1335, fifteen³ followed it. In between the two groups stands the Ma'bar rebellion of 1335.⁴ Almost all the rebellions of the first group were essentially isolated instances of the outbreak of troubles primarily caused by individuals and were subdued by the emperor in person or by his provincial governors or by the Vazīr. But the rebellions of the second group, which range over the rest of the reign from 1335 to 1351, were far more widespread. The Ma'bar rebellion of the year 1335 partakes of the character of the first group in so far as it is raised ostensibly by an individual, namely, Aḥsan Shāh, governor of Ma'bar, and of the second because it found

¹ See *supra*, Chapter VI.

² (i) The rebellion of Bahā-ud-dīn Gurshāsp.

(ii) The rebellion of Kishlū Khān.

(iii) The rebellion of the Qāzī and Khātib of Kamālpur.

(iv) The rebellion of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur.

(v) The rebellion of Wūnār and Qaiṣar-i-Rūmī.

(vi) The Doāb rebellion.

³ (i) The rebellion of Mas'ūd Khān.

(ii) The rebellion of Hulājūn.

(iii) The rebellion of Mālik Hoshang.

(iv) The Hindū rebellion of Kampīla and Wārangal.

(v) The rebellion of Sayyid Ibrāhīm, governor of Hānsī and Sirsa.

(vi) The rebellion of Fakhrā.

(vii) The rebellions of the Hindūs and Muslims of Sunām, Sāmāna, Kaithal and Kuhrām.

(viii) The rebellion of Nizām Mān at Kara.

(ix) The rebellion of Shihāb-ud-dīn Sulṭānī at Bidar.

(x) The rebellion of 'Alī Shāh at Gulbarga.

(xi) The rebellion of 'Ain-ul-Mulk.

(xii) The rebellion of Shāhū Afghān.

(xiii) The rebellion of Qāzī Jalāl.

(xiv) The rebellion of the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Daulātābad.

(xv) The rebellion of Taghī.

⁴ The rebellion of Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh Jalāl-ud-dīn. (i) Baranī (Bib. Ind., p. 480).

(ii) B.N. MS. 909, F. 150. (iii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 328.

supporters amongst Aḥsan Shāh's dependants and followers throughout the whole country lying between the Cauvery and the Sutlej. This explains why at the first news of this rebellion in the south, the emperor had all Aḥsan Shāh's relations and dependants arrested in the north.¹ That the Ma'bar rebellion had more in common with the second than with the first group is proved in the first place by the fact that it was the first of a series of rebellions, which Muḥammad bin Tughluq could not subdue, and resulted in the establishment of an independent provincial kingdom, and secondly, by the fact that its origin must be sought in the mutinous conduct of his troops² and in the disaffection of the nobles, or the *amīrān-i-ṣadah*,³ thirdly, by the fact that it was followed by calamities such as famine, drought, epidemics, as well as by his own illness⁴; fourthly, by the fact that it marked the spread of the symptoms of disease and discontent from the north to the south, from the Muhammadan vālis or provincial governors and other officials to the Hindūs across the Narbada, culminating in the establishment of Hindū and Muslim independent kingdoms with centres at Vijayānagar, at Wārangal and at Gulbarga.

To all that has been said above to prove the decisive character of the year 1335 may be added the fact that it was in this year that the emperor acknowledged the failure of his experiment in capital-making. It was the Doāb rebellion which convinced him of the imperative need of his personal residence in the north on which he would henceforth concentrate leaving the south under the immediate control of his officials.

Baranī, who makes no such discrimination, forms a special heading of rebellions in general, but gives⁵ neither a complete nor a connected account. He ignores Bahā-ud-dīn Gurshāsp's rebellion, which according to Yahya bin⁶ Aḥmad and Budāūnī⁷ was the first to break

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 480.

² Ibid.

³ The *amīrān-i-ṣadah* (centurions or amīrs of hundreds) were not only military officers, but also civil officials collecting taxes in groups of about a hundred villages each (J.R.A.S., July, 1922).

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 480-1.

⁵ Ibid, p. 478.

⁶ Yahya bin Aḥmad: *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* B.I., p. 99; B.M. MS. Or 1673, F. 386.

⁷ Budāūnī: *Muntakhabāt-ut-Tavārikh* (B.I.), pp. 226-7.

N.B.—It should be noted that the account in the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* is fuller compared with that given in the *Muntakhabāt-ut-Tavārikh*. But the former has both in its manuscript and printed forms the word *Safar* as the place where rebellion broke out. Probably this is a corruption of *Sāghar* mentioned by Firishta (*Bombay*, I, 241).

out. The same is evident from Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,¹ who tells us that on the death of his uncle, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, Bahā-ud-dīn refused to swear allegiance to his cousin, Muḥammad bin Tughluq. A large army, under the command of Malik Majir and Khwāja Jahān, was sent against him. A severe fight ensued followed by his flight to the rājā of Kampīla,² where he was pursued by the royal troops. The rājā of Kampīla, having secured his flight to another rājā, probably Vira Ballāla III,³ also called Bilāl Deo,⁴ the Hoysāla rājā of Dvārasamudra,⁵ died fighting for the sake of his Muslim guest. Bilāl Deo captured the latter and made him over to Khwāja Jahān. Bahā-ud-dīn was sent a prisoner to Delhi, where according to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁶ he was flayed alive. His flesh cooked with rice was placed before the elephants and ultimately sent to his family. Much the same information is given by 'Iṣāmī.⁷

The differences between the accounts of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and Firishta are interesting: (1) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa gives the name of the rebel as Bahā-ud-dīn Kushtāsb⁸; Firishta has Bahā-ud-dīn Kurshāsp or Gurshāsp. (2) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes him as the son of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq's sister; Firishta mentions him as the son of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's uncle. (3) Unlike Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who gives no definite information regarding the position of Bahā-ud-dīn, Firishta describes

¹ Def. et Sang., III, p. 318.

² Kampīla or Kampli or Kampil is a town on the Tungabhadra ten miles north-east of the ruins of Vijayanagar (Mzik, p. 163; *Imperial Gazetteer*, Second Edition, Vol. 7, p. 354). Sewell identifies it with Anegundi on the Tungabhadra, which in his opinion was captured by Muḥammad bin Tughluq in 1334 (Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 16). But there is no proof that Bahā-ud-dīn's rebellion took place in 1334. That Sewell's information is unauthentic and his conclusions unsound appears from his statement regarding Malik Nāib, the "Enybiquymelly" of Nuniz (Sewell, p. 19), whom the Sultān is said to have left behind as local governor on his return northward. There was in fact no Malik Nāib under Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Confusion seems to have arisen from the name of the famous Malik Nāib of the time of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.

³ Saletore: *Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 6 and 11.

⁴ Firishta (*Bombay*), I, p. 241.

⁵ Mzik (p. 165) is of opinion that in the fight that ensued on this occasion, probably in 1327, Dvārasamudra was destroyed. This finds a confirmation in Saletore (p. 6), who mentions the demolition of Dvārasamudra in 1327, but does not regard it as the result of the above-mentioned war.

⁶ Def. et Sang., III, 321.

⁷ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin*, MS. F. 236A.

⁸ Def. et Sang., III, pp. 315-22. There is practically no difference between "Kurshāsp" (vide MS. of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi*, B.M., Or. 1673, F. 386) and Gurshāsp (vide the printed edition of the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (Bib. Ind., p. 99) and also the *Muntakhabāt-ul-Tawārikh* (Bib. Ind., p. 226).)

Saletore (I, p. 10) erroneously describes Bahā-ud-dīn as the nephew of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and says that he was also known as Khūr Sarif.

him as a leading amīr under Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and as the Muqṭī' (Governor) of Sāgar.¹ (4) Unlike Ibn Baṭṭūṭa again, who gives no details of the war and dismisses the long story of successive actions by concentrating on the sacrifice performed by the rājā of Kampīla, with whom Bahā-ud-dīn had sought shelter, Firishta informs us that the first battle of the war took place near Deogīr. During the action, Khizr Bahrām, one of the leading amīrs of Gurshāsp's army, deserted him and joined Khwāja Jahān. This led to Bahā-ud-dīn's flight to Sāgar, where he was pursued by Khwāja Jahān's troops. So, from Sāgar the fugitive came to Kampīla, whose rājā being friendly to him, he sought shelter there. (5) Unlike Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Firishta says that the emperor came from Delhi to Deogīr, presumably to direct military operations in person. Three successive battles seem to have been fought between Khwāja Jahān and the joint armies of Bahā-ud-dīn and the rājā of Kampīla. In the first two, Khwāja Jahān was defeated; in the third, reinforcements having arrived from Deogīr, the allies were defeated and the rājā of Kampīla was taken prisoner.

Thus ended the first and one of the most important of all rebellions. It affords an instance of the inflammable temper of the emperor and indicates the manner in which by striking terror into every heart he wanted to crush all opposition. It affords an illustration of what Ibn Baṭṭūṭa would call the humanity and manliness of the rājā of Kampīla, who sacrificed even his family by making them enter into fire for the sake of his Muslim guest. Perhaps this sacrifice was not without a political motive. It might be contended that the Hindūs of the Deccan were prepared to invite and support rebels against the emperor of Delhi. Bilāl Deo, who betrayed Bahā-ud-dīn, might be said to have taken the drastic step in self-defence. Perhaps he deceived Muḥammad bin Tughluq into a false sense of the security of his dominions in the Deccan. Such appears to be the context of Firishta,² who tells us that Bilāl Deo preferred to remain on friendly terms with the emperor.

This rebellion, which³ he is inclined to put in 1338/739, Firishta regards as one of the reasons prompting the emperor to transfer the capital to Deogīr. In view of the fact that the so-called transfer

¹ Sāgar, near Gulbarga, about ten miles north of Shorāpur in the Deccan (*Cambridge History of India*, III, 140).

² Firishta (*Bombay*), I, 241.

³ Firishta (*Bombay*), I, 241-242.

took place in 1327, Firishta's date is absurd. Mzik¹ also rejects it on the plea that Firishta's dates are not very reliable. Yet Saletore² puts this rebellion in 1338. The date 1327 /727 given instead by Budāūnī and Yaḥya bin Aḥmad is approximately correct. But Budāūnī's statement that the rebellion broke out in Delhi after the emperor had moved to Deogīr, leaving behind the Vazīr, Khwāja Jahān, creates a difficulty. It is in direct conflict with Firishta. If Firishta's view that the rebellion preceded the transfer of the capital and that it broke out in the Deccan be accepted, it will follow that another rebellion in favour of Bahā-ud-dīn probably encouraged by the hostile elements broke out in Delhi.

Firishta³ tells us that Bahā-ud-dīn's rebellion being over, the emperor marched from Deogīr against the hill-fortress of Kondhāna. It was held by Nak Nāyak, who surrendered after a siege of eight months and was subsequently enrolled as an amīr. Firishta follows 'Iṣāmī,⁴ who is our only source of information regarding this incident. It finds no place in the other accounts of the reign. As Bahā-ud-dīn's rebellion had ended in 1327, the Kondhāna conquest took place probably in 1328.

Firishta⁵ next mentions the rebellion of Bahrām Aiba Kishlū Khān, governor of Multān. It was the first rebellion according to Baranī,⁶ who gives a sketchy account and mentions no cause. He says, however, that it broke out after the emperor had moved to Daulatābād. It was apparently a demonstration of the amīrs' protest against the Sultān's orders to repair to Daulatābād. Yaḥya bin Aḥmad⁷ tells us that the emperor, having moved to Daulatābād, one 'Alī Khaṭṭāṭī was detailed to bring Bahrām Aiba Kishlū Khān's family to Daulatābād. 'Alī Khaṭṭāṭī fell out with Laula, son-in-law of Bahrām, and was killed in a combat that followed. This led to Kishlū Khān's rebellion.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁸ is of opinion that Kishlū Khān had incurred the emperor's displeasure for having buried the corpses of Bahā-ud-dīn

¹ Mzik: *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Batuta durch Indien und China*, p. 162.

² Saletore: *Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 6 and 11.

³ Firishta (*Bombay*), Vol. I, p. 242.

⁴ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, F. 236B.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁶ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 478.

⁷ Yaḥya bin Aḥmad: *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī* (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 100.

⁸ (i) *B.N.*, MS. 909, F. 138. (ii) *Def. et Sang.*, IIL, 322.

Gurshāsp and Ghiyās-ud-dīn Bahādur, which on being paraded together through the empire reached his territories. The Sultān sent for Bahrām Aiba, who refused to attend and revolted. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's¹ account is incomplete. He does not state whether the summons was issued from Delhi or from Daulatābād. In view of Baranī's² statement that at the time of the outbreak the emperor was at Daulatābād, it will not be incorrect to say that the summons was issued from Daulatābād. The cause of Kishlū Khān's rebellion, as described by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, cannot be accepted in view of the fact that (1) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa was not an eye-witness; (2) his account finds no confirmation in the contemporary or non-contemporary records; (3) Ghiyās-ud-dīn Bahādur's rebellion occurred some five years after that of Bahā-ud-dīn Gurshāsp's, as will be shown later. Their corpses, therefore, could not have been paraded throughout the empire at the same time.

According to Baranī³ the emperor marched from Daulatābād to Delhi, where he raised a new army and proceeded to Multān. The battle was fought in the plain of Abohar.⁴ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us that the emperor deceived the enemy in the course of the fight by placing under the royal parasol one 'Imād-ud-dīn, who resembled him, while he lay in ambush with a handful of soldiers. Kishlū Khān's army mistook 'Imād-ud-dīn for the emperor, and having killed him they dispersed, whereupon Muḥammad bin Tughluq sprang from his ambush, killed Kishlū Khān, and completely routed his army.

Our authorities assign no date to this rebellion. The circumstances leading up to it enable us to assign it to the year 1328.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us that after crushing Kishlū Khān's rebellion, the emperor sent the Vazīr Khwāja Jāhan to suppress a revolt in Kamālpur.⁵ It was probably an insurrection primarily caused by the Qāzī and the Khaṭīb of the town. Both of them were flayed alive, although the inhabitants were spared.⁶

The emperor then returned to Delhi, where according to Baranī,

¹ Idem.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 479.

³ Idem.

⁴ According to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, 125) Abohar lay at a distance of two days' journey from Multān.

⁵ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa places Kamālpur in Sind. The *Gazetteer* mentions a modern town bearing the name of Kamālpur near Karachi.

⁶ Def. et Sang., III, 324-5.

he remained for two years.¹ It was about this time that the rebellion of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur broke out in Sonārgāon, in eastern Bengal. He had been kept a prisoner in Delhi since Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq's triumphant return from Bengal. When Muḥammad bin Tughluq² ascended the throne of Delhi, he released the prisoner and conferred on him, as well as on his own brother, Bahrām Khān, the government of Bengal. The Khūṭba was to be read and coins struck in the names of both, but the former was required to send his son as a hostage to the royal court at Delhi. Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn refused to comply with this order, whereupon the emperor sent an army against him under the command of Diljalī Tatāri, better known as Tatār Khān. Bahrām Khān joined the royal troops and gave battle to Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur, who was defeated and killed. His skin was stripped off, filled with straw, and paraded through the country.

This rebellion finds no mention anywhere except in the *Rihla*.³ It appears from the coins of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Bahādur that it occurred in 1330-1/730. This was the fourth rebellion.

The fifth rebellion broke out in Sehwan. The emperor had made a Hindū, named Ratan, governor of Sehwan. But Wunār and Qaiṣar-i-Rūmī, the two Muslim chiefs in the royal service, viewed his rise with jealousy and treacherously put him to death. They then seized all government property in the city of Sehwan, amounting to twelve lakhs. The rebels next installed Wunār as their chief whom they called Malik Fīroz. Malik Fīroz distributed the plundered government property among the army. Wunār, fearing that his life was in danger, cut off as he was from his tribe, left Sehwan with a small following of his kinsmen. After his flight, the rebel

¹ Taking these two years to have been 1328 to 1330, Sir Wolsley Haig has been led by Baranī's peculiar phraseology to conclude that the emperor returned to Daulatābād in 1330 (*Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 147). But while Baranī says that the emperor remained in Delhi for two years (p. 479) he does not say that the latter left for Daulatābād at the end of two years or in 1330. In fact, Baranī (p. 480) does not mention the emperor's march to the south until the outbreak of Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh's rebellion in Ma'bar in 1335. Meanwhile the emperor was busy disbanding the Khurāsān army, and was occupied with the Qarāchil expedition, the token currency, and the enhancement of the revenue and the punitive expeditions in the Doāb. Of all these engagements of the emperor's Baranī has mentioned the last, which was in his eyes the most grievous, because it led eventually to punitive expeditions, the so-called man-hunting expeditions to Baran, the native land of Baranī, to Dalmaū, and to Kanauj (1332-34). In September, 1333, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa reached the Indus, and in March, 1334, he visited Delhi. He reports the emperor to have been in the vicinity of Kanauj. Like Baranī he describes the emperor's march to the Deccan on the outbreak of the Ma'bar rebellion in 1335.

² Def. et Sang., III, p. 316.

³ Def. et Sang., III, p. 317.

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army made Qaiṣar-i-Rūmī their chief. When 'Imād-ul-Mulk Sarteḡ, the governor of Multān, heard of this, he marched with his troops to Sehḡān, where a battle was fought. The rebels were defeated and were subsequently executed. As Ibn Battūṭa¹ arrived in Sehḡān shortly after, and witnessed the bodies of the executed rebels nailed to the cross over the ramparts of the city, the year 1333-4 can be conveniently fixed as the date of this rebellion. Baranī does not mention this rebellion and no reference to it will be found in any history of this period.

The sixth rebellion took place in the Doāb.² It was one of the most important and yet the most grossly misunderstood of rebellions. Baranī describes it repeatedly,³ and impresses upon the reader the atrocious régime based on a policy of high exactions and exorbitant demands introduced into the Doāb by the emperor on his return from Multān. A special department called the Diwān-i-Ṭalab-Aḡkām-i-Tauqī' was set up for the execution of special orders, hundreds of which used to be issued every day. One of these, for instance, raised the taxes of the Doāb ten-fold and twenty-fold.⁴ Through the tyranny of the government the peasants, at last gave up the cultivation of land, thus producing a famine. The rains also ceased, and the famine became general. Baranī regards it as the grossest of the Sulṭān's blunders; and coming as it did last in the order of the royal innovations and projects, he puts it first in view of its gravity and significance. Far from serving the purpose of refilling the treasury, an object with which it is supposed to have been instituted, it roused universal opposition and discontent. The rebellions which arose in the Doāb spread to almost every other province. The emperor failed to diagnose the real cause of the trouble, and instead of making any concession he persisted in levying

¹ Def. et Sang., III, p. 108.

² The Doāb (the land between the two rivers) was, according to Mr. Moreland (p. 23), much smaller in the 14th century than what it is now supposed to be. Its modern usage does not include the land south of the Jumna and the Ganges. Crooke puts it as comprising an area of 22,500 sq. miles, extending between the Jumna and the Ganges from Sahāranpur to Allahabad. Mr. Moreland (p. 23) defines the Doāb of the 14th century as the territory lying between the Ganges and the Jumna, extending in the north to the Siwālik, but in the south not much beyond Aligarh, even Kanauj and Kara being excluded. I think, however, that the Doāb under Muḡammad bin Tughluq was much larger. It comprised the land stretching between the Ganges in the east and the Sutlej in the west, having the Siwālik or the low hills of the Himālayas as its northern limit; its southern boundary being formed by a line drawn roughly from Kanauj to Rājputāna, but excluding Mālwa.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 470-471-473-479.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 473.

high taxes in spite of the terrible famine which devastated Hindustān. To crown all, he led punitive¹ expeditions to various places, to Baran,² to Dalmaū³ and to Kanauj, and "ruthlessly murdered the inhabitants."

It should be noted that Baranī is the only contemporary authority on the subject of the Doāb rebellion. He finds fault with the administration, and charges the emperor (i) with rashly issuing impracticable administrative ordinances, (ii) with forcing the officials to oppress and outrage the people, (iii) with inability to realize the distress of the peasants, who gave up cultivation, burnt the corn and turned their cattle out into the jungle, (iv) with continuing to levy high taxes⁴ in spite of the outbreak of famine, and (v) with raiding different places in the Doāb, and murdering the inhabitants.

All the later writers, with the exception of Ḥājji-ud-Dabir, have followed Baranī—Yaḥya bin Aḥmad, Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad, Budāūnī and Firishta. With slight variations, each of these has adopted the sense of Baranī's text.

But none of the other contemporary writers, neither 'Iṣāmī, nor Shihāb-ud-dīn Aḥmad 'Abbās, nor Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, has a word to say on the Doāb rebellion. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa arrived in India (1333) while trouble in the Doāb was at its height. Why he would seem to have heard nothing about the increased taxation, and the dreadful oppression that powerfully stirred the imagination of Baranī is a cause for close consideration.

Gardner Brown⁵ is of opinion that Baranī's account is highly exaggerated. He maintains that the taxation imposed by Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not heavy. 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī had raised the state demand to⁶ fifty per cent. of the produce. It was reduced

¹ These punitive expeditions have been called "man-hunting expeditions" as a result of Baranī's expression, "*Ba rasm-i-shīkhār raft*."

² Baran is identified with the modern town of Bulandshahr. (*Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IX, p. 228.)

³ A *tahsil* and a town of the same name in the Rāe Bareilly district, United Provinces situated on the Ganges in 26° 4' N., and 81° 3' E. (*Imperial Gazetteer*, p. 127, Vol. XI.)

⁴ The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (p. 101) says that the Sultān increased the land tax in the Doāb twenty-fold, and levied, besides, the house-tax (*khari*) and the pasture-tax (*charai*).

The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (p. 202) says that the Sultān increased the tax ten-fold.

The *Muntakhhab-ut-Tawārikh* (I, 237) says that the Sultān raised the land tax ten-fold and twenty-fold. Ranking (*Al-Badāoni*, I, 305) interprets the phrase as meaning that the tax was doubled.

Firishta (I, 239) says that the tax in the Doāb was tripled, and quadrupled.

⁵ *A.U.*, 1925.

⁶ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), 287.

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by Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak¹ Shāh, and later by Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq.² From that reduced demand of his father's, which was, according to one reading, ten per cent., Muḥammad bin Tughluq raised it to double the amount.

Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, while following Baranī in the main in condemning the Sultān, seems to have had other sources of information, and presents a somewhat different picture of events. He gives an account of the increases in taxation, and their consequences twice over, and refers each time to the outbreak of what might almost be described as a kind of civil war in the Doāb. In the first instance, he says that one of the causes of ruin was the Sultān's order to levy an enormous land tax, so high that for each previous ṭanka, three or four ṭankas were now demanded. "This eventually aggravated the sufferings of the ryots, the tax-collectors ('Ummāls),³ and their governors, and led to the appointment of the amīrān-i-ṣadah over them, and to much bloodshed on both sides ; and the soil ceased to be cultivated."⁴ In the second instance, Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr tells us that the Sultān ordered an increase in the land tax in the Doāb ; for every ṭanka, which had been levied since the conquest of Delhi under Qutb-ud-dīn, ten and twenty being demanded. But the treasury was not enriched. "When the 'Ummāl (tax-collectors) treated the peasants harshly, the latter killed them. On this, the amīrān-i-ṣadah prepared themselves and killed the peasants. Then seizing their opportunity the peasants killed the amīrān-i-ṣadah. Thus the district was entirely ruined."⁵

Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr has shown that the Sultān was confronted with a crisis in the Doāb, though he offers no explanation for it. Like Baranī, he makes an egregious mistake in regarding the increased

¹ Baranī (p. 383) says that Qutb-ud-dīn reduced the heavy taxation imposed by 'Alā-ud-dīn. This is vague, and does not enable us to fix the reduced amount.

² With regard to the land tax assessed by Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq, there is a controversy. While Sir Wolseley Haig (*Cambridge History of India*, III, 128) takes Baranī's phrase (p. 429) to mean that the land tax was limited to one-tenth or one-eleventh of the gross produce, Mr. Moreland (p. 44) suggests that the above-mentioned one-tenth or one-eleventh was a demand on the provincial governors levied on their revenues, and not directly on the peasants. It would appear that Baranī probably means that Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq prohibited the central ministry (Diwān-i-Vizārat) from making any excessive or arbitrary increase in taxation, for example, "an increase of more than one-tenth or one-eleventh on the iqṭā's, and provinces."

³ 'Ummāl (singular, 'Āmil) = tax-collectors or administrators of public affairs. (i) Lane, E. W. : *Arabic-English Lexicon*. (ii) Levy, R. : *The Sociology of Islam*, II, 188.

⁴ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, III, 873.

⁵ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, III, 890.

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taxation as a prelude to the recruitment of the Khurāsān army. Probably, the recruitment, maintenance, and finally the disbandment of the Khurāsān army of 370,000 soldiers had precipitated the crisis and led to the imposition of increased taxes.

It has been shown above that the Hindūs (or the ryots, in the words of Hājji-ud-Dabīr) formed a considerable part of the Khurāsān army. When it was disbanded a huge mass of unemployed soldiers, both Muslims and Hindūs, was let loose. They mixed with the turbulent elements already existing in the country. So Baranī¹ tells us. The political atmosphere, which had long been tense on account of the bitternesses caused by the recent rebellions of Bahā-ud-dīn² Gurshāsp, and Kishlū Khān,³ and by the indignation of the 'Ulamā and Mashāikh, became highly favourable for an outbreak in the Doāb. The more so as about this time the rains failed, and prices soared. The situation in Delhi and its suburbs became worse when, because of the drought, the usual convoys of corn ceased to come from different parts of the Doāb.⁴ This was a crisis unprecedented in the history of the Doāb. The nearest parallel to it can be found in that which had previously been encountered by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji. Like him, Muḥammad strove to prevent the outbreak of disorders and rebellions by keeping the refractory⁵ inhabitants of the Doāb busy in agriculture, spending every ounce of their energy in eking out a living. Much the same principle, it may be remembered, was later adopted in the French Revolution during the Reign of Terror. But where 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji of India and the terrorists of France succeeded, Muḥammad failed. 'Alā-ud-dīn had met the crisis by controlling markets and fixing prices of all commodities. Muḥammad bin Tughluq made no experiment of this kind. He introduced new but oppressive legislation, which Baranī

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 470-499.

² See p. 143 *supra*.

³ See p. 146 *supra*.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 470-479.

⁵ A survey of the history of Hindustān in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries shows that the Doāb had been a danger-point. Its inhabitants were traditionally prone to insurrection. They would take advantage of the slightest weakness of the central government, and were ready to revolt at the earliest opportunity. Almost every great Sultān—Iltūtmish, Balban, and 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji—had endeavoured to tame the refractory inhabitants of the Doāb. 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji was obliged to make special ordinances to control the Hindū insurrectionaries. These ordinances have been mistaken as an evidence of his anti-Hindū policy—a point recently cleared by Mr. Moreland (see preface). The same was true of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. An account of unceasing troubles in the Doāb under the successors of Fīroz Shāh and Sayyid rulers may be read in the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*.

RISE AND FALL OF MUḤAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ figuratively describes as *Yake ba deh wa yake ba bist*.¹ Mr. Moreland rightly observes that this phrase is "rhetorical, not arithmetical."² As long as the Rājput clans had been on the roll, the state demand on the produce of their land was either remitted³ or reduced to a nominal sum. When the army was disbanded and the ex-soldiers were thrown out of employment and ceased to draw their pay, the state demand was reimposed and considerably increased. But it was not necessarily unbearable. However, the refractory inhabitants of the Doāb grew restive. They not only refused to pay the taxes, but also ceased to work—a circumstance unforeseen by the Sultān. Furthermore, they defied the tax-collectors; and when the time⁴ for the collection of *Kharāj* came round they set fire to the corn on the threshing-floors. This conduct of the cultivators amounted to rebellion; since the peasants' duty to till the soil formed the fundamental conception of the agrarian system of medieval India. The ryots made good use of the confidence, the arms, and the military training they had recently acquired at the expense of the state; and, as Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr informs us, they killed the tax-collectors.⁵ The Sultān called the local Hindū chiefs—*Khūṭs* and *muqaddams*—to account, and inflicted on them exemplary punishments. This stage in the crisis Mr. Moreland describes, saying "many of the leading men were killed or blinded."⁶ The *amīrān-i-ṣadah* were then fitted out to crush the rebellion, but they were also killed by the rebels.⁷ Fearing the consequences, the ringleaders then fled into the forests, with which parts of the Doāb were still covered, and when they fraternized with the hitherto independent Rājput clans⁸

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 473.

² Moreland: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 48.

³ Baranī does not mention the remission, but Ibn Baṭṭūta does (Def. et Sang., III, 117), although the date he assigns to it is, in fact, later than that of the Doāb rebellion, which, it will be remembered, he completely ignores. Now either Ibn Baṭṭūta has made a mistake in the date of the remission of taxes, or, if he is correct, the taxes were remitted on two occasions. It is difficult to dispute the veracity of Ibn Baṭṭūta's statement because it is based upon personal observation. It would, therefore, follow that the first remission had already taken place before his arrival. It would also appear that after the Doāb troubles were over, the Sultān made compensations to the peasants for their sufferings by once again remitting the *Kharāj* and other taxes.

⁴ Jamādi, II, 729 (April, 1329). This would appear from the text of Baranī (469-477) and that of Yahya bin Aḥmad (101-105).

⁵ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, III, 890, 877.

⁶ Moreland, W. H.: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, 48.

⁷ Ḥājji-ud-Dabīr, III, 877, 890.

⁸ See p. 154 n.

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of Dalmaū, the Sultān pursued¹ them over the whole area from Baran to Kanauj.

The fact that in all the places where the rebels mustered in strength and were attacked by the Sultān, Baran is mentioned first, tends to suggest that the trouble started in Baran.

Baranī's account of the devastation of Dalmaū in the Doāb should be compared with the result of the researches made by Benett.²

In the course of his researches on the Rājput clans of Rāi Bareilī—part of the Doāb including Dalmaū—Benett discovered that it was under³ Muḥammad bin Tughluq that Dalmaū first came under Muslim occupation; before his time it had been entirely Hindū. On the authority of a Hindī story book composed in 1377/779,⁴ Benett informs us that it was Muḥammad bin Tughluq⁵ who had visited Dalmaū and beautified the city. Malik Mubārak,⁶ the brother

¹ Baranī's expression (pp. 479-80, *Ba ʿariq-i-shikār raft*) which has given rise to a misunderstanding that the emperor organized man-hunting expeditions (see Elphinstone's *History of India*, II, p. 61-2), has two possible interpretations: (i) it means, as it has been used by Baranī in his account of Balban (p. 85), to set out or to march in form on any expedition, not necessarily a hunting expedition. Baranī (p. 85) describes Balban's resolve to lead a punitive expedition against Tughral, the rebellious governor of Lakhnāutī by saying "*Sultān bar 'azm-i lashkār kashī simt-i-Sāmāna wa Sunām bēvān āmad . . .*" [with a view to raise armies for the Lakhnāutī expedition the Sultān marched to Sāmāna and Sunām; (where) he divided the province of Sāmāna and Sunām into Shiqs (districts)]. It should be noted that Baranī has used here almost the same expression, *Ba rasmi-i-shikār raft*. But far from meaning a man-hunt, for there is nothing of the kind in the text, the phrase *Ba rasmi-i-shikār raft* provides a concrete instance of its idiomatic use for the king's march on any expedition or campaign. (ii) The phrase *Ba ʿariq-i-shikār raft*, even if literally translated in the case of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, would mean that he set out in the same fashion and with the same procession as was usual for his hunting expeditions. A special form of his movements and processions explaining his hunting expeditions is given in the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*, as well as in the *Rihla*.

At any rate it does not follow that Muḥammad bin Tughluq was suddenly transformed into a man-hunter, and surrounding the jungles hunted men indiscriminately as the Mongols (D'ohosson, I, 404-410) used to hunt animals. Yet this is the meaning generally given to Baranī's above-mentioned expression.

² Benett, W. C.: *A Report on the Family History of the Chief Clans of Roy Bareilly*.

³ The Hindī story book on which Benett bases his inquiry says that it was Jauna Shāh, the lieutenant of the emperor Fīroz, who had stopped at Dalmaū and had beautified the city. But there was no such man in the service of Fīroz Shāh. And Benett had no hesitation in identifying the above-mentioned Jauna Shāh with Muḥammad bin Tughluq. In a marginal note (p. 2) he explains that Jauna Shāh had preceded Fīroz as ruler of Delhi. It should be remembered that Muḥammad bin Tughluq's original name was Jauna.

⁴ Benett gives 1587 as the Christian date corresponding to 779 of the Hijra. But the correct Christian date corresponding to 779 A.H. is 1377.

⁵ Benett, W. C.: *A Report on the Family History of the Chief Clans of Roy Bareilly*, p. 2.

⁶ There was no Malik Mubārak under Fīroz Shāh. There was a brother of Muḥammad bin Tughluq called Mubārak Khān mentioned by Baranī (p. 454) as well as by Ibn Battūta. Probably it is he who is mentioned as Malik Mubārak in the

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of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, is mentioned as the governor of Dalmaū.

At that time he was, according to Benett, the founder of "the Muhammadan settlement in Dalmaū." His tomb on which the kings of Oudh in the eighteenth century are said to have kept a light burning, lies in the local fort, and his memory is still honoured in Dalmaū. It is now confirmed that it was the flight of the ring-leaders from Baran into Dalmaū that forced Muḥammad bin Tughluq to pursue them from place to place. Dalmaū, a veritable Rājput¹ realm, formed a danger-point in the heart of the crown lands. The emperor, therefore, conquered it and placed a Muslim governor in charge directly responsible to Delhi. This was definitely the first establishment of the Muslim element in Dalmaū. But the Rājputs still remained powerful, particularly the Bhār Rājputs, who are known to have established a kind of organized government in the vicinity of Dalmaū. They would even take the offensive if circumstances were favourable. Such was the case in the time of Ibrāhīm Shāh Sharqī (1402-36), who had to fight a battle with them at Sudāwanpur.²

The Hindū version that Jauna Shāh beautified Dalmaū, though not contemporary, cannot be altogether dismissed. It is in accord with the spirit of the contemporary Hindū evidence mentioned above.³ It seems that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had become popular with at least some of the Hindūs; hence the legend of his goodness. Dalmaū lay like an island in the Doāb, unconquered but partially

Hindī story book quoted by Benett. The respect which the Kings of Oudh paid to the memory of Malik Mubārak was not only because he was the founder of Muslim settlements in Dalmaū, as Benett thinks, but also because he was a Muslim prince.

¹ It appears from the census reports (*Gaz. Rāi Bareli District*, XXXIX, p. 58) that Dalmaū and the modern district of Rāi Bareli in the Doāb is overwhelmingly populated with a great variety of Rājput clans, the most numerous of all being (1) the Bais, (2) the Kanhpurias, (3) the Chauhāns, (4) the Gautams, (5) the Amethias, (6) the Sombansis, (7) the Rāthors, (8) the Panwārs, (9) the Jauwars, (10) the Kachchwahās, (11) the Bisens, (12) the Dikhits, (13) the Bhadauriās, (14) the Chandel. Benett is of opinion that the specified area was until the middle of the 13th century largely covered with forests; the only signs of human habitation being the few brick huts and scattered hamlets of the Bhārs. He thinks that about the middle of the 13th century there was a general advance of the Hindūs into this district; the Kanhpurias, the Bais, and the Pandes having settled in its different parts. The Pāsis, long feared for their dexterity with the bow, were perhaps the oldest inhabitants of the country. From their secret and inaccessible abodes in the jungles, where they took refuge on the arrival of the Rājputs, they used to harry the agricultural Hindūs up to the 18th century, and the agriculturists on the plain resorted in self-defence to "an occasional combined attack on the offending jungle."

² Sudāwanpur or Sudamanpur is a village at a distance of 14 miles from Dalmaū. (*District Gazetteer of the United Provinces*, XXXIX, 163.)

³ See (i) Chapter VII; (ii) Appendix B, Sanskrit Inscriptions.

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subdued. It had been the centre of disorder and a den of rebels and brigands. Henceforth it was brought under control and better administered.

It will be seen that Baranī's version of the Doāb troubles is inexact and misleading. In the first place, he leaves his readers in ignorance as to the kind of Kharāj (land tax) then levied; in the second place, his account of the sufferings of the peasants is both exaggerated and confusing; and in the third place he confuses the principal points in the story, and mistakenly describes the increases in taxation and outbreak of the famine as the causes of the insurrections.

We propose to discuss each of these considerations in turn.

(1) According to the Muslim¹ jurists there are three kinds of Kharāj or land tax: (i) Kharāj-i-muqāsamah, (ii) Kharāj-i-Waḥīfah, (iii) Kharāj-i-muqāṭa'ah. The Kharāj-i-muqāsamah or proportional Kharāj is a definite proportion of the produce of the ground: either one-half, the maximum, or one-third, or one-fourth, or one-fifth, the minimum. The Kharāj-i-Waḥīfah, on the contrary, is a fixed charge on the land: so much in natural produce or in money per unit area. The Kharāj-i-muqāṭa'ah has been variously interpreted. It is probably "the lump sum agreed upon to be paid yearly to the state by individuals in consideration of public lands made over to them by the state."² Of these three kinds of Kharāj it was the proportional Kharāj that Muḥammad bin Tughluq levied in the Doāb. In other words, the assessment of land tax at that time took the form of definite contributions of corn and food-stuffs levied on villages and on agriculturists at each harvest.

(2) Baranī³ portrays the peasants a famished mass of helpless people without arms or organization. But Ḥājji-ud-Dābir⁴ indicates that the peasants were armed and organized under their leaders. In view of the previous history⁵ of the Doāb, it will not be unreasonable to infer that the mass of peasants had revolted or were swayed by rebels. The weakness of the central government had presented them with a unique opportunity of casting off the yoke of Delhi. Hence they entered into a war with the Sultān.

(3) It might be true to say that the levy of increased taxation in

¹ Aghnides, N. P.: *Muhammadian Theories of Finance*, 378-380.

² Idem.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 473-479.

⁴ Ḥājji-ud-Dābir, III, 873, 890.

⁵ That is, in the 13th century, and under 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.

the Doāb was accompanied by drought and the rise of prices or famines. But to regard the increases in taxation and the drought and famine as the causes of insurrection would appear to be incorrect. It has been shown above that the increase in taxation was not unbearable and not unprecedented. If caused by the increased taxation the insurrections should have broken out under the Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khajī; if caused by the famine they should have come later, perhaps after 1335, when the famine was really severe. If the root cause was famine or the scarcity of fodder, then the remission of taxes, which Muḥammad bin Tughluq is known to have granted, and the administration of famine relief with which he is credited, would have come earlier. Surely no ruler in his senses could have increased the land tax and levied new imposts and cesses as well as a pasture-tax while famine was raging in the country and fodder was already scarce.

Muḥammad bin Tughluq's behaviour with regard to the peasants of the Doāb is very similar to that of Mas'ūd,¹ the Ghaznavid ruler, with regard to the people of Tirmidh and Balkh. When the 'Āmil of Tirmidh congratulated Mas'ūd on a victory, the sovereign was highly pleased, and showed his pleasure by remitting taxation. When, subsequently, the people of Balkh "ventured in his absence to repel an attack from Qara Khānī raiders, Mas'ūd rated them angrily telling them that it was not their function; and that as a penalty he would make them pay for the bazaars of their town, which he had built at great expense for them." While recruiting the Khurāsān army Muḥammad bin Tughluq had made concessions to the peasants and the Rājput warrior clans of the Doāb.² He remitted even the land tax, as mentioned above. On the disbandment of the army, when the taxes were re-imposed and increased, discontent arose. The Sultān was displeased and indignant with the very same people on whom he had previously lavished favours. This is the real meaning of the stories of the Sultān's displeasure with his subjects related by Ibn Battūta and 'Iṣāmī in a totally different connection. The peasants had struck work; a drought having also broken out, famine conditions developed. But the Sultān considered these troubles as largely their own fault, and refused to make further concessions to a people who had proved so ungrateful. That is why, in spite of famine conditions, the taxes

¹ Levy, R.: *The Sociology of Islam*, II, 228-234.

² See Chapter VII.

REBELLIONS AND DISORDERS

were neither restored to their former rate, nor ever reduced. On the contrary, strict orders were issued to the tax-collectors, to the Khūts and muqaddams to exact the state demands. The officials who were in personal touch with the excited peasants, and observed the extraordinary conditions then prevailing, knew the futility of the royal commands. But they were helpless. Baranī¹ tells us that the officials were placed in a very difficult position. On the one hand, they feared the disastrous consequences of the royal orders, which, if carried out, the subjects could hardly endure; and, on the other hand, they knew that they risked their own lives if they neglected to obey the emperor. For fear of their lives they were compelled to wring money from the peasants at any cost. Thus the peasants became desperate, and did whatever they could by way of protest against the levy of taxes and the drastic measures adopted by the emperor.

The emperor appears to have lost his temper. He should have treated the matter more calmly and carefully. But Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not endowed with the diplomacy and coolness which are the characteristics of modern statesmanship. He was used to treating the orthodox Musalmāns—‘Ulamā and Mashāikh—harshly. He had no compunction with regard to the peasants when they behaved as rebels. But he was by no means a tyrant as the text of Baranī would make out.

It is now clear that the accepted theory of the Doāb rebellion, founded on an assumption of Muḥammad bin Tughluq’s capricious and uncalled-for increase of the taxes in the Doāb in the very beginning² of his reign, is not supported by facts. Nor was the increase of taxation in the Doāb due to any attempt on the Sultān’s part to introduce a uniform standard of land taxation throughout his dominions. A careful examination of all the known facts would suggest rather that the oppressive and repressive legislation in the Doāb was forced upon the emperor by the situation that developed after the disbanding of the Khurāsān army, and the unrest caused by the failure of a number of ambitious projects, and serious rebellions that shook his empire from within.

According to Baranī³ the Doāb rebellion occupies a middle

¹ Baranī, 473.

² Moreland, W. H.: *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, 48.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 473-480.

position, standing as it does between the Multān rebellion which preceded it, and the Ma'bar rebellion which followed.¹ He tells us that while the emperor was still busy in his destructive work in the Doāb, news came of the rebellion of Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh in Ma'bar. In order to suppress it an army was sent from Delhi but it remained in Ma'bar, presumably joining hands with the rebel. At last the emperor repaired to Delhi, whence making preparations for the Ma'bar expedition he marched to Deogīr.

Ibn Battūṭa,² who had recently arrived in India, supplies details which are wanting in Baranī. He gives the 8th of June (1334)³ as the date of the emperor's arrival in Delhi, and the 5th of January (1335)⁴ that of his march for Ma'bar. It follows that on his return from the Doāb expedition the emperor remained in Delhi seven months before marching southward. In this period Ibn Battūṭa, together with many other newcomers, was introduced to the court and was made the Qāzī of Delhi. The date of the Ma'bar rebellion, therefore, must have been 1334/735, which is confirmed by the numismatic evidence.⁵ The first coin of the Maḍura (Madūra) mint bearing the name and title of Jalāl-ud-dīn Aḥsan Shāh as independent ruler or Sulṭān is of 1334/735, the latest date on the Maḍura coins struck in the name of Muḥammad bin Tughluq being A.H. 734/1333. The dates 1340/741 and 1341/742 assigned to this rebellion by Yahya bin Aḥmad, Budāūnī, and Firishta respectively are wrong, because Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh had been killed in 1339.⁶

It is evident from Baranī's language that the nature of the Ma'bar rebellion was almost the same as that of the Doāb. He tells us that on reaching Daulatābād on his way to Ma'bar the emperor levied new taxes (abwāb) in Mahārāshṭra (Marhaṭ), and made such atrocious demands that many died. Baranī implies that the emperor's oppressive policy in Mahārāshṭra was a replica of his Doāb policy. It should be remembered that the disbandment of

¹ This, as well as the scheme of events given in the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (101-105), enables us to fix the year 1329 as the approximate date of the Doāb rebellion.

² (i) B.M., MS. 909, F. 146. (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 374 ff.

³ 4th Shawwāl (A.H. 734). Def. et Sang., III, 391.

⁴ 9th Jamādī I (A.H. 734). Def. et Sang., III, 427.

Ibn Battūṭa gives the month in each case, not the year.

⁵ J.R.A.S., 1922, p. 344. J.R.A.S., 1909, p. 673.

⁶ J.R.A.S., 1909, p. 671.

⁷ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 480-81.

the *Khurāsān* army previous to the outbreak of the *Doāb* rebellion had led to the dispersal of thousands of unemployed soldiers all over the country. Furthermore, the *Qarāchīl* tragedy, the *Multān* rebellion, and above all the emperor's devotion to pagan philosophy, his atheistic leanings and doubts about *Islām*, culminating in his ruthless murder of the orthodox *Sunnīs*, *Ṣūfīs* and the 'Ulamā had spread an incalculable amount of discontent all over the empire.¹ This was multiplied enormously by the outbreak of a severe famine in *Delhi* and *Mālwa* and of epidemics in *Telingāna* where the troops employed in the *Ma'bar* expedition died in huge numbers, and the emperor himself having fallen ill his death was rumoured. He was forced to relinquish the *Ma'bar* expedition and to retire to *Daulatābād* from *Badrkot* according to *Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, and from *Wārangal* according to *Baranī*, whither he had proceeded in pursuit of his design. *Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*² remarks that rebellions having broken out and discontent having spread in all directions, the rule of *Muḥammad bin Tughluq* was seemingly over, and the sceptre would have fallen from his hands had it not been decreed otherwise.

How far the *Ma'bar* rebellion was prepared by the *Doāb* rebellion and how far it was akin to it can further be gauged from the following two phrases of *Baranī*³: (1) On his return from *Multān* the *Sultān* stopped in *Delhi* for two years, while his army as well as his amīrs remained separated from their families cut off in *Daulatābād*. From *Delhi* the emperor evidently marched into the *Doāb* on the outbreak of the *Doāb* rebellion, the army chiefs, as *Firishta*⁴ tells us, being still discontented. Presumably they would have left no stone unturned to make the emperor leave for *Daulatābād*. It would not be unnatural if in their anxiety to do so, they intrigued with the military chiefs in *Ma'bar* or with *Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh* himself to raise the standard of rebellion. (2) The troops which had been detailed from *Delhi* for the consolidation of *Ma'bar* remained there, and joined hands with the rebel governor, *Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh*. It seems that on the disbandment of the *Khurāsān* army some regiments consisting mainly of the inhabitants of *Kaithal* and its surroundings—*Kaithal*, a town north-west of *Delhi* was the native place of *Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh* of *Ma'bar*—were sent as an addi-

¹ Cf. 'Isāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS. F. 239, 279, 290, 312, 316.

² (i) B.N., MS. 909, F. 139. (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 335.

³ *Baranī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 429.

⁴ *Firishta* (*Bombay*), Vol. I, p. 243-4.

tional force to Ma'bar. It was they who, according to Baranī,¹ had joined hands with the rebel governor. Obviously the latter was not granted any extraordinary monetary allowance from the central government to maintain the additional force. Instead of applying to the emperor or to his governments at Daulatābād and Delhi, which was a tedious and doubtful process, Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh took the law into his own hands and asserted his independence. The emperor was distracted that, in spite of his utmost efforts, he could not crush the Ma'bar rebellion. The injuries that he sustained by the fiasco of the Ma'bar expedition, the impairment of his prestige and the loss of the monetary and man power entailed by his ill-fated journey from the Dōāb or from Kanauj—for he was busy suppressing the Dōāb rebellion at Kanauj when he heard of the outbreak of the Ma'bar rebellion—to Delhi, and from Delhi to Daulatābād, and thence to Telingāna, whence, retreat being unavoidable, his return to Delhi via Daulatābād and Dhār in Mālwa, were irreparable. That Ma'bar became independent and Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh successfully founded the Maḍūra Sultanate bears testimony to the decline in the fortunes of Muḥammad bin Tughluq and the disintegration of his empire. Although in the course of this journey he reorganised the administration in Daulatābād, in Telingāna, and in Bīdar, no real good came of this eventually. Daulatābād, which had now ceased to be the favourite capital city, was, together with Mahārāshṭra (Marhaṭ) placed under the governorship of Qutluḡ Khān. Telingāna was placed under the charge of Malik Qabūl, the Nāib Vazīr, and the government of Bīdar was entrusted to one Shihāb Sulṭānī entitled Nuṣrat Khān for a stipulated sum of a crore of ṭankas to be paid within three years.

During this journey from Delhi to Wārangal and back which took the emperor two and a half years, that is, from January 1335, to July, 1337, the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth rebellions broke out.

The eighth rebellion, which is referred to by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and finds no mention elsewhere, was that of Mas'ūd Khān, a step-brother of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. He was suspected of rebellion; and on his acknowledging the charges brought against him was executed. As Ibn Baṭṭūṭa had personally seen him on his arrival in Delhi, Mas'ūd Khān's rebellion and execution probably took

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 480.

place on the eve of the emperor's march to Ma'bar ; hence its date 1334-5.

The ninth rebellion was that of Hulājūn. Hulājūn, or as Sir Wolseley Haig¹ suggests, Hulāgū, was probably one of those Mongol chiefs whom Muḥammad bin Tughluq had retained in his service. Baranī gives no account of his rebellion which he, however, places at Lahore during the ill-starred Ma'bar expedition. Budāūnī² says that Hulājūn treacherously killed Malik Tatār, the governor of Lahore, and set up as ruler. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa,³ although he does not mention the murder, agrees on the whole with Budāūnī. He tells us that Hulājūn was assisted in his enterprise by Amīr Quljand.⁴ The Vazīr Khwāja Jahān raised armies and marched against him from Delhi. A battle was fought probably on the banks of the Rāwī. The rebel was defeated and fled. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa gives no date of this rebellion, but helps us to fix it in 1335, inasmuch as he gives 9th Jamādī-ul-ūla for the Ma'bar expedition.⁵ It was after the emperor's arrival in Daulatābād, up to which place the Vazīr Khwāja Jahān had accompanied him, that the rebellion broke out. It was suppressed by the Vazīr on his return from Daulatābād, about December, 1335, the emperor having proceeded to Telingāna.

The tenth rebellion was that of Malik Hoshang in Daulatābād. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us that Malik Hoshang, son of Malik Kamāl-ud-dīn Garg and the governor of Daulatābād, revolted on hearing of the emperor's reported death. The emperor was then on his way back from Telingāna to Daulatābād. Malik Hoshang fled to a neighbouring Hindū rājā, Burabrah, whose dominions lay in the western Ghāṭs. It was probably the outbreak of this rebellion which forced the emperor in spite of his illness to travel back to Daulatābād. He pursued Hoshang in his mountainous retreat, but his Hindū protector refused to surrender him. The emperor, however, made some effective arrangement for crushing the rebellion and, leaving instructions to this effect with Qutluḡ Khān, the new governor of Daulatābād, he set out for Delhi as has been mentioned above.

The eleventh rebellion was that of the Hindūs in Kampīla and

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922, pp. 319-72.

² Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), p. 231.

³ Def. et Sang., III, p. 332-3.

⁴ "Qul Jand" is the Arabic form of Gul Chand, the name of a Hindū amīr.

⁵ See page 158 *supra*, and the *Rihla* (Def. et Sang., III, 427).

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Wārangal. Baranī¹ informs us that Malik Maqbūl, the Nāib Vazīr, unable to withstand Kanya Nāik who asserted his independence, fled away from Wārangal which fell into the hands of the Hindūs. About the same time one of Kanya Nāik's relations whom the emperor had sent to Kampīla apostatized from Islām and revolted. Thus Kampīla also fell into the hands of the Hindūs, and disorders having spread in all directions nothing remained secure except Deogīr and Gujarāt. According to Firishta's² account, which is fuller, Krishna Nāyak of Wārangal, son of Ludder Deo (Rudra Deo)—the Kanya Nāik of Baranī—went over to Bilāl Deo, the rājā of Carnatic, and instigated him to a rebellion, the object being to seize Ma'bar as well as Dvārasamudra and Kampīla from the Muslims, and to raise against them a barrier in the south. Accordingly, a frontier outpost of Carnatic was founded by Bilāl Deo and named Bījan Nagar (the city of Bījan) after the name of his son, Bījan Rāi. Bījan Nagar later became Vijayānagar. Bilāl Deo next helped Krishna Nāyak to turn out 'Imād-ul-Mulk Vazīr from Wārangal, and subsequently emancipated from Muslim control the rājās of Ma'bar and Dvārasamudra, who had been for a long period tributaries of the ruler of the Carnatic.

Firishta's account is inaccurate, and his date of the foundation of Vijayānagar wrong, although his information regarding the Hindū conspiracy in the Deccan, and the part Bilāl Deo played in displacing the Muslim rule south of the Godāvāri from Wārangal and the Carnatic is correct.

A comparative study of Firishta, Baranī and Sewell, who records a story based on the Portuguese chronicler Nuniz, leads to the conclusion that Vijayānagar was founded in 1336. This is confirmed by the epigraphic evidence. It follows that Bukka and Harihar, the two brothers, had fled from Wārangal when it was besieged by Ulugh Khān (1323), and had entered the service of the rājā of Anegondi—the Kambīla of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. They fell subsequently into the hands of the royal troops and were carried off to Delhi, when, in connection with the rebellion of Bahā-ud-dīn, Anegondi was besieged in 1327. According to Nuniz, the emperor, finding his representative Malik Nāib unable to hold his own, restored Anegondi to the Hindūs, and made Devā Rāyā, formerly the chief minister, the Rāya (rājā). It was he who at the suggestion of

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 484.

² Firishta (*Bombay*), I, p. 246.

the sage Mādheva Charya, surnamed Vidyâranya, founded a city on the Tungabhadra. The city was named Vidyânagar and subsequently became Vijayânagar. It will be remembered that in his account of the Kampîla rebellion Baranî¹ says that a relation of Kanya Nâik, whom the Sultân had sent to Kampîla, apostatized from Islâm and revolted. Probably this apostate was no other than Devâ Râyâ, otherwise known as Harihar or Harihara I, the first real king of Vijayânagar.

Early in 1335, when the emperor had left for Ma'bar, a famine had broken out in Delhi and its suburbs. Ibn Battûta gives an eye-witness account of the afflictions of the people, and tells us that the emperor ordered six months' provisions at the rate of a daily allowance of one and a half *Raṭl*² per head to be given to all the people of Delhi. Baranî reports the spread of the famine to Mâlwa and other parts of Hindustân, and says that on his return from the Deccan the emperor tried to improve the cultivation by sinking wells and by advancing loans to the peasants. The famine was the most terrible of its kind and lasted about six years (1335-41). The distress caused by it was one of the reasons why the emperor made no attempt to crush the Hindû rebellion. He expected Qutluḡ Khân, whom he had appointed Vazîr of Daulatâbâd, to do so.

The twelfth rebellion was that of Sayyid Ibrâhîm, governor of Hânsî and Sirsa. Seizing the royal treasures which happened to pass through his territory in 1336/737 he assumed an independent attitude but was easily captured and put to death.

The thirteenth rebellion was in Bengal. It will be remembered that after crushing the rebellion of Ghiyâs-ud-dîn Bahâdur, Muḥammad bin Tughluq had made Tatâr Khân,³ entitled Bahrâm Khân, governor of Sonârgâon, and Malik Baidar⁴ surnamed Qadr Khân, governor of Lakhnâutî. Baranî⁵ tells us that while the emperor was engaged in the Doâb expeditions, Bahrâm Khân died, and Fakhrâ having killed Qadr Khân, revolted. Yahya bin Ahmad⁶ describes Fakhrâ as Fakhr-ud-dîn, the armour-bearer (*Silahdâr*) of Bahrâm Khân, who, after assassinating his master, assumed the

¹ Baranî (Bib. Ind.), p. 484.

² See p. 215.

³ He was an adopted son of Ghiyâs-ud-dîn Tughluq and a step-brother of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

⁴ Edward Thomas (p. 262) reads Malik Bandar Khâlji (see p. 88 *supra*).

⁵ Baranî (Bib. Ind.), p. 480.

⁶ Yahya bin Ahmad: *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* (Bib. Ind.), p. 104.

title of Sulṭān Fakhr-ud-dīn. A comparative study of the slightly varying accounts given by the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*,¹ *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh*,² *Tabaqāt-i-Akbārī*,³ *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa*,⁴ *Hājji-ud-Dabir*,⁵ and the *Riyāz-us-Salāṭīn*⁶ shows that between 1338 and 1341 a revolution was worked out in Bengal, as a result of which eastern as well as western Bengal, Sonārgāon as well as Lakhnāutī were lost to Delhi, the efforts of Muḥammad bin Tughluq at stemming the revolution⁷ being completely frustrated.

The fourteenth rebellion broke out in Sunām and Sāmāna. It resembled the Doāb rebellion in two respects: (1) because it was largely a rebellion of Hindūs and (2) because its root cause was the refusal of the ryots to pay the land tax. They had raised strongholds called "Mandals" from which they defied the authorities. The emperor marched against them personally after the fiasco of the Ma'bar expedition, and proceeded via Kaithal and Kuhrām which had equally formed scenes of disturbance, probably to Nagarkot. The ringleaders were captured and carried to Delhi. Some of them became converts.

Unlike Baranī, Budāūnī affirms that the above rebellions were fomented by the Sayyids and Musalmāns, most of them being the

¹ Yahya bin Ahmad (Bib. Ind.), pp. 104-5.

² 'Abd-ul-Qādir Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), Vol. I, p. 230.

³ Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad: *Tabaqāt-i-Akbārī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 205.

⁴ Firishṭa (Bombay), Vol. II, pp. 574-5.

⁵ Hājji-ud-Dabir, Vol. III, pp. 972-3.

⁶ Ghulām Husain Salīm (Bib. Ind.), pp. 91-4.

⁷ Muhammad bin Tughluq appears to have commissioned certain amīrs—Malik Hisām-ud-dīn Abū Riḥa, the auditor-general of the empire (Mustaufi-i-Mumālīk), 'Azam Malik 'Izz-ud-dīn Yahya, Muqṭī of Satgāon and Firoz Khān, governor of Karā—under the direction of Qadr Khān, the governor of Lakhnāutī, to march against Fakhr-ud-dīn. Fakhr-ud-dīn was defeated and lost Sonārgāon, but recovered it before long from Qadr Khān, who was slain in 1339. Thus Fakhr-ud-dīn added Lakhnāutī, which he tried to hold through his slave, Mukhlīs, to his possession of Sonārgāon. But 'Alī Mubārak, the muster-master ('Ariz-i-Lashkar) of Qadr Khān, killed Mukhlīs, and having in vain solicited a formal acknowledgment from Muhammad bin Tughluq assumed the title of Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn. Muhammad bin Tughluq had contented himself with nominating as governor of Lakhnāutī, Malik Yusuf, the prefect of Delhi (Shahna-i-Dehli), who died before reaching Lakhnāutī. Edward Thomas (p. 263) affirms that Fakhr-ud-dīn Mubārak successfully ruled Sonārgāon from 1340/741 to 1349/750.

Baranī (p. 480) places the Bengal rebellion before the punitive expedition to Kanauj and Dalmān, that is, about the year 1333, which goes against the numismatic evidence. Edward Thomas (p. 263) draws attention to a coin of Fakhr-ud-dīn bearing the date A.H. 737 A.D. 1336, and is inclined to believe that the rebellion broke out in the same year, which is also the view of Mzik (p. 172). But Sir Wolseley Haig regards Budāūnī's date A.H. 739 (A.D. 1338) as correct. (J.R.A.S., July, 1922, pp. 319-22.) Blochmann in the *Journal Asiatic Society of Bengal* (1873, p. 252) had already suggested reading 739 instead of 737 on the coin referred to by Edward Thomas.

tribesmen of Ḥasan Gangū Bahmanī. The emperor put them ruthlessly to the sword and subsequently made concessions to the Hindūs of Sunām and Sāmāna. Budāūnī fixes this event in the year 1343/744, which Sir Wolseley Haig regards as correct. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa makes no mention of the above rebellions at all, and Budāūnī's date stands uncorroborated. Baranī's underlying idea seems to be sound. He ranges the Sunām and Sāmāna rebellions along with the Hindū rebellions in Kampīla and Wārangal, coming as they did in the period of famine on the eve of the emperor's departure for Sargadwārī.

Baranī and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa both describe how the severity of the famine compelled the emperor with some of his troops and people to move to a camp on the banks of the Ganges, not far from Kanauj, where supplies could be obtained from the more fertile parts of Kara and Oudh (Awadh). Here a temporary town arose which the emperor named Sargadwārī¹ ("the Gate of Paradise"). Sargadwārī (Swarga-dwāra), being a Sanskrit word,² is significant because it shows how the emperor was interested in Sanskrit.

During his residence here for two and a half years, roughly from the close of 1338 to the middle of 1341, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth rebellions broke out successively. The fifteenth rebellion was that of Niẓām Mā'in³ at Kara (1338/739). He had undertaken to farm the revenue of Kara for a payment of several lakhs of tankas. On being unable to pay even one-tenth of it, he revolted and assumed the title of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. He was defeated by 'Ain-ul-Mulk, the famous governor of Oudh (Awadh), and Zafarābād⁴ (Zafarābād). The rebel was eventually flayed and his skin sent to Delhi.

The sixteenth rebellion was that of Shihāb Sultānī or Tāj-ul-Mulk Nuṣrat Khān at Bīdar. He had engaged to promote cultivation and to hand over a certain fixed sum to the treasury. But he failed to carry out his pledge, and misappropriated in the course

¹ 'Iṣāmī corrupts Sargadwārī into "Sarkābarī" and compares it to *Shaddād's* paradise, *Shaddād* being a proverbially impious king, who built the gardens of *Iram* (Steingass, 738). (*Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, F. 256 (b).)

² *Cambridge History of India*, III, 154.

³ Mr. Moreland (p. 47) rightly paraphrases Baranī's scornful expressions for the rebel, "a contemptible, drug-soaked little idiot." (Baranī, *Bib. Ind.*, p. 487.)

⁴ Zafarābād is mentioned in the *Ain-i-Akbarī* as a pargana in Sarkar Jaunpur under the Subah of Iahabad (Allahābād). (Jarrett's tr., II, 164.) It lies on the right bank of the Gumti, and was probably founded by Zafar Khān during the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khājī.

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of three years about a crore of ṭankas from the imperial exchequer. On his raising the standard of rebellion his fortress was besieged. Qutluḡ Khān joined by some troops from Delhi and Dhār marched against him. He was defeated and sent a prisoner to Delhi. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa misplaces this rebellion among those which broke out during the Ma'bar expedition. But it is evident from Baranī that it was in 1336 that Nuṣrat Khān was appointed governor of Bīdar. On his failure to pay the promised sum of a crore of ṭankas in three years' time he revolted. The rebellion should therefore have occurred in 1338-9/740.

This rebellion provides an instance of revenue farming which was adopted in special circumstances, but always with disastrous results.

The seventeenth rebellion which followed (1339/740) was that of Alī Shāh at Gulbarga, where he was deputed from Deogīr to collect the taxes. It should be noted that Baranī and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa both agree in describing 'Alī Shāh as an adherent of Qutluḡ Khān. According to Baranī he was a nephew of Zafar Khān, the famous general and amīr of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālījī, and a centurion of Qutluḡ Khān. Raising a party of his own kinsmen, 'Alī Shāh killed Bhīran, the Hindū official of Gulbarga, and seized the government money. He then raided Bīdar and established his hold over both. Again Qutluḡ Khān, joined by the Delhi and Dhār troops, took the field. 'Alī Shāh was defeated and eventually captured and sent to the emperor at Sargadwārī. The emperor exiled him as well as his brothers to Ghazna. Both Baranī¹ and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² relate this fact distinctly, and mention how ultimately on their return from Ghazna without the emperor's permission they were executed.

The fact that the rebels were exiled to Ghazna is significant. It shows that Muḥammad bin Tuḡhluq still had no cause to fear a Mongol invasion from the north-west. It also tends to confirm the statements made above regarding his friendliness with the Mongols.

The eighteenth rebellion was that of 'Ain-ul-Mulk (1340/741). This man was an old friend of the emperor's, an able statesman, and governor of Oudh (Awadh), Zafarābād and Lucknow (Lakhnau). Through his wise administration his subjects had enjoyed unbroken peace and tranquillity. Under his paternal rule they had prospered

¹ Baranī, 508.

² Def. et Sang., III, 356-358.

and flourished. Most of them were engaged in peaceful agricultural pursuits and the soil being fertile the produce was abundant. This had enabled 'Ain-ul-Mulk to advance the surplus to the emperor. He is reported to have sent to the imperial camp 50,000 maunds of wheat, and an equal quantity of rice every day.

But the emperor grew suspicious of 'Ain-ul-Mulk, the reason being that some of the rebels from Delhi had taken refuge with him. Partly for this reason and partly because of the misdeeds of Qutluḡh Khān, the Vazīr of Daulatābād, the emperor resolved to transfer 'Ain-ul-Mulk to the south, making him the Vazīr of Daulatābād instead. But 'Ain-ul-Mulk had his own fears. In the emperor's orders for his transfer he read his destruction. So he rebelled. He marched at the head of a large army against the emperor, but was defeated and captured. He was subsequently pardoned by the emperor and restored to his position.¹

On the suppression of this rebellion the emperor left Sargadwārī and made a pilgrimage to the shrine of Sālār Mas'ūd² in Bahrāich, whence he returned to Delhi. An improvement in the condition of the people now led to a more hopeful outlook and a new phase began, for with the bursting of the monsoons the famine almost ceased.³

¹ (i) Baranī, 491; (ii) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: *Def. et Sang.*, III, 341-356.

² *Vide* my article on Sālār Mas'ūd Ghāzi in the *Agra College Magazine* (1929).

³ Cf. (i) Baranī, 491; (ii) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: *Def. et Sang.*, III, 109-120, 341-356.

CHAPTER IX

A NEW PHASE

THE new phase covered the last eleven years of the emperor's reign. Whatever hopes Muḥammad bin Tughluq may have entertained of preventing the disruption of his empire were dashed to the ground by a series of disasters from which there was no escape.

On his return from Ṣargadwārī, the emperor seriously began to consider the necessity of being recognized by the 'Abbasid Caliph.¹ No king, he argued, could legitimately wield the sceptre without securing the Caliph's confirmation decree. He then made diligent enquiries about the Caliphs of the house of 'Abbās.

It will be remembered that on the death of the Prophet of Arabia (632/11) the question of a successor was one of paramount importance. The *Khilāfat* or succession question divided Islām into two main sects, and two armed camps of the Shi'ahs and Sunnīs were organized. The Shi'ahs, who form but a minority, regard 'Alī and his successors as the *de jure* successors of the Prophet and as true Caliphs, while the Sunnīs consider the historical succession of the Caliphs—Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uṣmān and 'Alī—as correct. 'Alī's title was challenged by Mu'āwīa, the governor of Syria, who subsequently founded the Ommyyad dynasty, making the Caliphate hereditary in his family (661-750). The Ommyyads were succeeded by the 'Abbasids, descendants of 'Abbās, the uncle of the Prophet. They held the sceptre for more than 500 years (750-1258). In 1258 the Mongols, under Hulāgū Khān, destroyed the seat of the Caliphate and murdered Mu'taṣim, the last of the 'Abbasid Caliphs. His uncle, Aḥmad, escaped to Egypt, where the Mamlūk Turks had ruled since 1252. Zāhīr, the reigning king (1258-1265) welcomed Aḥmad and installed him as Caliph. Hence began a revival of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt.

It should be noted that on the destruction of Baghdād and the expatriation of the 'Abbasids, the Caliphate had been practically

¹ Baranī, 491.

extinguished. According to Jalāl-ud-dīn¹ as-Suyutī, the Muslim world was without a Caliph for three years and a half (February, 1258–June, 1261). It was on account of this interregnum and revolution in the history of the Caliphate that general ignorance in regard to the Caliphate prevailed in Muslim India. It was at this critical juncture in the history of Islām that Muḥammad bin Tughluq determined to secure the Caliph's investiture. He was not unaware of the destruction of Baghdād at the hands of Hūlagū Khān, but he was not sure about the fate of the 'Abbasids. Hence his enquiries. As soon as he learnt that an 'Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mustakfī Billah, was in Egypt, he entered into communication with him, and stopped the Friday and 'Id prayers until the investiture was received (1343/744). As Ḥājji S'aīd Ṣarṣarī, an envoy from the Egyptian Caliph, Al-Ḥākim II, appeared in the court with the confirmation decree and the robe of honour, the emperor humbled himself before him. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa tells us that the Sultān went forth to meet him with great ceremony and walked before him barefooted. He bowed down before him and ceremoniously helped him with his own hands to mount his horse and held his stirrup.

The emperor had been striking coins in Delhi in the name of the Caliph Al-Mustakfī-Billah for the previous three years. Al-Mustakfī had died in 1339/740, and had been succeeded by Al-Wāsiq I. Three years later (1342/743) the latter was superseded by Al-Ḥākim II (1342-1352).²

It is difficult to fix the cause of this servile humility on the part of the emperor to the Caliph. It might be supposed that his intense longing to be recognised as emperor by the Caliph was caused by his remorse for the murder of his father, and that he could not bring himself to justify to his conscience his own accession to the throne. But Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not the only king who sought confirmation or investiture from the Caliph. Many of his predecessors and successors, the Mughal emperors excluded, are known to have sought confirmation of their title to the throne from the Caliph. Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna, for instance, secured the investiture at the expense of great wealth, and obtained from the Caliph the title of *Yamīn-ud-Daulah Walī-i-Amīr-ul-Mominīn*.³ The Sultāns of

¹ As-Suyutī Jalāl-ud-dīn: *Tārīkh-ul-Khulafa*, Arabic Text, p. 191.

² A.H. 743-753.

³ (i) Minhāj-i-Sirāj (Raverty): *Tabaqāt-i-Nasiri*. I, 75 (ii) Firishṭa (Bombay), I, 48-68.

RISE AND FALL OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

Delhi and Bengal, who could not secure the investiture, usually described themselves *Walī-i-Amīr-ul-Mominīn* (friend of the Caliph). The Caliph's name is found inscribed on many of the coins of Delhi and Lakhnāūtī. Allegiance to the 'Abbassid Caliph was maintained in form even after the destruction of Baghdād, as is verified by the numismatic records up to the death of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī (1316).¹

His son, Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, however, introduced a change. He declared himself "the *Most Mighty Imām, the vice-gent of God, the Caliph of the Lord of Heaven and Earth.*"² The rulers of the Tughluq house arrogated to themselves no such claims, but Muḥammad bin Tughluq's desire for the Caliph's investiture was thoroughly in accordance with the old traditions. Fīroz Shāh also secured, at the cost of immense wealth and with great exertions, the investiture of the 'Abbassid Caliph. He relates in his *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhī* how the investiture, together with a ring, a sword and the title of *Sayyid-us-Salātīn* (lord of the kings) was bestowed upon him.³

To understand this exhibition of servility on the part of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, it should be remembered that submission to the Caliph had been hitherto formal and theoretical. Muḥammad bin Tughluq endeavoured to make it real and practical. The reason was as much political as religious. The strength of the rebels and the malcontents, who had become prominent early in the reign, steadily increased despite the emperor's efforts to check the trouble at its source. He endeavoured, like 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, to analyse the causes of the rebellion and disaffection. But while his Khaljī predecessor, making a correct analysis of the causes, successfully grappled with the problem, Muḥammad bin Tughluq found the problem increasingly difficult. After suppressing the Multān rebellion he had remained in Delhi instead of returning to Daulatābād and had deliberated on the causes of disaffection. The nature of the rebellions turned out to be different from those of the time of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. The rebels were not Hindūs, but Muslims, the ring-leaders being the official classes, the 'Ulamā, the Qāzīs, or judges, the Khatībīs, or preachers, the Faqhīs, or jurists, and the Mashāikh, or saints, a body of people who had hitherto enjoyed sanctity. It should be remembered that it is these whom, in connection with the trans-

¹ Edward Thomas: *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 133-176.

² *Ibid.*, 178-183.

³ *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, MS. Or 2039, p. 16.

ference of the capital, Baranī has called *Khawāṣ-i-Khalq* (upper and official classes) and *Mardum-i-guzidah wa chīdah* (the choice of the people). Muḥammad bin Tughluq put them ruthlessly to death—a practice which horrified the rank and file of the Muslims. But murder was no remedy, far less a cure. A surgical operation on a diseased body is successful only when the operation is performed at the right moment and with skill. If performed before time or unskilfully, or when it is too late, serious complications are inevitable. Such was the case with Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Like an inefficient surgeon, he performed a serious operation or a series of operations in the hope of letting the bad blood out of the body of his empire, but every operation brought forth complaints. New complications arose in other parts of the body politic. Baranī rejoices to narrate how the rebels from Delhi fled to Oudh (Awadh) and undermined the loyalty of the veteran 'Ain-ul-Mulk. This is no isolated instance of the spread of the trouble from one part of the empire to the other part. Almost the whole reign abounds in similar instances. By the time the emperor left Sargadwārī a generation of rebels had grown up. The trouble which arose almost in the beginning of the reign had ranged now over fourteen years. All this time the emperor had been confronting a steadily increasing volume of opposition, even enmity, as appears from a closer study of the contemporary records. Hitherto, opposition to the Sultāns of Delhi had come from the Hindū chiefs, as in the case of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, or from certain Turkish chiefs, as was the case with the successors of Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish, or with Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī. But unfortunately for Muḥammad bin Tughluq, a new and more formidable enemy arose in the 'Ulamā and the saints. He had incurred their hostility mainly because of his peculiar views about what he understood as Islām. No historian, except 'Iṣāmī,¹ says anything on this point, but indirect references are not wanting. Direct evidence is afforded by what has survived from the emperor's autobiography. He openly denounces therein most of the preceding Sultāns of Delhi, except his own father, calling them usurpers (*Mutaghallib*), and acknowledges how he felt serious doubts about the fundamentals of Islām. He narrates the story of his search for truth, and rejoices to tell us how he at last discovered it. It follows that he was deeply interested in the theology, history and jurisprudence of Islām. In the course

¹ Compare *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS. F. 245-279.

of his researches he discovered the faults and weaknesses, perhaps the wranglings of the 'Ulama ; and although he blundered he had certain definite opinions about the church of Islām. Knowing how ignorant his predecessors, notably Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban and 'Alā-ud-dīn Khalji had been of what he considered to be the truth ; knowing again how much Islām had been misunderstood, he revolted against the time-honoured but narrow-minded class of the 'Ulamā. What he actually wanted to do or to say is not further known ; the autobiography is incomplete.

The following translation of the translatable part of what might have been as important as Bābur's autobiography for a reconstruction of the history of Muslim India, will not be amiss at this stage in the narrative.

" Since the date when the above-mentioned Balban assumed the title of Sultān-Ghiyās-ud-dīn he committed so many outrages and atrocities that religion grew weaker and weaker day by day and the commandments of Islām were not enforced (?), so that the majority of the people took to committing outrages. Indulgence in this evil they regarded as a source of benefit. Tyranny came to be regarded as a befitting and legitimate title to sovereignty. And so the kingdom passed from one usurper to another and from one rebel to the next rebel. And the recognition (?) of the rightful Imām, which is one of the laws established by the Prophet and the cause of the advancement of the Muslim community along the path of righteousness, became effaced from the hearts (of the people). Whereas whosoever does not show his obedience to the dignity of that saintly person (the Imām), the name of that accursed man must be cancelled from the list of Islām. In spite of the fact that the people considered those usurpers as the Sultāns and called them accordingly, one of the slaves of (Balban's) family, he whose name became Jalāl-ud-dīn, killed the grandson of Balban, and seized the kingdom by force. . . . And during five years the Muslims of this country were afflicted with the darkness of his tyranny. He had a nephew called 'Alī Gāo. He cut off the head of the above-mentioned Jalāl-ud-dīn and usurped power with the title of Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. He collected an army of rebels and seized this country. He neither knew anything about the fundamentals of Islām nor had he the slightest conception about the duties of kingship (?) or government. During his reign no trace of Islām remained. What was legitimate was made illegitimate and *vice versa*. Security was taken away from the property and persons of Muslims, and the institutions of tyranny and outrage reigned supreme in the hearts of men. He was succeeded by a son, who

was surnamed Quṭb-ud-dīn. He took his father's place and promoted a slave-born Hindū, and made him one of his intimates, addressing him as Khusrav Khān. This Hindū slave acquired the habits of treason and deceit, and thought that his career would lead him even to kingship (?). He meditated treason against his benefactor (?), killed Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn inside his house, and left none of his sons alive. In this abominable manner he seized the throne by sheer force.

"This terror lasted four months. I withdrew myself from obedience to that ungrateful Hindū. I thought it necessary to keep away from him. At this time my father, who was the amīr of the above-mentioned usurper 'Alā-ud-dīn, was in charge of a large Iqtā'. Disgusted with Delhi I joined my father. For two reasons the opposition and resistance to that despicable Hindū commended itself to my heart: (1) the nature of human instinct to take revenge urged by the favours of a benefactor (Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn), although he was not in the truest sense the benefactor; (2) fear of my life because every usurper had made it his practice to put to death the amīrs who flourished under the foregoing ruler. For these two reasons it was decided to start on a punitive expedition against that ungrateful wretch. Together with a party of followers, which we succeeded in organising, intent upon our object we marched on Delhi. The Hindū who (by that time) had taken possession of all the amīrs and troops of Delhi, with all his royal forces came out to meet us. God granted strength and endurance to my father at that moment, and awarded him victory over that low Hindū. And whosoever was associated with him in the murder of Sultān Quṭb-ud-dīn became a victim of our swords; and the people were liberated from their domination.

"Afterwards a number of the people of Delhi gathered together and elected my father as ruler. And my father ruled with everybody's support four years and ten months. Since he had come as a stranger to this country, some time after the days of Balban's tyrannous rule, he remained immune (from the reproaches of tyranny) . . . and the dust of oppression and ingratitude did not soil the skirt of his garment. But the circumstances of his career prevented him from acquiring the knowledge of divine sciences. . . . On account of the want of study and diligence on his part he also prevented my search for the rightful Imām. . . . He also did not attach importance to the affairs, which, in fact, depended on the approval of the rightful Imām. Consequently, following the indications given by my father in his lifetime and in view of the fact that I had no knowledge of the said important problem, I laid myself open to blame. I used to lend my ears to absurdities and, therefore, made straight for a corner in hell. The 'Ulamā, believing in the saying that necessity renders permissible forbidden things,

refrained from speaking the truth; and on account of their bias extended the hand of evil out of the sleeve of godlessness.

"In the greediness for lucrative posts they marched hand in hand. So the lustre of divine sciences had completely disappeared from among them.

"However, as the people are naturally in search of science, they cannot feel composure without that search. By chance, I met some philosophers and thinking that they might be on the right path I mixed with them; and some of their words remained in my heart as a sort of preparatory teaching. . . . Atheism had already got the upper hand to such a degree that doubts spread concerning the existence of the Creator. And this circumstance increased the evil of the usurpers in whose time the 'Ulamā were not able to express the truth. . . .

"My condition became such that no designs of mine could be actually realised. And the important affairs of the kingdom, and nation, and religion, and the state were disorganized. The general chaos became such that one would have preferred (in despair of Islām) to become an idolater.

"However, as by their nature people belong to civilized society certainly . . . (?) it set me thinking about the final result for myself and the people like myself who still considered themselves as belonging to Islām; and as regards the end of such a situation.

"While I was afflicted with these sad meditations, a breeze of happiness came down on me from the sky where the wind of divine grace blows, and I began to feel . . . and by dint of logical arguments and traditional proofs the existence of the Creator, and His pure attributes became evident. When the heart was set upon the unity of God, and when it was convinced of the dignity of the Prophet who leads men to God I recognised the necessity to conform my behaviour to the will of the rightful Imām, who is God's Caliph, and the Prophet's viceregent. . . . (?) The allegiance to the Caliph in spite of long distance . . . (?) could easily be made . . . (?) "

Indirect indications are not wanting in the *Siyar-ul-Auliya* and the *Rihla* as to Muḥammad bin Tughluq's views about Islām. It has been contended that the Sultān had the audacity to employ and treat the 'Ulamā and saints like ordinary men.² He was therefore a blasphemer. Baranī³ regards him as a Nimrod or as a Pharaoh.

A closer study of the *Tārīkh-i-Ḥīroz Shāhī* leads to the conclusion that the Islām of Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī was different from the Islām of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. 'Iṣāmī is more outspoken.⁴ He

¹ B.M., Add. 25,785.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 506.

³ Def. et Sang., III, 293.

⁴ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS. F. 279A.

denounces Sultān Muḥammad as *Kāfir*, and urges a general revolt¹ against him. He censures him for siding with the Hindūs and for mixing privately with the Jogīs. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa is discreet. While he gives us the same information regarding the emperor's associations² with the Jogīs he does not accuse him of revolt against Islām.

But Iṣāmī's language is highly suggestive.³ He tells us that the Qāzīs of the empire had condemned Sultān Muḥammad bin Tughluq to death, and that "the Shari'a approved of his execution." In view of this, it is by no means unreasonable to infer that the series of rebellions in the empire was due to the influence the aggrieved Qāzīs or 'Ulamā exercised over the provincial governments. After fourteen years of strenuous but fruitless efforts at checkmating rebels, the emperor had now become helpless. But he was ever courageous and resourceful.

He evolved a new plan to thwart the enmity of the 'Ulamā. He turned to the 'Abbasid Caliph, who was decidedly the spiritual leader of the entire Muslim world, the Shi'ahs excepted.

That this submission to the Caliph was a political move on the part of the emperor undertaken in order to regain the confidence and support of his subjects is borne out by certain economic and administrative measures he introduced.

These measures were systematically drawn up in the form of a code called *Ushūb*, or *Asālib*.⁴ The emperor is credited by Baranī with having worked on them sedulously and ceaselessly. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's testimony in this respect is no less important; and the slightly varying but not conflicting accounts of the new reforms given by them both afford a proof of the emperor's sincerity of purpose. Still, Baranī does not fail to remark on the impracticability of these measures of reform, which in his opinion were not better than those which had been previously adopted in the Doāb.

These measures were four.⁵ The first was the remission of almost all the taxes except the Zakāt and 'Ushr. The second was his increased supervision of the administration of justice by holding a special court twice a week.⁶ The third measure was the setting up of a new agricultural department called the Diwān-i-Amīr-i-Kohī⁷ with a staff of about a hundred officials (Shiqdārs). The object of

¹ Idem.

² Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin*, F. 279A.

³ Ibn. Baṭṭūṭa: Def. et Sang., III, p. 117.

⁴ Ibn. Baṭṭūṭa: Def. et Sang., III, p. 288.

⁵ Def. et Sang., III.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 499.

⁷ Baranī (B.I., p. 498).

the department was to promote agriculture, and to increase the revenue. Accordingly, certain agricultural reforms¹ were introduced, and a large area of land in the Doāb was divided into plots, each sixty miles square. On each of these workmen were appointed to till the soil and to see that the produce was not less than necessary. Contractors were called for, and large sums of money were advanced to them on condition that they promoted cultivation. It was hoped that this promotion of cultivation would increase the population of the whole area, which would become a valuable recruiting ground for the imperial army. Baranī calls these contractors superintendents of the cultivation of waste lands, and informs us that in the course of two years (1341-43) about seventy lakhs of tankas were advanced to them from the treasury. But it was an uphill task. Not even one-hundredth or one-thousandth part of the promised cultivation was carried out. Fortunately for them, the emperor was confronted, before long, with a series of rebellions, the pursuit of which ended with his death near Tattah (1351). Had he returned alive from Tattah he would have put every contractor to death for his failure to carry out his contract. This is the opinion of Baranī.

The fourth measure aimed at raising the strength of the army. Baranī does not mention any attempts on the part of the emperor at the recruitment of Hindū and Indian soldiers, although his language affords indirect evidence of it. But he complains again, as before, that the emperor welcomed the Mongol chiefs and lavished his wealth on them. The object of the royal favours to the Mongols, which Baranī fails to understand, was to employ them in the Indian army.

The fifth measure aimed at setting up a new régime in Deogīr and Mahārāshṭra (Marhaṭ) based on a new administrative scheme. Mahārāshṭra was divided into four divisions (Shiqs), each under the charge of an officer. The four officers appointed were (1) Malik Sardawātdār, (2) Malik Mukhlīṣ-ul-Mulk, (3) Yusuf Bughra, and (4) 'Azīz. All were to be placed under the control of 'Imād-ul-Mulk, the new

¹ Baranī's statement (B.I., 498) that "the crops cultivated should be changed, so that wheat should be sown instead of barley, sugar-cane instead of wheat, and dates instead of sugar-cane and grapes" is misleading. While on the one hand it affords no proof for the rotation of crops, a conclusion drawn by Sir Wolsley Haig (*Cambridge History*, III, p. 161), on the other hand, Mr. Moreland has pointed out (*The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 51) that the passage may mean an attempt to substitute better crops. But any attempt to grow the vine and date-palms on a large scale in the vicinity of Delhi would have been doomed to failure owing to climatic conditions.

Vazīr of Deogīr, the latter being assisted by Dhārā, a Hindū, who was made the Nāib Vazīr. The old Vazīr of Deogīr, Qutlugh Khān had incurred the emperor's suspicion, and was recalled. To conduct him honourably back to Delhi, since he had been the emperor's tutor, whom he still respected, Badr Chāch, the court poet, was sent to Daulatābād. The poet¹ celebrates in a chronogram the 8th of December, 1345, as the date of his departure from Delhi for Daulatābād.

As the new Vazīr of Deogīr with his staff did not arrive in time to take over his office after Qutlugh Khān's departure, the emperor appointed Maulāna Nizām-ud-dīn, Qutlugh Khān's brother, as a provisional vazīr, and ordered him to proceed from Broach to Deogīr.

In pursuance of his new policy, the emperor dismissed all those old officials, Qutlugh Khān and his staff being among them, whom he suspected of disaffection. He had them replaced by new employees of humble extraction. Baranī² condemns them all as upstarts, and stigmatizes one as *Khammār* (drunkard); the other as *Mutrib*, singer; the third as a barber; the fourth as a cook; the fifth as a gardener; the sixth as a weaver; and the rest as rogues.

It is difficult to believe that an emperor gifted with learning and experience would appoint rogues to responsible offices in the empire.

The man whom Baranī calls vintner³ or distiller (*Khammār*) was 'Azīz-ud-dīn by name. He was like most of the new employees, a convert. His forefathers who were Hindūs might have been distillers, or were in mockery called vintners, hence the name *Khammār* stuck to his family. The emperor appointed him first a governor in the Deccan and later the governor of Mālwa. Ibn Battūta had seen him previously in Amroha working as a tax-collector (*Vālī-ul-Khīraj*). The man whom Baranī calls a *Mutrib* *Bachcha* (musician's son) was one whom Budāūnī mentions as Qivām-ul-Mulk Maqbūl. He was also a convert, whom the emperor successively made the governor of Multān, of Budāūn, and of Gujarāt.

¹ Qasāid-i-Badr Chāch (*Lucknow*), p. 64.

² Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 505.

³ The printed text (*Bib. Ind.*, p. 503) has "Himār," that is 'Azīz, the ass. But the difference between *Himār* (ass) and *Khammār* (vintner) is made by a dot. The Bombay text of Firishta has *Khammār*.

The cashiering of the old class of officials and the substitution of a new body of men taken from the ranks was evidently a new measure adopted by the emperor to assure the efficient working of the *Asālīb*, his new code of reform. He had reason to distrust old officials like Qutluḡ *Khān*. The latter had been appointed as Vazīr of Daulatābād in 1335, when the emperor on account of his personal illness and the most unfortunate circumstances had to give up the Ma'bar expedition and return to Delhi. Qutluḡ *Khān* was expected to crush the Ma'bar rebellion, but he did not. As a result, the Maḍūra Sultanate was established, and disintegration began. Qutluḡ *Khān* was again expected to stem the Hindū revolt in Wārangal and Kampīla, and Dvārasamudra. But he made no attempt to do so. As a result, Telingāna was lost and a new Hindū Kingdom of Vijayānagar was formed. The emperor saw all this; and yet did not punish Qutluḡ *Khān*. But he lost confidence in him, and suspected him of maladministration when he was further informed about the decline in the Deccan revenue. It seems that the emperor's mind had been alienated from Qutluḡ *Khān* for much the same reason which had alienated him from 'Ain-ul-Mulk in Sargadwārī. It was during his stay there and before the outbreak of 'Ain-ul-Mulk's rebellion that the Sultān had primarily resolved to recall Qutluḡ *Khān* from Daulatābād. The emperor suspected Qutluḡ *Khān* of sheltering or supporting rebels and malcontents. At all events, great differences arose between the emperor and Qutluḡ *Khān*. These differences were never settled and their nature is difficult to establish. They appear to have undermined the success of the new administration inaugurated by the emperor. Baranī¹ tells us that Qutluḡ *Khān*'s withdrawal shocked the inhabitants of Deogīr, who became apprehensive and panic-stricken.

At any rate the emperor was confronted by ever-increasing difficulties, by (1) the failure of his new administrative scheme, and (2) the inability of his new and inexperienced class of officials to cope with the situation. The result was the outbreak of new troubles and rebellions, which overwhelmed him and ended with his death in 1351. Baranī² attributes this tragic failure of the administrative scheme to (1) the impracticability of the *Asālīb* and (2) to the punishments which the emperor ruthlessly and indiscriminately inflicted upon the defaulters. He accuses the emperor

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 501, 502.

² Idem., p. 499.

of having, thus, deliberately brought about the destruction of his empire by alienating the ryots and the army. Even Mr. Moreland,¹ who regards Baranī as a true observer, thinks that the underlying idea of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reforms was, in essence, sound ; it was the execution which broke down. Why the reforms failed is a mystery Mr. Moreland does not care to probe. It appears that the malady was of old standing ; and the execution of the new scheme of reforms as that of the old failed on account of the want of co-operation or disaffection of the officials, civil and military. They were under the influence of the hostile section of the 'Ulamā whom the emperor had failed to pacify. Presumably the emperor's political device to thwart their hostility through the Caliph's investiture and support had failed to answer the purpose. There is evidence to conclude that secret intrigues were being carried on to depose Muḥammad bin Tughluq and instal his cousin Fīroz. Baranī slurs over the matter. But his language² is clear enough to establish two points : (1) that the punishments, which the emperor inflicted on the defaulters in Delhi, sent a wave of repulsion and revolt throughout the empire, and (2) that there was a party of influential men, who sympathized with the victims. These were perhaps some of the 'Ulamā and the saints—disciples of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya like Shaikh Naṣir-ud-dīn Chirāgh-i-Delhi, and perhaps Malik Fīroz himself. At all events, with the accession of Malik Fīroz as Sultān Fīroz Shāh, after the death of Muḥammad bin Tughluq the above-mentioned 'Ulamā and saints obtained the upper hand ; and then, but not until then, these troubles ceased.

It must be acknowledged that Muḥammad bin Tughluq committed a political blunder in removing old and experienced officials and in replacing them by young and inexperienced hands. This is proved by the case of 'Azīz, who was certainly not fit to be the governor of Dhār. At the time of investing him with this office the emperor warned him to beware of the amīrān-i-ṣadah³ (centurions). The emperor regarded them as the promoters of mischief. 'Azīz arrived at Dhār, and before long beheaded about eighty of them. This was a horrid massacre most treacherously perpetrated. It provoked the amīrān-i-ṣadah in other parts of the country,

¹ Moreland : *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp. 45-50.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 511 ff.

³ See p. 181.

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This was the nineteenth rebellion. Baranī¹ and Ibn Battūṭa² both agree that Shāhū Afghān killed Bahzād, the governor of Multān and advanced his own claims to kingship. Both regard this rebellion as the cause of the increasingly hostile activities of the Afghāns of Gujarāt and Deccan. The difference in the accounts of Baranī and Ibn Battūṭa is entirely a matter of detail. According to Baranī, the emperor marched from Delhi to suppress the rebellion, but, on the way, he received the news of the death of his mother. Immediately he went into mourning, but resumed his journey before long. Near Dīpālpur he learnt of Shāhū Afghān's flight to "*Afghānistān*," and thence returned to Delhi. Baranī uses "*Afghānistān*" in its strictly literal sense, "the home of the Afghāns." Ibn Battūṭa expressly mentions Cambay, Gujarāt and Nahrwāla as the home of the Afghāns. There Shāhū Afghān had fled, and on his successfully joining his fellow Afghāns living in that part the emperor issued orders for the arrest of all the Afghān residents in his country.

Baranī's account urges us to place Shāhū Afghān's rebellion about 1337/738, but Ibn Battūṭa, who was a better judge of the situation, regards it as marking the outbreak of the insurrections of the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Gujarāt and Deccan ; hence its date 1341/742.

The twentieth rebellion was that of Qāzī Jalāl, mentioned under this heading only by Ibn Battūṭa who had in fact left India before its outbreak. He probably collected the material for it on his return from China or in Cambay on the western coast. His reports deal with local events as his reporters were naturally most interested in the events which happened in the neighbourhood.

It should be remembered that the recall of Qutluḡ Khān from the government of Deogīr and Marhaṭ (Mahārāshtra) had created great discontent in those parts especially among the amīrān-i-ṣadah (the centurions) or lieutenants of the army, as Mzik³ calls them. Under his weak successor 'Ālim-ul-Mulk, the discontent became so widespread that the emperor was forced to issue orders for their arrest and removal.

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 482.

² Ibn Battūṭa : Def. et Sang., III, p. 362.

³ Mzik : *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Batuta durch Indien und China*, p. 194.

A NEW PHASE

Instructions¹ to this effect were personally given by the emperor to 'Azīz, the newly-appointed governor of Mālwa. But while 'Azīz succeeded in his attempt to exterminate the amīrān-i-ṣadah as mentioned above, Malik² Muqbil, the governor of Gujarāt, failed.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa³ tells us that when the emperor wrote to his officials ordering them to seize the Afghāns he wrote to Malik Muqbil, the Vazīr's Nāib in Gujarāt and Nahrwāla, to capture Qāzī Jalāl and his Afghān adherents. But Muqbil's plans were betrayed to them by Malik-ul-Hukamā, himself an Afghān, though a relation⁴ of Muḥammad bin Tughluq and a companion of Malik Muqbil. As a result, some three hundred Afghāns, whom the latter had intended treacherously to murder, revolted. They raided Cambay, where they plundered the government treasury as well as the goods of the people, particularly those of Ibn-ul-Kaulamī, a well-known merchant. Malik Muqbil marched against them but was defeated. A similar attempt by Malik 'Azīz and Malik Jahān Bambal at the head of 7,000 horsemen was also unsuccessful. The turbulent and disaffected people having now rallied around Qāzī Jalāl, he broke out into open rebellion, and defeated the emperor's armies, which were sent against him. The infection now spread to the Afghāns of Daulatābād, who also rebelled.

From the above reports of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa it follows that Qāzī Jalāl's rebellion is the same as that of the amīrān-i-ṣadah (centurions) described by Baranī.⁵ He fully supports Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's version of Malik Muqbil's abortive attempt at the capture of the Afghāns, whom he calls the amīrān-i-ṣadah. When the news of this general conflagration reached the emperor in January,⁶ 1345, he was thoroughly incensed, and set out in person against the rebels.

Both the *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī*⁷ and the *Burhān-i-Ma'aṣīr*⁸ fully confirm Baranī. Referring to the same⁹ year as Baranī, 'Alī Ibn 'Azīz affirms that serious disorders had broken out in the empire of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. The emperor was informed that the

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 503.

² B.N., MS. 909, F. 143. Def. et Sang., III, p. 362.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 503-7.

⁴ Idem., Ramazan, 745.

⁵ Bānkipore, MS. F. 8-13.

⁶ King: "History of the Bahmanī Dynasty," *Indian Antiquary*, XXVIII, p. 141 ff.

⁷ The *Burhān-i-Ma'aṣīr* gives no year. The probability is that it refers to 1343/744 or 1344/745.

⁸ Idem., p. 507.

⁹ Ibid.

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amīrān-i-ṣadah, who had been appointed to keep in subjection
the coast of Gujarāt had revolted. Upon this, he proceeded in
person to crush this rebellion.

Baranī¹ disapproves of this move on the part of the emperor.
At such a disturbed time, when disorder had set in, and rebellions
were rife, the emperor's leaving his capital, and his moving in person
against a large body of rebels, was in Baranī's opinion unwise.
He was warned against the danger by Qutluḡ Khān, who sent him a
message through Baranī. Qutluḡ Khān offered his personal services,
and wished to proceed against the amīrān-i-ṣadah; but the em-
peror distrusted Qutluḡ Khān, who had disappointed him previously
in the Deccan.

The emperor² appointed in Delhi a council of regency consisting
of Fīroz Shāh then Malik Fīroz, Malik Kabīr and Aḥmad-i-Aiyāz;
and then set out on his journey. Reaching Sultānpur, a town lying
at fifteen Kuroh³ from Delhi, he remained there until the 5th of
February,⁴ 1345. During his stay there, two notable incidents
occurred: (1) news arrived of 'Azīz Khammār's rash fight with the
amīrān-i-ṣadah of Gujarāt; and (2) the emperor's conference with
Baranī on the causes and remedies of rebellions.⁵

The halt at Sultānpur was made with a view to avoid the fatigue
of travelling in the fasting month of the Ramazān. This being over,
the emperor resumed his journey to Gujarāt marching via Paṭan and
Mount Ābū, a distance of about 540 miles,⁶ which he traversed in
about two months (April, 1345).

From Mount Ābū the emperor sent a force in pursuit of the
amīrān-i-ṣadah of Dabhoī and Baroda. A severe and prolonged
battle ensued resulting in huge casualties. The rebels at last broke
up and fled towards Deogīr. From Mount Ābū the emperor marched
to Broach, whence he detailed Malik Maqbūl, the Nāib Vazīr, to pursue
the fugitives, placing him in command of a body of the Delhi and
Broach troops for this purpose. The Nāib Vazīr overtook them near
the Narbada, and dispersed them. He then encamped on the banks
of the Narbada, where he treacherously killed a large number of the
amīrān-i-ṣadah of Broach previously specified by the emperor.

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), 507-8.

² Ibid., p. 509.

³ "Kuroh" is the word used by Baranī (p. 509) for what is called "Kos," league.

⁴ Shawwāl, I, 745.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 509-10.

⁶ Sir Wolseley Haig, *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922.

This was the third massacre of the amīrān-i-ṣadah, the first being the Dhār massacre, the second the Gujarāt "massacre," which had proved a fiasco. Those who escaped the third, namely the Narbada massacre, became divided into two parties. One party fled to Deogīr, and the other repaired to Gujarāt joining hands with the Hindū muqaddams.

During his stay at Broach the emperor set about collecting the land tax which had been in arrears for some years. Oppressive collectors were appointed, and dues were realised from Broach as well as from Gujarāt and Cambay. Moved by his vindictive temper, in the words of Baranī,¹ the emperor then ordered the general arrest and execution of all those who had defied the authorities or aided the rebels. He then deputed to Deogīr two most infamous and scandalous persons, namely, Zain Bandah entitled Majd-ul-Mulk and a son of Rukn Thānesarī as inquisitors to pursue² and bring to book the amīrān-i-ṣadah who had on the emperor's arrival in Gujarāt fled away to Deogīr. This created a panic in Deogīr, as a result of which the emperor deputed two better known amīrs.

They were commissioned to bring to Broach the leading amīrān-i-ṣadah of Deogīr together with an army of 1,500 horse which 'Ālim-ul-Mulk Niẓām-ud-dīn, the Vazīr of Deogīr, was to raise. The amīrān-i-ṣadah had not gone much farther from Deogīr, when apprehending the bitter fate awaiting them, they revolted.

They killed the two officials who were taking them to Broach and returned to Deogīr, where they laid hands upon 'Ālim-ul-Mulk Niẓām-ud-dīn and threw him into prison. Almost all other officials were put to death, the son of Rukn Thānesarī being hacked to pieces. The rebels then captured the government treasury in the fort of Dharāgīr and selecting Maḥ Afghān, one of the body of the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Deogīr, as their leader, proclaimed him king.³

Baranī's⁴ statement is fully confirmed by the *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī*⁵ and the *Burhān-i-Ma'āṣir*.⁶

Thus broke out the twenty-first rebellion of the amīrān-i-ṣadah

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 514.

² This meaning of Baranī's phrase (p. 514) is corroborated by the *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bānkipore MS.).

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 513-514.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Bānkipore MS.

⁶ King: "History of the Bahmanī Dynasty," *Indian Antiquary*, XXVIII, p. 1418 ff.

of Daulatābād which resulted in the foundation of the Bahmanī kingdom. The prime movers of this rebellion were the amīrān-i-ṣadah of the Deogīr army, who had refused to proceed to Broach and had returned to Deogīr. Joined by the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Dabhoī and Baroda, under the leadership of Ism'ā'il Makh Afghān, they seized Mahārāshṭra which they portioned out among themselves. Thus a conspiracy of great magnitude and significance was organized with Deogīr¹ as its centre.

When the emperor heard of this he raised a large army and marched from Broach² to Deogīr, where he fought a battle with the rebels, who were defeated and put to flight. Among the fugitives was Ḥasan Kānkū,³ the would-be founder of the Bahmanī Kingdom. Ism'ā'il Makh Afghān with his adherents shut himself up in the fortress of Dharāgīr, which the emperor besieged. He then sent 'Imād-ul-Mulk Sarteẓ with an escort to Gulbarga, which was to be raised into a protective bulwark against the rebels,⁴ and from which centre he was to institute a search for the fugitives.

Meanwhile, the emperor concerted⁵ measures for the consolidation of Deogīr and Marhaṭ, making a redistribution of the Iqṭa's to the amīrs. Baranī affirms that the emperor also sent all the Musalmāns, who yet remained in Deogīr, to Delhi, dispatching at the same time news of his success to the Council of Regency. Shortly after, news came of the outbreak of a new rebellion in Gujarāt headed by Ṭāghī; and the emperor lost no time in leaving for Broach.

Baranī's⁶ remark regarding the emperor's measures to send back the Muslims of Deogīr to Delhi is worth reflecting over. It should be compared with his previous statements⁷ to the same effect. It is a commentary on the much misunderstood forced emigration from Delhi to Deogīr previously discussed. It follows that emigration even when primarily carried out in connection with the transference of the capital had left the Hindūs alone. Still, Baranī's⁸ expression is far from exact and cannot be literally accepted. The emperor was busy consolidating Deogīr and Marhaṭ, which, according to Baranī,⁹ he apportioned in the form of Iqṭa's to the amīrs. And before long he marched to Gujarāt leaving Khudāwandzada

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 514.

² Idem., p. 515.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 515.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 515.

⁶ Idem.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 513.

⁹ Ibid., p. 481.

Qivām-ud-dīn, Malik Jauhar, and Shaikh Burhān with some divisions of the principal army in Deogīr. Thus the exaggerations in Baranī's statement stand revealed. Further, the inconsistencies and improbabilities with which it abounds leap to the eye, when one reads a subsequent remark that the emperor on setting out to Gujarāt took all the Musalmāns,¹ young and old, who still remained in Deogīr. The word *lashkar* (army) in Baranī's phrase led Mzik² to think that the emperor took as many soldiers with him as possible to suppress the new rebellion.

At any rate, the emperor could not afford to deplete Deogīr of the Muslim element at this stage, when a considerable part of the Deccan had been already recovered by the Hindūs. Baranī³ acknowledges that the emperor on his march to Gujarāt left behind in Deogīr an army under Muhammadan generals. How far this army was manned by Muslims and how far by Hindūs is a problem which Baranī does not help us to solve.

The twenty-second and last rebellion was that of Ṭāghī. . . . It finds no mention in the *Rihla*, and Baranī gives scanty information regarding Ṭāghī. The *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī* tells us that Ṭāghī, originally a Turkish slave, was brought from Turkistan to the court of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq by some Turkī merchants. Among other presents they made to the emperor were some slaves, Ṭāghī being one of them. He was bestowed by the emperor on Safdar Malik Qīrān-i-Sultānī. By virtue of his wits, intelligence and cleverness, Ṭāghī created a favourable impression at court. After the death of Safdar Malik, Muḥammad bin Tughluq appointed him superintendent of the durbār and later made him an officer in the vazīr's army. In the course of the performance of his official duties, Ṭāghī once committed an offence, and was ordered to be exiled to the Yemen. He was first taken in chains to Cambay where he was still a prisoner, when Qāzī Jalāl's rebellion broke out in Gujarāt. This rebellion was joined by the Gujarāt army, the ringleaders being Mubārak Jawar, Bambal, Jhallū and Qāzī Jalāl. This necessitated the emperor's march from Delhi to Gujarāt. Meanwhile, Ṭāghī encouraged and helped the inhabitants of Cambay in dispersing the rebels. This secured him his release and restoration to his original post of the Shaḥnah-i-Bārgāh (superintendent of the court).

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 516.

² Mzik : *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Batuta durch Indien und China*, p. 194.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 516.

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When on the outbreak of the Daulatābād rebellion, the emperor proceeded to the Deccan, he appointed Tatār Malik Bahādur Sulṭānī in Asāwal as an adjutant to Shaikh Mu'izz-ud-dīn, governor of Gujarāt. Tatār Malik became hostile to Ṭāghī, who was still in Gujarāt, and possessed an Arab horse and a Gujarāti slave girl. Tatār Malik desired possession of both, and adopted measures, which goaded Ṭāghī into rebellion.

Baranī tells us that Ṭāghī revolted in conjunction with the mūqaddams, and the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Gujarāt. He slew Shaikh Mu'izz-ud-dīn, the governor of Nahrwāla, as well as his deputy, Malik Muẓaffar, plundered Cambay, and with a large following of both Hindūs and Muslims he besieged the fort of Broach.

On hearing of this, the emperor marched from Daulatābād, and at Ghātī Sakun, a place about twelve miles from Daulatābād, he met Baranī, who had come from Delhi with a congratulatory message from the Council of Regency. Meanwhile, Ṭāghī fled from Broach. Near Cambay he defeated and slew Malik Yusuf Bughra, who was pursuing him under the emperor's orders. The emperor immediately marched to Cambay, but Ṭāghī forestalled him and left Cambay for Asāwal. The emperor learnt of this, while still on his way to Cambay, and instantly turned towards Asāwal. But Ṭāghī fled from Asāwal to Nahrwāla (Paṭan). Baranī amazingly remarks how Ṭāghī, with a handful of rebels, defied the emperor by means of his skilful tactics and guerilla warfare. From Broach to Cambay, from Cambay to Asāwal, and from Asāwal to Paṭan he fled wherever he liked, and the emperor followed him in vain from place to place. In Asāwal he stopped about a month partly on account of the fatigue and partly on account of the incessant rains. There he heard that Ṭāghī had left Paṭan and was marching towards the town of Kadi, where the emperor at last overtook him. Ṭāghī gave battle at Takalpur, twelve leagues (Kuroh) from Paṭan, but was defeated and fled towards Paṭan. The emperor at once commissioned Khizr, whose father, Yusuf Bughra, had been previously killed by Ṭāghī, to pursue the fugitives. But Khizr had hardly reached Paṭan, when Ṭāghī, having collected his party, marched out with all his adherents and his family from Paṭan to *Kant Barāhī*, whence he opened correspondence with the Rāi of Gīrnār. After a few days he went to Gīrnār, but, being disappointed he proceeded to Sind, seeking shelter there with the Sumeras of Tattah and Damrīla. It is

evident from the *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, which fully confirms Baranī, that the Sumeras were also in revolt.

At this stage, Baranī reports how once more fortune smiled on Muḥammad bin Tughluq. He encamped in Nahrwāla on the platform of the tank called Sahsilang and busied himself with measures for the consolidation of Gujarāt. The Hindū muqaddams, rājās, and chiefs (*Rāigān wa Mahantagān*) came to pay their homage and make presents, and were awarded gifts and robes in return. Thus, in a short time, in the words of Baranī, peace was re-established in Gujarāt and order restored.

It should be noted that the Gujarāt expedition, which had commenced in January, 1345, with the emperor's march from Delhi, merged, in October, 1350, into the Tattah expedition, for in that year the emperor moved towards Tattah, in Sind, where he died (March, 1351). The five years of the Gujarāt expedition fall into two parts. (1) 1345-1347, a period of two years which witnessed the emperor's struggle with the amīrān-i-ṣadah of Gujarāt and Daulatābād, and the outbreak of Ṭāghī's rebellion in Gujarāt. In the beginning of this period had occurred an event which formed a glowing background in the otherwise gloomy picture of the period. This event, which finds no mention in Baranī, but to which an inscription of the year, 1345, as well as the testimony of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa directs us, was the Piram and Gogha expedition—Piram being an island in Cambay and Gogha a seaport in Kāthiāwār. In his historical sketch of the "town of Gogha," published in the *Indian Antiquary*, Watson,¹ quotes thirty-eight Sanskrit bardic verses celebrating the success of this expedition, which Muḥammad bin Tughluq is believed to have sent. On his visit to Piram, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² heard local reports about a Muhammadan invasion, which had laid the island waste. He mentions the efforts made later by Malik-ut-Tujjār, an amīr of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, to colonize it with Muslims. Possibly the Muhammadan invasion reported by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa was the same expedition, which, according to the above-mentioned local legend, the emperor had sent. Details of the expedition are not known, and the fact itself remains doubtful, as there is no regular historical account of it. But indirect evidence is not wanting. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions Gogha as being ruled by a Hindū chief named Dankol, who acknowledged but nominally the suzerainty of Muḥammad bin

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, III, 1874.

² Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: *Def. et Sang*, IV, p. 65.

Tughluq. An inscription celebrating his triumphs about the year 1345/744 has been recovered from Gandhār. Gandhār, like Gogha, was in Kāthiāwār, as mentioned in the Āin-i-Akbarī. It seems that it was after the Gogha expedition that the inscription¹ was fixed at the Gandhār (Qandhār) Fort.

(2) 1347-1350, a period of three years in which the emperor was mainly occupied with efforts to suppress Ṭāghī, but at intervals he set his hands also to other things, for instance, the restoration of peace and order in Gujarāt mentioned above, and the conquest of Northern Konkan, which Baranī has failed to mention. But Edwards, using local accounts, informs us that it was about this time (1347-8) that Natho Rāo Sindha Bhogle, one of the disaffected Sardārs of Nagardev, then King of North Konkan (1331-48), saw Muḥammad bin Tughluq, or his governor (Vālī) of Gujarāt, at Wadnagar. He complained of the great oppression exercised by King Nagardev, and described how Bhagadcharī, the king's favourite, then governor of the province of Shanti (Salsette) oppressed his subjects by levying extravagant taxes and by outraging women. The Sardār had a personal grievance against his king; anxious to wreak vengeance on him, he urged the Sultān to conquer North Konkan. The Sultān, who was engaged in the pursuit of Ṭāghī, entrusted his general, Nikā Malik, with this task. Thus North Konkan, including the islands of Bombay (Salsette, Bassein, Pratts-pur, Thāna and Mahim), were conquered and annexed to the empire.² Further, the emperor showed great kindness to the Rānā of Mandal-Patri,³ to whom some of the adherents of Ṭāghī had fled, but the Rānā gave them no shelter. On the contrary, he killed them and sent their heads to the emperor. The Rānā became the recipient of royal favours, and paid a visit to the emperor. It was about this time (August, 1347), while the emperor was halting at Paṭan, that he heard of the death of 'Imād-ul-Mulk, brought about by Ḥasan Kānkū and his adherents, of the latter's rise to kingship in Daulatābād, and of the flight of his own army and officers—*Khudāwandzāda Qivām-ud-dīn* and Malik Jauhar—from Daulatābād. Now, the emperor became desperate.

He considered his difficult position and realized that he was facing

¹ *E.I.M.*, 1919-20, p. 20.

² Edwards, S. M.: *Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island*, pp. 18-20.

³ Mandal-Patri are two towns immediately to the east of the Little Rann (*J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922).

a terrible crisis, which, unless met by a wise change in his policy, would certainly result in destruction. The new policy that he now evolved to meet this emergency, was what Baranī so much desired, namely, abstention from punishments. Baranī's remark that for a few months of his stay at Nahrwāla the Sultān abstained from punishments, gives a wrong impression. What he really means is that, as a result of the news of Ḥasan Kānkū's rise to power in Daulatābād, the emperor revised his policy which ceased to be so sanguinary and uncompromising as it had previously been. No further murders of the Sunnis and Sayyids, nor even of the amīrān-i-ṣadah, are reported, although the emperor's temper became, in the words of Baranī, the more vindictive. An approximately true estimate of the emperor's mind and temper may, however, be formed by studying the conference, which he now held with Baranī. In a moment of distraction he sent for Baranī¹ and plaintively remarked that the body politic of the empire was overwhelmed with diseases; the attempt to cure one disease was, instead of healing, sure to produce another. That is, an attempt on his part to remove the disturbance in one quarter was invariably followed by the outbreak of disorder in another quarter. He asked Baranī as a historian how such a crisis in political history had been treated in the past. Baranī advised abdication.

Abdication, which was uncongenial to Muḥammad bin Tughluq, might have been the best remedy in the opinion of Baranī. But whether in suggesting it Baranī was not acting as the spokesman of the hostile section of the 'Ulamā and saints anxious to depose Muḥammad bin Tughluq and instal Fīroz in his place is a point worth considering. It follows that the emperor could not measure correctly the strength of his enemies. A demonstration of this is afforded by the fact that he sent orders to the Vazīr, Khwāja Jahān Aḥmad Aiyāz, Malik Bahrām Ghaznī, Amīr Qabtaghū, and to Amīr Mahān at Delhi, commanding them to come over with an army to Paṭan. His object was to dispatch them to the Deccan against Ḥasan Kānkū. But after they had arrived in Paṭan the emperor did not consider it expedient to send them to Daulatābād. Perhaps, he did well as the strength of Ḥasan Kānkū had risen enormously, and the chances of the Vazīr's successfully coping with him had diminished.

However, the emperor resolved first to settle affairs in Gujarāt,

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 521.

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to crush Ṭāghī and even to capture Girnār before marching against Ḥasan Kānkū. In pursuance of this resolve he spent three rainy seasons successively in Gujarāt. In the first (June to October, 1348) he was busy improving the administration of Gujarāt and raising armies. During the second (June to October, 1349) he remained in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Girnār (Junagarh). Impressed by the royal troops, the Hindū ruler of Girnār proposed to capture Ṭāghī alive and surrender him. But Ṭāghī lost no time in making his escape to Tattah, seeking shelter with the Jām of Tattah. In the closing months of the year 1349, the rainy season being over, the emperor captured Girnār and consolidated his rule over the adjacent coastal strips and island. The Rānās and Hindū chiefs attended the court to pay their homage, and were awarded gifts and robes of honour. Khengār (the Rāo of Kachh) and the Rānā of Girnār were also brought to the court. Order being thus fully established in Gujarāt, the emperor set out towards Sind in pursuit of Ṭāghī.

In the course of this journey, which he was forced to break at Gondal¹ on account of illness, news came from Delhi of the death of Malik Kabīr Qabūl, his friend and minister. Then began the rainy season, the third and the last, which he spent in Gondal. In spite of bad health he was no less intent upon the problems confronting him. The death of Malik Kabīr having intensified the situation in Delhi, he sent the Vazīr, Aḥmad Aiyāz as well as Malik Maqbūl the Nāib Vazīr to Delhi. He then made preparations on a large scale for a final reckoning with Ṭāghī. In the first place, he sent for troops from all parts, from within as well as from outside India, a detachment of the Mongols under Altūn Bahādur having in response come from Farghāna. Baranī fixes their arrival at a time when the emperor, having crossed the Indus, had bent his steps towards Tattah. In the second place, the emperor ordered a large number of boats to ferry the army across the Indus. The boats came from such distant places as Dīpālpur, Multān, Uch and Sivistān, while the emperor was still at Gondal. In the third place, he ordered some of the 'Ulamā and saints, as well as the leading nobles, to come over from Delhi to Gondal, together with the families of the maliks and amīrs in the royal army. When all the preparations were complete, the emperor moved with a huge army from Gondal and crossed the Indus. He moved on towards Tattah in a vigorous pursuit of

¹ Gondal is in Kāthiawar situated in 21° 58' and 70° 48' E.

Tāghī, and in order to crush the Sumeras who had given him shelter. Before long his condition became worse. The fever which he had hardly shaken off since his departure from Gondal tightened its grasp. On breaking the fast of the tenth of Muḥarram, he took fish which did not agree with him. In spite of fever, he sailed on for two successive days. At last, with infourteen leagues (Kuroh) of Tattah, he was compelled to land, where after a little over a week he died on the 20th of March,¹ 1351.

The following couplets,² are said to have been composed by him while writhing in the agony of death :

“ We strutted about this world a good deal ; we indulged in luxuries.

“ We rode many high-statured horses. We bought many highly-prized Turkish slaves.

“ We had many joys ; till, at last, we sank and became hump-backed like the new moon.”

¹ 21, Muḥarram, 752.

² *Firishta (Bombay)*, I, 258.

CHAPTER X

REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

NO account of the rise and fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq would be complete without a description of his character and personality, subjects to which Baranī¹ devotes great space and attention. Altogether he makes² four definite attempts to portray his character, and even his stray remarks and his discourses³ with the emperor contain references to the same.

According to Baranī,⁴ in his character was to be found the chief cause of his misfortunes and of the disintegration of his empire. His character had been shaped as a young man by his association with atheist philosophers, with S'ad,⁵ the metaphysician; 'Ubaid, the poet; Najm Intishār and Maulāna 'Ālim-ud-dīn. As a result of his prolonged discussions with these philosophers, his belief in Islām, and even in God⁶ had been shaken. His mind, in the words of Baranī,⁷ was set against the fundamental truths taught by all the prophets since the beginnings of the world. He set at a discount the heavenly books, and the prophets' sayings, which form the bed-rock of faith, the vital part of Islām and the fountain-head of Muslim life. He would not listen to anything, which was contrary to reason and philosophy. Baranī maintains that all the atrocities and outrages that Muḥammad bin Tughluq committed, all the executions and massacres he perpetrated, all the impossible demands he made,

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 457-468.

² Idem., pp. 509-11, 516-17, 520-22.

³ Idem., pp. 470-72, 496-497.

⁴ Idem., pp. 464-467.

⁵ Malik S'ad-ud-din Mantiqī (metaphysician) was a well-known philosopher, whom Baranī calls in mockery S'ad Mantiqī. He was a distinguished disciple of Shaikh Nizām-ud-din Auliya, and a comrade of Amīr Khusrav. Along with the latter he was recommended by Shaikh Nizām-ud-din Auliya to Sultān Jalāl-ud-din Khalji. The Sultān had, accordingly, made him as well as Amīr Khusrav his courtier (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 198).

Malik S'ad-ud-din Mantiqī was also a courtier of Sultān 'Alā-ud-din Khalji. It was he who had reported to the Sultān the treatise of Maulāna Shams-ud-din Turk, the famous professor of Hadis (sayings of the Prophet), which some of the 'Ulamā had withheld from the Sultān (Baranī, Bib. Ind., pp. 297-299).

⁶ Baranī's language (p. 465) implies this, and it is confirmed by Muḥammad bin Tughluq's autobiography, where he frankly acknowledges that he had lost faith in God.

⁷ Ibid.

together with his innumerable orders, his ferocity, his provocative and inflammable temper, and his ruthlessness, were due to his pursuit of atheistic philosophy. But for this he would have applied his extraordinary gifts and talents to the pursuit of the Word of God, in compliance with the rulings of the Prophet and the dictates of the 'Ulamā. Had it not been for this he would have abstained from the execution of believers, and would have been the greatest monarch who had ever lived. But his heart was atrophied by his devotion to philosophy; there being no corner in it for the sayings of the Prophet and the Word of God, which alone, by inspiring fear of the hereafter, makes one meek and humble. As a result, he acquired a propensity for shedding the blood of the Muslims. So many of the 'Ulamā and saints, Sayyids and Şufīs, mendicants, revenue officers, as well as troopers, were put to death, that, in the exaggerated phraseology of Baranī, their blood poured in torrents almost every day before his¹ palace.

The next defect in Muḥammad bin Tughluq's character, according to Baranī,² was his conceit. He would issue orders whatever he conceived, irrespective of all considerations. Far from realizing that the orders were impracticable, he would ascribe the diffidence on the part of his officials to carry them out to their disobedience, hostility, faithlessness and want of devotion and allegiance. He would inflict punishments indiscriminately. Anxious to improve his own lot, Baranī³ acknowledges that he encouraged and helped the Sultān in acting contrary to the spirit of Islām; a behaviour which he subsequently regretted.

Indignant at Muḥammad bin Tughluq's pursuit of Greek philosophy, chagrined by his aggressive policy towards the 'Ulamā, the saints, the Sayyids, the Sunnīs and the Şūfīs, disappointed with his preference for foreigners, deprived of the honours and offices which he considered his due, and vexed at the promotion of upstarts at the expense of the Muslim aristocracy of blood and wealth, Baranī's position in regard to Muḥammad is peculiar. It is certainly not one of uncritical eulogy as Dowson⁴ thinks, nor is it one of astonishment and perplexity, as Mr. Moreland,⁵ assumes. On the contrary, it is one of antagonism and hostility. His character-sketch

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 465-466.

² Idem., p. 466-467.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 466.

⁴ Moreland: *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 45.

⁵ Ibid.

of Muḥammad is a kind of satire. He dwells at length upon those events and attainments of the emperor which were too well-known to be ignored. It is his habit to introduce in the midst of a string of eulogy a sentence or two to undo the whole, so that the reader instead of being favourably inclined towards the Sultān is left with an impression of his wickedness. Baranī's narrative of Muḥammad's character is interspersed with passages too difficult to be adequately translated into English. To the average reader they appear eulogistic descriptions of his character, but, in reality, they are venomous attacks interspersed with sarcastic epithets.

He describes the ambitious¹ projects of the Sultān as instances of follies and blunders on his part, and treats his theme with his usual skill, and with his marvellous gift of concealing his innermost feelings.

He observes² that the Sultān issued a body of new fiscal and military ordinances called *Uslūb* and *Asālīb*, which though apparently feasible and ameliorative, were in fact impracticable and destructive. He says not a word by way of explaining the *Uslūb* or *Asālīb*, which evidently constituted an important code of administrative, revenue and military reforms, drawn up assiduously by the emperor himself. Like the *Uslūb*, which came in the latter part of the reign, Baranī gives short shrift to the administrative measures adopted by the emperor early in the reign to assimilate the land revenue of each province to that of the Delhi country.³ Baranī's language betrays confusion of thought and conveys nothing tangible. Sir Wolsley Haig,⁴ endeavouring to make the best out of the worst, inferred that Muḥammad bin Tughluq ordered the compilation of a register of the land revenue of the empire on the model of the register already maintained in the districts near the capital—an inference which none of the followers of Baranī cared to draw.

"I have," says Baranī,⁵ "for seventeen years and three months been a close attendant of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and have been honoured by him with many and various prizes and rewards. Yet I am, I confess, simply amazed at his extremely conflicting habits. I used to hear from him almost the whole of his life, the evils of the

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 471-478.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 498-500.

³ The original (p. 468) is "*Bilād-i-Mummālik-i-Dehli*," which appears to be practically synonymous with Mr. Moreland's (p. 23) *havāli-i-Dehli* or the Delhi country.

⁴ *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1922.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 504.

mean and the low and his dislike for them ; nevertheless, later in his reign he raised to high offices of great responsibility the mean fellows of low descent, the musicians, and entrusted to their care the administration of Gujarāt, Multān and Budāūn. Similarly he honoured 'Azīz the vintner, his brother Fīroz, the barber ; Munta, the cook ; Mas'ūd, the shoe-maker and his son, the gardener and many other rogues with high offices, and granted them favour and access to his person and throne. That an emperor mighty like Jamshed, and magnificent like Kaikhūshro, too proud of his high position to bow before the ruler of Bengal or before the Mongols, too fastidious to accept for his service even men like the great Buzrgmihr¹ should condescend to award the low-born menials with the dignified posts of high command is perfectly amazing indeed ! If I who stand completely lost and bewildered to study his character liken him in his careless way of bestowing precious gifts on the menials, and the deserving and the undeserving alike to God whose one characteristic is to confer high command and supreme authority often on a base-born tyrant, on a wicked person or upon an atheist, the simile, I am afraid, does not stand on all fours, for the emperor, unlike the Almighty Giver is a deep and sincere devotee of God, very regular in the discharge of daily prayers and strict in the observance of even the details of Islamic law."

Baranī further observes that the Sultān's powers of body and mind and his infinite resources were beyond comprehension. His extraordinary generosity, combined with his longing to kill the believers and learned Sayyids, and at the same time to offer devotion to God, sounded like breathing hot and cold in the same breath. He was one of the most eccentric of men, with strikingly conflicting habits. He combined in his person the qualifications befitting a master as well as those essentially characteristic of a slave. He regarded with contempt the names of his predecessors, while he professed a deep reverence for the Caliphs, whether alive or dead, and ministered to their messengers and ministers, not to speak of themselves, for they never came to his court, such mean offices as even a slave would be loth to perform to his master. Again, while he continued incessantly striving to get rid of the evil-doers by putting thousands to death on the slightest suspicion, he was blind to the mischief of a body of rogues, whose sole business was to murder the pious Musalmāns and the Šūfis.

As a result of Baranī's peculiar portraiture² of the Sultān, it

¹ The famous vazīr of the Sasanian King, Anusherwān. (*Encyclopædia of Islām*, I, p. 809.)

² Baranī (p. 123) ; his special gift and skill in the art of portraiture.

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became an article of faith with all and was handed down to succeeding generations as a settled fact of history, that of all the Muslim rulers of India, Muḥammad bin Tughluq was a mixture of¹ opposites ; he was at once the wisest and the most foolish, the most courteous and the most discourteous, the most humane and humiliating and the most tyrannical and arrogant, the most merciful and lenient and yet the most ruthless and cruel. "His conduct," observes Mr. Moreland,² "was a mass of inconsistencies."

A comparative study of Baranī's scattered references and of all the available data has led the writer to the following conclusions. A man of more than middle height, his person was endowed with a particular grace or excellence. He possessed a superbly stout body—strong limbs, long arms, broad chest, large and open forehead and dignified and noble countenance. His face, with its remarkably white complexion, thick but skilfully trimmed beard and moustache, wide, square-like eyes, straight and moderate nose, thin and reddish lips, a fleshy and muscular neck, and a large round skull, covered with a closely-set oval cap tapering towards the top, exercised a magnetic charm. He used to wear a sash round his waist and rings on the last two fingers of his left hand. On the whole, he was very beautiful and possessed of great personal charm, which was immensely heightened by his physical, intellectual and moral equipment.

Physically, he was well built, robust and vigorous ; he was a brave man, bold-hearted and high-spirited. Like his father, he was a veteran warrior, intrepid on the field of battle.

As regards his morality or the observance on his part of a sound social code, there can be no doubt. Those who regard him a parricide will blame him for his selfishness, which in his juvenile short-sightedness made him the agent of his father's death. But no charge of loose morals, of depravity or of licentiousness can be brought against him. All records testify to his habits of temperance and sobriety. But he did not detest music. He kept 1,200 musicians³ in his service, not counting 1,000 slave-musicians. It is said that he would kill⁴ his musicians, if any of them were found to have sung before any other person. His musicians must have possessed a special gift

¹ Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), p. 240.

² Moreland : *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp. 45-46.

³ *Quatremère Notices des Manuscrits*, XIII, p. 185.

⁴ *Ibid.*

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and skill, which he jealously guarded. He himself must have had a special ear for music. Occasionally a nautch¹ was held at the palace. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² mentions one on the occasion of the marriage of the emperor's sister with Amīr Saif-ud-dīn.

Intellectually he was far in advance of his age, a great scholar well versed in almost every science then known to Orientals. In calligraphy he surpassed the most accomplished scribes. The excellence of his handwriting, the ease of his composition, the sublimity of his style and the play of his fancy raised him head and shoulders above the most accomplished teachers and professors. No teacher of composition dared to compete with him. He knew by heart a good deal of Persian poetry and understood it well. Occasionally, he even composed verses in Persian. He was well-acquainted with the *Sikandar Nāmah*, the *Abū Muslim*³ *Nāmah* and the *Tārīkh-i-Maḥmūdī*. He knew the Qurān as well as the *Hedāya*⁴ by heart. No learned or scientific man, scribe, poet, wit, or physician had the presumption to argue with him about his own special pursuit. Besides, he was fond of history, and had so retentive a memory that he recollected almost every event he heard of, and the time it occurred. He also studied medicine, and attended the sick. With regard to the efficacy of his prescriptions, he entered into long discussions with the famous physicians of his age. He was a keen student of philosophy of the Greek schools, and welcomed to his court distinguished philosophers. Of Arabic he possessed a moderate knowledge. He understood it easily, though he could not speak it fluently. Above all, he possessed an invaluable gift of speech. According to Baranī,⁵ no one tired of listening to his conversation. He was a great mathematician, and was trained in logic, astronomy, medicine, rhetoric and metaphysics.

At an early stage of his career, however, he had come under the influence of the philosophers, as Baranī⁶ tells us. They engendered in him a spirit of enquiry and he set about studying Islām or religion

¹ The picture of a nautch party (see *supra*, p. 3) said to have been drawn in 1534 is probably fictitious. But it supplies a sort of legend of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's traditional liking for music and dance.

² *B.N.*, MS. 909, F. 132-133.

³ There is a manuscript of the Turkish novel called *Abū Muslim* in Vienna. (*Encyclopædia of Islam*, Vol. I, p. 102.)

⁴ *Abū Muslim* (726-755) was a powerful leader of a religious and political movement in Khurasān.

⁵ *Quatremère Notices des Manuscrits*, XIII, pp. 190-191.

⁶ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 463.

⁷ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 465.

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in general with an open mind. This opened for him a long period of mental unrest, during which his father died suddenly at Afghānpur (1325) and he was called upon to rule. His accession to the throne opened a new vista, and afforded him unique opportunities for carrying on his enquiries or researches, but it saddled him with the most responsible work of government and administration. A modern statesman, placed in a similar position, would have immediately dropped all theological discussions and researches, giving himself entirely to the problems of the State. But the State in those days, as it is still in Islamic theory, was indissolubly connected with the Church. Not even Akbar could drop or exclude theological discussions. And Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not endowed with Akbar's prudence, insight and moderation. Nor was it in his nature to let go a thing which he had once seriously undertaken. Accordingly, while in the first decade (1325-35), he was confronting political issues of an extraordinarily formidable nature, was making preparations for the Khurāsān expedition, was endeavouring to make Deogīr into Daulatābād with a view to raising it to the status of the first capital of the empire, was introducing the token currency, was subduing rebellions, and was directing the Qarāchīl expedition, he was also carrying on his researches into religion.¹ It was an extremely difficult task with which in his position as emperor of India he was thoroughly unable to cope. At last he despaired. His explanation—" . . . *one would have*² *preferred to become an idolater*"—bespeaks the amount of his despair. This evidence of his appreciation of "Hindūism" is confirmed by his cultivation of a taste for Sanskrit,³ and by his free and unrestrained association with the Hindū ascetics.⁴ This was gall and wormwood to 'Iṣāmī.⁵

It was during this period of mental unrest that the seeds of the future troubles destined subsequently to overwhelm himself and shatter his empire were sown. It was in this period that distrust arose between him and the 'Ulamā, who appear to have influenced the government⁶ and, in a way, the army chiefs.⁷ In these circum-

¹ This follows from a comparative study of the *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhi*, the *Rihla*, the *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhi* and of the *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārikh*.

² *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, B.M., Add. 25, 785.

³ (i) B.N., MS. 909, F. 140. (ii) Def. et Sang., III, 341 ff.

⁴ (i) B.N., MS. 909, F. 157. (ii) Def. et Sang., IV, 35-40.

⁵ *Futūh-us-Salāṭin*, MS., F. 279A.

⁶ Cf. *Rihla*: Def. et Sang., III, 300-308.

⁷ *Futūh-us-Salāṭin*, MS., F. 279A.

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stances, as he himself acknowledges,¹ every project that he formed failed and brought in its train a series of new troubles. It was a little before Ibn Battūta's arrival in India (1333-4) that the emperor found himself able to believe in the existence of God, in the validity of the mission of the Prophet, and in the tenets of Islām. He came back to its fold, but his conduct was still hostile to the 'Ulamā, because he was still consciously or unconsciously a revolutionary.

It was by no means astute of him to have made no attempt whatsoever to announce his repentance for his past "sins" and doubts. Perhaps he wanted to fight his opponents tooth and nail, and make radical changes.² Perhaps, in the course of his researches he had discovered the weaknesses of the 'Ulamā; hence his strong attitude in the matter. Ibn Battūta³ is in complete accord with Baranī in maintaining that the emperor was most forward in the shedding of blood. His door was never free from an indigent person who was to be enriched, and from a living person, who was to be killed. Stories of his generosity, his bravery, his cruelty and violence to culprits obtained great currency among the people. Yet he was the humblest of men, and most devoted to the administration of justice and to the pursuit of truth.

It does not follow from the above that just as a butcher's shop is never free from a goat to be slaughtered, Muḥammad bin Tughluq's court was seldom without a man to be executed. What it really amounts to is that his campaign for the discovery of truth, and his anxiety to stop the evil at its source, and administer justice and equity had brought him into conflict with a body of people whose fault was unpardonable in his eyes. This is illustrated by the story of the two jurists of Sind, on whom the emperor had passed a cruel and summary sentence of death, apparently without justification.⁴

It is evident from the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*⁵ that Muḥammad bin Tughluq developed new and revolutionary theories about the Church, the State and the government. No description of these theories can be given, for none is available. But an idea of their reactionary character can be formed from Ibn Battūta's testimony

¹ *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, B.M., Add. 25, 785.

² Compare *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 231-279.

³ MS. 909, F. 125-126, B.N. Def. et Sang., III, pp. 216-217.

⁴ MS. 909, F. 135, B.N. Def. et Sang., III, p. 300.

⁵ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 231-279.

as to the emperor's subsequent actions. Impressed by the strict maintenance of Islamic observances at the royal court, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa¹ affirms that the emperor lays great stress on the performance of prayer. His standing orders were that prayers must be recited in congregation, and severe punishment was meted out to all defaulters. In one single day he once killed nine men, one of whom was a musician, for failing to say the prayers in congregation. He used to send round men appointed for the purpose into the streets to look for the defaulters. Those found loitering about prayer-time were punished. He issued orders that the people were to be taught the principles of ablution, and of prayer, as well as the fundamentals of Islām. And the people were interrogated on these points. Those who could not give satisfactory answers were punished.

This should be read alongside Baranī's² account, which in the first instance declares the emperor irreligious, and a rank atheist doomed to perdition like Nimrod and Pharaoh ; and in the second instance, as punctilious in observing the ritual and letter of Islamic law. It follows that Baranī's first account represents the earlier stage of the emperor's life when he was in a state of doubt or revolt against Islām and God ; his second account is a picture of the second and new stage in the emperor's life, which was, as corroborated by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, reactionary.

Like Baranī, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa does not accuse the emperor of atheism or of devotion to pagan philosophy ; he had seen none of it. That stage of his life was over before Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's arrival in India. It had, of course, left behind repercussions, as a result of which exaggerated accounts and baseless stories of his inhumanity, violence and atrocity had obtained wide currency. Baranī had seen demonstrations of both extremes in the emperor's thoughts and actions—his paganism as well as his reactionary and aggressive Islāmism, and was unable to understand either. Hence his amazement and bewilderment ! In his eyes Muḥammad's conduct was reprehensible in either case. Neither his paganism and disbelief in God nor his policy of compelling people to say prayers under threat of capital punishment was justifiable.

And Baranī had no reason to believe that Muḥammad bin Tughluq's beliefs had undergone a change for the better. His

¹ MS. 909, F. 134, B.N. Def. et Sang, III, p. 286.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 457-468, pp. 470-472, pp. 496-497.

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memoirs were not available to him. What he saw was that although there was no more of the emperor's association with the philosophers, yet his actions were no better ; in fact, worse. Baranī's difficulty or inability to understand the dramatic changes in the nature of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's actions is therefore self-evident.

'Iṣāmī's mind is bitterly poisoned against Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and he can see in him no merit whatever. Every stage of the Sultān's life, and every phase of his character appears to the poet as a fresh evidence of his craftiness and guile. The reason is not far to seek. 'Iṣāmī wrote his book to please the enemies¹ of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. And besides that he himself had in all probability suffered at the hands of the Sultān, he could never forgive him for the sufferings and death of his grandfather, Sipah Sālār A'izz-ud-dīn 'Iṣāmī.² In face of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's autobiography,³ 'Iṣāmī's charges against him lose much of their weight. The poet has clearly ignored the second or reactionary stage of the emperor's life, mentioned above.

It should be noted that in spite of his aggressive Islāmism, Muḥammad bin Tughluq did little or nothing at any rate directly for the propagation of Islām. His endeavours, made early in his reign, for making Deogīr the centre of Muslim culture,⁴ cannot but be assigned to political reasons. His zeal for the spread of Muslim culture there can hardly serve as a proof of his zeal for the propagation of Islām, for at that time his belief in Islām had been shaken. The whole of his life fails to give any instance of unkindness to his non-Muslim subjects on the ground of religion, although the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*⁵ talks magniloquently of his razing the idol-houses. Two incidents alone can be mentioned ; one being related by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa⁶ and the other by Baranī⁷ of the conversion of some Hindūs to Islām. But neither can be cited as a proof of the existence of state propaganda for the spread of Islām or as a proof of religious persecution. Even the Shi'ahs, whom orthodox Sunnis bitterly hated,⁸ and who were persecuted under Fīroz Shāh,⁹ enjoyed freedom. The *Purusa Parīksā*¹⁰ of Vidyāpatī Thākkura makes indirectly com-

¹ See Preface.

² B.M., Add. 25,785.

³ Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, XIII, p. 203.

⁴ B.N., MS. 909, F. 137.

⁵ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: *Def. et Sang.*, I, p. 320.

⁶ Fīroz Shāh: *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhi*, B.M., Or. 2039.

⁷ Vidyāpatī Thākkura: *Purusa Parīksā*, pp. 20-24, 41-44.

⁸ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 244A.

⁹ See *supra*, p. 108.

¹⁰ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 483.

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mendable references to Muḥammad bin Tughluq, who, it cannot be denied, employed Hindūs in his army as well as in his government.¹

That Muḥammad bin Tughluq was considerate to his enemies, and appreciated merit even in rebels, suspects and undesirables, is proved by the instances of his forgiveness extended to (1) Ibn Battūṭa after he had become a suspect and had been interned; (2) to the prisoner, 'Ain-ul-Mulk, after his unsuccessful revolt; (3) to Sayyid Ibrāhīm *Khariṭadār*, the governor of Hānsī and Sirsa, the rebellious son of a rebellious father, Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh, governor and later king of Ma'bar; (4) to Malik Hoshang, the rebellious governor of Daulatābād; and (5) to Baranī, whose views, as expressed in the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* and the *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī*, were diametrically opposite to those of the emperor. But the latter made a correct estimate of his merits, and far from punishing him for his views, rewarded him frequently, though he did not give him any title or lucrative post or office.

Why an emperor who was so learned and experienced, who claimed to be 'Ādil (just), and whose coins were inscribed with titles such as—"the earnest in the way² of God; the victorious by the help of God; the warrior in the cause of God"; why an emperor, who was the richest and the mightiest of all the rulers of his age, and who received embassies from many³ courts and countries, should be called a visionary and a madman and cursed as a *Khūnī*⁴ (bloody) Sultān, is an enigma. His reign is said to have been marked by reckless prodigality and attempts to carry out hare-brained schemes, the chief of which were the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Deogīr, his introduction of a debased currency and wildly ambitious designs for the conquest of *Khurāsān* and China. As a set-off to these are mentioned his ferocious cruelty, relentless taxation and man-hunting expeditions, which provoked universal rebellions and disorders and shattered his empire.

It should be remembered that the political condition of Central Asia at the accession of Muḥammad bin Tughluq to the throne of Delhi had led in the first instance to the flight of Tarmāshīrīn into

¹ (i) Cf. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, MS., F. 239; (ii) *Rihla*: Def. et Sang., III, 105-106.

² Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 203-253.

³ (i) Ibn Battūṭa, MS. 909, F. 130-132, B.N.; F. 152, B.N. (ii) Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), p. 538.

⁴ (i) Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ul-Tawārīkh* (*Bid. Ind.*), p. 240. (ii) 'Iṣāmī: *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, F. 279a.

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India, and in the second instance to the formation of a triple coalition comprising Muḥammad bin Tughluq, Tarmāshirīn and Malik An-Nāṣir of Egypt, for a joint invasion of Khurāsān. This was an important factor, which profoundly affected the character of the subsequent history of the reign.

In view of the favourable conditions which then obtained both in India and abroad, the project of the Khurāsān expedition cannot be called visionary or impracticable. There was at that time no fear of rebellion in the Doāb, which had been consolidated under Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Balban and 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. Still the emperor enrolled the fighting clans of the Rājput̃s in the Khurāsān army as a precaution, though he did not foresee the consequences of the disbandment of this huge army of three hundred and seventy thousand men. But he would have been shirking his responsibilities, if he had turned his back on the trans-Indus politics and had failed thereby to seize the unique opportunity which then presented itself of crushing the Mongols. This had been the dream of the preceding Sultāns of Delhi; and Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish¹ is said to have even set out with the object of conquering Khurāsān (1234).

The transfer of the capital to Deogīr, which in effect only meant a change in the relative position of Delhi and Deogīr or Daulatābād, awakened the dormant antagonism of the 'Ulamā and saints, and went farther than any other measure to make the emperor unpopular. Rebellions broke out in Delhi as well as in Multān. An investigation into their causes made at Delhi by the emperor on his return from Multān (1330) revealed the complicity of the 'Ulamā and Ṣūfis, whereupon the emperor put them to the sword.

The fiasco of the Qarāchīl expedition and token currency followed. A great misunderstanding has been caused by the assumption that the Qarāchīl expedition was sent as late as 1338 on the ground (1) that Budāūnī² and Firishṭa both fix it in 1337-8/738, and (2) that it involved the conquest of Nagarkot which, according to Badr Chāch, took place in that year. But whereas the emperor did not personally take charge of the Qarāchīl expedition, he was present at the conquest of the fort of Nagarkot. This is established by the joint

¹ Hājji-ud-Dabīr, Vol. II, p. 699.

² It should be remembered that the chronology of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign as given by Budāūnī, Nizām-ud-dīn, Firishṭa and even by Yahya bin Aḥmad is seriously misleading. Not a single date given by any of them can be accepted without corroboration.

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 evidence of Badr¹ Chāch, of 'Afif² and of the *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī*.³ Baranī has also a reference to this effect, though he⁴ does not make the point quite clear. Thus the Qarāchīl expedition was distinct from, and preceded, the fall of Nagarkot. It was over before the arrival of Ibn Battūta. If it be supposed that Ibn Battūta's account of the Qarāchīl expedition as given in the *Rihla* is an eye-witness or contemporary account, then the question arises, why does it not contain a reference to the conquest of Nagarkot? The conquest of Nagarkot, if it was a part of the Qarāchīl expedition, must have preceded the tragic failure and loss of the Qarāchīl army which Ibn Battūta describes at length. The probability is that Ibn Battūta's account of the Qarāchīl expedition is not a first-hand account but based on hearsay. Ibn Battūta has described the same story with variations in two⁵ places, exactly as it was related to him at the time.

Of all the motives ascribed to the introduction of the token currency—the depletion of the treasury according to Baranī,⁶ money for the Sultān's ambitious schemes of conquest according to Firishhta,⁷ the great outlay involved in the transfer of the capital according to Budāūnī—⁸the crisis caused by the recruitment and maintenance of large armies for the *Khurāsān* and *Qarāchīl* expeditions, as well as the shortage of silver, seems to be the most reasonable and sound. The disbursement of incalculable amounts of silver to the armies had created a problem not unlike that which 'Alā-ud-dīn *Khaljī* had met by fixing the prices of all commodities. Muhammad bin Tughluq abstained from repeating the *Khaljī* fiasco. He contracted a loan from his subjects by assigning a nominal face value to the brass or copper⁹ tokens. This was also necessary in view of the threatening shortage of silver and the great need for a large coinage in consequence of the unprecedented extension of the empire.

¹ "It was at night that the great emperor (Muhammad bin Tughluq) arrived at this fort with thousands of glories. . . ." (*Odes of Badr Chāch*).

² 'Afif (Bib. Ind.), pp. 185-190.

³ Bānkipore MS., p. 36.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 483.

⁵ B.N. MS., F. 134 and F. 138.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 475.

⁷ Firishhta (Bombay), Vol. I, p. 239.

⁸ Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* (Bib. Ind.), Vol. I, p. 228.

⁹ Baranī and all his followers use the word copper to indicate the metal used for the token currency, while Edward Thomas gives also brass specimen of Muhammad bin Tughluq's token currency. (*The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 243, 249-251.)

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It should be noted that silver in India has always been a rare metal. Its relation to gold in Medieval Europe, according to Col. Yule,¹ was one to twelve; the ratio, he thinks, was still lower in India. In his opinion, the value of gold much depreciated early in the fourteenth century, on account of vast quantities being put into circulation as a result of the successive invasions of the Deccan. He maintains that under Muḥammad bin Tughluq the relative value of gold and silver should have been ten to one, or even less. Edward Thomas² agrees with Col. Yule, who, he observes, suggests a probable fall in the value of gold at Muḥammad bin Tughluq's accession to a proportion of seven to one.³

Driven by necessity and encouraged by the success of the paper currency in China, the emperor issued copper or brass tokens with a higher nominal value in place of the small silver coins (1330).

From the remarks made by Baranī, Yahya bin Aḥmad, Nizām-ud-dīn, Budāūnī and Firishṭa, it has been inferred that the token currency was introduced only in and near the two capital cities of Daulatābād and Delhi, as well as in the Doāb. Recent research has, however, shown that such coins were also struck at Dhār, Satgāon, Lakhnāutī, Tughluqpur 'urf Tirthut,⁴ and Dār-ul-Mulk Sulṭānpur⁵ (Wārangal). The coinage continued for a little more than two years, and is said to have failed on account of the ease with which the token coins could be forged, and the emperor's inability to prevent forgery in view of the great profit derived from it.

It is surprising how an emperor, a veritable "Prince⁶ of Moneyers," who had made great improvement in the design of coins, and in the execution of dies, had established new mints, improved the calligraphy, and introduced what Edward Thomas calls the "decimal in the date,"⁷ failed to take precautions to prevent forgery. Baranī, who is the only source of information on this head, says: "The house of every Hindū was turned into a mint; and the Hindūs of the provinces caused crores and lakhs of coins to be coined."⁸ It

¹ Yule: *Cathay and Way Thither*, p. 442.

² Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 234-235.

³ Edward Thomas's views on the ratio of gold to silver have been revised by Nelson Wright and Mr. Neville (J.A.S.B., 1924).

⁴ Indian Museum Catalogue of Coins, II (pp. 59-60).

⁵ *Islamic Culture* (Hyderābād), April, 1935, p. 287.

⁶ Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 206.

⁷ Idem., 212.

⁸ Baranī (B.I.), p. 475.

should be noted that Baranī uses the causative verb, which suggests that the Hindūs were helped in forging coins. Some colour is given to this view by the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*.¹ Possibly the Muslim officers of the royal mint entered into a conspiracy with the Hindūs. In any case, it was not very difficult for the Hindūs to forge money. Many of them were capable of engraving dies ; and the manufacture of a coin then required no special machinery. Moreover, the temptation for the Hindūs to make their brass or copper, of which they possessed abundant supplies, pass for silver was too great.

Further, Muḥammad bin Tughluq's experiment was bound to fail because the people, who had token coins in their possession immediately got rid of them in accordance with Gresham's law ; and in this way the token coins were returned to the imperial treasury. No punishments were inflicted, because in the words of Niẓām-ud-dīn Aḥmad,² it was impossible to punish all the people. That is why after the token currency was cancelled, the tokens brought to the treasury were paid for in silver and gold.

Facts militate against Baranī's exaggerated³ view of the harm done by the token currency. It might have undermined the treasury, but certainly did no harm to the conspirators and forgers for the whole matter appears to have been hushed up. Indeed, so completely had it been forgotten, that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa does not even mention it.

By the time of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's arrival (1333-4) a great milestone in the history of Muḥammad bin Tughluq and his empire had been reached. A financial crisis following the Qarāchīl expedition and the fiasco of the token currency had led to the enhancement of revenue and the initiation of oppressive and repressive legislation in the Doāb. This was followed by the Rājput rebellions, the causes of which can be traced in the terms and conditions of the enrolment of the local fighting Rājput clans in the *Khurāsān* army. The perilous situation that ensued necessitated the emperor's formal march, which Baranī describes graphically. His idiomatic use of the term *shikār* (hunt) under peculiar conditions created an impression that the emperor organized man-hunting expeditions on a large scale. The increased troubles in the north, combined with the spread of the rebellious

¹ Niẓām-ud-dīn Aḥmad : *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 202-203.

² Niẓām-ud-dīn Aḥmad : *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 203.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 475-476.

ideas and the escape of the rebels to the south, led to the outbreak of Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh's¹ rebellion in Ma'bar.

The change which had taken place in the emperor's attitude towards Islām a little before Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's arrival, by no means relieved the situation. The emperor came from the Doāb to Delhi, where he appointed Ibn Baṭṭūṭa the Qāzī, and proceeded on the Ma'bar expedition. On account of the outbreak of an epidemic and his own illness in Telingāna *en route* to Ma'bar, he had unfortunately to return, entrusting the task of suppressing the Ma'bar rebellion to Qutluḡh Khān, his former tutor, whom he now made Vazīr of Daulatābād (1335). From that time Daulatābād ceased to be the capital. Meanwhile, a grievous famine had broken out in Hindustān, and continued to the year 1341. On his return march to the north via Dhār and Mālwa, the emperor was aggrieved to notice the disastrous effects of the famine. He endeavoured to relieve the famine-stricken areas, and advanced loans to agriculturists. While rebellions were breaking out in different parts, most of which were subdued except that in Bengal, the emperor himself² led a punitive expedition against the rebellious Hindūs of Sāmāna and Kaithal, whence he proceeded to Nagarkot (1338).

What happened afterwards has already been described. It is, therefore, important to realize that the chief causes of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's downfall were not merely those which Baranī points out, namely, his pursuit of pagan philosophy and the impracticability of his schemes. Other factors were the great extension of the empire, his lack of balance and moderation, and the revolt of the amirān-i-ṣadah (centurions), the Mongol and Afghān military chiefs, who had in addition the fiscal duties to perform.

Had Muḥammad bin Tughluq inherited a small kingdom like Iltūtmish or Balban, his dominions might have escaped disintegration. The means of communication then available could not maintain the authority of a centralized power at Delhi over so large an area. Consequently, the emperor was led to devise the creation of a second capital. In pursuance of this new device of his he did all that has gone to build up the story of the complete evacuation of Delhi, and of the transference of the capital. At this time his

¹ Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), p. 231, has confounded Sayyid Aḥsan Shāh with Ḥasan Kānkū.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 483.

pursuit of pagan philosophy and his study of religion were in full swing. He was, of necessity, at war with the 'Ulamā and saints, whom he sought to curb by exiling them to Daulatābād. Hence arose the story of the popular and universal scorn for MuḤammad bin Tughluq, and of the non-co-operation between him and his subjects, which has been immortalized in the pages of Baranī.¹ The fate of the emperor's subsequent projects and measures of reform was also sealed. But MuḤammad was by nature resourceful and fearless. He still sought to solve the new problems as they arose, despising the opposition which was gathering strength in different parts of his empire.

The Deccan problem was, and remained, decidedly the most formidable of all. Even the preceding rulers—'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and Mubārak Shāh Khaljī—had failed to tackle it successfully. 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī's policy of letting the Deccan remain under Hīndū rulers had already been abandoned by his son and successor, Mubārak Shāh Khaljī, who had replaced it by the policy of direct administration by means of Muslim officers. It was he who first appointed a Vazīr at Deogīr. This was the policy of consolidation which was taken up and elaborated by Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn and MuḤammad bin Tughluq. With all the efforts on the part of the latter—and of all the Sultāns of Delhi, he was the most conversant with Deccan politics—his empire became at last like the Assyrian empires of old, a mere congeries of subject kingdoms or provincial governments united by the loosest of ties. On the slightest illness, rumours of his death would spread to the remotest parts of his empire, and the flames of universal opposition would burst forth.

One of the root causes of this was his preference for foreigners over Indians. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa² reports that the emperor had a great liking for foreigners, conferred on them great obligations and made them rich presents. He called them by the name of 'Azīz (venerable) and prohibited their being called "foreigner."

Now most of the officers in the court as well as in the army of MuḤammad bin Tughluq were foreigners. Many of the amīrān-i-ṣadah (centurions) were also foreigners; some of them were the descendants of the Mongols who had embraced Islām under Jalāl-ud-dīn and 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and had settled in India. These had old wrongs to avenge, the wrongs they had been subjected to under

¹ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 521-522.

² B.N., MS. 909, F. 129.

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'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī. With great difficulty they had escaped the sanguinary punishments then inflicted on them. They had been biding their time to wreak vengeance. The high-handedness of Muḥammad bin Tughluq roused them to fury; and in the emperor's attempt to reorganise the administration of the Deccan they saw a repetition of the policy of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī to have them replaced by "base-born"¹ Indians. Their discontent increased when they learnt of the emperor's hostility to them. The instructions given to one 'Azīz, the governor of Mālwa, to get rid of the amīrān-i-ṣadah was a conclusive proof of his intention. Troubles in Lahore (Lāhaur) that led to the rising of Shāhū Afghān² were of a similar nature. Shāhū fled from Lahore to Mālwa, whence he proceeded to Gujarāt,³ inciting his fellow-Afghāns all along the way. Then followed an unbroken succession of rebellions, from Mālwa and the Panjāb to Gujarāt and the Deccan.

Although his health had been failing for some time, the manner of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's death combined with the active antagonism of a powerful hostile party in the court tends to create a suspicion that he was poisoned. According to a report recorded by Budāūnī,⁴ Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd, taking advantage of the emperor's troubles in Gujarāt, had installed Fīroz as king at Delhi. The emperor heard of this during his stay at Gondal, and ordered that Fīroz and Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn should be brought as prisoners. Baranī makes no mention of this, but he⁵ acknowledges that some of the 'Ulamā and saints were sent for from Delhi. However, as the prisoners, according to the story, arrived in the suburbs of Tattah, where the royal camp lay, the emperor issued orders for their execution. But shortly after this he died; and as a result the orders remained unexecuted. The story proceeds that the emperor had a son who at that time was out on a hunting expedition. Putting him aside treacherously with the assistance of the amīrs and maliks, Fīroz ascended the throne, and bent his steps towards Delhi.

This story, which has been dismissed as apocryphal by Sir Wolseley

¹ Baranī (p. 505) uses the terms base-born and mean for almost all of the new officers and officials of Indian stock.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 482-483.

³ Baranī uses the term "Afghānistān" in a peculiar sense as has been pointed out above (see *supra*, p. 180). He means Gujarāt, which then loomed as "home of the Afghāns" or Afghānistān. There was at that time no Afghānistān in the modern sense.

⁴ Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), p. 242.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 523.

Haig¹ requires consideration. Muḥammad bin Mubārak,² the author of the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, states that while the emperor was engaged in the pursuit of Ṭāghī, near Tattah, he sent for the 'Ulamā and saints, and among them for Shaikh Naṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd. On their arrival he did not show them the respect befitting their position, behaviour which was at that time considered as a cause of his death.

According to Baranī³ the summons was issued from Gondal. Why orders were issued during a serious rebellion for the 'Ulamā living in Delhi is a mystery, which none has cared to probe. But there must have been some reason for this order. From the above story of the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, it is evident that the emperor had grown suspicious of them; and that is why on their arrival he did not treat them with respect. Now, it is a fact proved by indirect evidence, that Fīroz or Malik Fīroz was a supporter of the 'Ulamā, and had journeyed in their company to Tattah. That feelings were estranged between the emperor and Malik Fīroz follows from a remark of Baranī.⁴ He affirms that the emperor was reconciled to Malik Fīroz on his death-bed. Presumably the reconciliation when it took place must have been preceded by an estrangement.

From Gondal the emperor also sent a requisition for military aid to Amīr Qarghan,⁵ the powerful minister of Buyan Qulī, one of the successors of Tarmāshīrīn in Transoxiana. This he most probably did to checkmate the hostilities of those 'Ulamā and saints who, he knew, had undermined the allegiance of his own troops. The Mongol auxiliary forces, a division of five thousand horse, sent by Amīr Qarghan under the command of Altūn Bahādur, reached the royal camp after Muḥammad bin Tughluq had left Gondal and crossed the Indus *en route* to Tattah. Altūn Bahādur joined⁶

¹ J.R.A.S., July, 1922.

² Muḥammad bin Mubārak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, p. 246.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 523.

⁴ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 532.

⁵ The Bibliotheca edition of Baranī (p. 524) has "Amir Farghan; but Budāūni (p. 240) and Firishṭa (p. 257), as well as Yahya bin Ahmad (p. 117) distinctly mention Amīr Qarghan. It should be noted that while Baranī, Nizām-ud-dīn and Firishṭa give no whereabouts of Amīr Qarghan, Budāūni (p. 240) and Yahya bin Ahmad (p. 117) describe him as the Nāib (Vazir) of the King of *Khurāsān*. This is the kind of mistake which each of them (p. 227 and p. 101 respectively) like Hājji-ud-Dabir (III, p. 865) has committed regarding Tarmāshīrīn. Neither Tarmāshīrīn nor Buyan Qulī nor his Nāib, Amīr Qarghan was the ruler of *Khurāsān*. *Khurāsān* has been confounded with Transoxiana. Amīr Qarghan was the minister of Buyan Qulī (1348-58), one of the successors of Tarmāshīrīn. (S. Lane-Poole: *The Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 242.)

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 533-534.

Amīr Nauroz,¹ the son-in-law of Tarmāshīrīn, who was still in the royal army. Disgusted at the faithlessness and disaffection of the Indian officers of the royal army, both Altūn Bahādur and Amīr Nauroz, left² India after the death of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Before their departure, however, they laid severe hands on and plundered the Indian troops. In the midst of the frightful confusion that ensued, one Malik Tūn,³ a slave of the Vazīr Khwāja Jahān, fled from the royal camp to Delhi. There he told his master the news of the emperor's death. He also said that the Mongols had set upon and plundered the royal troops, and that consequently many of the chieftains, including Malik Fīroz had disappeared. They were either killed by the Mongols or had fallen prisoners into their hands.

Upon this, the Vazīr Khwāja Jahān⁴ raised Maḥmūd, a young son⁵ of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, to the throne, under the title of Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Maḥmūd Shāh.

Three days after Muḥammad bin Tughluq's death, Malik Fīroz was installed as emperor Fīroz Shāh (23rd March, 1351), Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd⁶ being his chief supporter.⁷ Fīroz Shāh then lost no time in marching to Delhi.

The Vazīr Khwāja Jahān was shocked⁸ to hear this. He left Delhi and was able to meet Fīroz Shāh on the way, near Sarsutī. Fīroz Shāh understood Khwāja Jahān's position and was convinced of his sincerity; for the latter had always treated him as his own son. Fīroz Shāh would have treated him kindly but was forced by the amīrs and maliks, who had been antagonistic to Muḥammad bin Tughluq, to put him to death.

Baranī has not a word to say regarding the funeral of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. From the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*,⁹ however, it is evident

¹ See *supra*, p. 107.

⁵ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 533-535.

² Afif (Bib. Ind.), p. 51.

⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

³ According to Baranī (p. 539), who denounces the lad as illegitimate, he was between six and seven years old.

⁴ Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd, otherwise known as *Chiragh-i-Dehli* (light of Delhi), was an inhabitant of Oudh (Awadh). He was one of the leading disciples of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya and a comrade of Amīr Khusrav. (Muḥammad bin Mubarak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, pp. 238-242.)

Muḥammad bin Mubarak, the author of the *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, was a disciple of Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd. The author tells us (p. 245) that Shaikh Naṣīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd had suffered hardships at the hands of Muḥammad bin Tughluq early in his reign.

⁷ Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), p. 242. Baranī, p. 535.

⁸ Afif (Bib. Ind.), pp. 57-80.

⁹ Muḥammad bin Mubarak: *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, p. 246.

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that his corpse was taken to Delhi. There it is said to have been buried in the Tughluqābād mausoleum by the side of his father. A glance at the three¹ graves now lying side by side in the above-mentioned mausoleum, one of which is pointed out as that of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, tends to show the indifference with which his funeral was treated.

Had Muḥammad bin Tughluq made a mausoleum of his own? If so, why was he not buried in it? These are questions which no one has answered so far. It was a usual practice with the Muslim rulers to build mausoleums for themselves. Even Khusrav Khān, who was a convert and ruled for a short time in an extremely stormy period, had built one² for himself. In all probability, Muḥammad bin Tughluq had also built one in his city of Jahānpanah. It still stands in its full glory in the midst of the ruins of Jahānpanah, and is now known as the *Lāl Gumbad*.³ The name is significant in so far as it is a dome-shaped building of red stone, and was given to it much later for want of a better one.

Whether Muḥammad bin Tughluq left any heirs is another question that requires consideration. While Baranī is silent, 'Iṣāmī definitely asserts that he left none.⁴ But 'Afif⁵ mentions that a daughter was born to him during the reign of his father, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq. A reference is also made⁶ to a son of Muḥammad's who, as mentioned above, was raised to the throne by Khwāja Jahān. From the apocryphal story given by Budāūnī,⁷ it appears that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had another son, an elder one, who had accompanied him on his Sind expedition.

Like the fate of his progeny, the problem of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's marriage is shrouded in mystery. From a passing remark in 'Afif,⁸ it appears that he had married early in his father's reign; but the name of his wife is not known. Whether he had only one wife or more than one is equally difficult to determine. But the absence of any domestic troubles which in the case of a large family are, according to Balban,⁹ likely to arise, combined with the testimony uniformly borne by all, regarding his temperance and

¹ See photograph, p. 212.

² B.N., MS. 909, F. 124. Def. et Sang. III, p. 208.

³ See photograph p. 213.

⁴ 'Afif (Bib. Ind.), 54.


⁵ Budāūnī (Bib. Ind.), 242.

⁶ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 150-151.

⁷ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS., F. 245B.

⁸ Ibid., 60, 70.

⁹ 'Afif (Bib. Ind.), p. 54.



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
THE THREE GRAVES

(i) Of Ghiyāṣ-ud-din Tughluq.

(ii) Of his wife, the Makhdūma-i-Jahān.

(iii) Of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

[facing page 212]



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THE LĀL GUMBĀD

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purity of character, urges the conclusion that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had only one wife.

Unlike his wife, who finds no mention in any contemporary or non-contemporary records, his sisters are often mentioned, the most prominent being Khudāwandzadah.¹ She had a son, Dāwar Malik,² whose claims to the throne after the death of Muḥammad bin Tughluq she was anxious to advance. Other sisters have been mentioned in the *Rihla*,³ which bears testimony to the kindness he uniformly showed to them.

To judge Muḥammad bin Tughluq from the standpoint of the twentieth century is to commit an anachronism. There is a great difference between the characteristic features of the fourteenth and twentieth centuries. The criterion of morality, the mode of life, the standard, and above all, the conception of sovereignty differed widely. Two things were then essentially required in a king; (1) princely expenditure, and generosity, and (2) dignity, awe, majesty and severity. A king who lacked either of these was spurned and despised. Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī (1290-95) was, for instance, rebuked and condemned more than once. He was regarded as too lenient to be a king. Plot after plot was formed to murder him; and his leniency encouraged the rebels. Muḥammad bin Tughluq had learnt a good lesson from his experience, and his rule was that of a stern despot, the only rule possible at the time. The condition of India in the fourteenth century called for a strong monarch. Moderation would have been construed in those turbulent days as weakness. But occasionally he became mild. Perhaps, the constant failure of his administrative schemes, and the incessant troubles and disorders engineered and nursed by interested parties had embittered his temper.

His history is now sufficiently displayed to enable the reader to form an independent judgment. But men will always hold divided opinions about him. Perhaps some will find in him a resemblance to al-Ma'mūn, the 'Abbasid Caliph⁴ (786-833). Under him the 'Abbasid Caliphate had reached its zenith; under Muḥammad bin Tughluq the Sultanate attained its *apogee*. And yet under each the seeds of decadence were sown.

Al-Ma'mūn, as well as Muḥammad bin Tughluq, attached great

¹ Afif (Bib. Ind.), p. 100.

² Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 527.

³ B.N.; MS. 909, F. 132-133.

⁴ *Encyclopædia of Islām*, Number 40, pp. 221-222.

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importance to rationalism, and had a passion for philosophy and the exact sciences. Each would criticise the judgments of the jurists, doctors of the law, and each strove to emancipate the human intellect from their shackles. Both extended a warm welcome to foreigners with a view to attract to their court men of learning and skill. Both regarded philosophers and scientific men as beings chosen by God to perfect human reason, and as the guides of humanity. Both were broad-minded and tolerant and associated freely with the unorthodox metaphysicians and philosophers. Muḥammad bin Tughluq's free association with the Hindū¹ devotees is a case in point.

But he was not tactful and forbearing enough like Ma'mūn, who never² imposed punishment unless compelled by the exigencies of government.

Others will persist in calling him a fool and a madman, though to hold such a view is to misread the lessons of history. In medieval India, where the principle of the survival of the fittest alone determined the kingship and where weak and lenient rulers lost their throne, as in the case of Arām Shāh (1210), Rukn-ud-dīn Fīroz I (1235-6), Raziya (1236-39), Mu'izz-ud-dīn Bahrām (1239-41), 'Alā-ud-dīn Mas'ūd (1241-46), Mu'izz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād (1287-90), Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīroz II (1290-95), Quṭb-ud-dīn Mubārak (1316-20), Muḥammad bin Tughluq, had he been a ruler of this type, could never have succeeded in ruling for more than a quarter of a century (1325-51).

Others will delight in calling him a visionary, though his many-sided and vigorous character militates against such a view. Others may call him a born tyrant or a self-seeker completely disregarding his public-spirited measures. But his reign is full of instances of his administrative reforms, and of his honesty and goodwill manifested (1) in recalling the discredited coinage and buying up all the copper tokens at their nominal value, (2) in richly rewarding the emigrants from Delhi to Daulatābād and liberally providing for them, and (3) in making strenuous efforts at relieving his subjects irrespective of caste and creed during the unprecedented famine of 1335-41.

As the famine grew in intensity the emperor abolished most of

¹ B.N., MS. 909, F. 156-157. Def. et Sang., IV, p. 38.

² Ameer 'Alī: *A Short History of the Saracens*, pp. 278-81.

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the taxes.¹ At this time he was dogged by misfortunes on all sides—rebellion in Ma'bar, epidemics in Telingāna, his own illness, rumours of his death, the outbreak of a series of new and widespread disorders, the fiasco of the Ma'bar expedition, his unsuccessful return to the north in the midst of the disasters caused by the famine and the rise of the Hindū opposition culminating in the foundation of the kingdom of Vijayānagar. Still he spared no pains to mitigate the sufferings of his famine-stricken people. Few Indian governments, until recent times, have tackled the problem of famine relief in so comprehensive a way. In the country districts wells were dug and loans advanced to the agriculturists. In the capital a careful census of the population was taken and lists were drawn up of the inhabitants of each street. They were divided into convenient groups, each group being assigned to the care of a Qāzī and an amīr empowered to advance six months' provisions to each individual or to give a fixed daily² allowance. All this was done by the Vazīr in accordance with the royal orders, the emperor being still in the Deccan. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa³ was one of the responsible officials selected by the Vazīr to administer poor relief. He had five hundred people to look after. He gave them free board and lodging. He used to distribute food freely every fifth day, sufficient to last for five days.

This solicitude on the part of Muḥammad bin Tughluq to relieve his subjects may well be compared to that of Shāhjahān (1628-58). When in 1630-32 famine broke out in Gujarāt and the Deccan, and destitution reached such a pitch that people, according to Peter Mundy,⁴ sold their children for paltry sums, and according to 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lahāwri,⁵ devoured each other, the emperor was living at Burhānpur. Peter Mundy goes on to describe the most inhuman

¹ B.N., MS. 909, F. 114.

² Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions this twice, first under a special heading of famine relief (F. 134, MS. 909, Def. et Sang., III, p. 290); and secondly in the midst of an account of magicians (F. 156, MS. 909, Def. et Sang., IV, pp. 36-37).

In the first place he says that six months' provisions at the rate of a daily allowance of one and a half *Raṭl* was to be given to every individual. In the second place he stresses the doling out of daily relief at the same rate.

Now, "Raṭl" according to Steingass (p. 579) is equal to half a maund, that is, 20 sers. Maulvi Muḥammad Ḥusain (p. 134) errs in regarding it as equivalent to a maund. However, the maund of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's time being equal to 14 sers and 8 chataks (Muḥammad Ḥusain, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, p. 134), the given amount of the daily allowance comes up to ten and a half sers. This amount was probably assigned per house rather than per head.

³ B.N., MS. 909, F. 156. Def. et Sang., IV, p. 37.

⁴ Peter Mundy, *The Travels of Asia*, Vol. II, pp. 40-44.

⁵ 'Abd-ul-Ḥamīd Lahāwri: *Bādshāh Nāmah*. (Bib. Ind.), Vol. I, pp. 262-263.

spectacle of the highways from Surat to Nandurbār in Khāndesh, strewn with the dead people, and with hungry persons, men, women and children, scraping on the dunghills in the hope of finding in the beasts' excrements an undigested piece of grain. Making allowances for possible exaggerations, all of Shāhjahān's efforts with which his court historian credits him to relieve his subjects do not compare favourably with those made by Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

Others will believe that Muḥammad bin Tughluq was a victim of Nemesis. He was a parricide and had to suffer retribution for the heinous crime with which his reign had opened.

But the verdict of history is that he was neither visionary nor impractical, nor inherently unsound, nor were his grandiose schemes beyond the range of human possibility. He was far in advance of his age, and could not, like a modern government, exploit religion, which he should have left to itself, if he wanted to rule successfully. He roused the opposition of the 'Ulamā, and in his attempt to reform them he not only paralysed the right arm of the state, but raked up hostilities, before which he succumbed and his imperialism perished.

PART FOUR
ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER XI

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

THE form of government was an absolute and despotic monarchy. The will of the Sultān, though theoretically subject to the law, was in practice supreme. Law was not in the modern sense an expression of the popular will; it was divine¹ as embodied in the Holy Book and the Ḥadīṣ (sayings of the Prophet).

The structure of the central government was as follows. The Sultān, who was the pivot of the whole political machinery, was personally and directly responsible for the conduct of the central government. He was assisted by his chief minister,² who in turn was assisted by four secretaries (Dabīr). Each Dabīr³ had a staff of three hundred clerks.⁴ The chief minister acted for the Sultān during his absences from the capital. As long as the Sultān remained in the capital the chief minister was merely a member of the Sultān's advisory council, the Arbāb-ud-Dawal⁵ (masters of the state). The chief minister also supervised all the Dīwāns (departments) into which the administration of the central government was divided, namely, the Dīwān-i-'Arz⁶ (military department), the Dīwān-i-Ishrāf (audit department), the Dīwān-i-'Imārat (the public works department), the Dīwān-i-Insha⁷ (the secretariat), the Dīwān-i-Kohī⁸ (the agricultural department), the Dīwān-i-Vizārat⁹ (revenue department), the Dīwān-i-Mustakhrij (the department for the realization of arrears), the Dīwān-i-Risālat¹⁰ (appeal department); the Dīwān-i-Qaḍā¹¹ (judicial department), the Dīwān-i-Bandagan (department of slaves), the Dīwān-i-Vikālat (department of the Sultān's

¹ This divine law was applicable only to the Muslims, not to the Hindūs (see p. 230).

² The chief minister is sometimes termed nāib, and sometimes vazir ((i) B.N. MS.; (ii) Quatremère, XIII, p. 184).

³ Shihāb-ud-dīn Aḥmad 'Abbās ((i) B.N. MS.; (ii) Quatremère, XIII, p. 184).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ (i) B.N., MS. 909, F.; (ii) Def. et Sang., III, p. 344.

⁶ Barānī (Bib. Ind.), pp. 374; 153.

⁷ Idem., p. 498.

⁸ Idem., p. 163. 'Affīf, p. 513.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Idem., pp. 376; 153.

¹¹ Barānī, p. 497.

RISE AND FALL OF MUḤAMMAD BIN TUḠHLUQ court and royal household), and the Dīwān-i-Siyāsāt¹ (department for the punishment of culprits).

The leading officials of these departments were the 'Arz-i-Mumālīk² (minister of the army) and his Nāib (deputy), called the Nāib 'Arz-i-Mumālīk; the Mustawfī (auditor-general of the imperial finances), the Sharf-ul-Mulk (minister of finance), the Mir 'Imārat (minister of public works), the Sardawātdār (keeper of the royal stationery), the Amīr Kohī (minister of agriculture), the Barīd-ul-Mulk (postal minister), the Qāzī-ul-Quzāt (chief Qāzī or lord chief justice), and the Mīrdād³ (special officer appointed to bring to the Qāzī's court influential amīrs against whom a summons was issued).

The following were the chief officials connected with the Dīwān-i-Vikālat (the department of the Sultān's court and royal household): the Bārbak (grand usher), the Nāib Bārbak (deputy grand usher), the Ḥājib-ul-Ḥujjāb (lord chamberlain), the Ḥājib (chamberlain), the Sarjāmdār (keeper of the fly-wisk), the Shurbdār (keeper of the royal drinks), the Muhrdār (keeper of the seals), the Khariṭadār (keeper of the royal letter-bag), the Shaḥnah-i-bārgāh⁴ (superintendent of the royal court), the Chāshnīgīr⁵ (supervisor of the royal food), the Vakīldār⁶ (officer who performed the secretarial functions of the court), and the Mutaṣaddī (clerk).

The head of every department lived in the capital and enjoyed close access to the emperor, all being supervised by the Chief Minister.⁷

There was no distinction between the civil and military departments, as for example the amīrān-i-ṣadah (the centurions), who

¹ Ibid.

² This office was variously known as Sar-i-Lashkar (Baranī, 231), Rāwat-i-'Arz (Baranī, 114-115), 'Arz-i-mumālīk (Baranī, 174, 197, 248, 423), 'Ariz (Baranī, 116), and Mir 'Arz (Nāib 'Arz) [Baranī, 326]. Balban was the first Sultān, who on realizing the dangers of combining the civil and military powers in the hands of one Vazīr placed the military department under a separate minister. The chief duties connected with this office were those of reviewing the troops, recruiting soldiers, inspecting horses and arms, holding military tests, and of heading expeditions. It corresponded to the Mir Bakhshi of the Mughal Empire.

³ (i) The duties of this office held by Mubārak Khān, the emperor's brother, have been described by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Def. et Sang., III, 287-288. (ii) It is evident from Baranī (p. 358) that a similar officer called Mīr Dād-i-Lashkar was also attached to the army. (iii) Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Def. et Sang., III, 400.

⁴ Baranī, 260-261.

⁵ Ibid., 358.

⁶ Vakīldār (Baranī, 576) was also known as Rasūl-i-dar and Ḥājib-ul-Irsāl.

⁷ Vazīr was a general term applied equally to the chief minister as well as sometimes to the heads of the administrative departments, unless otherwise specified. For instance, the head of the Dīwān-i-Siyāsāt was called the Muftī. (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 497.)

were at once military officers and collectors of revenue in the provinces. What was true of the provincial government was also true of the central government.

For purposes of administration, the empire was divided into provinces,¹ each province (*iqīm*) being governed by a *Vālī* or *Nāib* or *Amīr-ul-Umarā*, appointed by the emperor. As a general rule, the provincial governments also contained departments corresponding to those of the central government, as, for example, the *Dīwān-i-Qaṣa* and the *Dīwān-i-Mustakhrij*.

The head of every provincial government, usually called the *Vālī*, supervised the working of several departments. As a rule, he could himself appoint officials to each department, but incumbents of great and responsible offices were appointed with the consent of the emperor. The *Vālī* had charge of the provincial army, which he could use in times of emergency to suppress rebellion without securing the formal permission of the emperor.

In the technique of administration the *Vālī* was assisted by two chief officials, namely, the *Nāib Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt* (assistant to the *Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt*) and the (*Nāib*) *Mustakhrij*. The *Nāib Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt* was a high *Qāzī*, who resided in the provincial capital, the *Qāzīs* of the various towns in the province being directly subject to him. To him appeals were made against the *Qāzīs*. But he was, in turn, subject to the *Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt*. The *Nāib Mustakhrij* was a revenue officer who resided in the provincial capital, his chief duty being the realization of arrears from the *ʿĀmil*s. He also supervised the collection of the provincial revenue.

The *Vālī* exercised great powers in the province as long as he enjoyed the emperor's goodwill, on which depended the tenure of his office. But his office was not hereditary. On the whole, he was subject to transfer or recall after some years.

The *Vālīs* drew no salary from the imperial exchequer; each drew from the public revenues of his province a certain proportion as his remuneration. From the gross amount of the provincial revenues, besides his own remuneration, he took money to meet all the necessary expenses and remitted the rest to the central government. The emperor endeavoured to control the provincial govern-

¹ The *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* ((i) B.N. MS. (ii) Quatremère, *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome XIII, pp. 170-173), and the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 468) use the word "*iqīm*," for a province.

ments by making tours of inspection and sending the robes of honour to the governors on certain occasions.

The central government was much more highly developed than the provincial. This is evidenced by the efficiency of the military and judicial departments at the centre. The capital was the headquarters of the army, and a contingent was invariably dispatched from it whenever need arose.¹

Similar was the case with the judicial department at the capital. A large number of Qāzīs resided here partly because of the increased number of judicial courts in the capital, and partly because of their employment in different capacities. On his arrival in Delhi, Ibn Battūta was received by the Qāzīs of Delhi, and was impressed by their large number. Besides, there lived in the capital the highest judicial authority, Ṣadr Jahān Kamāl-ud-dīn, the Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt-i-Hind (the Qāzī of the Qāzīs of India). On the one hand the Qāzī-ul-Quṣāt decided local disputes and cases, and on the other he used to try and listen to the appeals made to his court from the lower courts of the Qāzīs. Political offenders of grave importance from all parts were often referred to him, and he was authorized to exercise the law. In case the law was ambiguous or silent on any particular point, the case was referred to the emperor.

The emperor had constituted himself not only into a supreme judge but also the crown counsel. Four jurists were stationed in the royal palace. When a case was brought up for trial, the emperor discussed it with them, and unless an agreement was reached on the matter under consideration no sentence was pronounced. For any life destroyed without sufficient cause or proof the emperor would hold the jurists² responsible.

It appears from the *Rihla*³ that from 1341 the emperor held special courts of appeal twice a week. Every Monday and Thursday he used to sit in a special chamber in front of the council-house (Mashwar). On that day no one except the amīr Ḥājib,⁴ the Khāṣ Ḥājib, the Sayyid-ul-Ḥujjāb and the Sharf-ul-Ḥujjāb could attend on him. No aggrieved person whosoever was restrained from approaching him. At the four gates of the chamber he had appointed four

¹ Ibn Battūta : Def. et Sang, III, p. 344.

² Budāūnī : *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* (Bib. Ind.), I, p. 239.

³ Ibn Battūta : Def. et Sang., III, p. 288.

⁴ Ḥājib means Chamberlain (Steingass, p. 407). *Amir, Khāṣ, Sayyid* and *Sharf* are terms of distinction marking different grades of the Ḥājibs.

leading amirs, one of them being his cousin, Malik Fīroz, who later became Fīroz Shāh. They were all commissioned to listen to and record the petitions of the aggrieved. If the first man at the gate recorded the petition, well and good; otherwise the petitioner would go to the second, and even to the third, and the fourth, successively, if need arose. In case none of them attended he would go to the Qāzī-ul-Quzāt. If disappointed by the latter he would proceed to the emperor. If it was proved to him that the petitioner had approached the various officers in vain, he would rebuke them. All the petitions recorded in the course of the day were, as a rule, perused and reviewed by the emperor at night.

The Imperial and Provincial Service

The Vālī had authority over all departments in his province. His office was essentially provincial because it was confined to the province, whereas certain appointments such as that of the Qāzī-ul-Quzāt-i-Hind (the chief Qāzī of India) had an imperial or an all-India character.

The incumbents of the provincial posts, for instance, the Nāib-ul-Makhzan¹ and the Nāib-ul-'Askar¹ were appointed by the Vālī, and were paid from the provincial treasury, whereas those of the imperial posts were appointed by the emperor, and were paid from the imperial treasury. Recruitment to the provincial service was not, however, confined to the province. Ibn Battūṭa's narrative of Chanderī makes it clear that the provincial officers came from different parts of the empire. The Vālī of Chanderī was an inhabitant of Multān; his councillor, Wajih-ud-dīn was a resident of Bayāna,² and the lieutenant of his army, S'ādat by name, came from Telingāna.

Like the emperor, the Vālī also had in his personal service a body of select nobles. He was expected to consult them, as the emperor was expected to consult the Arbāb-ud-Dawal.³

No post was hereditary. Efficiency was the chief test for public employment. But the emperor was very much upset by the dearth

¹ Nāib-ul-Makhzan (treasury officer) and the Nāib-ul-'Askar (military officer) have been mentioned in the *Rihla* (Def. et Sang., III, p. 350) as leading officials at the provincial capital. They appear to have worked in different capacities under the Vālī, although technically the former was the superintendent of the treasury and the latter commander or captain of the army.

² Bayāna or Biāna, now in the state of Bharatpur, Rājputāna (*Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. VII, p. 137).

³ See p. 219.

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of capable officials in India ; hence his encouragement of foreigners. He appointed them to the highest and most responsible posts in almost every department. These foreigners largely belonged to, or had sympathies with, the 'Ulamā. They failed him, eventually. He then replaced them by a new class of officials, on the whole men of low origin. As these upstarts were raised to positions of eminence, to the exclusion of Indian Muslims of high standing, Baranī was displeased. He believed that he was far more qualified than the new recruits to fill a responsible office. So did many of his friends. They were right in a way. The new class of officers being inexperienced landed the emperor in troubles, while the cashiered veterans stirred up strife all over the empire, and promoted disorder.

Administrative Organization

Every province (iqlim) was divided into a number of districts, and a district (shiq)¹ was subdivided into towns (madīnah),² and every town had as its dependency a Ṣadī,³ a collection of a hundred villages or Parganas. The governor of a district was called an 'Āmil or Nāẓim or Shiqdār, that of a town, the Kotwāl or amīr, and that of a Ṣadī, amīr-i-ṣadah. The amīr-i-ṣadah was something like a modern Taḥṣildār. Like the Taḥṣildār, who has under him a large staff of subordinate officials in the Tāḥṣil, the amīr-i-ṣadah had a large staff of lower officials, namely the *Mulaṣarrif*, the *Kārkun*, the *Balāhar*, the *Khūṭ*, the *Muqaddam*, the *Chaudhrī*, the *Paṭwārī*, the *Sarhang* and the *Piyāda*. Their posts and positions were graded, some being higher than the others. Each had his own special duties to perform and all helped in their different capacities in the collection of land-tax, and of other cesses and dues, as well as in the maintenance of peace. The internal administration of the villages was left to the village communities.

The Land Revenue and Fiscal System

For the purpose of collecting land-tax, a separate department,

¹ The word has been used by Baranī (Bib. Ind., pp. 501 ff.) to indicate a fiscal unit in a particular part of the reign. But it seems that "Shiq" already existed, and was synonymous with district.

² Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Def. et Sang., III, p. 97) frequently uses the word *Madīnah* for a town. Baranī ignores the point, although evidence for the existence of towns is not scarce.

³ The existence of the *Ṣadī* is proved by the frequent use of the term amīr-i-ṣadah in the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Baranī, Bib. Ind., p. 512) and in the *Rihla* (Def. et Sang., III, p. 388).

worked under the supervision of the Vazīr and his assistant, the Nāib Vazīr, or the "Sharf Qāi."¹ These two officials of the central government were directly responsible for the realization of the revenue from the provinces. Each provincial governor had a whole staff of graded officials as mentioned above, a kind of administrative machinery, which worked or continued to work irrespective of the changes in the personnel of the provincial and central government. As a result the governor was able, at specified times, to receive the revenue of his province. Out of the sum total he was authorized to spend as much as required for the government purposes, previously sanctioned by the emperor. The surplus he used to transmit to the central government.

This is an inference drawn from the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*. It also appears from the *Rihla* that the specified revenue was at stated intervals remitted by the provincial government to the central government. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa has occasionally mentioned instances where such a remittance being neglected resulted in war and was followed by troubles. When the remittance was duly made, the amount of the revenue received at the capital passed through and was examined and scrutinized successively by the Dīwān-i-Ishrāf (audit department), the Dīwān-i-Nazr (inspecting department), and the Dīwān-i-Vizārat (revenue ministry). Each department forwarded the amount, together with its own report, till it reached the emperor, and then under his special orders it was sent to the Dīwān-i-Khāzin (the imperial exchequer or the treasurer's department), who deposited it in the treasury.

The town or city was an administrative unit under the charge of the Kotwāl or the amīr, who exercised all kinds of powers. He held command of the fortress, which in those days was an essential part of a city. He was the governor and the administrator of the city and responsible for the welfare of its inhabitants.

The *Ṣadī* was the lowest administrative unit. Its supreme officer, namely, the amīr-i-ṣadāh, had under him a large number of subordinate officials—the *chaudhrī*, the *mutasarrif*, the *paṭwārī*, the *sarhang*, the *balāhar*, the *khūt* and the *piyādah*, all of them Hindūs.

Different taxes were imposed in different periods, and in different parts of the empire. Baranī makes a bitter complaint against the

¹ Baranī (*Bib. Ind.*), 288.

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heavy taxation in the Doāb as well as in Mahārāshṭra, but gives no time or date of imposition. On his crossing Multān in 1333-4, Ibn Battūṭa's luggage was searched by the customs officers. He tells us that a duty of twenty-five per cent. was levied on the goods, and a tax of seven dīnārs¹ on each horse. About 1336 these duties were abolished, but were perhaps reimposed. For, according to the *Riḥla*, all the taxes, except the Zakāt and 'Ushr,² were abolished after 1341. How long these taxes were suspended, and whether they were reimposed at all in his reign, is a problem, which cannot be satisfactorily answered. Fīroz Shāh has mentioned in his *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhi*,³ a long list of taxes, which he abolished in the beginning of his reign, namely Maṇḍni Barg (market dues), Dalālat-i-Bāzārha (brokerage), Jazzārī⁴ (tax on butchers), Amīrī Ṭarab (tax on music), Gul Faroshī (tax on perfumery), Zarība (?) Tambol (tax on betels), Chungi Ghallah (Octroi duty on grain), Kitābī (tax on the sale of books), Nīlgarī (tax on indigo), Māhī Faroshī (tax on the sale of fish), Naddāfī (tax on cotton cleaning), Sābungarī (tax on soap making), Rīsmān Faroshī (tax on the sale of rope), Roghangarī (tax on *ghee*), Nakhud Biryān (tax on roasted gram), Tahbazārī (ground rent of stalls), Jahabat (?) (duty upon stocks), Qimār Khāna (tax upon gambling), Charāī (duty on pasture), Dādbegī (fees for Dādbak); Karhī (house-tax), Kotwālī (fees for Kotwal), Iḥtisābī (fees for the inspection of markets).

The mere fact that Fīroz Shāh announced on his accession the abolition of these taxes does not prove their reimposition by Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Fīroz Shāh's formal announcement might have been a pledge on his part against their reimposition. But the probability is that Muḥammad bin Tughluq had reimposed these taxes in the closing years of his reign, when his wars and expeditions had considerably increased the demands on the exchequer.

The actual amount of money obtained from the custom duties cannot be ascertained. But the proceeds were certainly considerable. From the port of Lāharī,⁵ for instance, sixty lakhs of dīnārs⁶ were raised annually.

¹ For dīnār see p. 237.

² For 'Ushr see the *Encyclopædia of Islam*, IV, p. 1050.

³ Fīroz Shāh: *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhi*. B.M., Or. 2039, p. 5.

⁴ The MS. has "jurārī." But the word might as well be Jazazī, which would mean tax on date-cutting or sheep-shearing.

⁵ Ibn Battūṭa: *Def. et Sang.*, III, p. 112.

⁶ For dīnār see p. 237.

The Land

Theoretically, the Sultān was the sole proprietor of the whole land. But as a matter of fact there were three distinct types of land: the *Khālṣa* (the crown land), the *majāshīr*¹ (*jāgīr*), and the *waqf* (land dedicated to religious purposes).

The officers of the empire were paid not in cash only but also by grants of land. Cash payments were much encouraged by the emperor.

Sources of the State Income

Besides the land-tax, the chief sources of the state income were the cesses, and duties; the tribute² from the subordinate Hindū states, and the presents³ made by visitors and gifts offered on special occasions by officials.

Nor can an estimate be made of the amount obtained from the levy of Jizya, which, it is interesting to note, has not been mentioned by Baranī in his *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*. It appears, however, from his *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī* that Jizya was levied on non-Muslims. But the Brahmins were exempt from it. It was for the first time levied on them by Fīroz Shāh.⁴

The Army

The army, recruited from all nationalities, Turks, Mongols, Persians and Indians, was divided into two chief groups, cavalry and infantry. The cavalry consisted of two kinds of horsemen, those who supplied their own horses and accoutrements and those whom the State supplied. The cavalry was more important and useful than the infantry, due on the one hand to the difficulty of rapid movement through wild forests and deserts, and, on the other, to the methods of warfare peculiarly suitable to a horseman. In a pitched battle infantry could not work against cavalry. Perhaps the infantry lived inside the fortress and played only a subordinate part in battle by being mainly employed in working the balistas (Minjanīq).

¹ Ibn Battūta: Def. et Sang., III, p. 400.

² Indirect references to this effect are found in Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*. But no details are available.

³ Ibn Battūta (Def. et Sang., III, pp. 98, 225) tells us that a visitor to the royal court was required to make a propitiatory offering. Ibn Battūta himself did so more than once. (Def. et Sang., III, pp. 421-425.)

⁴ Afif: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 379.

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Regarding the provincial armies, which the emperor could call and use on emergencies, mention is made in the *Rihla*. When 'Ain-ul-Mulk's revolt broke out in Sargadwārī the emperor summoned forces from Sāmāna, Amroha, Baran and Aḥmadābād.¹

The usual weapons of a soldier were the arrow, the lance, the sword and the spear.

As a rule, the weapons were inspected every year. Before and after a battle a special and extraordinary inspection was conducted by the 'Arz-i-Mumālik. He kept a regular register in which the names and particulars of all those recruited in the army were entered.²

The Police

There was no distinction between the army and the police, such as we know it to-day. The army, stationed in strong fortresses and cantonments throughout the country, also performed the duties of police. These cantonments were not temporary lodgings, but permanent and strong fortresses. They were greater in number in the north of India than in the south, perhaps due to the traditional fear of the Mongols.

The Postal System

Baranī gives practically no information on this head. But the *Rihla*³ and the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*⁴ give considerable details. They agree that the post was of two kinds. First the horse-post, called *Walāq*, and secondly the ordinary post, called *Dawa*. As for the horse-post, horses were stationed at a distance of every four miles, and for the purpose of the ordinary post three stations per mile were fixed. At every third of a mile there was a well-populated settlement, outside which were three pavilions in which sat men with girded loins ready to start. Each carried a whip two cubits in length with copper bells at the top. When the courier started from the city he held the letter in one hand and the whip with its bells in the other. He ran as fast as he could. When the men in the pavilion heard the ringing of the bells they got ready. As soon as the courier reached them one of them took the letter from his hand and ran at

¹ Ibn Battūta: Def. et Sang., III, p. 345.

² This has been elicited from Baranī's *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, and Ibn Battūta's *Rihla*. Ibn Battūta (Def. et Sang., III, p. 119) also gives an eye-witness account.

³ Ibn Battūta: Def. et Sang., III, pp. 95-99.

⁴ (i) B.N. MS. (ii) Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome XIII, p. 209.

top-speed, shaking the whip all the while until he reached the next *Dawa*. The same process continued till the letter reached its destination. This ordinary post was quicker than the horse-post.¹

The *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*² reports that for communicating the events which happen in distant provinces, posts are established between the capital and the chief cities of the different provinces. At each post, placed at a certain distance from the other, swift runners were appointed. They conveyed letters from one station to the next station.

It should be noted that the post was reserved for the emperor, and was not open to the public.

Summary

The administrative machinery under Sulṭān Muḥammad shows signs of improvement compared to that of his *Khaljī* predecessors. The Mongol raids were over, and times were more favourable for administrative reforms. There is strong evidence that Sulṭān Muḥammad introduced many more reforms than have been mentioned by Baranī. He acknowledges that on his return from Sargadwārī the emperor was busy for years constructing the *Asālīb*.³ These were certain reform measures adopted to improve cultivation and to increase the revenue and army. These were written out and registered, and named *Uslūb*.⁴ Baranī gave no details, and no copy of the *Uslūb* is now available, which would have proved the point incontestably. It follows, however, that the emperor was not backward in devising new measures of reform. Had the whole of his reign been peaceful like the opening years, there would have been under him remarkable progress in administration, and in the evolution of institutions of government.

It must, however, be remembered that there was at that time no constitution or political organization as we understand it nowadays. No distinction was made between the religious and secular aspects of the State, since it was in theory a theocracy. Muḥammad bin Tughluq was gifted with an original turn of mind. Perhaps he endeavoured to evolve a new state ideal. Certainly he fell out with the 'Ulamā. Like Richelieu, who bore no personal grudge to the

¹ Ibn Battūta: Def. et Sang., III, pp. 95-99.

² (i) B.N. MS. (ii) Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome XIII, p. 209.

³ Baranī (Bib. Ind.), p. 498 ff.

⁴ "Uslūb" means "measures" (Steingass, p. 58).

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Huguenots, but was intolerant of their political powers, Muḥammad bin Tughluq was not personally hostile to the 'Ulamā. He was politically not religiously intolerant.

In these circumstances, the history of administration and government under Muḥammad bin Tughluq marks a stage in the conflict between the old and new order. The times being revolutionary, it becomes very difficult to generalize. Still, the administration may be divided into three departments: legislative, judicial and executive.

The Legislative

In theory all legislation was embodied in the Qurān, and the *Shari'at*. There was nobody superior to the Divine Law. Yet uḥammad bin Tughluq occasionally exceeded its bounds.

The Hindūs, however, were exempt from the Qurānic law. In regard to them, partly their own religious law and partly the T'azir¹ was administered.

The Judiciary

It was the work of the Qāzī to apply the law to special cases. The posts of the Qāzīs, of the Nāib Qāzī-ul-Quḏāt and of the Qāzī-ul-Quḏāt were graded. No statistics are available to give the exact number of Qāzīs in the empire. The information given by Ibn Battūta² regarding his own salary enables us to infer that salaries were likewise fixed for all the Qāzīs, and officials employed in the judicial department. From this it appears that there was an organized judiciary. The very name, Qāzī-ul-Quḏāt, the head of the judiciary, suggests this. He was, next to the Vazīr, the busiest official in the realm. All sorts of cases³ were referred to him, and the emperor himself occasionally appealed to him. When upbraided and accused of tyranny by Shaikh Shihāb-ud-dīn, the Sultān appealed to the Qāzī-ul-Quḏāt, Ṣadr Jahān Kamāl-ud-dīn. A similar illustration is afforded by the story of amīr Saif-ud-dīn Ghada, the emperor's brother-in-law. Shortly after his marriage with the emperor's

¹ Indirect references to the T'azir in contemporary literature (*Fatāwa-i-Jahāndāri*, I.O., MS. 2563) are not wanting. But no record exists because it was never committed to writing. It was the name of a body of conventions based on usage and precedent. It was extremely practical, and had grown out of the practical needs of the times and emergencies.

² Ibn Battūta: *Def. et Sang.*, III, pp. 347-406.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 279-296.

sister, amīr Saif-ud-dīn Ghada quarrelled with the gate-keeper of the royal residence, and wounded him. The wounded gate-keeper betook himself to the emperor and demanded redress. The emperor referred him to the Qāzī, who tried the case, and pronounced judgment, which, though uncongenial to the emperor's sister, the wife of amīr Saif-ud-Dīn Ghada, was carried out.¹

The Executive

For all practical purposes the emperor was the supreme executive. But in theory he was subject to the law, and worked under three restrictions. First, the jealousy of the 'Ulamā, who were legally entitled to depose him. Muḥammad bin Tughluq ran great risk of being deposed. Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī, who voiced the opinion of the 'Ulamā, plainly advised him to abdicate. Secondly, the danger of rebellions, which so distracted Muḥammad bin Tughluq that he repeatedly changed the course of his policy and devised new measures, sometimes extremely mild and thoughtful. Thirdly, the danger of assassination, which was sufficiently grave to cow an ordinary king. Muḥammad bin Tughluq was extraordinarily dauntless. He threw himself almost always into dangers, and is suspected of having been eventually poisoned.

In short, the government of Muḥammad bin Tughluq was despotic, and the administrative organization of his empire bureaucratic, but not feudal, as the term was understood in medieval Europe. Under the feudal system the king possessed no real power; he was merely the first among his territorial vassals. But the Sultān in medieval India was all powerful. Under his personal orders or under those of his Vazīr, all the great officers of the empire were appointed, transferred, promoted and removed; they were also subject to the strict financial control of the Dīwān-i-Vizārat. The word Muqṭī', often mistranslated as "fiefholder," does not really indicate a "feudal chief." Unlike the latter, the Muqṭī' was entirely dependent upon the king.

¹ Ibn Battūṭa : *Def. et Sang.*, III, pp. 280-3.

CHAPTER XII

COINAGE

THE coinage of Muḥammad bin Tughluq stands midway between that of Iltūtmish,¹ the initiator of a purely Muslim coinage, and that of Sher Shāh,² the originator of the modern rupee. Iltūtmish was the first to strike a silver ṭanka,³ which became the standard coin, gradually displacing the old *Dehliwals*, a small coin of mixed silver and copper, which had hitherto formed the chief medium of currency in northern India. To the silver ṭanka of Iltūtmish a gold ṭanka was added by Nāṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd,⁴ and both continued right up to the time of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. In his account of the value of money under 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, Firishta⁵ observes that a ṭanka was equal to a *tola* in weight, whether of gold or of silver, and a silver ṭanka was equal to 50 jīṭals.⁶

'Alā-ud-dīn appears to have contemplated⁷ a reduction in the silver ṭanka from 175 grains to 140. But no great reduction was probably carried out until the time of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

Of all the sultāns of Delhi, Muḥammad bin Tughluq left a most vividly personal mark on his numerous coins, which are still to be found in large numbers and of various types bearing different legends and titles. Hitherto they had been practically monotonous. Muḥammad bin Tughluq made a departure both in the selection of

¹ Edward Thomas: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 41-79.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 403-410.


³ The origin of the word ṭanka is obscure (*vide* Edward Thomas, *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 49 n.). Erskine is of opinion that it is a word of Turki origin (Erskine's *Hist. India*, Vol. I, p. 546). But the fact that Maḥmūd of Ghazni uses *ṭanka* in the Sanskrit legend on the reverse of his coins of the year 1027/418 as a corresponding word for the Arabic "*dirham*" on the obverse (*vide* Edward Thomas, p. 48) shows that ṭanka *ṭanka* is really an Indian word. *Ṭaka*, *ṭaka* is still a general term for money in India; perhaps it is derived from *ṭankah*, *ṭaka*, which meant a stamped coin.

⁴ Wright, H. H.: *Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta*, Vol. II, pp. 7, 31. J.A.S.B., 1924, N.S. XX.

⁵ Firishta (Bombay), Vol. I, p. 199.

⁶ Nelson Wright and Mr. Neville (J.A.S.B., N.S. XX, 1924) are of opinion that this was the ratio in the Deccan, and that in Delhi the jīṭal was 1/48th of a ṭanka.

⁷ (i) Thomas: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 159. (ii) Lane-Poole, S.: *The Coins of the Sultāns of Delhi in the British Museum*, p. xx.



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THE COINS

verses from the Qurān, in the framing of new titles and in the use of Persian phraseology. His predecessors had uniformly styled themselves "Sultāns" or "Shāhs," or "Al-'Āzam" (great), or "Iskandar" (Alexander). Muḥammad bin Tughluq never styled himself "Al-'Āzam" (great) or "Iskandar" (Alexander) and sparingly used the titles "Sultān" and "Shāh." He struck, probably at the outset, a coin in the name of his father, whom he styled, "The fortunate sultān, the martyr, Ghāzī, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn" (the redress of this world and hereafter).¹

This coin has been ascribed by Edward Thomas to Muḥammad bin Tughluq's eccentricity. But a reference to the posthumous coins struck by Ildūz² after the death of Muḥammad bin Sām shows that it was not unprecedented. Muḥammad bin Tughluq honoured the memory of his deceased father by striking a posthumous coin. This is confirmed by the extraordinarily great weight, 245 grains, of the coin, by the superb calligraphy and excellent die execution. Similar coins, though not of the same weight, were struck also on other occasions, a notable instance being that of No. 158,³ which bears the following inscription on the obverse: "The sultān, the fortunate, the testifier, the Ghāzī, Ghiyāṣ-ud-dunya wa-ud-dīn"; on the reverse⁴ "Abul Muẓaffar Tughluq Shāh. May God illumine his testimony."

There is an interesting difference of opinion between Edward Thomas and Lane-Poole with regard to this coin. While Edward Thomas⁵ reads the letters following ٧٢١ as a date (721), Lane-Poole,⁶ as well as Nelson Wright,⁷ regards it as badly written لسلطان. Perhaps Lane-Poole is right, and this coin will have to be regarded as a posthumous coin struck by Muḥammad in memory of his father, Tughluq Shāh.

His coins struck in the name of the Caliph have been, like those struck in that of his father, misunderstood. Edward Thomas⁸ is of

¹ Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Dehli*, p. 212.

² (i) Lane-Poole: *The Coins of the Sultāns of Dehli in the British Museum*, p. ix.

(ii) J.R.A.S., 1900, pp. 772-773. (iii) Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Dehli*, p. 29.

³ Idem., p. 190.

⁴ Mr. Nelson Wright [J.R.A.S. (1900), p. 774] points out that 721 read by Edward Thomas on No. 158 is really لسلطان; and that a date 726 or 727 comes in the margin.

⁵ Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Dehli*, p. 190.

⁶ Lane-Poole, S.: *The Coins of the Sultāns of Dehli in the British Museum*, p. 51.

⁷ J.R.A.S., 1900, p. 774.

⁸ Thomas, E., p. 206.

opinion that such coins expressed the emperor's doubts and difficulties concerning his title to the throne, but the real objective underlying the use of the Caliph's name and investiture has been shown above.¹ It should be noted that even in this respect Muḥammad bin Tughluq was following a precedent. İltūtmish² had struck a coin bearing merely the Caliph's name.

Where Muḥammad bin Tughluq really differed from his predecessors was (i) in using for himself various new titles in Persian as well as in Arabic (and he was the first to use a Persian title on the coins), *e.g.*,

- (1) "The just Sultān,"
- (2) "The slave, hopeful of the grace of God,"
- (3) "Expectant on the help of God,"
- (4) "Hopeful of the blessings of the benevolent God,"
- (5) "Fighter in the way of God,"
- (6) "A hopeful slave,"


(ii) in the making of his coins, which are noted for their novelty, for their superb die execution, and for their design. Of all the coins, many of which afford an illustration of one or the other of the points mentioned above, the *Sultānī*, so-called after its royal inventor, is a concrete instance of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's originality. The *Sultānī* was a small coin, otherwise called *dokānī*, extremely useful, four being equivalent to the *hashikānī* and three to the *shashikānī*. A piece which was half of the *Sultānī* was called *Yakānī*, and was equivalent to a *jītal*.

Usually made of gold, silver, copper and brass, and sometimes of an alloy of silver and copper, they bear the mark of different mints, *e.g.*, Daulatābād or Deogīr, Agrah,³ Tughluqpur,⁴ Lakhnautī, Dār-ul-Islām,⁵ Sonārgāon and Satgāon. Probably many more mints existed. The coins extant reflect almost every important change in the emperor's policy, and represent its five different phases.

I. In the first phase (1325-7) the emperor studied the problem of coinage in India and realized how inadequately gold had hitherto been minted by the preceding Sultāns. He realized how for various

¹ See *supra*, Chapter IX, p. 170 ff.

² Thomas, E., p. 46.

³ The coin 305B in Lane-Poole's catalogue of the year A.H. 730 bears the mint mark  which Lane-Poole transliterates as Agrah (p. 64). It is difficult to identify it with the modern town of Agra, which was then probably a village.

⁴ The next coin, 305C (Lane-Poole, *Catalogue of the Indian Coins of the Sultāns of Dehli*, p. 64), bears the mint mark of "Province of Tughluqpur."

⁵ The coin No. 188 (Thomas, E., p. 215) bears the mint mark Dār-ul-Islām.

reasons the old relations between gold and silver had been disturbed. Edward Thomas¹ puts their relative value as 8 : 1, and Col. Yule² as 7 : 1. Hence the emperor undertook the reconstruction and remodelling of the coinage. He raised the weight of the gold ṭankah from 170 to 198 or 200 grains, and introduced³ a new silver ṭankah of 140 grains⁴ called 'Adalī. The 'Adalī was designed to replace the heavier silver ṭankah of 175 grains.

II. In the second phase (1327-9) when Deogīr, now Daulatābād, became the first capital of the empire, and large amounts of gold came into the treasury, the emperor reformed the coinage accordingly. He struck a new gold coin called Niṣfi⁵ weighing 99 grains, and issued some new silver coins ranging in weight from 56 to 51 grains.⁶

III. In the third phase (1330-32) increased demands on the treasury led to a fresh instalment of reforms in the currency. This was marked by a reversion to the old form of the gold ṭanka. But the new specimens weighed slightly differently, *i.e.*, 168, 169 and 171 grains.⁷ Moreover, a system of nominal values in the form of copper or brass tokens, which were to pass current for a silver ṭanka and its lower pieces was introduced. The tokens were probably made of brass as well as of copper,⁸ since Baranī definitely mentions copper, while both Edward Thomas and Lane-Poole mention brass. It was probably to remove any reluctance on the part of his subjects to accept his brass or copper as equivalent to silver that the emperor quoted on his tokens certain threatening and devotional verses from the Qurān, *e.g.*, "Obey God, and obey the Prophet, and those in authority among you. If there were no Sultān one section of the people would certainly devour the other."⁹

¹ Thomas, E. : *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 235.

² Nelson Wright and Mr. Neville (J.A.S.B., 1924) have revised Thomas's views on the relations between gold and silver. They maintain that the ratio between silver and gold was 10 : 1.

³ Thomas, E. (p. 236), is inclined to ascribe the introduction of this coin on the authority of the *Khazāin-ul-Futūḥ* to 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, but no specimens of this coin of the time of 'Alā-ud-dīn exist.

⁴ *Idem.*, p. 213.

⁵ Thomas, E. : *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, p. 211.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁷ Lane-Poole, S. : *The Coins of the Sultāns of Delhi in the British Museum*, p. xxi, 68.

⁸ Five pieces of the token coins, which I have obtained from Lahore are, as far as I can ascertain, of copper.

⁹ Reading of coin No. 198 (Thomas's *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings*, p. 250) corrected by Sir Richard Burn. [*Journal Asiatic Society of Bengal* (1933).]

RISE AND FALL OF MUḤAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

Ordinarily each token coin bore an inscription showing for exactly how much it was to be valued, *e.g.*, (1) the token coin which corresponded to the 'Adalī or the white ṭanka bore the following inscription,¹ "Sealed as a ṭanka current in the reign of the slave (of God) hopeful (of His grace), Muḥammad bin Tughluq;" (2) that which corresponded to the 50 kānī piece read as follows: "Sealed as a ṭanka of 50 kānīs or Gānīs"; (3) the token coins which were to pass current for the Niṣṣī² (half), the Rab'ī (quarter) and the 8 kānī and 2 kānī, respectively, bore corresponding inscriptions. But the corresponding coins of those tokens, which bore no relative inscription were to be found by means of a graduated scale of proportionate weights. For instance, the brass tokens Nos. 197³ and 198, which bore no relative inscriptions, were each to pass current for 40 kānī piece. Similarly, the brass token No. 200,⁴ was to pass current for 20 kānī piece or for a small silver coin, No. 189, of 56 grains.⁵

IV. In 1333-4 the coins were struck in the emperor's usual style; but the weight of the gold and silver coins was proportionately lowered or adjusted. The gold ṭanka of 169 grains,⁶ as well as the silver coin of 55 grains, which had been in use since 1330, continued in circulation.

V. After the emperor had received the Caliph's investiture (1343) he had in the last and fifth period of his reign (1341-51) the Caliph's name inscribed on the coins. But the scarcity of the precious metals prevented him from raising the weight of the coins. He was forced rather to reduce the weight of gold coins from 170 to 163.5 grains.⁷

A study of the available data shows that under Muḥammad bin Tughluq various kinds of ṭankas were current, the following being the most important:

- (1) the gold ṭanka or red ṭanka, which was 198 grains or 200 grains in weight,

¹ All the five specimens of the token currency which I have obtained bear this inscription on the reverse, though each differs in a way from the others both in breadth and thickness. Almost all of them bear on the margin the expression "in the capital city of Delhi."

² (i) Thomas, E., pp. 247-248. (ii) Lane-Poole, S., xxii.

³ Thomas, E., p. 250.

⁴ Thomas, E., p. 251.

⁵ Ibid., p. 216.

⁶ See Nos. 176, 178, 179 and 194. Thomas, E., pp. 211-216.

⁷ See No. 212 and the following (pp. 259-260). Thomas, E.

- (2) the silver ṭanka or white ṭanka, which was 175 grains in weight, or the 'Adalī, which was 140 grains in weight,
- (3) the black ṭanka of mixed silver and copper, which was 56 grains in weight.

While Ibn Battūṭa has mentioned the first two, *i.e.*, the gold ṭanka as ṭanka, the silver ṭanka as dīnār, and the 'adalī as dīrhamī dīnār, he makes no mention of the black ṭanka. The existence of the black ṭanka is established by Firishta¹ and the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*,² as well as by Edward Thomas.³ On the authority of the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Firishta maintains that the silver ṭanka of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's time was amalgamated with a good deal of alloy, so that each ṭankā only exchanged for sixteen copper pice. This is a hypothesis, the authenticity of which is questioned by Edward Thomas⁴; it led Col. Briggs, it is believed, erroneously⁵ to evaluate the silver ṭanka at 4d. instead of 2s. Firishta is said to have misread the original which is to the effect that the ṭanka of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's time was slightly alloyed with copper, so that it was only worth eight black ṭankas. Edward Thomas⁶ is of opinion that the black ṭanka was equal to a shashkānī or six jītals.

The information supplied by the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār*⁷ enables us to build up the following scheme of the state coinage and its interchangeable rates :

- | | |
|--|---|
| (a) 1 red lakh (Lak-ul-Aḥmar) | = 100,000 gold ṭankas. |
| 1 white lakh (Lak-ul-Abiyaz) | = 100,000 silver ṭankas. ⁸ |
| 1 red ṭanka (of gold) | = { (i) 10 new white ṭankas or 'Adalis.
(ii) 8 old silver ṭankas of 175 grains each. |
| (b) 1 white ṭanka (of silver) ⁹ | { = 64 kānīs.
= 32 Do-kānīs.
= 8 Hashtkānīs.
= 4 Shanzdehkānīs. |
| also called dīnār of 175 grains or of 140 grs. | |

¹ Firishta (Bombay), I, p. 236.

² Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad: *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 199.

³ Thomas, E.: *The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, pp. 229-30.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Thomas, E., pp. 229-230.

⁷ (i) Quatremère: *Notices des Manuscrits*, XIII, pp. 211-212. (ii) Thomas, E., p. 219.

⁸ Thomas, E., pp. 232, 236-237.

⁹ Nelson Wright and Mr. Neville (J.A.S.B., 1924) are of opinion that under Muḥammad bin Tughluq "the Delhi ṭanka was subdivided into 48 jītals, while the Deccan scale was 50 jītals to the ṭanka."

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(c) The small silver coins, lower than the ṭanka, were six in number :

- (1) Shanzdehkānī or 16 kânī.
- (2) Doazdehkānī or 12 kânī.
- (3) Hashtkānī or 8 kânī.
- (4) Shashkānī or 6 kânī.
- (5) Sulṭānī or 2 kânī.
- (6) Yakānī or 1 kânī.

(d) Their relative rates were :—

1 Shanzdehkānī (or one 16 kânī) = 2 Hashtkānī (two 8 kânīs).

1 Doazdehkānī (or one 12 kânī) = 1½ Hashtkānī.

1 Hashtkānī = $\begin{cases} 4 \text{ Sulṭānīs, or} \\ 4 \text{ Dokānīs.} \\ 1 \text{ Dirhem.}^1 \end{cases}$

1 Sulṭānī = ½ Shashkānī.

1 Kānī or Yakānī = 1 Jītal.

1 Jītal = 4 copper Fals.

(e) 1 black ṭanka (or ṭankah-i-siyāh)

= 1 Shashkānī.

¹ The "Dirham" was not an Indian coin. It was an important coin of contemporary Egypt and Syria and has been frequently mentioned both in the *Rihla* and the *Masālik-ul-Abṣār* as corresponding to a "Hashtkānī."

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(A.) ARCHITECTURE

The recent excavations of a part of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's Hazār Sutūn palace have roused general interest in the buildings of the "cruel tyrant."¹ The bases of the wooden pillars, which supported the one-thousand-pillared palace (Hazār Sutūn), have been uncovered by the Archæological Department of the Government of India. But what was really a palace has been² reported as a hall two storeys high, 210 ft. in width, and 300 ft. in length. Light has also been thrown on what is called the Bijāi Maṇḍal or Badī' Maṇḍal, which Sir Sayyid rightly calls Badī' Manzil (wonderful mansion). He maintains that it was a tower of the Hazār Sutūn palace of Jahānpanāh. It was extremely beautiful and elegant. In it was built a room with four doors. The room led up to a summer pavilion which no longer exists.

Sir Sayyid holds the view that the tower was used by the emperor for inspecting the army below. But it has now been identified as the Hall of Special Audience. It is probably the same Mashvar (hall of audience) which Ibn Battūṭa frequently mentions. In it have been discovered two pits, which served perhaps as treasure houses. Sir Sayyid is right in regarding the Badī' Manzil as a part of the Hazār Sutūn Palace. It is evident from the *Rihla* and is confirmed by the excavations. It is supposed that walking from the Badī' Manzil the emperor used to descend by a broad terrace to his thousand-pillared hall, where he gave public audience to such of his subjects as might have petitions to present to him.

A still more important construction of Muḥammad bin Tughluq was that of the city of Jahānpanāh, which has been described above.

Muḥammad bin Tughluq had inherited the old historical city of Delhi (Dehli), divided into three small cities, namely, Indra-prastha, the original city, which had been conquered by the Turks in 1191/587; Sīrī, founded by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī, and Tughluqābād, built by Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. Each city was protected by a rampart and a stronghold. To these three Sultān Muḥammad added a fourth, which he named Jahānpanāh (the refuge of the

¹ "To the excavated remains of the buildings of the Sultāns and Mogul Emperors, which strew the plain of Delhi, has now been added the Hall of a Thousand Pillars of the 'cruel tyrant,' Mohammed bin Tughlak (1325-1351)." (*Times*, London, 28th December, 1934.)

² Ibid.

world). It joined the original Delhi with Sirī. Probably after completing the construction of 'Ādilābād in 1327, the emperor raised a double enclosure of ramparts stretching from the 'Alāi fort to the castle of Rāi Pithanra, which from the time of Jalāl-ud-dīn Khālji was called new Delhi. The extremities of these walls extended from the 'Alāi fortress or Koshak-i-Sirī to the castle of Rāi Pithaura. To the towns enclosed by these walls he gave the name of Jahānpanāh. But the three fortresses, namely, the fortress of Rāi Pithaura or Old Delhi, the 'Alāi fortress or Koshak-i-Sirī and the Jahānpanāh joined together formed one large fort or one city. The total number of the gates of these fortresses was thirty, Jahānpanāh having thirteen, seven in its south-easterly direction and six to the north-east. The Sirī fortress had seven gates, four of which opened outside, and three inside the city of Jahānpanāh. The fortress of Rāi Pithaura or of Old Delhi had ten gates, some of which opened outside and others inside the city of Jahānpanāh. It therefore follows that Jahānpanāh was a magnificent city.

Mention should also be made of the Begumpurī mosque of Jahānpanāh, the Lāl Gumbad, the Jamā'at Khānāh mosque at the shrine of Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, the Satpula, the 'Ādilābād fortress and the tomb of Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq. The Begumpurī mosque was probably built by Muhammad bin Tughluq in the city of Jahānpanāh, but has been erroneously attributed to Fīroz Shāh. It is an extremely impressive mosque of great size, and appears to have been designed as the Jāmi' Masjid (Cathedral mosque) of the three great cities of Delhi enclosed by Jahānpanāh. It surpassed or was meant to surpass and supersede the Quwwat-ul-Islām mosque at the Qutb.

The Lāl Gumbad, a structure of red stone known as the tomb of Kabīr-ud-dīn-Auliya, was probably the mausoleum built for himself by Muhammad bin Tughluq. The Jamā'at Khānāh mosque at the shrine of Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, which is generally attributed to Fīroz Shāh, had been probably built in part by Muhammad bin Tughluq.

The Satpula or the large sluice 250 ft. long in the southern line of Jahānpanāh was built by Sultān Muhammad to regulate the flow of water in the stream, which crossed the city of Jahānpanāh, and fell eventually into the Jumna.

The 'Ādilābād or Muhammadabad fortress had been constructed by Muhammad bin Tughluq early in his reign. It lies on a hill near Tughluqābād, and was designed as a place of recreation. Inside this fortress the emperor is said to have built another palace of one thousand pillars.

The tomb of Sultān Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq which lies near the Tughluqābād fortress was built by Muhammad bin Tughluq over the grave of his father. Subsequently two other graves, namely,

the grave of Makhduma-i-Jahān, and that of Sultān Muḥammad himself were made in it.

It should be remembered that in the course of his Ma'bar expedition (1335-7) the emperor had fallen ill; he had then repaired to Daulatābād. On his way there, at a village called¹ Bīr, he was afflicted with a violent toothache, and lost one of his teeth, which he ordered to be buried there. A magnificent tomb was reared over it, which still stands, and is known as the "dome of the tooth of Sultān Tughluq."

The tooth mausoleum is generally regarded as a monument of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's vanity, but a student of Muslim sociology and culture knows that Muḥammad bin Tughluq's action was fair and consistent with the Sharia't. A Muslim is expected to bury a disjointed tooth instead of throwing it away.

The architecture of Muḥammad bin Tughluq is typical of the Tughluq house. Unlike the style of the Slave and Khaljī kings marked by quasi-Hindūism, it is distinguished by a puritanic reaction. It is simple and much more suitable for religious services than for festive assemblies. The stern simplicity which marked the character of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq, the founder of the Tughluq house, forms also the common feature of the buildings erected by his son.

Tughluq Shāh's tomb finished by Muḥammad is typical of all his buildings. Its chief features are sloping walls; bold and massive towers and horse-shoe arches.

(B.) INSCRIPTIONS

I. *The Rajahmahendry Inscription.*

This records the erection of a mosque by Sālār 'Ulwī in 1324/724. The inscription was made after Ulugh Khān's conquest of Telingāna, and apparently after his occupation of Rajahmahendry. It runs as follows:—

"It is the abode of God.

"During the reign of the great Sultān Ghiyāṣ-ud-dūnya (waddīn) . . . Abu' (l Muzaffar) Tughluq Shāh, the Sultān (May God perpetuate his kingdom, and sovereignty, and elevate his authority and dignity!), and during the ever-increasing prosperity (*i.e.*, prosperous régime) of the Khān of the world, Ulugh Khān, the humble servant soliciting the mercy of God. . . . Sālār (?) 'Ulwī built this mosque on the 20th of the auspicious month of Ramāzān (may its blessings be universal!), 724 (Monday, 10th September, A.D. 1324.)"²

¹ Firishta (Bombay), I, p. 244.

² E.I.M., 1923-4, p. 13.

II. *Sanskrit Inscription¹ of the Reign of Muhammad Tughluq and of the Vikrama Year, 1384 (A.D. 1327).²*

“The inscription records the foundation of a well by a Brahmin of the name of *Sridhara* at the village of *Nādayana*, the modern *Naraina*, near *Delhi*. The stone on which the inscription is engraved measures 18 ins. in width by 13 ins. in height. The height of the letters is about $\frac{3}{8}$ in. The surface of the stone is much disintegrated and several of the letters are partially or wholly destroyed. The upper proper right corner is broken, by which the beginning portion of the first four lines is completely lost. The inscription consists of 21 lines, of which the last one, which contains the date, covers only about half the width of the stone. It is, with the exception of the date, composed in Sanskrit poetry. The author was evidently well versed both in the grammar and rhetorics of that language.

“In his poem a great variety of metres is used. . . . The first two stanzas in which *Ganesa* and the demon-slaying goddess *Chandika* (another name for *Durga*) are invoked are in the *Prithvi* metre. In the next 3 stanzas (3-5) the praise is sung of the district *Hariyana*, the city of *Dihli* (*Delhi*) and its overlord, *Muhammad Tughluq*. The metres used are *Anushtubh*, *Vasantatilaka* and *Sārdūlavikrīḍita*. Verses 6-14 are an eulogy on *Sridhara*, the founder of the well and his ancestors. Here the metre is alternately *Indrāvājra* and *Anushtubh*.

“The concluding two stanzas record the foundation of the well which *Sridhara* had dug on the north side of the village of *Nādayana*, and describe the praise bestowed by travellers on the excellency of its water.

“The inscription ends with the date : *Vikrama*, 1384, *Bhādrapada* badi 3, Thursday, corresponding to the 6th August, A.D. 1327. *Muhammad Tughluq* reigned from *Rabi* 1, 725 (Febr., 1325), to *Muharram* 21, 752 (Jan., 1351).’

Translation

1. Hail ! He (*Ganesa*) who is known as the destroyer of every hindrance for those who bow down before him ; who, being worshipped, fulfils here the wish of his adorers ; he, the lord of obstacles, bears one prominent tusk like a terrible crystal staff for the destruction of the enemies of the gods.

2. May (the goddess) *Chandika*, who destroys the foes of the Lord of the gods, and stands on the shoulder of the buffalo (demon) ; she who is invoked by *Hari* (*Vishnu*), *Isa* (*Siva*) and the lotus-born (*Brahmā*) for complete success, the protectress of my house who

¹ *Catalogue of the Delhi Museum of Archaeology*, pp. 29-33. Compiled by J. Ph. Vogel, Calcutta Baptist Mission Press (1908).

² See Proceedings of the Asiatic Society, Bengal (May, 1873).

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quickly bestows rewards on man and upholds the universe ; may she prove destructive to your sinfulness !

3. There is a great and holy land named Hariyana where Krishna with Pritha's sons (the Pandavas) walked (among men) for the suppression of sin.

4. Therein lies this town of Dhilli covered with innumerable jewels, whence sin is expelled through the chanting of the Vedas by the knowers of the sacred lore and which appears lovely by the tinkling of anklets of lovely damsels even as the heavenly river (the Ganges) by the voice of geese.

5. There was the renowned Mahamūda Shāhī (Muḥammad Shāh), the crest-jewel of all rulers of the earth ; the mighty Saka lord (or according to another reading, Sakendra—institutor of a new era), whose foes were overthrown by the valour of his arm, through fear of whom, when going to the hunting-park, the earth trembles, the ocean dries up, all quarters (*viz.*, the whole world) takes at once to trembling (as well as) mountains and (his) foes.

Lineage described.

6. There was formerly a merchant who with his family made his abode in the village of Nādāyana—Govinda-deva, skilled in many pious works. . . .

7. Unto him was born a virtuous son, Ratna (pearl), even as a pearl is born from the ocean, who, law-abiding, took the faithful Ganganāsri for wife.

8. By her were born to the good Ratna these four famous sons : Gangadhara, Mādhava, Lakshmaṇa and one called Dāmodara.

9. The youngest among them, Dāmodara, having married the beloved Viradā, begot Dhira-Deva, Krishna and other sons (to the number of) nine.

10. Among them the wise and virtuous Dhira-deva accomplished in every art and well-versed in mercantile pursuits, in buying and selling, was liberal in giving cattle, land, gold and garments.

11. He, having married a fair and fortunate lady named Dhānī, begot two sons, Risada and Sudeva.

12. By his wife, Rajasri by name, Risada obtained two goodly sons, namely, one called Dullabha-deva and another Srivara.

13. The wise Srivara, versed in the law and devoted to the worship of the lotus-like feet of Srivara (Vishnu, the lord of Sri), married two wives, Kallya and Gangadisri.

14. Srivara had three accomplished sons—Prithvidhara by his elder faithful wife, and the other two, Sridhara and Solhana by name.

15. On the west side of Indraprastha there is a village well known by the name of Nādāyana ; to the north of this village Sridhara caused a well to be made for the gratification of his forefathers.

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16. Is this the water of the celestial river (the Ganges)—cool, sweet and wholesome? Or is it nectar here by the immortals. Thus exclaim the crowd of wayfarers when they proceed home, after drinking the sweet clear water of this well.

The work of Madana. In the year 1384 (the month of) Bhadra (pada), the third day of the dark fortnight on Thursday. May good happen of this!

III. *Sanskrit Inscription of the Reign of Muḥammad Tughluq and of the Vikrama year 1384 (A.D. 1328).*

“The stone (bearing this inscription) appears to have been found in the village of Sarban, 5 miles south of Delhi, which is no doubt identical with the village of Sārvala or Sārabala mentioned in the inscription.¹

“The inscription is neatly incised on a rectangular slab of black stone measuring 17 ins. by 11 ins. It consists of 18 lines, of which 17 cover the width of the stone, whereas the last one measures only 3 ins. in length. It is almost entirely composed in Sanskrit poetry.

“The first two stanzas are benedictory verses in which the blessings of Ganesā and Satyala (Siva) are invoked. In the next four verses the history of Delhi (here called Dhilli) is briefly sketched from its foundation till the time when the inscription was written. The city was founded by the Tomaras, the Tunvar Rajputs, who were superseded by Chāhamānas or Chauhans. The latter were conquered by Sahābadīna, viz., Shahabuddin Muḥammad Ghori (A.D. 1156-1205). From this time, Dhilli was ruled by the Turushkas. The ruling prince was Muḥammad Shāhī, or Muḥammad bin Tughluq. Verses 7-12 contain a eulogy of the ancestors of the two merchants, Khetala and Paitala (or Paituka), who, as stated in verses 13-14, had a well made in the village of Sāravala, the modern Sarban, ‘for the bliss of their parents in the next world and for the growth of their offspring.’ The concluding stanza expresses the wish for the long existence of this well and its founders.

“The date is contained in the last but one stanza, the year being indicated by the words Veda (= 4), Vasu (= 8), Fire (= 3) and Moon (= 1). At the end of the inscription we find the date again, but here the year is given in figures—Vikrama Samvat, 1384, the month Phālguna, the fifth day of the bright fortnight, Tuesday. This corresponds . . . to 16th Feb., A.D. 1328, Tuesday.”

Translation.

1. Hail, Worship be unto that Lord of Ganas through constant devotion at whose feet men obtain the fruit of all their desires. . . .

¹ See A.S.B., May, 1873, pp. 102-104. See also *Epigraphia Indica*, Jan., 1889, Vol. I, pp. 93-95.

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5. Thereupon the Barbarian Sahabdin, having burnt down the forest of hostile tribes by the fire of his valour, seized that city by force.

6. Thenceforward that city has been in the possession of the Turushakas to this day ; at present Prince S'rī Maḥammad S'āhi (Muḥammad) rules over it.

7. Now, in that city there is a family of merchants dwelling in Agrotaka¹ : in this family was born the virtuous S'rī Sāchadeva.

8. His son was Lakshmidhara, the bee on the lotus-like pair of Lakshmidhara's (Vishnu's) feet, whose mind was ever bent on the propitiation of the gods and Brahmins, and who obtained fame by his kindness to all beings.

9. Lakshmidhara had two sons, who were strangers to the Age of sin ; both of them oceans of greatness, and of goodly form. The first of them was Māha by name, of subtle mind ; and his younger brother named Ghika, of highest renown.

10. Māha had a charming son, named Melha, who was ever bent on propitiating the gods, Brahmins and Gurūs.

11. Ghika married Sridhara's daughter, Viro by name, devoted to her husband, by whom he had two sons.

12. The elder of them, Khetala by name, an ocean of goodness, and of boundless piety, and the younger named Paituka, whose mind was devoted to the propitiation of all Gurūs and Brahmins.

13. Now in the thought of those two virtuous men, Khetala and Paitala, whose minds were occupied with deeds of renown, was dwelling this fair piece of ground in the vicinity of the village called Sāravala.

14. Khetala and Paitala, with the view of their deceased ancestors attaining to imperishable Heaven and for the continuation of their race, caused this well to be made.

15. Written in the year countable by Veda (4), Vasu (8), Fire (3) and Moon (1) from the time of Vikramānka, on Tuesday, the 5th of the bright half of Phālguna.

16. In this village of Sāravala in the *pratigana*² of Indraprastha, may this well and its author with his family exist for a long time.

Samvat, 1384, bright Phālguna 5, Tuesday.

In addition to these, other inscriptions of minor importance will be found in *Epigraphia Indica-Moslemica*.

¹ Rajendra Lal Mitra takes this to be "the original" or Sanskrit form of Agra, the merchants or banyas of which place are well known all over India as the Agarwālā Baniyas. Perhaps it may be the name (derived from Agra) of the quarter of the town of Dhilli, where these merchants resided.

² The word Pratigana probably stands for Pargana, "a sub-division of a district." Indraprastha is the name of the town founded by Yudhishtira ; it is evidently preserved in the modern Indrapat, south of Shājahānābād.

(C.) A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES

I. CONTEMPORARY

(1) The first contemporary authority is Ziyā-ud-dīn Baranī (1286-1359), the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, and the *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī*. He was a man of noble descent, whose forefathers had held high offices under the preceding *Khaljī* Sultāns of Delhi. His father enjoyed the title of Mūd-ul-Mulk, and his uncle that of 'Alā-ul-Mulk Kotwāl under Jalāl-ud-dīn and 'Alā-ud-dīn. Baranī himself flourished under Muḥammad bin Tughluq, whom he outlived by eight years. He was an attendant at his court for the last seventeen years of his life. The emperor showed him great favour, and because of his wide knowledge of history often consulted him, for Baranī was, even before he actually began to write history, well-known for his eminence in historical knowledge. Later in his life he deliberately chose the writing of history as the best calling. He excluded from his scheme of work all that had been included in the *Tabaqāt-i-Nasirī*. Commencing with Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban he carried his work down to the sixth year of the reign of Fīroz Shāh. Disappointed in his hopes and expectations, Baranī then abandoned his task retiring to Ghiyāspur, in the suburbs of Delhi. He was reduced to such extreme poverty that no shroud other than a piece of coarse matting could be furnished for his funeral obsequies.

Baranī named his work *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*, after Fīroz Shāh, though the actual history of Fīroz Shāh forms not more than a fifth part of the whole.

Baranī's history takes the form of a chronological account of the reigns of the Sultāns of Delhi from Balban to Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq. To the history of Balban, and 'Alā-ud-dīn *Khaljī* he has devoted much time and space. But he assigns comparatively little space to the history of Muḥammad bin Tughluq; and far from writing his history in the spirit of a scientific historian, Baranī completely omits some of the most important events of his reign. His account of the history of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign is so confused that certain events of the opening years of the reign are likely to be mistaken for those of the closing years and *vice versa*. Baranī's account is therefore very misleading to the ordinary reader. Baranī also makes it impossible for the average reader to construct in chronological order a list of the events of the reign. Baranī himself has confessed this. "I have," says he, "written in this history the principles of Sultān Muḥammad's administration, and have paid no heed to the sequence and order of events."

Baranī does not deny the merits of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, for

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they were too well-known to be denied. But he takes care at the same time to stress all his weaknesses and faults. Thus he has portrayed him as a mixture of opposites. When sketching his character Baranī makes use of hyperbolical and satirical expressions. Even when he acknowledges Muḥammad bin Tughluq's good qualities, in the midst of his eulogy he includes sentences which produce the opposite effect in the mind of the careful reader. By expressing repeatedly, and in a peculiar manner his bewilderment at understanding him he endeavours to convince the reader of the Sultān's innate badness.

It should be noted that while Baranī applauds the father, namely, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq for his good faith, he censures the son Muḥammad for his engrossment with philosophy, and for his association with sceptics.

Still, Baranī acknowledges his own mistakes, and faults, and even curses himself, saying, "... I am guilty of uttering lies and fabricating facts to pacify the angry Sultān in retribution for which I have received condign punishment by being condemned to an obscure life, solitary, friendless, without a real appreciator or patron."

Living in Delhi, and in touch with the emperor, Baranī possessed opportunities for ascertaining the truth.

Baranī was a man of no extraordinary academic qualifications. His knowledge of Arabic was not great. His Persian was peculiar. But he knew the value of history, and was fully aware of the duties and responsibilities of a historian. He shows evidence of his critical faculty in his observations, and says, "I took care to sift the matters, and to distinguish between fabrication and reality." "To be honest," he continues, "in observing incidents, and in chronicling them as such is the most essential duty of a historian." He knew also how necessary it was for a historian to be free from religious bigotry. "Many writers from excessive bigotry," says he, "have been induced to tell lies." He was equally conscious of truth. "I, the compiler of the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*," says he,¹ "have in my preface made this pledge that whatever I shall write in this history shall be the whole truth. Of the persons whose history I relate I shall mention both good and bad actions. To publish men's good actions and to conceal their bad is what I shall not do; for if I should carelessly overlook (their bad actions) and recount simply their excellent deeds, and shut my eyes to the evil, then my writings would be lowered in the (auspicious) eyes of my readers; and I myself will stand charged before the tribunal of God." Baranī has introduced this in the midst of a passage, in which he gives an account of the murder of Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī, in which he has condemned all who had a hand in this foul deed,

¹ Baranī: *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (Bib. Ind.), p. 468.

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including his own uncle, 'Alā-ul-Mulk, the Kotwāl of Delhi, and 'Alā-ud-dīn, the emperor.

In the whole reign of MuḤammad bin Tughluq, Baranī has assigned dates to four events only, that is :

- (1) His accession, 725 A.H.
- (2) His expedition to Gujarāt, 745 A.H.
- (3) The Caliph's investiture, 744 A.H.
- (4) His death, 751 A.H.

Baranī's work is singularly devoid of order and arrangement. Occasionally he forms paragraphs, and divides his subject under different headings ; but it does not improve his work much. He himself deplores more than once this lack of order and arrangement.

The Bibliotheca Indica edition of this work has been checked by the MSS., Or. 2039 and 211, in the British Museum and the India Office. The British Museum MS. occasionally differs slightly from the Bibliotheca Indica edition, and leaves gaps.

Baranī wrote a second work, the *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī* (I.O., 2646), which appears to have been a kind of supplement to his *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī*. At any rate the ideas underlying both of his books are the same. What in the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* Baranī has merely hinted or insinuated he has said plainly in the *Fatāwa-i-Jahāndārī*. As the title of the book implies, it is a kind of ideal political code, which Baranī would like a Muslim monarch to follow.

(2) Abū 'Abdullah MuḤammad Ibn Battūṭa (1304-78) is the second authority. He started on his travels in 1325, and during the next eight years explored the whole of Northern Africa, Arabia, and Persia, the Levant and Constantinople, whence he came by the overland route to India. He reached Sind on the 12th of September, 1333 (1st Muḥarram, 734). We find in Ibn Battūṭa a quick-witted and observant youth, who acquainted himself with the customs and social habits of the people, and in all ways fitted himself to give detailed information about India. MuḤammad bin Tughluq appointed him Qāzī of Delhi, which office he held about eight years. At last he lost the emperor's favour, and was imprisoned. It was only after earnest prayers and supplications on his part that he was released. He was afterwards sent as an ambassador to China (1342). Shipwrecked on the way, he feared to return to Delhi, and proceeded to the Maldive Islands. Here he settled down for a year, and became a judge. About 1345 he set out for Ceylon, whence he repaired to Southern India, and stayed at Maḍūra. He then proceeded to Chittagong, where he took a boat for China. He then performed the Haj at Mecca, whence he returned to Morocco, his African home (1349). After another short journey (1352) in Central Africa he settled in Morocco (1353). Here at the court of Sultān Abū 'Inān, Ibn Battūṭa dictated the experiences of

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his journey to Abū 'Abdullah Muḥammad bin Muḥammad, commonly known as Ibn Juzai, who edited them as the "*Rihla*" (journal). Ibn Battūta, since, remained in Morocco, where he died at the age of 73 (1377-78).

As regards his qualifications, Ibn Battūta must rank higher than Baranī. He was a doctor of law and theology. But he did not know Persian well, nor did he possess any knowledge of Hindī.

He had, however, many opportunities for knowing the truth of the events. Not only did he enjoy the emperor's favour, but he was a travelling-student, who had left his home to seek knowledge abroad.

Ibn Battūta possessed greater advantages than Baranī for getting new and accurate information about facts. Baranī was not a student; hence in investigating the mass of information he appears to have fixed his mind almost entirely on questions which were of immediate interest to him to the exclusion of much that was really important.

(3) A Persian poet named Badr-ud-dīn, a native of Chāch or Tāshkand, came to India and attracted some notice at the court of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. His *odes* supply us by means of chronograms with invaluable information, and enable us to fix the date of events. Printed copies of the work are available in India, a famous translation with ample comments being made by 'Uṣmān Khān of Rāmpur. This as well as the India Office MSS. have been used in this thesis.

(4) Amīr Khusrav, the famous poet and historian, composed the *Tughluq Nāmāh* by order of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq. An incomplete copy of this manuscript has been discovered in the private library of Nawāb Ṣadr Yār Jung Maulvī Ḥabīb-ur-Raḥmān Khān Sherwānī at Ḥabībganj. The title-page of the MS. bears the name "*Jahāngīr Nāmāh*," and "*Ḥaiyātī Kāshī*," a poet at the court of Jahāngīr (1603-28). Ḥaiyātī seems to have added some verses; but his contribution is of little value. The major part of the work can be identified as that of Amīr Khusrav. Although this work merely records the events of two months of the early career of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, it supplements the information contained in Baranī's work.

(5) A manuscript of the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī* at the British Museum (Add. 25,785) contains four pages of the *Memoirs of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*. The rest of the work has been lost. But the fragment that survives enables us to know the personal views of the emperor, and supplies a much-needed corrective to Baranī.

(6) The *Majmu'a-i-Khānī*, a Persian MS., I.O., 2572, is a manual of Muslim ecclesiastical law compiled by Kamāl Karīm Nāgaurī, and dedicated to Bahrām Khān. The India Office catalogue gives no account of Bahrām Khān. But Mr. A. G. Ellis of the Royal

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Asiatic Society has reason to identify Bahrām Khān with Qutluḡ Khān, the tutor of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and sometime the vazīr of Daulatābād.

"The *Majmū'a-i-Khānī* consists of a compilation of passages from older works, the latest of which are (1) the *Naṣafī*, a commentary on the *al-Manzūma* by Ḥafīẓ-ud-dīn Abul Barakāt Aḥmad bin 'Abd-ullah an-Naṣafī, who died in 1310; and (2) the *Anfa'*, by Burhān-ud-dīn Ibrāhīm bin 'Alī al-Tarasūsī, who died in 1356."

Probably the book was written during the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq in Daulatābād, the position of which it clearly mentions. It must, however, be regarded as a work of secondary importance.

(7) The *Basātin-ul-Uns*, a Persian manuscript at the British Museum, Add. 7717, is a Hindū tale compiled by Muḥammad Ṣadr 'Āla Aḥmad Ḥasan Dabīr, an hereditary servant at the Delhi court, and a secretary of the royal chancery.

The importance of the work lies in the fact that it was composed in the first year of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign. It gives a detailed account of Ghīyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq's Tirhut expedition. The author was in the emperor's suite and feelingly describes his sufferings on the return journey to Delhi. He makes commendable references to Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

(8) The *Masālik-ul-Aḥṣār* by Shihāb-ud-dīn (Aḥmad) 'Abbās (1300-1350), though a contemporary, was a native of Damascus. He never came to India, but gathered his information about the country from intelligent and learned travellers with whom he came in contact. The value of his work lies in his account of the characteristic features of civilisation under Muḥammad bin Tughluq. It also acts as a corrective to Baranī in some respects. A manuscript of this work which has been used in this thesis lies in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. A French translation of it is found in Quatremère's *Notices des Manuscrits*, Tome Treizième, which has also been used.

(9) The *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, by Muḥammad bin Mubārak Kirmānī, is a life of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya, and contains references to Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and to his relations with the saints, particularly with the disciples of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. The author was a contemporary of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. He throws light on certain points described in the body of this thesis.

The British Museum Manuscript (Or. 1746) has been compared with the printed edition (Delhi Press, 1884).

(10) The *Munshāt-i-Māhrū* of 'Ain-ul-Mulk Multānī was written under Fīroz Shāh. It is extremely valuable for the history of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, since the author had been a servant of and rebel against the emperor. It is to be regretted that this work is more literary than historical. It throws, however, light on the story of the Afghānpur tragedy.

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(II) The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* of Khwāja 'Abd Malik 'Iṣāmī (I.O., 895) is a poetical history of the Sultāns of India from the rise of the Ghaznavid dynasty up to the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, the date of composition being A.H. 750 (A.D. 1349).

The author was a contemporary of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and wrote his book on the lines of the great Firdausī's *Shāhnāma*. He dedicated it to his patron, 'Alā-ud-dīn Ḥasan, the first Bahmanī king of the Deccan, a rebel against Sultān Muḥammad.

'Iṣāmī calls the Sultān a wretch,¹ and denounces him as insincere. He tells us that Muḥammad, while pretending to mourn the loss of his father, really rejoiced at heart. Under the heading "delusion² practised by Sultān Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq on the inhabitants of India," the *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* informs us that on his accession, Muḥammad bin Tughluq made lavish promises to the people to give them sound and sympathetic administration, and captivated their hearts by profuse largesse.

Before long, however, his character had almost completely changed, and the Sultān had become distrustful and oppressive.³ It was on account of this that Bahā-ud-dīn Gurshāsp, the governor of Sāgar, revolted.

Being the spokesman of the aggrieved party in the country, 'Iṣāmī relates stories which were highly prejudicial to the Sultān, stories which found wide currency among the people, and were later heard by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa on his arrival in India. For example, 'Iṣāmī tells us that Bahā-ud-dīn was ultimately skinned alive; that his skin stuffed with straw was paraded round the streets and that his flesh cooked with rice was placed before elephants.⁴ Almost the same has been repeated by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Again, 'Iṣāmī gives a highly coloured account of the transfer of the capital,⁵ and occasionally introduces short tales of the inhumanity and cruelty of Sultān Muḥammad not unlike those found in the *Riḥla*.

The *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* makes it clear that the oppressive measures were adopted by the Sultān mainly with a view to destroying the *aṣḥāb-i-dīn*⁶ (people of religion), the Hindūs being exempted. Such was the object of the forced migration⁷ from Delhi to Daulatābād, and of the token⁸ currency. Occasionally 'Iṣāmī speaks of universal destruction, but his language is not free from exaggeration. One day, he tells us, the Sultān rode up to the gardens along the banks of the Jumna, and found the streets thronged with vendors and customers. He was so annoyed to see the prosperous condition of the town and the affluence of his people that he resolved immediately to destroy it. With this object in view he sent out the

¹ I.O., MS. 895, F. 231A.

² I.O., MS. 895, F. 232B.

³ Ibid., F. 245-248.

⁴ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn*, F. 247A.

⁵ I.O., MS. 895, F. 231A.

⁶ I.O., MS. 895, F. 236A.

⁷ See p. 135, *supra*.

⁸ Ibid., F. 250B.

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Qarāchil expedition. Another measure which he later adopted for the destruction of his people was to order the evacuation of Deogīr. All its inhabitants were consequently sent off to Delhi.

Finally under a heading "applause¹ for Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn Khālji, and censures for Muḥammad Shāh bin Tughluq Shāh," 'Iṣāmī vehemently denounces Sultān Muḥammad for his revolt against Islām.

'Iṣāmī's *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn* has been acknowledged by Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad² as one of his authorities. It was also used by Firishṭa,³ and was known to Budāūnī.⁴

(12) The *Tāj-ul-Maāshir*, by Ḥasan Nizāmī, a contemporary of Qutb-ud-dīn Aibak, was written early in the thirteenth century. It deals chiefly with Qutb-ud-dīn, but also contains an account of Muḥammad of Ghūr, and Shams-ud-dīn Iltūtmish. The MSS. of the *Tāj-ul-Maāshir* (Add. 7623; Add. 24,951; Add. 7624) in the British Museum have been used.

(13) The *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāsirī*, by Minhāj-us-Sirāj, was written in the middle of the thirteenth century. Its Bibliotheca Indica edition, together with its translation (Calcutta, 1897) by H. G. Rāverty, has been used.

Both the *Tāj-ul-Maāshir* and the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāsirī* are the principal contemporary sources for the history of the Sultanate before the establishment of the Tughluq dynasty.

Central Asian Histories.

(1) The *Tārīkh-i-Jahān Kushāi* of 'Alā-ud-dīn Juwainī is a useful history of the Mongols completed in 1257. It gives an account of Chingiz Khān and his successors. Its edition of the Gibb Memorial series has been used.

It is an important contemporary source for the history of the foreign policy of the early Sultāns of Delhi.

(2) The *Jāmi'-ut-Tavārikh* of Rashīd-ud-dīn Faḡl-Ullāh, completed in 1310, is another history of the Mongols and enables us to study the political conditions across the Indus in the thirteenth century. The Gibb Memorial Series edition (London, 1911) has been used.

(3) The *Tārīkh-i-Waṣṣāf*, completed in 1328, is a history of the Mongols in Persia. It throws light on the history of Abū S'aid, the contemporary of Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and also contains references to India. Its Bombay edition (1845) has been used. There is also a manuscript, Add. 23,517, in the British Museum.

(4) The *Tārīkh-i-Guzīdah* was composed in 1329 by Ḥamd Ullāh Mustawfi. It gives useful information about the history of the

¹ *Futūḥ-us-Salātīn*, MS., F. 325-328.

² Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad: *Ṭabaqāt-i-Akbarī* (Bib. Ind.), 3.

³ Firishṭa (Bombay), I, 234.

⁴ Budāūnī: *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārikh* (Bib. Ind.), 236.

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Il-Khānids of Persia and the Chaghataīs of Transoxiana. Its edition of the Gibb Memorial series (London, 1913) has been used. There is also a manuscript, Add. 22,693, in the British Museum.

(5) The *Nuzhat-ul-Qulūb*, a geographical work by the same author, written about 1339, throws light on the geography of Persia and some adjacent countries. Its manuscript in the British Museum, Add. 16,736, has been used.

II. NON-CONTEMPORARY

(1) The *Futūḥāt-i-Fīroz Shāhī* (B.M., Or. 2039) is a compilation of the ordinances issued by Fīroz Shāh, and contains some useful information about Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

(2) The *Sīrat-i-Fīroz Shāhī* was written in 1370. The work is anonymous, and as it appears from the context was written at the dictation of Fīroz Shāh. It supplies valuable information about Muḥammad bin Tughluq. A unique manuscript is to be found in the Bankipore library.

(4) The *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* by Shams Sirāj 'Afīf (B.M., Or. 162) is a history of the reign of Fīroz Shāh (1351-88), but occasionally makes useful references to Muḥammad bin Tughluq. 'Afīf was born in 1350, and grew up at the court of Sulṭān Fīroz Shāh. He became a disciple of Shaiḫ Qutb-ud-dīn Munawwar, a contemporary of Muḥammad bin Tughluq.

'Afīf wrote the *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz Shāhī* after Tīmūr's invasion of 1398. The Bibliotheca Indica edition has been used in this thesis.

(5) The *Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī*, by Yaḥya bin Aḥmad, is a work written about the middle of the fifteenth century. Its statements sometimes differ from Baranī's, and are not always reliable. The Bibliotheca Indica edition of this work has been referred to in the thesis, though the manuscript in the British Museum (Or. 1673) has been frequently used.

(6) The *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, a work written by Nizām-ud-dīn Aḥmad under Akbar, contains an account of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. There is a manuscript of this work, Add. 6543, in the British Museum, which has been used. References are, however, given to the Bibliotheca Indica edition.

(7) The *Muntakhab-ut-Tavārīkh* of 'Abdul Qādir Budāūnī (1541-1595) is another work written in the time of Akbar. The author throws new light on several aspects of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign. There is a manuscript, Add. 6581, in the British Museum which has been consulted. But the Bibliotheca Indica edition has been referred to in the thesis.

(8) The *Tārīkh-i-Firishta*, written by Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Astarābādī about 1606, contains a detailed account of the reign

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of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. But the author gives neither accurate dates nor makes always very authentic statements. The Bombay edition (1831) largely used in this thesis has been compared with the Lucknow edition (1864).

(9) *Hājji-ud-Dabīr*, the famous author of the *Arabic History of Gujārāt*, was a contemporary of Firishṭa. He borrows his information not only from Baranī, but also from Ḥusām Khān's *Tārīkh-i-Bahādur Shāhī*. The latter appears to have used sources of which we possess no knowledge.

The manuscript of this history was discovered and edited by Sir E. Denison Ross, C.I.E., who also discovered that Hājji-ud-Dabīr was the first to make use of Ḥusām Khān's *Tārīkh-i-Bahādur Shāhī*.

(10) The *Burhān-i-Ma'aṣir* (B.M., Add. 9996-9998), by 'Alī bin 'Azīz Ullāh Ṭabāṭabāī, is a history of the Nizām Shāhī dynasty of Ahmadnagar. It was finished about 1595. It gives an account of 'Alā-ud-dīn Ḥasan Shāh Bahmanī, the founder of the Bahmanī dynasty, and a servant of and rebel against Muḥammad bin Tughluq. An abridged translation of this work by King, J. S. (B.M., 09057D.9), with the parts published in the Indian Antiquary, has also been consulted.

(11) The *Khulāṣat-ut-Tavārīkh* of Sujān Rāi (B.M., 55, 59), the Hindū historian of Aurangzeb's reign, written in 1695-96, supplies useful information regarding the origin of Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn Tughluq and the Panjāb flood. A manuscript of this work, which lies in the library of the School of Oriental Studies, London, has been used.

(12) The *Maṭlūb-ut-Tālibīn*, written in 1111/1699 by Muḥammad Bulāq, is a biography of Shaiḫ Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya. It supplies useful information regarding the Afghānpur tragedy. The manuscript of this work in the India Office library (No. 653) has been used.

(13) The *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* of Muḥammad Haidar Dughlat, written towards the middle of the sixteenth century and translated into English by Ney Elias and Sir Edward Denison Ross (London, 1895), contains a useful reference to the Qaraunas.

Central Asian Histories.

(1) The *Shajarat-ul-Atrāk* or *Ulūs-i-Arba'ah Chingīzī* was written about the middle of the fifteenth century. It is based on a similarly entitled work of Sulṭān Ulugh Beg Mirza. It contains a detailed account of the successors of Chingīz Khān, and makes a reference to Tarmāshīrīn. Its manuscript (Add. 26,190) in the British Museum together with its abridged translation by Col. Wm. Miles (London, 1838) has been used.

(2) The *Maṭla'-us-Sa'dain* or *Majma'-i-Bahrain*, by 'Abdur Razzāq of Samarqand, is a history of trans-Indus countries from 1335 to

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1468. It throws light on the story of Tarmāshirīn. Manuscripts of this (Add. 17,928 and 192) lie in the British Museum and the India Office.

(3) The *Rauzat-uṣ-Ṣafa*, by Muḥammad ibn Khāvand Shāh, called Mīr Khvānd, is a general history of the world from the earliest times down to 1497, in seven volumes or books. The fifth book contains useful information about the Chaghataīs. It also throws light upon the history of the Qaraunas.

The printed edition of this work (Bombay, 1854) has been used.

(4) The *Habīb-us-Siyar*, a general history of the world, was written by Ghiyāṣ-ud-dīn bin Humām-ud-dīn, otherwise known as Mīr Khvānd, in 1523. It is extremely useful for the history of the Mongols, and contains important references to Tarmāshirīn. The printed edition (Teheran, 1855) has been used in this thesis. There is also a manuscript of it, Add. 23,508, in the British Museum.

III. PROVINCIAL HISTORIES

Sind.

(1) The *Tārīkh-i-Ma'ṣūmī* or *Tārīkh-i-Sind* makes references to the Sumeras, and to the history of the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq. The British Museum manuscript (Add. 24,091) has been used.

(2) The *Tuḥfat-ul-Kirām*, written by Mīr 'Alī Shir Qānī of Tattah about 1766, has been drawn upon in connection with the Sumeras. The British Museum manuscript (Add. 21,589) has been used.

Bengal.

The *Riyāz-us-Salāṭīn*, written in 1788 by Ghulām Husain, is not accurate enough. It has been supplemented by a study of the numismatic records, the *Rihla*, and the *Tārīkh-i-Firishṭa*. Charles Stewart's *History of Bengal* (London, 1813) has also been used.

Gujarāt.

The *Mirāt-i-Aḥmadī*, written about 1762, by 'Alī Muḥammad Khān, supplies useful information about the history of Gujarāt from the beginning of Muslim rule. The Gaekwad's Oriental series edition (Baroda, 1927-8), together with its supplement, translated by Syed Nawāb 'Alī and Mr. C. N. Seddon (Baroda, 1924), has been used. There is also a manuscript (Add. 6580) in the British Museum, which has been consulted.

IV. MODERN WORKS

(1) *Histoire des Mongols* par D'ohsson, C., in four volumes (Amsterdam, 1835), helps us to study the history of the Mongols, particularly of the 12 Khāns of Persia.

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(2) The *History of the Mongols*, by Howarth, H. H., in four parts (London, 1876), is equally useful.

(3) The *History of Rājputāna*, in two volumes, and the *History of Udaipur*, written in Hindī, by R. B. Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha (Ajmer), are extremely valuable. The author has made use of the Rājput traditions and stories, and has particularly used Muhnot Nainsi's *Khyata*, completed in the middle of the seventeenth century. The references made by Nainsi, as well as by R. B. Mr. Gaurī Shankar Ojha, to the history of Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign have been carefully studied.

(4) *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, by Barthold, W. (London, 1928), is an important work, and has been used as far as it was necessary.

Many other works in Arabic as well as in English like the *Tārīkh-i-Abu al-Fidā—Al-Mukhtaṣar fī Akhbār il-Bashar*—(Constantinople, 1297), the *Tārīkh-ul-Khulafā* of Jalāl-ud-dīn As-Suyūṭī (Egypt, 1887); Yule's *Marco Polo* (London, 1926) and *Tod's Rajasthan* (edited by Crooke, W., London, 1920) have been used, and referred to in footnotes in the course of this thesis. The *Epigraphia Indica*, *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, *Archæological Survey Reports*, *Imperial and District Gazetteers*, *numismatic and epigraphic records*, *census reports*, and various historical journals, for instance, the *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, the *Indian Antiquary* and *Islamic Culture* have also been consulted.

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11. 'Ain-ul-Mulk. *Munshāt-i-Māhrū*. MS., A.S.B., A.U.

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جوت مردم بالطبع در صرع الیائی داخل اند البتة قوازه صادره
مضرت در کار بود بصورت طبع بر جلب منتعت که از خاصه ایسان اما
می نمود اندیشید تا سر انجام بند و امتثال بند که خود را در بار میانی می برد
خواهد بود و مال کاره خواهد شد تا نگاه در غم این چنین اند مشا جان کوی
نمایان سبب الطاف ربانی نیم بعبادت نور و اسرار اعطای بر زبان
غایتی بر سید جبر فی از مطالع کت سعادت نور روان مطالع اعطای و ربانی
اصول دین دست دادن گرفت و پیران عقلی و شواهد الهی و خود معانی و
ذات و تمام صفات باری جل ذکوه روشن کت و جوت دل بر وحدت
الوجود قرار کت و تصدیق نبوت که واسطه وصول بند کان است الی الله تعالی
مقرر شد و از اینجا اشاع امام بحق که تخلیق نبی و قیام
شرطی کنی و لازم است واجب دید و باشد مجامع طلبت کعبه
سرایانی می شناسند و اصحاب علم و عقل و در جبهه نبوت چه هر دو
که مقتضی بحق نبوده کفایت
یا وجود نبی می یافت اگر چه از شرق تا غرب باشد چنانکه بر ایند کان که در آخر صف
پیمانی افتاده ایم می شناسند و انیت جنت بند از جنت و عدین لم یعرف امام زمانه
فقد مات منه جاهلیه در الحی محرجت و عمرات عرفان صخرت و بنداه ضلالت
و دهنه مهام جمالت و ظلمات عمارت و غوایت و شغبات عبا و و موالات کانه
علی ما شفا حرف هار من النار اضطراری و اضطراری می نمود خود مشاهده شد
میدید که ادب در کات هایل بر هایت و نه دلیل و قیام که ارفه مدقق و اصل

که بایند و خسرو خان خطاب کرد آن هند و بجهه چیرا عذر و توبه بفرمود
و بهیچ الواف و عادی معروف شده بود سبب ترقی و درجه سلطنت گمان بود
ثمت خورشید عذر اندیشید و قرضی طلبید و سلطان قطب الدین درون خانه ایست
و از دیگران آسلاطین مستولی همگی را زنده نگذاشت و کشت از سلطان و قطب الدین
بغلب بدین شجاعت فرو گذشت و این منت جماعت و قیام ماند و بند از طاعت آرند
بجهه خواستار استنکاف نمود و تجارب و تحاشی واجب دید و درین حال بدر بیدار
از امر اعدا الدین متغلب مذکور بود بر سر قضا و بیک بند از دهلی نفرت گرفته
بشدت پیوسته را محاربت و مخالفت این هند و بجهه مدد سبب کرد دل افتاد یکی از
جست استقام طبیعت انسانی که برودش ولی نعمت اگر چه حقیقی نبود الفت یافت
بود دوم سبب خوف جان چه عادت هر متغلبی بختان تمر شد بود که از امر استغفار
گذاشته و مکران او کپی باقی نگذاشت بدین دو سبب عزیمت قلع آن گاه که نعمت مضم
گشت و با اتفاق جمعی که ترتیب ایشان دست داد از سر جان خاسته روی بدی
آورده شد و آن هند و بجهه چون بر تمام امر آ و لشکرها و دهلی استیلا یافت بود
لشکرها و استعلاجات سلطنت تحریر پیش آمد باری تعالی بدر بیدار و دران مقام
قدم انداخت و ظفر بخشید آن هند و بجهه خیر خانی و هر که بال و در قتل
سلطان قطب الدین و برادران او متفق بودند غلامت بیغ گشتند و خلع از تنیکه
دهی و کامرانی متعابان او خلاص یافتند و بعد ازین قصه اهلی این دیار مردم دهلی جمع
شدند و بدر بیدار بر کار فوایدی این دیار اختیار کردند و با اتفاق حکمان مد جماعت
سال و ده ماه برین کامو قیام و چون بعد از تغلب و استیلا سلطان غیاث الدین بلبن

